#7167: Combine traffic obfuscation with address diversity of flash proxy
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Reporter: karsten | Owner: asn
Type: project | Status: needs_revision
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Pluggable | Version:
transport | Keywords: SponsorF20131101 flashproxy
Resolution: | Parent ID:
Actual Points: |
Points: |
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Comment (by dcf):
Replying to [comment:38 dcf]:
> What I propose to do about this: Let's push conns on a stack, rather
than a queue. When a new external connection comes in, it is put on top of
the stack. When a new internal connection comes in, it is assigned the
most recently seen address, the one at the top of the stack. Zombie
connections that somehow didn't survive the proxy chain to make an
internal connection will remain at the bottom of the stack, and never
assigned to any ExtORPort connection (and we can just prune them if they
get too old).
I implemented the stack idea and am now running it on the relay. See
comment:17 for how to see the code and run a client against it.
I did some review and polishing of the server code and I think it's ready
for beta-level testing now.
I think we should move the bamsoftware.com repository to
git.torproject.org and call it something other than obfs-flash. I created
#9743 for that.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7167#comment:39>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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