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Re: [tor-bugs] #4124 [Tor Bridge]: Bridges should use create_fast cells for the first hop of their circuits

#4124: Bridges should use create_fast cells for the first hop of their circuits
---------------------------+------------------------------------------------
    Reporter:  arma        |       Owner:                    
        Type:  defect      |      Status:  reopened          
    Priority:  normal      |   Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
   Component:  Tor Bridge  |     Version:                    
  Resolution:              |    Keywords:                    
      Parent:              |      Points:                    
Actualpoints:              |  
---------------------------+------------------------------------------------

Comment(by arma):

 Replying to [comment:13 nickm]:
 > Good point.  Can we make it so that we use CREATE_FAST cells only for
 the begindir stuff?

 Here's the patch for that. Note that in writing it I became convinced it's
 a poor idea.

 {{{
    if (!options->FastFirstHopPK)
      return 0; /* we prefer to avoid create_fast */
 +  if (options->BridgeRelay) {
 +    /* If we're a bridge, then we want to use create_fast cells like a
 +     * normal user for our one-hop begindir connections, because we
 +     * potentially connect to many different relays so looking different
 +     * from a client is too risky. But for normal circuits to one of our
 +     * guards, choose to stand out as a bridge rather than look like a
 +     * client, so the guard can't tell whether this circuit is from us
 +     * or from one of the users of our bridge, even though none of
 +     * our bridge users would extend a circuit to our guard since he
 +     * has the Guard flag. See bug 4124. */
 +    return circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel;
 +  }
    if (public_server_mode(options)) {
 }}}

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4124#comment:16>
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