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Re: [tor-bugs] #13193 [Tor]: Tag circuits locally by exit vs hidden-service, for stats
#13193: Tag circuits locally by exit vs hidden-service, for stats
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Reporter: arma | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.???
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: SponsorR, tor-relay
Actual Points: | Parent ID: #13192
Points: |
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Comment (by arma):
Replying to [comment:1 cypherpunks]:
> If this and other similar stuff like crawling is indeed going to be done
whether we like it or not, it should not be in release versions of Tor.
Well, the goal here is to get a sense of what Tor is actually used for, to
help us understand how to focus our development energy. Think of it like
profiling. With the additional challenge of course that, like everything
else to do with Tor, there are privacy questions to answer too.
As for whether to put it in release versions of Tor, I think step one is
to get some simple code that measures some stuff, and then see if it
works, and then see if we think getting those numbers from more relays
would be useful and not harmful. A lot of the interesting profiling work
will come from changes in trends over time, not from grabbing one number
on a Sunday in September. For example, it sure would have been useful to
have some hidden-service related broad network statistics when the botnet
showed up in August 2013 -- and we still have no idea whether those bots
are loading down the network right now or not.
I do have hopes of eventually, once we've gotten everything the way we
want it, adding some global statistics to the extra-info descriptor, to go
with all the other statistics we already collect at relays.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/13193#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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