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Re: [tor-bugs] #27669 [Webpages/Website]: Replace recommendations to use tor-ramdisk with something better
#27669: Replace recommendations to use tor-ramdisk with something better
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Reporter: traumschule | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Webpages/Website | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: #13703 | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by traumschule):
thinking about a new ticket to track security issues, would you be
interested?
Sep 12 2018 [https://lwn.net/SubscriberLink/764325/2edc992c30c21634/
Trying to get STACKLEAK into the kernel]
> STACKLEAK is "an awesome security feature" that was originally developed
by The PaX Team as part of the PaX/grsecurity patches. The last public
version of the patch set was released in April 2017 for the 4.9 kernel.
Popov set himself on the goal of getting STACKLEAK into the kernel shortly
after that; he thanked both his employer (Positive Technologies) and his
family for giving him working and free time to push STACKLEAK.
[https://mobile.twitter.com/grsecurity/status/1039988817745375233
grsecurity's comment] via twitter:
> In fact, the current upstream-proposed STACKLEAK is weaker in a number
of areas where it matters, but LWN will never report that because they
need it on some public mailing list and written by an upstream developer
they can copy+paste their uncritical articles from
> (It's also slower for reasons that serve no security purpose at all, and
their manual VLA removal has resulted in slower/buggier code in general --
what's faster, a simple check inserted by the compiler to make sure a VLA
use is safe, or a whole kmalloc/kfree in a function?)
----
Sep 12 2018 [https://firmwaresecurity.com/2018/09/12/intel-releases-17
-security-advisories/ Intel releases 17 security advisories!]
----
Sep 12 2018 [https://lwn.net/SubscriberLink/764593/267ea415c17c1c79/
Toward better handling of hardware vulnerabilities] on why
> Spectre fixes for 32-bit ARM processors do not go back past 4.18
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27669#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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