Re: [tor-bugs] #17031 [general]: hardware tor relay

["Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki" <blackhole@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

#17031: hardware tor relay
-------------------------+-----------------
     Reporter:  elypter  |      Owner:
         Type:  task     |     Status:  new
     Priority:  normal   |  Milestone:
    Component:  general  |    Version:
   Resolution:           |   Keywords:
Actual Points:           |  Parent ID:
       Points:           |
-------------------------+-----------------

Comment (by kernelcorn):

 What you are describing is called a Sybil attack and introduces encrypted
 hardware is not a defense for this attack. There's nothing to stop an
 attacker from buying many legitimate copies of your encrypted hardware and
 still taking over the network that way. Also, it's completely impractical
 to distribute encrypted hardware to all relay operators and potential
 operators.

 Even if the hardware prevented an attacker from manipulating Tor traffic
 at an application level, they could still run your encrypted hardware and
 wiretap Tor traffic flowing in and out of the device. If they gained
 enough traffic, they could still carry out many types of passive and
 active attacks upstream of your devices, which would be damaging to the
 Tor network.

 The main defense that Tor uses against Sybil attacks is consensus weight,
 which makes it more difficult and costly for an attacker to actively gain
 access to significant amounts of Tor traffic.

--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17031#comment:1>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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