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[tor-commits] [tor/release-0.4.0] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.4' into maint-0.3.5
commit 231036a110c1062e39b214b4b88fdc2a1eb46dc8
Merge: 742b5b32d cbce8dedd
Author: teor <teor@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri Apr 19 12:00:41 2019 +1000
Merge branch 'maint-0.3.4' into maint-0.3.5
changes/bug29017 | 4 ++++
changes/bug29665 | 7 +++++++
doc/tor.1.txt | 2 +-
src/core/or/circuituse.c | 4 ++++
src/feature/relay/router.c | 11 +++++------
5 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --cc src/core/or/circuituse.c
index e306307c4,000000000..02bfa15fb
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/core/or/circuituse.c
+++ b/src/core/or/circuituse.c
@@@ -1,3132 -1,0 +1,3136 @@@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file circuituse.c
+ * \brief Launch the right sort of circuits and attach the right streams to
+ * them.
+ *
+ * As distinct from circuitlist.c, which manages lookups to find circuits, and
+ * circuitbuild.c, which handles the logistics of circuit construction, this
+ * module keeps track of which streams can be attached to which circuits (in
+ * circuit_get_best()), and attaches streams to circuits (with
+ * circuit_try_attaching_streams(), connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(),
+ * and connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit() ).
+ *
+ * This module also makes sure that we are building circuits for all of the
+ * predicted ports, using circuit_remove_handled_ports(),
+ * circuit_stream_is_being_handled(), and circuit_build_needed_cirs(). It
+ * handles launching circuits for specific targets using
+ * circuit_launch_by_extend_info().
+ *
+ * This is also where we handle expiring circuits that have been around for
+ * too long without actually completing, along with the circuit_build_timeout
+ * logic in circuitstats.c.
+ **/
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
+#include "core/or/channel.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitstats.h"
+#include "core/or/circuituse.h"
+#include "core/or/connection_edge.h"
+#include "core/or/policies.h"
+#include "feature/client/addressmap.h"
+#include "feature/client/bridges.h"
+#include "feature/client/circpathbias.h"
+#include "feature/client/entrynodes.h"
+#include "feature/control/control.h"
+#include "feature/dircommon/directory.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_circuit.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_client.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_common.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_ident.h"
+#include "feature/hs/hs_stats.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/describe.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
+#include "feature/relay/selftest.h"
+#include "feature/rend/rendclient.h"
+#include "feature/rend/rendcommon.h"
+#include "feature/rend/rendservice.h"
+#include "feature/stats/predict_ports.h"
+#include "lib/math/fp.h"
+#include "lib/time/tvdiff.h"
+
+#include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h"
+#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
+#include "core/or/entry_connection_st.h"
+#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h"
+#include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h"
+#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h"
+#include "core/or/socks_request_st.h"
+
+static void circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void);
+static void circuit_increment_failure_count(void);
+
+/** Check whether the hidden service destination of the stream at
+ * <b>edge_conn</b> is the same as the destination of the circuit at
+ * <b>origin_circ</b>. */
+static int
+circuit_matches_with_rend_stream(const edge_connection_t *edge_conn,
+ const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ)
+{
+ /* Check if this is a v2 rendezvous circ/stream */
+ if ((edge_conn->rend_data && !origin_circ->rend_data) ||
+ (!edge_conn->rend_data && origin_circ->rend_data) ||
+ (edge_conn->rend_data && origin_circ->rend_data &&
+ rend_cmp_service_ids(rend_data_get_address(edge_conn->rend_data),
+ rend_data_get_address(origin_circ->rend_data)))) {
+ /* this circ is not for this conn */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if this is a v3 rendezvous circ/stream */
+ if ((edge_conn->hs_ident && !origin_circ->hs_ident) ||
+ (!edge_conn->hs_ident && origin_circ->hs_ident) ||
+ (edge_conn->hs_ident && origin_circ->hs_ident &&
+ !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk,
+ &origin_circ->hs_ident->identity_pk))) {
+ /* this circ is not for this conn */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if <b>circ</b> could be returned by circuit_get_best().
+ * Else return 0.
+ */
+static int
+circuit_is_acceptable(const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ,
+ const entry_connection_t *conn,
+ int must_be_open, uint8_t purpose,
+ int need_uptime, int need_internal,
+ time_t now)
+{
+ const circuit_t *circ = TO_CIRCUIT(origin_circ);
+ const node_t *exitnode;
+ cpath_build_state_t *build_state;
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(conn);
+ tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
+
+ if (must_be_open && (circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN || !circ->n_chan))
+ return 0; /* ignore non-open circs */
+ if (circ->marked_for_close)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* if this circ isn't our purpose, skip. */
+ if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED && !must_be_open) {
+ if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND &&
+ circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY &&
+ circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED &&
+ circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED)
+ return 0;
+ } else if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT &&
+ !must_be_open) {
+ if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
+ circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ if (purpose != circ->purpose)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If this is a timed-out hidden service circuit, skip it. */
+ if (origin_circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
+ purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET ||
+ purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST ||
+ purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS ||
+ purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) {
+ if (circ->timestamp_dirty &&
+ circ->timestamp_dirty+get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness <= now)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (origin_circ->unusable_for_new_conns)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* decide if this circ is suitable for this conn */
+
+ /* for rend circs, circ->cpath->prev is not the last router in the
+ * circuit, it's the magical extra service hop. so just check the nickname
+ * of the one we meant to finish at.
+ */
+ build_state = origin_circ->build_state;
+ exitnode = build_state_get_exit_node(build_state);
+
+ if (need_uptime && !build_state->need_uptime)
+ return 0;
+ if (need_internal != build_state->is_internal)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
+ purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST ||
+ purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET) {
+ tor_addr_t addr;
+ const int family = tor_addr_parse(&addr, conn->socks_request->address);
+ if (!exitnode && !build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Not considering circuit with unknown router.");
+ return 0; /* this circuit is screwed and doesn't know it yet,
+ * or is a rendezvous circuit. */
+ }
+ if (build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
+ if (!conn->want_onehop) {
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Skipping one-hop circuit.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ tor_assert(conn->chosen_exit_name);
+ if (build_state->chosen_exit) {
+ char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ if (hexdigest_to_digest(conn->chosen_exit_name, digest) < 0)
+ return 0; /* broken digest, we don't want it */
+ if (tor_memneq(digest, build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN))
+ return 0; /* this is a circuit to somewhere else */
+ if (tor_digest_is_zero(digest)) {
+ /* we don't know the digest; have to compare addr:port */
+ if (family < 0 ||
+ !tor_addr_eq(&build_state->chosen_exit->addr, &addr) ||
+ build_state->chosen_exit->port != conn->socks_request->port)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (conn->want_onehop) {
+ /* don't use three-hop circuits -- that could hurt our anonymity. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (origin_circ->prepend_policy && family != -1) {
+ int r = compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(&addr,
+ conn->socks_request->port,
+ origin_circ->prepend_policy);
+ if (r == ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (exitnode && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitnode)) {
+ /* can't exit from this router */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else { /* not general: this might be a rend circuit */
+ const edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
+ if (!circuit_matches_with_rend_stream(edge_conn, origin_circ)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!connection_edge_compatible_with_circuit(conn, origin_circ)) {
+ /* conn needs to be isolated from other conns that have already used
+ * origin_circ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if circuit <b>a</b> is better than circuit <b>b</b> for
+ * <b>conn</b>, and return 0 otherwise. Used by circuit_get_best.
+ */
+static int
+circuit_is_better(const origin_circuit_t *oa, const origin_circuit_t *ob,
+ const entry_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ const circuit_t *a = TO_CIRCUIT(oa);
+ const circuit_t *b = TO_CIRCUIT(ob);
+ const uint8_t purpose = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->purpose;
+ int a_bits, b_bits;
+
+ /* If one of the circuits was allowed to live due to relaxing its timeout,
+ * it is definitely worse (it's probably a much slower path). */
+ if (oa->relaxed_timeout && !ob->relaxed_timeout)
+ return 0; /* ob is better. It's not relaxed. */
+ if (!oa->relaxed_timeout && ob->relaxed_timeout)
+ return 1; /* oa is better. It's not relaxed. */
+
+ switch (purpose) {
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
+ /* if it's used but less dirty it's best;
+ * else if it's more recently created it's best
+ */
+ if (b->timestamp_dirty) {
+ if (a->timestamp_dirty &&
+ a->timestamp_dirty > b->timestamp_dirty)
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ if (a->timestamp_dirty ||
+ timercmp(&a->timestamp_began, &b->timestamp_began, OP_GT))
+ return 1;
+ if (ob->build_state->is_internal)
+ /* XXXX++ what the heck is this internal thing doing here. I
+ * think we can get rid of it. circuit_is_acceptable() already
+ * makes sure that is_internal is exactly what we need it to
+ * be. -RD */
+ return 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT:
+ /* the closer it is to ack_wait the better it is */
+ if (a->purpose > b->purpose)
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED:
+ /* the closer it is to rend_joined the better it is */
+ if (a->purpose > b->purpose)
+ return 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* XXXX Maybe this check should get a higher priority to avoid
+ * using up circuits too rapidly. */
+
+ a_bits = connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation(conn,
+ (origin_circuit_t*)oa, 1);
+ b_bits = connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation(conn,
+ (origin_circuit_t*)ob, 1);
+ /* if x_bits < 0, then we have not used x for anything; better not to dirty
+ * a connection if we can help it. */
+ if (a_bits < 0) {
+ return 0;
+ } else if (b_bits < 0) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ a_bits &= ~ oa->isolation_flags_mixed;
+ a_bits &= ~ ob->isolation_flags_mixed;
+ if (n_bits_set_u8(a_bits) < n_bits_set_u8(b_bits)) {
+ /* The fewer new restrictions we need to make on a circuit for stream
+ * isolation, the better. */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Find the best circ that conn can use, preferably one which is
+ * dirty. Circ must not be too old.
+ *
+ * Conn must be defined.
+ *
+ * If must_be_open, ignore circs not in CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN.
+ *
+ * circ_purpose specifies what sort of circuit we must have.
+ * It can be C_GENERAL, C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT, or C_REND_JOINED.
+ *
+ * If it's REND_JOINED and must_be_open==0, then return the closest
+ * rendezvous-purposed circuit that you can find.
+ *
+ * If it's INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT and must_be_open==0, then return the
+ * closest introduce-purposed circuit that you can find.
+ */
+static origin_circuit_t *
+circuit_get_best(const entry_connection_t *conn,
+ int must_be_open, uint8_t purpose,
+ int need_uptime, int need_internal)
+{
+ origin_circuit_t *best=NULL;
+ struct timeval now;
+ int intro_going_on_but_too_old = 0;
+
+ tor_assert(conn);
+
+ tor_assert(purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
+ purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS ||
+ purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET ||
+ purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST ||
+ purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT ||
+ purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED);
+
+ tor_gettimeofday(&now);
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
+ origin_circuit_t *origin_circ;
+ if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
+ continue;
+ origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
+
+ /* Log an info message if we're going to launch a new intro circ in
+ * parallel */
+ if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT &&
+ !must_be_open && origin_circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out &&
+ !circ->marked_for_close) {
+ intro_going_on_but_too_old = 1;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!circuit_is_acceptable(origin_circ,conn,must_be_open,purpose,
+ need_uptime,need_internal, (time_t)now.tv_sec))
+ continue;
+
+ /* now this is an acceptable circ to hand back. but that doesn't
+ * mean it's the *best* circ to hand back. try to decide.
+ */
+ if (!best || circuit_is_better(origin_circ,best,conn))
+ best = origin_circ;
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
+
+ if (!best && intro_going_on_but_too_old)
+ log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "There is an intro circuit being created "
+ "right now, but it has already taken quite a while. Starting "
+ "one in parallel.");
+
+ return best;
+}
+
+/** Return the number of not-yet-open general-purpose origin circuits. */
+static int
+count_pending_general_client_circuits(void)
+{
+ int count = 0;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
+ if (circ->marked_for_close ||
+ circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ||
+ !CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_COUNTS_TOWARDS_MAXPENDING(circ->purpose) ||
+ !CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
+ continue;
+
+ ++count;
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+#if 0
+/** Check whether, according to the policies in <b>options</b>, the
+ * circuit <b>circ</b> makes sense. */
+/* XXXX currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes; it should check more.
+ * Also, it doesn't have the right definition of an exit circuit. Also,
+ * it's never called. */
+int
+circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ const crypt_path_t *cpath, *cpath_next = NULL;
+
+ /* first check if it includes any excluded nodes */
+ for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath_next != circ->cpath; cpath = cpath_next) {
+ cpath_next = cpath->next;
+ if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes,
+ cpath->extend_info))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* then consider the final hop */
+ if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeExitNodes,
+ circ->cpath->prev->extend_info))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+/**
+ * Close all circuits that start at us, aren't open, and were born
+ * at least CircuitBuildTimeout seconds ago.
+ *
+ * TODO: This function is now partially redundant to
+ * circuit_build_times_handle_completed_hop(), but that function only
+ * covers circuits up to and including 3 hops that are still actually
+ * completing hops. However, circuit_expire_building() also handles longer
+ * circuits, as well as circuits that are completely stalled.
+ * In the future (after prop247/other path selection revamping), we probably
+ * want to eliminate this rats nest in favor of a simpler approach.
+ */
+void
+circuit_expire_building(void)
+{
+ /* circ_times.timeout_ms and circ_times.close_ms are from
+ * circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout() if we haven't computed
+ * custom timeouts yet */
+ struct timeval general_cutoff, begindir_cutoff, fourhop_cutoff,
+ close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff, hs_extremely_old_cutoff,
+ cannibalized_cutoff, c_intro_cutoff, s_intro_cutoff, stream_cutoff;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ struct timeval now;
+ cpath_build_state_t *build_state;
+ int any_opened_circs = 0;
+
+ tor_gettimeofday(&now);
+
+ /* Check to see if we have any opened circuits. If we don't,
+ * we want to be more lenient with timeouts, in case the
+ * user has relocated and/or changed network connections.
+ * See bug #3443. */
+ any_opened_circs = circuit_any_opened_circuits();
+
+#define SET_CUTOFF(target, msec) do { \
+ long ms = tor_lround(msec); \
+ struct timeval diff; \
+ diff.tv_sec = ms / 1000; \
+ diff.tv_usec = (int)((ms % 1000) * 1000); \
+ timersub(&now, &diff, &target); \
+ } while (0)
+
+ /**
+ * Because circuit build timeout is calculated only based on 3 hop
+ * general purpose circuit construction, we need to scale the timeout
+ * to make it properly apply to longer circuits, and circuits of
+ * certain usage types. The following diagram illustrates how we
+ * derive the scaling below. In short, we calculate the number
+ * of times our telescoping-based circuit construction causes cells
+ * to traverse each link for the circuit purpose types in question,
+ * and then assume each link is equivalent.
+ *
+ * OP --a--> A --b--> B --c--> C
+ * OP --a--> A --b--> B --c--> C --d--> D
+ *
+ * Let h = a = b = c = d
+ *
+ * Three hops (general_cutoff)
+ * RTTs = 3a + 2b + c
+ * RTTs = 6h
+ * Cannibalized:
+ * RTTs = a+b+c+d
+ * RTTs = 4h
+ * Four hops:
+ * RTTs = 4a + 3b + 2c + d
+ * RTTs = 10h
+ * Client INTRODUCE1+ACK: // XXX: correct?
+ * RTTs = 5a + 4b + 3c + 2d
+ * RTTs = 14h
+ * Server intro:
+ * RTTs = 4a + 3b + 2c
+ * RTTs = 9h
+ */
+ SET_CUTOFF(general_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms());
+ SET_CUTOFF(begindir_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms());
+
+ // TODO: We should probably use route_len_for_purpose() here instead,
+ // except that does not count the extra round trip for things like server
+ // intros and rends.
+
+ /* > 3hop circs seem to have a 1.0 second delay on their cannibalized
+ * 4th hop. */
+ SET_CUTOFF(fourhop_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms() * (10/6.0) + 1000);
+
+ /* CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND behaves more like a RELAY cell.
+ * Use the stream cutoff (more or less). */
+ SET_CUTOFF(stream_cutoff, MAX(options->CircuitStreamTimeout,15)*1000 + 1000);
+
+ /* Be lenient with cannibalized circs. They already survived the official
+ * CBT, and they're usually not performance-critical. */
+ SET_CUTOFF(cannibalized_cutoff,
+ MAX(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()*(4/6.0),
+ options->CircuitStreamTimeout * 1000) + 1000);
+
+ /* Intro circs have an extra round trip (and are also 4 hops long) */
+ SET_CUTOFF(c_intro_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms() * (14/6.0) + 1000);
+
+ /* Server intro circs have an extra round trip */
+ SET_CUTOFF(s_intro_cutoff, get_circuit_build_timeout_ms() * (9/6.0) + 1000);
+
+ SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, get_circuit_build_close_time_ms());
+ SET_CUTOFF(extremely_old_cutoff, get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()*2 + 1000);
+
+ SET_CUTOFF(hs_extremely_old_cutoff,
+ MAX(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()*2 + 1000,
+ options->SocksTimeout * 1000));
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *,victim) {
+ struct timeval cutoff;
+ bool fixed_time = circuit_build_times_disabled(get_options());
+
+ if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(victim) || /* didn't originate here */
+ victim->marked_for_close) /* don't mess with marked circs */
+ continue;
+
+ /* If we haven't yet started the first hop, it means we don't have
+ * any orconns available, and thus have not started counting time yet
+ * for this circuit. See circuit_deliver_create_cell() and uses of
+ * timestamp_began.
+ *
+ * Continue to wait in this case. The ORConn should timeout
+ * independently and kill us then.
+ */
+ if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_CLOSED) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ build_state = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state;
+ if (build_state && build_state->onehop_tunnel)
+ cutoff = begindir_cutoff;
+ else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT)
+ cutoff = close_cutoff;
+ else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT)
+ cutoff = c_intro_cutoff;
+ else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO)
+ cutoff = s_intro_cutoff;
+ else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND)
+ cutoff = stream_cutoff;
+ else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING)
+ cutoff = close_cutoff;
+ else if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened &&
+ victim->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
+ cutoff = cannibalized_cutoff;
+ else if (build_state && build_state->desired_path_len >= 4)
+ cutoff = fourhop_cutoff;
+ else
+ cutoff = general_cutoff;
+
+ if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)
+ cutoff = hs_extremely_old_cutoff;
+
+ if (timercmp(&victim->timestamp_began, &cutoff, OP_GT))
+ continue; /* it's still young, leave it alone */
+
+ /* We need to double-check the opened state here because
+ * we don't want to consider opened 1-hop dircon circuits for
+ * deciding when to relax the timeout, but we *do* want to relax
+ * those circuits too if nothing else is opened *and* they still
+ * aren't either. */
+ if (!any_opened_circs && victim->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
+ /* It's still young enough that we wouldn't close it, right? */
+ if (timercmp(&victim->timestamp_began, &close_cutoff, OP_GT)) {
+ if (!TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->relaxed_timeout) {
+ int first_hop_succeeded = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->cpath->state
+ == CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
+ if (!fixed_time) {
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "No circuits are opened. Relaxing timeout for circuit %d "
+ "(a %s %d-hop circuit in state %s with channel state %s).",
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose),
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state ?
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->desired_path_len :
+ -1,
+ circuit_state_to_string(victim->state),
+ victim->n_chan ?
+ channel_state_to_string(victim->n_chan->state) : "none");
+ }
+
+ /* We count the timeout here for CBT, because technically this
+ * was a timeout, and the timeout value needs to reset if we
+ * see enough of them. Note this means we also need to avoid
+ * double-counting below, too. */
+ circuit_build_times_count_timeout(get_circuit_build_times_mutable(),
+ first_hop_succeeded);
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->relaxed_timeout = 1;
+ }
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ static ratelim_t relax_timeout_limit = RATELIM_INIT(3600);
+ const double build_close_ms = get_circuit_build_close_time_ms();
+ if (!fixed_time) {
+ log_fn_ratelim(&relax_timeout_limit, LOG_NOTICE, LD_CIRC,
+ "No circuits are opened. Relaxed timeout for circuit %d "
+ "(a %s %d-hop circuit in state %s with channel state %s) to "
+ "%ldms. However, it appears the circuit has timed out "
+ "anyway.",
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose),
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state ?
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->desired_path_len :
+ -1,
+ circuit_state_to_string(victim->state),
+ victim->n_chan ?
+ channel_state_to_string(victim->n_chan->state) : "none",
+ (long)build_close_ms);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ /* some debug logs, to help track bugs */
+ if (victim->purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
+ victim->purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) {
+ if (!victim->timestamp_dirty)
+ log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Considering %sopen purpose %d to %s (circid %d)."
+ "(clean).",
+ victim->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" : "non",
+ victim->purpose, victim->build_state->chosen_exit_name,
+ victim->n_circ_id);
+ else
+ log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Considering %sopen purpose %d to %s (circid %d). "
+ "%d secs since dirty.",
+ victim->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" : "non",
+ victim->purpose, victim->build_state->chosen_exit_name,
+ victim->n_circ_id,
+ (int)(now - victim->timestamp_dirty));
+ }
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+ /* if circ is !open, or if it's open but purpose is a non-finished
+ * intro or rend, then mark it for close */
+ if (victim->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
+ switch (victim->purpose) {
+ default: /* most open circuits can be left alone. */
+ continue; /* yes, continue inside a switch refers to the nearest
+ * enclosing loop. C is smart. */
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
+ break; /* too old, need to die */
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY:
+ /* it's a rend_ready circ -- has it already picked a query? */
+ /* c_rend_ready circs measure age since timestamp_dirty,
+ * because that's set when they switch purposes
+ */
+ if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->rend_data ||
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_ident ||
+ victim->timestamp_dirty > cutoff.tv_sec)
+ continue;
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING:
+ /* Open path bias testing circuits are given a long
+ * time to complete the test, but not forever */
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED;
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
+ /* That purpose means that the intro point circuit has been opened
+ * successfully but the INTRODUCE1 cell hasn't been sent yet because
+ * the client is waiting for the rendezvous point circuit to open.
+ * Keep this circuit open while waiting for the rendezvous circuit.
+ * We let the circuit idle timeout take care of cleaning this
+ * circuit if it never used. */
+ continue;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT:
+ /* rend and intro circs become dirty each time they
+ * make an introduction attempt. so timestamp_dirty
+ * will reflect the time since the last attempt.
+ */
+ if (victim->timestamp_dirty > cutoff.tv_sec)
+ continue;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else { /* circuit not open, consider recording failure as timeout */
+ int first_hop_succeeded = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->cpath &&
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
+
+ if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->p_streams != NULL) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circuit %d (purpose %d, %s) has timed out, "
+ "yet has attached streams!",
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier,
+ victim->purpose,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose));
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)) &&
+ circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(get_circuit_build_times())) {
+
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Deciding to count the timeout for circuit %"PRIu32"\n",
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier);
+
+ /* Circuits are allowed to last longer for measurement.
+ * Switch their purpose and wait. */
+ if (victim->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) {
+ circuit_build_times_mark_circ_as_measurement_only(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(
+ victim));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the circuit build time is much greater than we would have cut
+ * it off at, we probably had a suspend event along this codepath,
+ * and we should discard the value.
+ */
+ if (timercmp(&victim->timestamp_began, &extremely_old_cutoff, OP_LT)) {
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC,
+ "Extremely large value for circuit build timeout: %lds. "
+ "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)",
+ (long)(now.tv_sec - victim->timestamp_began.tv_sec),
+ victim->purpose,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(victim->purpose));
+ } else if (circuit_build_times_count_close(
+ get_circuit_build_times_mutable(),
+ first_hop_succeeded,
+ (time_t)victim->timestamp_created.tv_sec)) {
+ circuit_build_times_set_timeout(get_circuit_build_times_mutable());
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If this is a hidden service client circuit which is far enough along in
+ * connecting to its destination, and we haven't already flagged it as
+ * 'timed out', flag it so we'll launch another intro or rend circ, but
+ * don't mark it for close yet.
+ *
+ * (Circs flagged as 'timed out' are given a much longer timeout
+ * period above, so we won't close them in the next call to
+ * circuit_expire_building.) */
+ if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out)) {
+ switch (victim->purpose) {
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY:
+ /* We only want to spare a rend circ if it has been specified in
+ * an INTRODUCE1 cell sent to a hidden service. A circ's
+ * pending_final_cpath field is non-NULL iff it is a rend circ
+ * and we have tried to send an INTRODUCE1 cell specifying it.
+ * Thus, if the pending_final_cpath field *is* NULL, then we
+ * want to not spare it. */
+ if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state &&
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->pending_final_cpath ==
+ NULL)
+ break;
+ /* fallthrough! */
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED:
+ /* If we have reached this line, we want to spare the circ for now. */
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"Marking circ %u (state %d:%s, purpose %d) "
+ "as timed-out HS circ",
+ (unsigned)victim->n_circ_id,
+ victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state),
+ victim->purpose);
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 1;
+ continue;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If this is a service-side rendezvous circuit which is far
+ * enough along in connecting to its destination, consider sparing
+ * it. */
+ if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out) &&
+ victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) {
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"Marking circ %u (state %d:%s, purpose %d) "
+ "as timed-out HS circ; relaunching rendezvous attempt.",
+ (unsigned)victim->n_circ_id,
+ victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state),
+ victim->purpose);
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 1;
+ hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (victim->n_chan)
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Abandoning circ %u %s:%u (state %d,%d:%s, purpose %d, "
+ "len %d)", TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier,
+ channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(victim->n_chan),
+ (unsigned)victim->n_circ_id,
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened,
+ victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state),
+ victim->purpose,
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state ?
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->desired_path_len :
+ -1);
+ else
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Abandoning circ %u %u (state %d,%d:%s, purpose %d, len %d)",
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->global_identifier,
+ (unsigned)victim->n_circ_id,
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened,
+ victim->state,
+ circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), victim->purpose,
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state ?
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state->desired_path_len :
+ -1);
+
+ circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC,TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim));
+ if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT)
+ circuit_mark_for_close(victim, END_CIRC_REASON_MEASUREMENT_EXPIRED);
+ else
+ circuit_mark_for_close(victim, END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT);
+
+ pathbias_count_timeout(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim));
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(victim);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Mark for close all circuits that start here, that were built through a
+ * guard we weren't sure if we wanted to use, and that have been waiting
+ * around for way too long.
+ */
+void
+circuit_expire_waiting_for_better_guard(void)
+{
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_origin_circuit_list(),
+ origin_circuit_t *, circ) {
+ if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->marked_for_close)
+ continue;
+ if (circ->guard_state == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if (entry_guard_state_should_expire(circ->guard_state))
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_NONE);
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
+}
+
+/** For debugging #8387: track when we last called
+ * circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside. */
+static time_t last_expired_clientside_circuits = 0;
+
+/**
+ * As a diagnostic for bug 8387, log information about how many one-hop
+ * circuits we have around that have been there for at least <b>age</b>
+ * seconds. Log a few of them. Ignores Single Onion Service intro, it is
+ * expected to be long-term one-hop circuits.
+ */
+void
+circuit_log_ancient_one_hop_circuits(int age)
+{
+#define MAX_ANCIENT_ONEHOP_CIRCUITS_TO_LOG 10
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ time_t cutoff = now - age;
+ int n_found = 0;
+ smartlist_t *log_these = smartlist_new();
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
+ const origin_circuit_t *ocirc;
+ if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
+ continue;
+ if (circ->timestamp_created.tv_sec >= cutoff)
+ continue;
+ /* Single Onion Services deliberately make long term one-hop intro
+ * and rendezvous connections. Don't log the established ones. */
+ if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) &&
+ (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO ||
+ circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED))
+ continue;
+ ocirc = CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
+
+ if (ocirc->build_state && ocirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
+ ++n_found;
+
+ if (smartlist_len(log_these) < MAX_ANCIENT_ONEHOP_CIRCUITS_TO_LOG)
+ smartlist_add(log_these, (origin_circuit_t*) ocirc);
+ }
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
+
+ if (n_found == 0)
+ goto done;
+
+ log_notice(LD_HEARTBEAT,
+ "Diagnostic for issue 8387: Found %d one-hop circuits more "
+ "than %d seconds old! Logging %d...",
+ n_found, age, smartlist_len(log_these));
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(log_these, const origin_circuit_t *, ocirc) {
+ char created[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ int stream_num;
+ const edge_connection_t *conn;
+ char *dirty = NULL;
+ const circuit_t *circ = TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc);
+
+ format_local_iso_time(created,
+ (time_t)circ->timestamp_created.tv_sec);
+
+ if (circ->timestamp_dirty) {
+ char dirty_since[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ format_local_iso_time(dirty_since, circ->timestamp_dirty);
+
+ tor_asprintf(&dirty, "Dirty since %s (%ld seconds vs %ld-second cutoff)",
+ dirty_since, (long)(now - circ->timestamp_dirty),
+ (long) options->MaxCircuitDirtiness);
+ } else {
+ dirty = tor_strdup("Not marked dirty");
+ }
+
+ log_notice(LD_HEARTBEAT, " #%d created at %s. %s, %s. %s for close. "
+ "Package window: %d. "
+ "%s for new conns. %s.",
+ ocirc_sl_idx,
+ created,
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->state),
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->purpose),
+ circ->marked_for_close ? "Marked" : "Not marked",
+ circ->package_window,
+ ocirc->unusable_for_new_conns ? "Not usable" : "usable",
+ dirty);
+ tor_free(dirty);
+
+ stream_num = 0;
+ for (conn = ocirc->p_streams; conn; conn = conn->next_stream) {
+ const connection_t *c = TO_CONN(conn);
+ char stream_created[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ if (++stream_num >= 5)
+ break;
+
+ format_local_iso_time(stream_created, c->timestamp_created);
+
+ log_notice(LD_HEARTBEAT, " Stream#%d created at %s. "
+ "%s conn in state %s. "
+ "It is %slinked and %sreading from a linked connection %p. "
+ "Package window %d. "
+ "%s for close (%s:%d). Hold-open is %sset. "
+ "Has %ssent RELAY_END. %s on circuit.",
+ stream_num,
+ stream_created,
+ conn_type_to_string(c->type),
+ conn_state_to_string(c->type, c->state),
+ c->linked ? "" : "not ",
+ c->reading_from_linked_conn ? "": "not",
+ c->linked_conn,
+ conn->package_window,
+ c->marked_for_close ? "Marked" : "Not marked",
+ c->marked_for_close_file ? c->marked_for_close_file : "--",
+ c->marked_for_close,
+ c->hold_open_until_flushed ? "" : "not ",
+ conn->edge_has_sent_end ? "" : "not ",
+ conn->edge_blocked_on_circ ? "Blocked" : "Not blocked");
+ if (! c->linked_conn)
+ continue;
+
+ c = c->linked_conn;
+
+ log_notice(LD_HEARTBEAT, " Linked to %s connection in state %s "
+ "(Purpose %d). %s for close (%s:%d). Hold-open is %sset. ",
+ conn_type_to_string(c->type),
+ conn_state_to_string(c->type, c->state),
+ c->purpose,
+ c->marked_for_close ? "Marked" : "Not marked",
+ c->marked_for_close_file ? c->marked_for_close_file : "--",
+ c->marked_for_close,
+ c->hold_open_until_flushed ? "" : "not ");
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ocirc);
+
+ log_notice(LD_HEARTBEAT, "It has been %ld seconds since I last called "
+ "circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside().",
+ (long)(now - last_expired_clientside_circuits));
+
+ done:
+ smartlist_free(log_these);
+}
+
+/** Remove any elements in <b>needed_ports</b> that are handled by an
+ * open or in-progress circuit.
+ */
+void
+circuit_remove_handled_ports(smartlist_t *needed_ports)
+{
+ int i;
+ uint16_t *port;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(needed_ports); ++i) {
+ port = smartlist_get(needed_ports, i);
+ tor_assert(*port);
+ if (circuit_stream_is_being_handled(NULL, *port,
+ MIN_CIRCUITS_HANDLING_STREAM)) {
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Port %d is already being handled; removing.", *port);
+ smartlist_del(needed_ports, i--);
+ tor_free(port);
+ } else {
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Port %d is not handled.", *port);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if at least <b>min</b> general-purpose non-internal circuits
+ * will have an acceptable exit node for exit stream <b>conn</b> if it
+ * is defined, else for "*:port".
+ * Else return 0.
+ */
+int
+circuit_stream_is_being_handled(entry_connection_t *conn,
+ uint16_t port, int min)
+{
+ const node_t *exitnode;
+ int num=0;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ int need_uptime = smartlist_contains_int_as_string(
+ get_options()->LongLivedPorts,
+ conn ? conn->socks_request->port : port);
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
+ if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
+ !circ->marked_for_close &&
+ circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL &&
+ (!circ->timestamp_dirty ||
+ circ->timestamp_dirty + get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness > now)) {
+ origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
+ cpath_build_state_t *build_state = origin_circ->build_state;
+ if (build_state->is_internal || build_state->onehop_tunnel)
+ continue;
+ if (origin_circ->unusable_for_new_conns)
+ continue;
+ if (origin_circ->isolation_values_set &&
+ (conn == NULL ||
+ !connection_edge_compatible_with_circuit(conn, origin_circ)))
+ continue;
+
+ exitnode = build_state_get_exit_node(build_state);
+ if (exitnode && (!need_uptime || build_state->need_uptime)) {
+ int ok;
+ if (conn) {
+ ok = connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitnode);
+ } else {
+ addr_policy_result_t r;
+ r = compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(NULL, port, exitnode);
+ ok = r != ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED && r != ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED;
+ }
+ if (ok) {
+ if (++num >= min)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Don't keep more than this many unused open circuits around. */
+#define MAX_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCUITS 14
+
+/* Return true if a circuit is available for use, meaning that it is open,
+ * clean, usable for new multi-hop connections, and a general purpose origin
+ * circuit.
+ * Accept any kind of circuit, return false if the above conditions are not
+ * met. */
+STATIC int
+circuit_is_available_for_use(const circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ const origin_circuit_t *origin_circ;
+ cpath_build_state_t *build_state;
+
+ if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
+ return 0; /* We first filter out only origin circuits before doing the
+ following checks. */
+ if (circ->marked_for_close)
+ return 0; /* Don't mess with marked circs */
+ if (circ->timestamp_dirty)
+ return 0; /* Only count clean circs */
+ if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL &&
+ circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS)
+ return 0; /* We only pay attention to general purpose circuits.
+ General purpose circuits are always origin circuits. */
+
+ origin_circ = CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
+ if (origin_circ->unusable_for_new_conns)
+ return 0;
+
+ build_state = origin_circ->build_state;
+ if (build_state->onehop_tunnel)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Return true if we need any more exit circuits.
+ * needs_uptime and needs_capacity are set only if we need more exit circuits.
+ * Check if we know of a port that's been requested recently and no circuit
+ * is currently available that can handle it. */
+STATIC int
+needs_exit_circuits(time_t now, int *needs_uptime, int *needs_capacity)
+{
+ return (!circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled(now, needs_uptime,
+ needs_capacity) &&
+ router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT);
+}
+
+/* Hidden services need at least this many internal circuits */
+#define SUFFICIENT_UPTIME_INTERNAL_HS_SERVERS 3
+
+/* Return true if we need any more hidden service server circuits.
+ * HS servers only need an internal circuit. */
+STATIC int
+needs_hs_server_circuits(time_t now, int num_uptime_internal)
+{
+ if (!rend_num_services() && !hs_service_get_num_services()) {
+ /* No services, we don't need anything. */
+ goto no_need;
+ }
+
+ if (num_uptime_internal >= SUFFICIENT_UPTIME_INTERNAL_HS_SERVERS) {
+ /* We have sufficient amount of internal circuit. */
+ goto no_need;
+ }
+
+ if (router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN) {
+ /* Consensus hasn't been checked or might be invalid so requesting
+ * internal circuits is not wise. */
+ goto no_need;
+ }
+
+ /* At this point, we need a certain amount of circuits and we will most
+ * likely use them for rendezvous so we note down the use of internal
+ * circuit for our prediction for circuit needing uptime and capacity. */
+ rep_hist_note_used_internal(now, 1, 1);
+
+ return 1;
+ no_need:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* We need at least this many internal circuits for hidden service clients */
+#define SUFFICIENT_INTERNAL_HS_CLIENTS 3
+
+/* We need at least this much uptime for internal circuits for hidden service
+ * clients */
+#define SUFFICIENT_UPTIME_INTERNAL_HS_CLIENTS 2
+
+/* Return true if we need any more hidden service client circuits.
+ * HS clients only need an internal circuit. */
+STATIC int
+needs_hs_client_circuits(time_t now, int *needs_uptime, int *needs_capacity,
+ int num_internal, int num_uptime_internal)
+{
+ int used_internal_recently = rep_hist_get_predicted_internal(now,
+ needs_uptime,
+ needs_capacity);
+ int requires_uptime = num_uptime_internal <
+ SUFFICIENT_UPTIME_INTERNAL_HS_CLIENTS &&
+ needs_uptime;
+
+ return (used_internal_recently &&
+ (requires_uptime || num_internal < SUFFICIENT_INTERNAL_HS_CLIENTS) &&
+ router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN);
+}
+
+/* This is how many circuits can be opened concurrently during the cbt learning
+ * phase. This number cannot exceed the tor-wide MAX_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCUITS. */
+#define DFLT_CBT_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCS (10)
+#define MIN_CBT_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCS 0
+#define MAX_CBT_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCS MAX_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCUITS
+
+/* Return true if we need more circuits for a good build timeout.
+ * XXXX make the assumption that build timeout streams should be
+ * created whenever we can build internal circuits. */
+STATIC int
+needs_circuits_for_build(int num)
+{
+ if (router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN) {
+ if (num < networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtmaxopencircs",
+ DFLT_CBT_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCS,
+ MIN_CBT_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCS,
+ MAX_CBT_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCS) &&
+ !circuit_build_times_disabled(get_options()) &&
+ circuit_build_times_needs_circuits_now(get_circuit_build_times())) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Launch the appropriate type of predicted circuit for hidden
+ * services, depending on our options.
+ */
+static void
+circuit_launch_predicted_hs_circ(int flags)
+{
+ /* K.I.S.S. implementation of bug #23101: If we are using
+ * vanguards or pinned middles, pre-build a specific purpose
+ * for HS circs. */
+ if (circuit_should_use_vanguards(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS)) {
+ circuit_launch(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS, flags);
+ } else {
+ /* If no vanguards, then no HS-specific prebuilt circuits are needed.
+ * Normal GENERAL circs are fine */
+ circuit_launch(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, flags);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Determine how many circuits we have open that are clean,
+ * Make sure it's enough for all the upcoming behaviors we predict we'll have.
+ * But put an upper bound on the total number of circuits.
+ */
+static void
+circuit_predict_and_launch_new(void)
+{
+ int num=0, num_internal=0, num_uptime_internal=0;
+ int hidserv_needs_uptime=0, hidserv_needs_capacity=1;
+ int port_needs_uptime=0, port_needs_capacity=1;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ int flags = 0;
+
+ /* Count how many of each type of circuit we currently have. */
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
+ if (!circuit_is_available_for_use(circ))
+ continue;
+
+ num++;
+
+ cpath_build_state_t *build_state = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->build_state;
+ if (build_state->is_internal)
+ num_internal++;
+ if (build_state->need_uptime && build_state->is_internal)
+ num_uptime_internal++;
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
+
+ /* If that's enough, then stop now. */
+ if (num >= MAX_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCUITS)
+ return;
+
+ if (needs_exit_circuits(now, &port_needs_uptime, &port_needs_capacity)) {
+ if (port_needs_uptime)
+ flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
+ if (port_needs_capacity)
+ flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
+
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Have %d clean circs (%d internal), need another exit circ.",
+ num, num_internal);
+ circuit_launch(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, flags);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (needs_hs_server_circuits(now, num_uptime_internal)) {
+ flags = (CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY | CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME |
+ CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL);
+
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Have %d clean circs (%d internal), need another internal "
+ "circ for my hidden service.",
+ num, num_internal);
+ circuit_launch_predicted_hs_circ(flags);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (needs_hs_client_circuits(now, &hidserv_needs_uptime,
+ &hidserv_needs_capacity,
+ num_internal, num_uptime_internal))
+ {
+ if (hidserv_needs_uptime)
+ flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
+ if (hidserv_needs_capacity)
+ flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
+ flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
+
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Have %d clean circs (%d uptime-internal, %d internal), need"
+ " another hidden service circ.",
+ num, num_uptime_internal, num_internal);
+
+ circuit_launch_predicted_hs_circ(flags);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (needs_circuits_for_build(num)) {
+ flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
+ /* if there are no exits in the consensus, make timeout
+ * circuits internal */
+ if (router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL)
+ flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
+
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Have %d clean circs need another buildtime test circ.", num);
+ circuit_launch(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, flags);
+ return;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Build a new test circuit every 5 minutes */
+#define TESTING_CIRCUIT_INTERVAL 300
+
+/** This function is called once a second, if router_have_minimum_dir_info()
+ * is true. Its job is to make sure all services we offer have enough circuits
+ * available. Some services just want enough circuits for current tasks,
+ * whereas others want a minimum set of idle circuits hanging around.
+ */
+void
+circuit_build_needed_circs(time_t now)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ /* launch a new circ for any pending streams that need one
+ * XXXX make the assumption that (some) AP streams (i.e. HS clients)
+ * don't require an exit circuit, review in #13814.
+ * This allows HSs to function in a consensus without exits. */
+ if (router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN)
+ connection_ap_rescan_and_attach_pending();
+
+ circuit_expire_old_circs_as_needed(now);
+
+ if (!options->DisablePredictedCircuits)
+ circuit_predict_and_launch_new();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Called once a second either directly or from
+ * circuit_build_needed_circs(). As appropriate (once per NewCircuitPeriod)
+ * resets failure counts and expires old circuits.
+ */
+void
+circuit_expire_old_circs_as_needed(time_t now)
+{
+ static time_t time_to_expire_and_reset = 0;
+
+ if (time_to_expire_and_reset < now) {
+ circuit_reset_failure_count(1);
+ time_to_expire_and_reset = now + get_options()->NewCircuitPeriod;
+ if (proxy_mode(get_options()))
+ addressmap_clean(now);
+ circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside();
+
+#if 0 /* disable for now, until predict-and-launch-new can cull leftovers */
+
+ /* If we ever re-enable, this has to move into
+ * circuit_build_needed_circs */
+
+ circ = circuit_get_youngest_clean_open(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL);
+ if (get_options()->RunTesting &&
+ circ &&
+ circ->timestamp_began.tv_sec + TESTING_CIRCUIT_INTERVAL < now) {
+ log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Creating a new testing circuit.");
+ circuit_launch(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, 0);
+ }
+#endif /* 0 */
+ }
+}
+
+/** If the stream <b>conn</b> is a member of any of the linked
+ * lists of <b>circ</b>, then remove it from the list.
+ */
+void
+circuit_detach_stream(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ edge_connection_t *prevconn;
+
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(conn);
+
+ if (conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_AP) {
+ entry_connection_t *entry_conn = EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
+ entry_conn->may_use_optimistic_data = 0;
+ }
+ conn->cpath_layer = NULL; /* don't keep a stale pointer */
+ conn->on_circuit = NULL;
+
+ if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
+ origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
+ int removed = 0;
+ if (conn == origin_circ->p_streams) {
+ origin_circ->p_streams = conn->next_stream;
+ removed = 1;
+ } else {
+ for (prevconn = origin_circ->p_streams;
+ prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn;
+ prevconn = prevconn->next_stream)
+ ;
+ if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) {
+ prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream;
+ removed = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (removed) {
+ log_debug(LD_APP, "Removing stream %d from circ %u",
+ conn->stream_id, (unsigned)circ->n_circ_id);
+
+ /* If the stream was removed, and it was a rend stream, decrement the
+ * number of streams on the circuit associated with the rend service.
+ */
+ if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED) {
+ hs_dec_rdv_stream_counter(origin_circ);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ } else {
+ or_circuit_t *or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
+ if (conn == or_circ->n_streams) {
+ or_circ->n_streams = conn->next_stream;
+ return;
+ }
+ if (conn == or_circ->resolving_streams) {
+ or_circ->resolving_streams = conn->next_stream;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (prevconn = or_circ->n_streams;
+ prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn;
+ prevconn = prevconn->next_stream)
+ ;
+ if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) {
+ prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (prevconn = or_circ->resolving_streams;
+ prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn;
+ prevconn = prevconn->next_stream)
+ ;
+ if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) {
+ prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Edge connection not in circuit's list.");
+ /* Don't give an error here; it's harmless. */
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+}
+
+/** Find each circuit that has been unused for too long, or dirty
+ * for too long and has no streams on it: mark it for close.
+ */
+static void
+circuit_expire_old_circuits_clientside(void)
+{
+ struct timeval cutoff, now;
+
+ tor_gettimeofday(&now);
+ last_expired_clientside_circuits = now.tv_sec;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
+ if (circ->marked_for_close || !CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
+ continue;
+
+ cutoff = now;
+ cutoff.tv_sec -= TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->circuit_idle_timeout;
+
+ /* If the circuit has been dirty for too long, and there are no streams
+ * on it, mark it for close.
+ */
+ if (circ->timestamp_dirty &&
+ circ->timestamp_dirty + get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness <
+ now.tv_sec &&
+ !TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_streams /* nothing attached */ ) {
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Closing n_circ_id %u (dirty %ld sec ago, "
+ "purpose %d)",
+ (unsigned)circ->n_circ_id,
+ (long)(now.tv_sec - circ->timestamp_dirty),
+ circ->purpose);
+ /* Don't do this magic for testing circuits. Their death is governed
+ * by circuit_expire_building */
+ if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING)
+ circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
+ } else if (!circ->timestamp_dirty && circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
+ if (timercmp(&circ->timestamp_began, &cutoff, OP_LT)) {
+ if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
+ circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET ||
+ circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST ||
+ circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS ||
+ circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT ||
+ circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO ||
+ circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING ||
+ (circ->purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
+ circ->purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) ||
+ circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) {
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Closing circuit %"PRIu32
+ " that has been unused for %ld msec.",
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier,
+ tv_mdiff(&circ->timestamp_began, &now));
+ circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
+ } else if (!TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->is_ancient) {
+ /* Server-side rend joined circuits can end up really old, because
+ * they are reused by clients for longer than normal. The client
+ * controls their lifespan. (They never become dirty, because
+ * connection_exit_begin_conn() never marks anything as dirty.)
+ * Similarly, server-side intro circuits last a long time. */
+ if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED &&
+ circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC,
+ "Ancient non-dirty circuit %d is still around after "
+ "%ld milliseconds. Purpose: %d (%s)",
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier,
+ tv_mdiff(&circ->timestamp_began, &now),
+ circ->purpose,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->purpose));
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->is_ancient = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
+}
+
+/** How long do we wait before killing circuits with the properties
+ * described below?
+ *
+ * Probably we could choose a number here as low as 5 to 10 seconds,
+ * since these circs are used for begindir, and a) generally you either
+ * ask another begindir question right after or you don't for a long time,
+ * b) clients at least through 0.2.1.x choose from the whole set of
+ * directory mirrors at each choice, and c) re-establishing a one-hop
+ * circuit via create-fast is a light operation assuming the TLS conn is
+ * still there.
+ *
+ * I expect "b" to go away one day when we move to using directory
+ * guards, but I think "a" and "c" are good enough reasons that a low
+ * number is safe even then.
+ */
+#define IDLE_ONE_HOP_CIRC_TIMEOUT 60
+
+/** Find each non-origin circuit that has been unused for too long,
+ * has no streams on it, came from a client, and ends here: mark it
+ * for close.
+ */
+void
+circuit_expire_old_circuits_serverside(time_t now)
+{
+ or_circuit_t *or_circ;
+ time_t cutoff = now - IDLE_ONE_HOP_CIRC_TIMEOUT;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
+ if (circ->marked_for_close || CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
+ continue;
+ or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
+ /* If the circuit has been idle for too long, and there are no streams
+ * on it, and it ends here, and it used a create_fast, mark it for close.
++ *
++ * Also if there is a rend_splice on it, it's a single onion service
++ * circuit and we should not close it.
+ */
+ if (or_circ->p_chan && channel_is_client(or_circ->p_chan) &&
+ !circ->n_chan &&
+ !or_circ->n_streams && !or_circ->resolving_streams &&
++ !or_circ->rend_splice &&
+ channel_when_last_xmit(or_circ->p_chan) <= cutoff) {
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Closing circ_id %u (empty %d secs ago)",
+ (unsigned)or_circ->p_circ_id,
+ (int)(now - channel_when_last_xmit(or_circ->p_chan)));
+ circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
+ }
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
+}
+
+/** Number of testing circuits we want open before testing our bandwidth. */
+#define NUM_PARALLEL_TESTING_CIRCS 4
+
+/** True iff we've ever had enough testing circuits open to test our
+ * bandwidth. */
+static int have_performed_bandwidth_test = 0;
+
+/** Reset have_performed_bandwidth_test, so we'll start building
+ * testing circuits again so we can exercise our bandwidth. */
+void
+reset_bandwidth_test(void)
+{
+ have_performed_bandwidth_test = 0;
+}
+
+/** Return 1 if we've already exercised our bandwidth, or if we
+ * have fewer than NUM_PARALLEL_TESTING_CIRCS testing circuits
+ * established or on the way. Else return 0.
+ */
+int
+circuit_enough_testing_circs(void)
+{
+ int num = 0;
+
+ if (have_performed_bandwidth_test)
+ return 1;
+
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) {
+ if (!circ->marked_for_close && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
+ circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING &&
+ circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
+ num++;
+ }
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
+ return num >= NUM_PARALLEL_TESTING_CIRCS;
+}
+
+/** A testing circuit has completed. Take whatever stats we want.
+ * Noticing reachability is taken care of in onionskin_answer(),
+ * so there's no need to record anything here. But if we still want
+ * to do the bandwidth test, and we now have enough testing circuits
+ * open, do it.
+ */
+static void
+circuit_testing_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ if (have_performed_bandwidth_test ||
+ !check_whether_orport_reachable(get_options())) {
+ /* either we've already done everything we want with testing circuits,
+ * or this testing circuit became open due to a fluke, e.g. we picked
+ * a last hop where we already had the connection open due to an
+ * outgoing local circuit. */
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN);
+ } else if (circuit_enough_testing_circs()) {
+ router_perform_bandwidth_test(NUM_PARALLEL_TESTING_CIRCS, time(NULL));
+ have_performed_bandwidth_test = 1;
+ } else
+ router_do_reachability_checks(1, 0);
+}
+
+/** A testing circuit has failed to build. Take whatever stats we want. */
+static void
+circuit_testing_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ, int at_last_hop)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ if (server_mode(options) && check_whether_orport_reachable(options))
+ return;
+
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,
+ "Our testing circuit (to see if your ORPort is reachable) "
+ "has failed. I'll try again later.");
+
+ /* These aren't used yet. */
+ (void)circ;
+ (void)at_last_hop;
+}
+
+/** The circuit <b>circ</b> has just become open. Take the next
+ * step: for rendezvous circuits, we pass circ to the appropriate
+ * function in rendclient or rendservice. For general circuits, we
+ * call connection_ap_attach_pending, which looks for pending streams
+ * that could use circ.
+ */
+void
+circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_BUILT, 0);
+
+ /* Remember that this circuit has finished building. Now if we start
+ * it building again later (e.g. by extending it), we will know not
+ * to consider its build time. */
+ circ->has_opened = 1;
+
+ switch (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose) {
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
+ hs_client_circuit_has_opened(circ);
+ /* Start building an intro circ if we don't have one yet. */
+ connection_ap_attach_pending(1);
+ /* This isn't a call to circuit_try_attaching_streams because a
+ * circuit in _C_ESTABLISH_REND state isn't connected to its
+ * hidden service yet, thus we can't attach streams to it yet,
+ * thus circuit_try_attaching_streams would always clear the
+ * circuit's isolation state. circuit_try_attaching_streams is
+ * called later, when the rend circ enters _C_REND_JOINED
+ * state. */
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
+ hs_client_circuit_has_opened(circ);
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST:
+ /* Tell any AP connections that have been waiting for a new
+ * circuit that one is ready. */
+ circuit_try_attaching_streams(circ);
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
+ /* at the service, waiting for introductions */
+ hs_service_circuit_has_opened(circ);
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
+ /* at the service, connecting to rend point */
+ hs_service_circuit_has_opened(circ);
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
+ circuit_testing_opened(circ);
+ break;
+ /* default:
+ * This won't happen in normal operation, but might happen if the
+ * controller did it. Just let it slide. */
+ }
+}
+
+/** If the stream-isolation state of <b>circ</b> can be cleared, clear
+ * it. Return non-zero iff <b>circ</b>'s isolation state was cleared. */
+static int
+circuit_try_clearing_isolation_state(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ if (/* The circuit may have become non-open if it was cannibalized.*/
+ circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN &&
+ /* If !isolation_values_set, there is nothing to clear. */
+ circ->isolation_values_set &&
+ /* It's not legal to clear a circuit's isolation info if it's ever had
+ * streams attached */
+ !circ->isolation_any_streams_attached) {
+ /* If we have any isolation information set on this circuit, and
+ * we didn't manage to attach any streams to it, then we can
+ * and should clear it and try again. */
+ circuit_clear_isolation(circ);
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Called when a circuit becomes ready for streams to be attached to
+ * it. */
+void
+circuit_try_attaching_streams(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ /* Attach streams to this circuit if we can. */
+ connection_ap_attach_pending(1);
+
+ /* The call to circuit_try_clearing_isolation_state here will do
+ * nothing and return 0 if we didn't attach any streams to circ
+ * above. */
+ if (circuit_try_clearing_isolation_state(circ)) {
+ /* Maybe *now* we can attach some streams to this circuit. */
+ connection_ap_attach_pending(1);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Called whenever a circuit could not be successfully built.
+ */
+void
+circuit_build_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ channel_t *n_chan = NULL;
+ /* we should examine circ and see if it failed because of
+ * the last hop or an earlier hop. then use this info below.
+ */
+ int failed_at_last_hop = 0;
+
+ /* First, check to see if this was a path failure, rather than build
+ * failure.
+ *
+ * Note that we deliberately use circuit_get_cpath_len() (and not
+ * circuit_get_cpath_opened_len()) because we only want to ensure
+ * that a full path is *chosen*. This is different than a full path
+ * being *built*. We only want to count *build* failures below.
+ *
+ * Path selection failures can happen spuriously for a number
+ * of reasons (such as aggressive/invalid user-specified path
+ * restrictions in the torrc, insufficient microdescriptors, and
+ * non-user reasons like exitpolicy issues), and so should not be
+ * counted as failures below.
+ */
+ if (circuit_get_cpath_len(circ) < circ->build_state->desired_path_len) {
+ static ratelim_t pathfail_limit = RATELIM_INIT(3600);
+ log_fn_ratelim(&pathfail_limit, LOG_NOTICE, LD_CIRC,
+ "Our circuit %u (id: %" PRIu32 ") died due to an invalid "
+ "selected path, purpose %s. This may be a torrc "
+ "configuration issue, or a bug.",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id, circ->global_identifier,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose));
+
+ /* If the path failed on an RP, retry it. */
+ if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND)
+ hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(circ);
+
+ /* In all other cases, just bail. The rest is just failure accounting
+ * that we don't want to do */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* If the last hop isn't open, and the second-to-last is, we failed
+ * at the last hop. */
+ if (circ->cpath &&
+ circ->cpath->prev->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN &&
+ circ->cpath->prev->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN) {
+ failed_at_last_hop = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if we failed at first hop */
+ if (circ->cpath &&
+ circ->cpath->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN &&
+ ! circ->base_.received_destroy) {
+ /* We failed at the first hop for some reason other than a DESTROY cell.
+ * If there's an OR connection to blame, blame it. Also, avoid this relay
+ * for a while, and fail any one-hop directory fetches destined for it. */
+ const char *n_chan_ident = circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest;
+ tor_assert(n_chan_ident);
+ int already_marked = 0;
+ if (circ->base_.n_chan) {
+ n_chan = circ->base_.n_chan;
+
+ if (n_chan->is_bad_for_new_circs) {
+ /* We only want to blame this router when a fresh healthy
+ * connection fails. So don't mark this router as newly failed,
+ * since maybe this was just an old circuit attempt that's
+ * finally timing out now. Also, there's no need to blow away
+ * circuits/streams/etc, since the failure of an unhealthy conn
+ * doesn't tell us much about whether a healthy conn would
+ * succeed. */
+ already_marked = 1;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_OR,
+ "Our circuit %u (id: %" PRIu32 ") failed to get a response "
+ "from the first hop (%s). I'm going to try to rotate to a "
+ "better connection.",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id, circ->global_identifier,
+ channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(n_chan));
+ n_chan->is_bad_for_new_circs = 1;
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_OR,
+ "Our circuit %u (id: %" PRIu32 ") died before the first hop "
+ "with no connection",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id, circ->global_identifier);
+ }
+ if (!already_marked) {
+ /*
+ * If we have guard state (new guard API) and our path selection
+ * code actually chose a full path, then blame the failure of this
+ * circuit on the guard.
+ */
+ if (circ->guard_state)
+ entry_guard_failed(&circ->guard_state);
+ /* if there are any one-hop streams waiting on this circuit, fail
+ * them now so they can retry elsewhere. */
+ connection_ap_fail_onehop(n_chan_ident, circ->build_state);
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (circ->base_.purpose) {
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
+ /* If we never built the circuit, note it as a failure. */
+ circuit_increment_failure_count();
+ if (failed_at_last_hop) {
+ /* Make sure any streams that demand our last hop as their exit
+ * know that it's unlikely to happen. */
+ circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves(circ->cpath->prev->extend_info);
+ }
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
+ circuit_testing_failed(circ, failed_at_last_hop);
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
+ /* at the service, waiting for introductions */
+ if (circ->base_.state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
+ circuit_increment_failure_count();
+ }
+ /* no need to care here, because the service will rebuild intro
+ * points periodically. */
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
+ /* at the client, connecting to intro point */
+ /* Don't increment failure count, since the service may have picked
+ * the introduction point maliciously */
+ /* The client will pick a new intro point when this one dies, if
+ * the stream in question still cares. No need to act here. */
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
+ /* at the client, waiting for the service */
+ circuit_increment_failure_count();
+ /* the client will pick a new rend point when this one dies, if
+ * the stream in question still cares. No need to act here. */
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
+ /* at the service, connecting to rend point */
+ /* Don't increment failure count, since the client may have picked
+ * the rendezvous point maliciously */
+ log_info(LD_REND,
+ "Couldn't connect to the client's chosen rend point %s "
+ "(%s hop failed).",
+ escaped(build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state)),
+ failed_at_last_hop?"last":"non-last");
+ hs_circ_retry_service_rendezvous_point(circ);
+ break;
+ /* default:
+ * This won't happen in normal operation, but might happen if the
+ * controller did it. Just let it slide. */
+ }
+}
+
+/** Number of consecutive failures so far; should only be touched by
+ * circuit_launch_new and circuit_*_failure_count.
+ */
+static int n_circuit_failures = 0;
+/** Before the last time we called circuit_reset_failure_count(), were
+ * there a lot of failures? */
+static int did_circs_fail_last_period = 0;
+
+/** Don't retry launching a new circuit if we try this many times with no
+ * success. */
+#define MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES 5
+
+/** Launch a new circuit; see circuit_launch_by_extend_info() for
+ * details on arguments. */
+origin_circuit_t *
+circuit_launch(uint8_t purpose, int flags)
+{
+ return circuit_launch_by_extend_info(purpose, NULL, flags);
+}
+
+/* Do we have enough descriptors to build paths?
+ * If need_exit is true, return 1 if we can build exit paths.
+ * (We need at least one Exit in the consensus to build exit paths.)
+ * If need_exit is false, return 1 if we can build internal paths.
+ */
+static int
+have_enough_path_info(int need_exit)
+{
+ if (need_exit)
+ return router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT;
+ else
+ return router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Tell us if a circuit is a hidden service circuit.
+ */
+int
+circuit_purpose_is_hidden_service(uint8_t purpose)
+{
+ if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Client-side purpose */
+ if (purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HS_MIN_ &&
+ purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HS_MAX_) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Service-side purpose */
+ if (purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MIN_ &&
+ purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HS_MAX_) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return true if this circuit purpose should use vanguards
+ * or pinned Layer2 or Layer3 guards.
+ *
+ * This function takes both the circuit purpose and the
+ * torrc options for pinned middles/vanguards into account
+ * (ie: the circuit must be a hidden service circuit and
+ * vanguards/pinned middles must be enabled for it to return
+ * true).
+ */
+int
+circuit_should_use_vanguards(uint8_t purpose)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ /* Only hidden service circuits use vanguards */
+ if (!circuit_purpose_is_hidden_service(purpose))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Pinned middles are effectively vanguards */
+ if (options->HSLayer2Nodes || options->HSLayer3Nodes)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return true for the set of conditions for which it is OK to use
+ * a cannibalized circuit.
+ *
+ * Don't cannibalize for onehops, or certain purposes.
+ */
+static int
+circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(uint8_t purpose_to_build,
+ int has_extend_info,
+ int onehop_tunnel)
+{
+
+ /* Do not try to cannibalize if this is a one hop circuit. */
+ if (onehop_tunnel) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Don't try to cannibalize for general purpose circuits that do not
+ * specify a custom exit. */
+ if (purpose_to_build == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL && !has_extend_info) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Don't cannibalize for testing circuits. We want to see if they
+ * complete normally. Also don't cannibalize for vanguard-purpose
+ * circuits, since those are specially pre-built for later
+ * cannibalization by the actual specific circuit types that need
+ * vanguards.
+ */
+ if (purpose_to_build == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING ||
+ purpose_to_build == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_HS_VANGUARDS) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* For vanguards, the server-side intro circ is not cannibalized
+ * because we pre-build 4 hop HS circuits, and it only needs a 3 hop
+ * circuit. It is also long-lived, so it is more important that
+ * it have lower latency than get built fast.
+ */
+ if (circuit_should_use_vanguards(purpose_to_build) &&
+ purpose_to_build == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Launch a new circuit with purpose <b>purpose</b> and exit node
+ * <b>extend_info</b> (or NULL to select a random exit node). If flags
+ * contains CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME, choose among routers with high uptime. If
+ * CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY is set, choose among routers with high bandwidth.
+ * If CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL is true, the last hop need not be an exit node.
+ * If CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL is set, the circuit will have only one hop.
+ * Return the newly allocated circuit on success, or NULL on failure. */
+origin_circuit_t *
+circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose,
+ extend_info_t *extend_info,
+ int flags)
+{
+ origin_circuit_t *circ;
+ int onehop_tunnel = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL) != 0;
+ int have_path = have_enough_path_info(! (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL) );
+
+ /* Keep some stats about our attempts to launch HS rendezvous circuits */
+ if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) {
+ hs_stats_note_service_rendezvous_launch();
+ }
+
+ if (!onehop_tunnel && (!router_have_minimum_dir_info() || !have_path)) {
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Haven't %s yet; canceling "
+ "circuit launch.",
+ !router_have_minimum_dir_info() ?
+ "fetched enough directory info" :
+ "received a consensus with exits");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* If we can/should cannibalize another circuit to build this one,
+ * then do so. */
+ if (circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(purpose,
+ extend_info != NULL,
+ onehop_tunnel)) {
+ /* see if there are appropriate circs available to cannibalize. */
+ /* XXX if we're planning to add a hop, perhaps we want to look for
+ * internal circs rather than exit circs? -RD */
+ circ = circuit_find_to_cannibalize(purpose, extend_info, flags);
+ if (circ) {
+ uint8_t old_purpose = circ->base_.purpose;
+ struct timeval old_timestamp_began = circ->base_.timestamp_began;
+
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Cannibalizing circ %u (id: %" PRIu32 ") for "
+ "purpose %d (%s)",
+ TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id, circ->global_identifier, purpose,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose));
+
+ if ((purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND ||
+ purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING) &&
+ circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED) {
+ /* Path bias: Cannibalized rends pre-emptively count as a
+ * successfully built but unused closed circuit. We don't
+ * wait until the extend (or the close) because the rend
+ * point could be malicious.
+ *
+ * Same deal goes for client side introductions. Clients
+ * can be manipulated to connect repeatedly to them
+ * (especially web clients).
+ *
+ * If we decide to probe the initial portion of these circs,
+ * (up to the adversary's final hop), we need to remove this,
+ * or somehow mark the circuit with a special path state.
+ */
+
+ /* This must be called before the purpose change */
+ pathbias_check_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
+ }
+
+ circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), purpose);
+ /* Reset the start date of this circ, else expire_building
+ * will see it and think it's been trying to build since it
+ * began.
+ *
+ * Technically, the code should reset this when the
+ * create cell is finally sent, but we're close enough
+ * here. */
+ tor_gettimeofday(&circ->base_.timestamp_began);
+
+ control_event_circuit_cannibalized(circ, old_purpose,
+ &old_timestamp_began);
+
+ switch (purpose) {
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
+ /* it's ready right now */
+ break;
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET:
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
+ /* need to add a new hop */
+ tor_assert(extend_info);
+ if (circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, extend_info) < 0)
+ return NULL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,
+ "unexpected purpose %d when cannibalizing a circ.",
+ purpose);
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return circ;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (did_circs_fail_last_period &&
+ n_circuit_failures > MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES) {
+ /* too many failed circs in a row. don't try. */
+// log_fn(LOG_INFO,"%d failures so far, not trying.",n_circuit_failures);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* try a circ. if it fails, circuit_mark_for_close will increment
+ * n_circuit_failures */
+ return circuit_establish_circuit(purpose, extend_info, flags);
+}
+
+/** Record another failure at opening a general circuit. When we have
+ * too many, we'll stop trying for the remainder of this minute.
+ */
+static void
+circuit_increment_failure_count(void)
+{
+ ++n_circuit_failures;
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"n_circuit_failures now %d.",n_circuit_failures);
+}
+
+/** Reset the failure count for opening general circuits. This means
+ * we will try MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES times more (if necessary) before
+ * stopping again.
+ */
+void
+circuit_reset_failure_count(int timeout)
+{
+ if (timeout && n_circuit_failures > MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES)
+ did_circs_fail_last_period = 1;
+ else
+ did_circs_fail_last_period = 0;
+ n_circuit_failures = 0;
+}
+
+/** Find an open circ that we're happy to use for <b>conn</b> and return 1. If
+ * there isn't one, and there isn't one on the way, launch one and return
+ * 0. If it will never work, return -1.
+ *
+ * Write the found or in-progress or launched circ into *circp.
+ */
+static int
+circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn,
+ uint8_t desired_circuit_purpose,
+ origin_circuit_t **circp)
+{
+ origin_circuit_t *circ;
+ int check_exit_policy;
+ int need_uptime, need_internal;
+ int want_onehop;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ tor_assert(conn);
+ tor_assert(circp);
+ if (ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT) {
+ connection_t *c = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "Connection state mismatch: wanted "
+ "AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT, but got %d (%s)",
+ c->state, conn_state_to_string(c->type, c->state));
+ }
+ tor_assert(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
+
+ /* Will the exit policy of the exit node apply to this stream? */
+ check_exit_policy =
+ conn->socks_request->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT &&
+ !conn->use_begindir &&
+ !connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn));
+
+ /* Does this connection want a one-hop circuit? */
+ want_onehop = conn->want_onehop;
+
+ /* Do we need a high-uptime circuit? */
+ need_uptime = !conn->want_onehop && !conn->use_begindir &&
+ smartlist_contains_int_as_string(options->LongLivedPorts,
+ conn->socks_request->port);
+
+ /* Do we need an "internal" circuit? */
+ if (desired_circuit_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
+ need_internal = 1;
+ else if (conn->use_begindir || conn->want_onehop)
+ need_internal = 1;
+ else
+ need_internal = 0;
+
+ /* We now know what kind of circuit we need. See if there is an
+ * open circuit that we can use for this stream */
+ circ = circuit_get_best(conn, 1 /* Insist on open circuits */,
+ desired_circuit_purpose,
+ need_uptime, need_internal);
+
+ if (circ) {
+ /* We got a circuit that will work for this stream! We can return it. */
+ *circp = circ;
+ return 1; /* we're happy */
+ }
+
+ /* Okay, there's no circuit open that will work for this stream. Let's
+ * see if there's an in-progress circuit or if we have to launch one */
+
+ /* Do we know enough directory info to build circuits at all? */
+ int have_path = have_enough_path_info(!need_internal);
+
+ if (!want_onehop && (!router_have_minimum_dir_info() || !have_path)) {
+ /* If we don't have enough directory information, we can't build
+ * multihop circuits.
+ */
+ if (!connection_get_by_type(CONN_TYPE_DIR)) {
+ int severity = LOG_NOTICE;
+ /* Retry some stuff that might help the connection work. */
+ /* If we are configured with EntryNodes or UseBridges */
+ if (entry_list_is_constrained(options)) {
+ /* Retry all our guards / bridges.
+ * guards_retry_optimistic() always returns true here. */
+ int rv = guards_retry_optimistic(options);
+ tor_assert_nonfatal_once(rv);
+ log_fn(severity, LD_APP|LD_DIR,
+ "Application request when we haven't %s. "
+ "Optimistically trying known %s again.",
+ !router_have_minimum_dir_info() ?
+ "used client functionality lately" :
+ "received a consensus with exits",
+ options->UseBridges ? "bridges" : "entrynodes");
+ } else {
+ /* Getting directory documents doesn't help much if we have a limited
+ * number of guards */
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(!options->UseBridges);
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(!options->EntryNodes);
+ /* Retry our directory fetches, so we have a fresh set of guard info */
+ log_fn(severity, LD_APP|LD_DIR,
+ "Application request when we haven't %s. "
+ "Optimistically trying directory fetches again.",
+ !router_have_minimum_dir_info() ?
+ "used client functionality lately" :
+ "received a consensus with exits");
+ routerlist_retry_directory_downloads(time(NULL));
+ }
+ }
+ /* Since we didn't have enough directory info, we can't attach now. The
+ * stream will be dealt with when router_have_minimum_dir_info becomes 1,
+ * or when all directory attempts fail and directory_all_unreachable()
+ * kills it.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check whether the exit policy of the chosen exit, or the exit policies
+ * of _all_ nodes, would forbid this node. */
+ if (check_exit_policy) {
+ if (!conn->chosen_exit_name) {
+ struct in_addr in;
+ tor_addr_t addr, *addrp=NULL;
+ if (tor_inet_aton(conn->socks_request->address, &in)) {
+ tor_addr_from_in(&addr, &in);
+ addrp = &addr;
+ }
+ if (router_exit_policy_all_nodes_reject(addrp,
+ conn->socks_request->port,
+ need_uptime)) {
+ log_notice(LD_APP,
+ "No Tor server allows exit to %s:%d. Rejecting.",
+ safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address),
+ conn->socks_request->port);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* XXXX Duplicates checks in connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit:
+ * refactor into a single function. */
+ const node_t *node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 0);
+ int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional;
+ if (node && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, node)) {
+ log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
+ "Requested exit point '%s' is excluded or "
+ "would refuse request. %s.",
+ conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
+ if (opt) {
+ conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
+ tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name);
+ /* Try again. */
+ return circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(conn,
+ desired_circuit_purpose,
+ circp);
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Now, check whether there already a circuit on the way that could handle
+ * this stream. This check matches the one above, but this time we
+ * do not require that the circuit will work. */
+ circ = circuit_get_best(conn, 0 /* don't insist on open circuits */,
+ desired_circuit_purpose,
+ need_uptime, need_internal);
+ if (circ)
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC, "one on the way!");
+
+ if (!circ) {
+ /* No open or in-progress circuit could handle this stream! We
+ * will have to launch one!
+ */
+
+ /* The chosen exit node, if there is one. */
+ extend_info_t *extend_info=NULL;
+ const int n_pending = count_pending_general_client_circuits();
+
+ /* Do we have too many pending circuits? */
+ if (n_pending >= options->MaxClientCircuitsPending) {
+ static ratelim_t delay_limit = RATELIM_INIT(10*60);
+ char *m;
+ if ((m = rate_limit_log(&delay_limit, approx_time()))) {
+ log_notice(LD_APP, "We'd like to launch a circuit to handle a "
+ "connection, but we already have %d general-purpose client "
+ "circuits pending. Waiting until some finish.%s",
+ n_pending, m);
+ tor_free(m);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If this is a hidden service trying to start an introduction point,
+ * handle that case. */
+ if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
+ const edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
+ /* need to pick an intro point */
+ extend_info = hs_client_get_random_intro_from_edge(edge_conn);
+ if (!extend_info) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "No intro points: re-fetching service descriptor.");
+ if (edge_conn->rend_data) {
+ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(edge_conn->rend_data);
+ } else {
+ hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk);
+ }
+ connection_ap_mark_as_waiting_for_renddesc(conn);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_REND,"Chose %s as intro point for '%s'.",
+ extend_info_describe(extend_info),
+ (edge_conn->rend_data) ?
+ safe_str_client(rend_data_get_address(edge_conn->rend_data)) :
+ "service");
+ }
+
+ /* If we have specified a particular exit node for our
+ * connection, then be sure to open a circuit to that exit node.
+ */
+ if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
+ desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST ||
+ desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET) {
+ if (conn->chosen_exit_name) {
+ const node_t *r;
+ int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional;
+ r = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 0);
+ if (r && node_has_preferred_descriptor(r, conn->want_onehop ? 1 : 0)) {
+ /* We might want to connect to an IPv6 bridge for loading
+ descriptors so we use the preferred address rather than
+ the primary. */
+ extend_info = extend_info_from_node(r, conn->want_onehop ? 1 : 0);
+ if (!extend_info) {
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,"Could not make a one-hop connection to %s. "
+ "Discarding this circuit.", conn->chosen_exit_name);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else { /* ! (r && node_has_preferred_descriptor(...)) */
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "considering %d, %s",
+ want_onehop, conn->chosen_exit_name);
+ if (want_onehop && conn->chosen_exit_name[0] == '$') {
+ /* We're asking for a one-hop circuit to a router that
+ * we don't have a routerinfo about. Make up an extend_info. */
+ /* XXX prop220: we need to make chosen_exit_name able to
+ * encode both key formats. This is not absolutely critical
+ * since this is just for one-hop circuits, but we should
+ * still get it done */
+ char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ char *hexdigest = conn->chosen_exit_name+1;
+ tor_addr_t addr;
+ if (strlen(hexdigest) < HEX_DIGEST_LEN ||
+ base16_decode(digest,DIGEST_LEN,
+ hexdigest,HEX_DIGEST_LEN) != DIGEST_LEN) {
+ log_info(LD_DIR, "Broken exit digest on tunnel conn. Closing.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, conn->socks_request->address) < 0) {
+ log_info(LD_DIR, "Broken address %s on tunnel conn. Closing.",
+ escaped_safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* XXXX prop220 add a workaround for ed25519 ID below*/
+ extend_info = extend_info_new(conn->chosen_exit_name+1,
+ digest,
+ NULL, /* Ed25519 ID */
+ NULL, NULL, /* onion keys */
+ &addr, conn->socks_request->port);
+ } else { /* ! (want_onehop && conn->chosen_exit_name[0] == '$') */
+ /* We will need an onion key for the router, and we
+ * don't have one. Refuse or relax requirements. */
+ log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
+ "Requested exit point '%s' is not known. %s.",
+ conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
+ if (opt) {
+ conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
+ tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name);
+ /* Try again with no requested exit */
+ return circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(conn,
+ desired_circuit_purpose,
+ circp);
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } /* Done checking for general circutis with chosen exits. */
+
+ /* What purpose do we need to launch this circuit with? */
+ uint8_t new_circ_purpose;
+ if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED)
+ new_circ_purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND;
+ else if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT)
+ new_circ_purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING;
+ else
+ new_circ_purpose = desired_circuit_purpose;
+
+ /* Determine what kind of a circuit to launch, and actually launch it. */
+ {
+ int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
+ if (want_onehop) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL;
+ if (need_uptime) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
+ if (need_internal) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
+
+ /* If we are about to pick a v3 RP right now, make sure we pick a
+ * rendezvous point that supports the v3 protocol! */
+ if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED &&
+ new_circ_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND &&
+ ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->hs_ident) {
+ flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_IS_V3_RP;
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Getting rendezvous circuit to v3 service!");
+ }
+
+ circ = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(new_circ_purpose, extend_info,
+ flags);
+ }
+
+ extend_info_free(extend_info);
+
+ /* Now trigger things that need to happen when we launch circuits */
+
+ if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
+ desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET ||
+ desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST) {
+ /* We just caused a circuit to get built because of this stream.
+ * If this stream has caused a _lot_ of circuits to be built, that's
+ * a bad sign: we should tell the user. */
+ if (conn->num_circuits_launched < NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD &&
+ ++conn->num_circuits_launched == NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD)
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "The application request to %s:%d has launched "
+ "%d circuits without finding one it likes.",
+ escaped_safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address),
+ conn->socks_request->port,
+ conn->num_circuits_launched);
+ } else {
+ /* help predict this next time */
+ rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), need_uptime, 1);
+ if (circ) {
+ const edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn);
+ if (edge_conn->rend_data) {
+ /* write the service_id into circ */
+ circ->rend_data = rend_data_dup(edge_conn->rend_data);
+ } else if (edge_conn->hs_ident) {
+ circ->hs_ident =
+ hs_ident_circuit_new(&edge_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk,
+ HS_IDENT_CIRCUIT_INTRO);
+ }
+ if (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND &&
+ circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
+ circuit_has_opened(circ);
+ }
+ }
+ } /* endif (!circ) */
+
+ /* We either found a good circuit, or launched a new circuit, or failed to
+ * do so. Report success, and delay. */
+
+ if (circ) {
+ /* Mark the circuit with the isolation fields for this connection.
+ * When the circuit arrives, we'll clear these flags: this is
+ * just some internal bookkeeping to make sure that we have
+ * launched enough circuits.
+ */
+ connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation(conn, circ, 0);
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_APP,
+ "No safe circuit (purpose %d) ready for edge "
+ "connection; delaying.",
+ desired_circuit_purpose);
+ }
+ *circp = circ;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff <b>crypt_path</b> is one of the crypt_paths for
+ * <b>circ</b>. */
+static int
+cpath_is_on_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *crypt_path)
+{
+ crypt_path_t *cpath, *cpath_next = NULL;
+ for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath_next != circ->cpath; cpath = cpath_next) {
+ cpath_next = cpath->next;
+ if (crypt_path == cpath)
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff client-side optimistic data is supported. */
+static int
+optimistic_data_enabled(void)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ if (options->OptimisticData < 0) {
+ /* Note: this default was 0 before #18815 was merged. We can't take the
+ * parameter out of the consensus until versions before that are all
+ * obsolete. */
+ const int32_t enabled =
+ networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "UseOptimisticData", /*default*/ 1, 0, 1);
+ return (int)enabled;
+ }
+ return options->OptimisticData;
+}
+
+/** Attach the AP stream <b>apconn</b> to circ's linked list of
+ * p_streams. Also set apconn's cpath_layer to <b>cpath</b>, or to the last
+ * hop in circ's cpath if <b>cpath</b> is NULL.
+ */
+static void
+link_apconn_to_circ(entry_connection_t *apconn, origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ crypt_path_t *cpath)
+{
+ const node_t *exitnode = NULL;
+
+ /* add it into the linked list of streams on this circuit */
+ log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC, "attaching new conn to circ. n_circ_id %u.",
+ (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id);
+ /* reset it, so we can measure circ timeouts */
+ ENTRY_TO_CONN(apconn)->timestamp_last_read_allowed = time(NULL);
+ ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn)->next_stream = circ->p_streams;
+ ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn)->on_circuit = TO_CIRCUIT(circ);
+ /* assert_connection_ok(conn, time(NULL)); */
+ circ->p_streams = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn);
+
+ if (connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn))) {
+ /* We are attaching a stream to a rendezvous circuit. That means
+ * that an attempt to connect to a hidden service just
+ * succeeded. Tell rendclient.c. */
+ hs_client_note_connection_attempt_succeeded(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn));
+ }
+
+ if (cpath) { /* we were given one; use it */
+ tor_assert(cpath_is_on_circuit(circ, cpath));
+ } else {
+ /* use the last hop in the circuit */
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath);
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath->prev);
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
+ cpath = circ->cpath->prev;
+ }
+ ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn)->cpath_layer = cpath;
+
+ circ->isolation_any_streams_attached = 1;
+ connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation(apconn, circ, 0);
+
+ /* Compute the exitnode if possible, for logging below */
+ if (cpath->extend_info)
+ exitnode = node_get_by_id(cpath->extend_info->identity_digest);
+
+ /* See if we can use optimistic data on this circuit */
+ if (optimistic_data_enabled() &&
+ (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
+ circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET ||
+ circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST ||
+ circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED))
+ apconn->may_use_optimistic_data = 1;
+ else
+ apconn->may_use_optimistic_data = 0;
+ log_info(LD_APP, "Looks like completed circuit to %s %s allow "
+ "optimistic data for connection to %s",
+ circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ?
+ /* node_describe() does the right thing if exitnode is NULL */
+ safe_str_client(node_describe(exitnode)) :
+ "hidden service",
+ apconn->may_use_optimistic_data ? "does" : "doesn't",
+ safe_str_client(apconn->socks_request->address));
+}
+
+/** Return true iff <b>address</b> is matched by one of the entries in
+ * TrackHostExits. */
+int
+hostname_in_track_host_exits(const or_options_t *options, const char *address)
+{
+ if (!options->TrackHostExits)
+ return 0;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(options->TrackHostExits, const char *, cp) {
+ if (cp[0] == '.') { /* match end */
+ if (cp[1] == '\0' ||
+ !strcasecmpend(address, cp) ||
+ !strcasecmp(address, &cp[1]))
+ return 1;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(cp, address) == 0) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(cp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** If an exit wasn't explicitly specified for <b>conn</b>, consider saving
+ * the exit that we *did* choose for use by future connections to
+ * <b>conn</b>'s destination.
+ */
+static void
+consider_recording_trackhost(const entry_connection_t *conn,
+ const origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ char *new_address = NULL;
+ char fp[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+
+ /* Search the addressmap for this conn's destination. */
+ /* If they're not in the address map.. */
+ if (!options->TrackHostExits ||
+ addressmap_have_mapping(conn->socks_request->address,
+ options->TrackHostExitsExpire))
+ return; /* nothing to track, or already mapped */
+
+ if (!hostname_in_track_host_exits(options, conn->socks_request->address) ||
+ !circ->build_state->chosen_exit)
+ return;
+
+ /* write down the fingerprint of the chosen exit, not the nickname,
+ * because the chosen exit might not be named. */
+ base16_encode(fp, sizeof(fp),
+ circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ /* Add this exit/hostname pair to the addressmap. */
+ tor_asprintf(&new_address, "%s.%s.exit",
+ conn->socks_request->address, fp);
+
+ addressmap_register(conn->socks_request->address, new_address,
+ time(NULL) + options->TrackHostExitsExpire,
+ ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/** Attempt to attach the connection <b>conn</b> to <b>circ</b>, and send a
+ * begin or resolve cell as appropriate. Return values are as for
+ * connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit. The stream will exit from the hop
+ * indicated by <b>cpath</b>, or from the last hop in circ's cpath if
+ * <b>cpath</b> is NULL. */
+int
+connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn,
+ origin_circuit_t *circ,
+ crypt_path_t *cpath)
+{
+ connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
+ tor_assert(conn);
+ tor_assert(base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT ||
+ base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT);
+ tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
+ tor_assert(circ);
+ tor_assert(circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
+
+ base_conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
+
+ if (!circ->base_.timestamp_dirty ||
+ ((conn->entry_cfg.isolation_flags & ISO_SOCKSAUTH) &&
+ (conn->entry_cfg.socks_iso_keep_alive) &&
+ (conn->socks_request->usernamelen ||
+ conn->socks_request->passwordlen))) {
+ /* When stream isolation is in use and controlled by an application
+ * we are willing to keep using the stream. */
+ circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = approx_time();
+ }
+
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(circ);
+
+ /* Now, actually link the connection. */
+ link_apconn_to_circ(conn, circ, cpath);
+
+ tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
+ if (conn->socks_request->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT) {
+ if (!conn->use_begindir)
+ consider_recording_trackhost(conn, circ);
+ if (connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(conn) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ if (connection_ap_handshake_send_resolve(conn) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return an appropriate circuit purpose for non-rend streams.
+ * We don't handle rends here because a rend stream triggers two
+ * circuit builds with different purposes, so it is handled elsewhere.
+ *
+ * This function just figures out what type of hsdir activity this is,
+ * and tells us. Everything else is general.
+ */
+static int
+connection_ap_get_nonrend_circ_purpose(const entry_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ const connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(!connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(
+ ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)));
+
+ if (base_conn->linked_conn &&
+ base_conn->linked_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR) {
+ /* Set a custom purpose for hsdir activity */
+ if (base_conn->linked_conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC_V2 ||
+ base_conn->linked_conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_HSDESC) {
+ return CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_HSDIR_POST;
+ } else if (base_conn->linked_conn->purpose
+ == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC_V2 ||
+ base_conn->linked_conn->purpose
+ == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_HSDESC) {
+ return CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_HSDIR_GET;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* All other purposes are general for now */
+ return CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL;
+}
+
+/** Try to find a safe live circuit for stream <b>conn</b>. If we find one,
+ * attach the stream, send appropriate cells, and return 1. Otherwise,
+ * try to launch new circuit(s) for the stream. If we can launch
+ * circuits, return 0. Otherwise, if we simply can't proceed with
+ * this stream, return -1. (conn needs to die, and is maybe already marked).
+ */
+/* XXXX this function should mark for close whenever it returns -1;
+ * its callers shouldn't have to worry about that. */
+int
+connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn)
+{
+ connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn);
+ int retval;
+ int conn_age;
+ int want_onehop;
+
+ tor_assert(conn);
+ tor_assert(base_conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
+ tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
+ want_onehop = conn->want_onehop;
+
+ conn_age = (int)(time(NULL) - base_conn->timestamp_created);
+
+ /* Is this connection so old that we should give up on it? */
+ if (conn_age >= get_options()->SocksTimeout) {
+ int severity = (tor_addr_is_null(&base_conn->addr) && !base_conn->port) ?
+ LOG_INFO : LOG_NOTICE;
+ log_fn(severity, LD_APP,
+ "Tried for %d seconds to get a connection to %s:%d. Giving up.",
+ conn_age, safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address),
+ conn->socks_request->port);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* We handle "general" (non-onion) connections much more straightforwardly.
+ */
+ if (!connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn))) {
+ /* we're a general conn */
+ origin_circuit_t *circ=NULL;
+
+ /* Are we linked to a dir conn that aims to fetch a consensus?
+ * We check here because the conn might no longer be needed. */
+ if (base_conn->linked_conn &&
+ base_conn->linked_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR &&
+ base_conn->linked_conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CONSENSUS) {
+
+ /* Yes we are. Is there a consensus fetch farther along than us? */
+ if (networkstatus_consensus_is_already_downloading(
+ TO_DIR_CONN(base_conn->linked_conn)->requested_resource)) {
+ /* We're doing the "multiple consensus fetch attempts" game from
+ * proposal 210, and we're late to the party. Just close this conn.
+ * The circuit and TLS conn that we made will time out after a while
+ * if nothing else wants to use them. */
+ log_info(LD_DIR, "Closing extra consensus fetch (to %s) since one "
+ "is already downloading.", base_conn->linked_conn->address);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we have a chosen exit, we need to use a circuit that's
+ * open to that exit. See what exit we meant, and whether we can use it.
+ */
+ if (conn->chosen_exit_name) {
+ const node_t *node = node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 0);
+ int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional;
+ if (!node && !want_onehop) {
+ /* We ran into this warning when trying to extend a circuit to a
+ * hidden service directory for which we didn't have a router
+ * descriptor. See flyspray task 767 for more details. We should
+ * keep this in mind when deciding to use BEGIN_DIR cells for other
+ * directory requests as well. -KL*/
+ log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
+ "Requested exit point '%s' is not known. %s.",
+ conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
+ if (opt) {
+ /* If we are allowed to ignore the .exit request, do so */
+ conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
+ tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (node && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, node)) {
+ log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
+ "Requested exit point '%s' is excluded or "
+ "would refuse request. %s.",
+ conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
+ if (opt) {
+ /* If we are allowed to ignore the .exit request, do so */
+ conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
+ tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Find the circuit that we should use, if there is one. Otherwise
+ * launch it
+ */
+ retval = circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(conn,
+ connection_ap_get_nonrend_circ_purpose(conn),
+ &circ);
+
+ if (retval < 1) {
+ /* We were either told "-1" (complete failure) or 0 (circuit in
+ * progress); we can't attach this stream yet. */
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC,
+ "Attaching apconn to circ %u (stream %d sec old).",
+ (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id, conn_age);
+ /* print the circ's path, so clients can figure out which circs are
+ * sucking. */
+ circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_APP|LD_CIRC,circ);
+
+ /* We have found a suitable circuit for our conn. Hurray. Do
+ * the attachment. */
+ return connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit(conn, circ, NULL);
+
+ } else { /* we're a rendezvous conn */
+ origin_circuit_t *rendcirc=NULL, *introcirc=NULL;
+
+ tor_assert(!ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->cpath_layer);
+
+ /* start by finding a rendezvous circuit for us */
+
+ retval = circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(
+ conn, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED, &rendcirc);
+ if (retval < 0) return -1; /* failed */
+
+ if (retval > 0) {
+ tor_assert(rendcirc);
+ /* one is already established, attach */
+ log_info(LD_REND,
+ "rend joined circ %u (id: %" PRIu32 ") already here. "
+ "Attaching. (stream %d sec old)",
+ (unsigned) TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc)->n_circ_id,
+ rendcirc->global_identifier, conn_age);
+ /* Mark rendezvous circuits as 'newly dirty' every time you use
+ * them, since the process of rebuilding a rendezvous circ is so
+ * expensive. There is a tradeoff between linkability and
+ * feasibility, at this point.
+ */
+ rendcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+
+ /* We've also attempted to use them. If they fail, we need to
+ * probe them for path bias */
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(rendcirc);
+
+ link_apconn_to_circ(conn, rendcirc, NULL);
+ if (connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(conn) < 0)
+ return 0; /* already marked, let them fade away */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /* At this point we need to re-check the state, since it's possible that
+ * our call to circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch() changed the connection's
+ * state from "CIRCUIT_WAIT" to "RENDDESC_WAIT" because we decided to
+ * re-fetch the descriptor.
+ */
+ if (ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state != AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "This connection is no longer ready to attach; its "
+ "state changed."
+ "(We probably have to re-fetch its descriptor.)");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (rendcirc && (rendcirc->base_.purpose ==
+ CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED)) {
+ log_info(LD_REND,
+ "pending-join circ %u (id: %" PRIu32 ") already here, with "
+ "intro ack. Stalling. (stream %d sec old)",
+ (unsigned) TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc)->n_circ_id,
+ rendcirc->global_identifier, conn_age);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* it's on its way. find an intro circ. */
+ retval = circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(
+ conn, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT, &introcirc);
+ if (retval < 0) return -1; /* failed */
+
+ if (retval > 0) {
+ /* one has already sent the intro. keep waiting. */
+ tor_assert(introcirc);
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Intro circ %u (id: %" PRIu32 ") present and "
+ "awaiting ACK. Rend circuit %u (id: %" PRIu32 "). "
+ "Stalling. (stream %d sec old)",
+ (unsigned) TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc)->n_circ_id,
+ introcirc->global_identifier,
+ rendcirc ? (unsigned) TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc)->n_circ_id : 0,
+ rendcirc ? rendcirc->global_identifier : 0,
+ conn_age);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* now rendcirc and introcirc are each either undefined or not finished */
+
+ if (rendcirc && introcirc &&
+ rendcirc->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY) {
+ log_info(LD_REND,
+ "ready rend circ %u (id: %" PRIu32 ") already here. No"
+ "intro-ack yet on intro %u (id: %" PRIu32 "). "
+ "(stream %d sec old)",
+ (unsigned) TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc)->n_circ_id,
+ rendcirc->global_identifier,
+ (unsigned) TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc)->n_circ_id,
+ introcirc->global_identifier, conn_age);
+
+ tor_assert(introcirc->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
+ if (introcirc->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
+ int ret;
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Found open intro circ %u (id: %" PRIu32 "). "
+ "Rend circuit %u (id: %" PRIu32 "); Sending "
+ "introduction. (stream %d sec old)",
+ (unsigned) TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc)->n_circ_id,
+ introcirc->global_identifier,
+ (unsigned) TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc)->n_circ_id,
+ rendcirc->global_identifier, conn_age);
+ ret = hs_client_send_introduce1(introcirc, rendcirc);
+ switch (ret) {
+ case 0: /* success */
+ rendcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+ introcirc->base_.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
+
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(introcirc);
+ pathbias_count_use_attempt(rendcirc);
+
+ assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc));
+ assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc));
+ return 0;
+ case -1: /* transient error */
+ return 0;
+ case -2: /* permanent error */
+ return -1;
+ default: /* oops */
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Intro %u (id: %" PRIu32 ") and rend circuit %u "
+ "(id: %" PRIu32 ") circuits are not both ready. "
+ "Stalling conn. (%d sec old)",
+ introcirc ? (unsigned) TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc)->n_circ_id : 0,
+ introcirc ? introcirc->global_identifier : 0,
+ rendcirc ? (unsigned) TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc)->n_circ_id : 0,
+ rendcirc ? rendcirc->global_identifier : 0, conn_age);
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Change <b>circ</b>'s purpose to <b>new_purpose</b>. */
+void
+circuit_change_purpose(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t new_purpose)
+{
+ uint8_t old_purpose;
+ /* Don't allow an OR circ to become an origin circ or vice versa. */
+ tor_assert(!!(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) ==
+ !!(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN(new_purpose)));
+
+ if (circ->purpose == new_purpose) return;
+
+ if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
+ char old_purpose_desc[80] = "";
+
+ strncpy(old_purpose_desc, circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->purpose), 80-1);
+ old_purpose_desc[80-1] = '\0';
+
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,
+ "changing purpose of origin circ %d "
+ "from \"%s\" (%d) to \"%s\" (%d)",
+ TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->global_identifier,
+ old_purpose_desc,
+ circ->purpose,
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(new_purpose),
+ new_purpose);
+ }
+
+ old_purpose = circ->purpose;
+ circ->purpose = new_purpose;
+
+ if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
+ control_event_circuit_purpose_changed(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ),
+ old_purpose);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Mark <b>circ</b> so that no more connections can be attached to it. */
+void
+mark_circuit_unusable_for_new_conns(origin_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ tor_assert(circ);
+
+ /* XXXX This is a kludge; we're only keeping it around in case there's
+ * something that doesn't check unusable_for_new_conns, and to avoid
+ * deeper refactoring of our expiration logic. */
+ if (! circ->base_.timestamp_dirty)
+ circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = approx_time();
+ if (options->MaxCircuitDirtiness >= circ->base_.timestamp_dirty)
+ circ->base_.timestamp_dirty = 1; /* prevent underflow */
+ else
+ circ->base_.timestamp_dirty -= options->MaxCircuitDirtiness;
+
+ circ->unusable_for_new_conns = 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Add relay_body_len and RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE-relay_body_len to
+ * the valid delivered written fields and the overhead field,
+ * respectively.
+ */
+void
+circuit_sent_valid_data(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint16_t relay_body_len)
+{
+ if (!circ) return;
+
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(relay_body_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
+
+ circ->n_delivered_written_circ_bw =
+ tor_add_u32_nowrap(circ->n_delivered_written_circ_bw, relay_body_len);
+ circ->n_overhead_written_circ_bw =
+ tor_add_u32_nowrap(circ->n_overhead_written_circ_bw,
+ RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE-relay_body_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Add relay_body_len and RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE-relay_body_len to
+ * the valid delivered read field and the overhead field,
+ * respectively.
+ */
+void
+circuit_read_valid_data(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint16_t relay_body_len)
+{
+ if (!circ) return;
+
+ tor_assert_nonfatal(relay_body_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
+
+ circ->n_delivered_read_circ_bw =
+ tor_add_u32_nowrap(circ->n_delivered_read_circ_bw, relay_body_len);
+ circ->n_overhead_read_circ_bw =
+ tor_add_u32_nowrap(circ->n_overhead_read_circ_bw,
+ RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE-relay_body_len);
+}
diff --cc src/feature/relay/router.c
index b376046c8,000000000..dad2c6a50
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/router.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/router.c
@@@ -1,3129 -1,0 +1,3128 @@@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#define ROUTER_PRIVATE
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "app/config/statefile.h"
+#include "app/main/main.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/netstatus.h"
+#include "core/or/policies.h"
+#include "core/or/protover.h"
+#include "feature/client/transports.h"
+#include "feature/control/control.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/process_descs.h"
+#include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h"
+#include "feature/dirclient/dirclient.h"
+#include "feature/dircommon/directory.h"
+#include "feature/dirparse/authcert_parse.h"
+#include "feature/dirparse/routerparse.h"
+#include "feature/dirparse/signing.h"
+#include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/authcert.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nickname.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
+#include "feature/relay/dns.h"
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
+#include "feature/relay/selftest.h"
+#include "lib/geoip/geoip.h"
+#include "feature/stats/geoip_stats.h"
+#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_init.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/encoding/confline.h"
+#include "lib/osinfo/uname.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+
+#include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h"
+
+#include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
+#include "core/or/port_cfg_st.h"
+#include "feature/dirclient/dir_server_st.h"
+#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/authority_cert_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/extrainfo_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h"
+
+/**
+ * \file router.c
+ * \brief Miscellaneous relay functionality, including RSA key maintenance,
+ * generating and uploading server descriptors, picking an address to
+ * advertise, and so on.
+ *
+ * This module handles the job of deciding whether we are a Tor relay, and if
+ * so what kind. (Mostly through functions like server_mode() that inspect an
+ * or_options_t, but in some cases based on our own capabilities, such as when
+ * we are deciding whether to be a directory cache in
+ * router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver().)
+ *
+ * Also in this module are the functions to generate our own routerinfo_t and
+ * extrainfo_t, and to encode those to signed strings for upload to the
+ * directory authorities.
+ *
+ * This module also handles key maintenance for RSA and Curve25519-ntor keys,
+ * and for our TLS context. (These functions should eventually move to
+ * routerkeys.c along with the code that handles Ed25519 keys now.)
+ **/
+
+/************************************************************/
+
+/*****
+ * Key management: ORs only.
+ *****/
+
+/** Private keys for this OR. There is also an SSL key managed by tortls.c.
+ */
+static tor_mutex_t *key_lock=NULL;
+static time_t onionkey_set_at=0; /**< When was onionkey last changed? */
+/** Current private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells. */
+static crypto_pk_t *onionkey=NULL;
+/** Previous private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells
+ * generated by clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */
+static crypto_pk_t *lastonionkey=NULL;
+/** Current private ntor secret key: used to perform the ntor handshake. */
+static curve25519_keypair_t curve25519_onion_key;
+/** Previous private ntor secret key: used to perform the ntor handshake
+ * with clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */
+static curve25519_keypair_t last_curve25519_onion_key;
+/** Private server "identity key": used to sign directory info and TLS
+ * certificates. Never changes. */
+static crypto_pk_t *server_identitykey=NULL;
+/** Digest of server_identitykey. */
+static char server_identitykey_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+/** Private client "identity key": used to sign bridges' and clients'
+ * outbound TLS certificates. Regenerated on startup and on IP address
+ * change. */
+static crypto_pk_t *client_identitykey=NULL;
+/** Signing key used for v3 directory material; only set for authorities. */
+static crypto_pk_t *authority_signing_key = NULL;
+/** Key certificate to authenticate v3 directory material; only set for
+ * authorities. */
+static authority_cert_t *authority_key_certificate = NULL;
+
+/** For emergency V3 authority key migration: An extra signing key that we use
+ * with our old (obsolete) identity key for a while. */
+static crypto_pk_t *legacy_signing_key = NULL;
+/** For emergency V3 authority key migration: An extra certificate to
+ * authenticate legacy_signing_key with our obsolete identity key.*/
+static authority_cert_t *legacy_key_certificate = NULL;
+
+/* (Note that v3 authorities also have a separate "authority identity key",
+ * but this key is never actually loaded by the Tor process. Instead, it's
+ * used by tor-gencert to sign new signing keys and make new key
+ * certificates. */
+
+/** Return a readonly string with human readable description
+ * of <b>err</b>.
+ */
+const char *
+routerinfo_err_to_string(int err)
+{
+ switch (err) {
+ case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NO_EXT_ADDR:
+ return "No known exit address yet";
+ case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_PARSE:
+ return "Cannot parse descriptor";
+ case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER:
+ return "Not running in server mode";
+ case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED:
+ return "Key digest failed";
+ case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_GENERATE:
+ return "Cannot generate descriptor";
+ case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING:
+ return "Descriptor still rebuilding - not ready yet";
+ }
+
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "unknown routerinfo error %d - shouldn't happen", err);
+ tor_assert_unreached();
+
+ return "Unknown error";
+}
+
+/** Return true if we expect given error to be transient.
+ * Return false otherwise.
+ */
+int
+routerinfo_err_is_transient(int err)
+{
+ /**
+ * For simplicity, we consider all errors other than
+ * "not a server" transient - see discussion on
+ * https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27034
+ */
+ return err != TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER;
+}
+
+/** Replace the current onion key with <b>k</b>. Does not affect
+ * lastonionkey; to update lastonionkey correctly, call rotate_onion_key().
+ */
+static void
+set_onion_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
+{
+ if (onionkey && crypto_pk_eq_keys(onionkey, k)) {
+ /* k is already our onion key; free it and return */
+ crypto_pk_free(k);
+ return;
+ }
+ tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
+ crypto_pk_free(onionkey);
+ onionkey = k;
+ tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
+ mark_my_descriptor_dirty("set onion key");
+}
+
+/** Return the current onion key. Requires that the onion key has been
+ * loaded or generated. */
+crypto_pk_t *
+get_onion_key(void)
+{
+ tor_assert(onionkey);
+ return onionkey;
+}
+
+/** Store a full copy of the current onion key into *<b>key</b>, and a full
+ * copy of the most recent onion key into *<b>last</b>. Store NULL into
+ * a pointer if the corresponding key does not exist.
+ */
+void
+dup_onion_keys(crypto_pk_t **key, crypto_pk_t **last)
+{
+ tor_assert(key);
+ tor_assert(last);
+ tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
+ if (onionkey)
+ *key = crypto_pk_copy_full(onionkey);
+ else
+ *key = NULL;
+ if (lastonionkey)
+ *last = crypto_pk_copy_full(lastonionkey);
+ else
+ *last = NULL;
+ tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
+}
+
+/** Expire our old set of onion keys. This is done by setting
+ * last_curve25519_onion_key and lastonionkey to all zero's and NULL
+ * respectively.
+ *
+ * This function does not perform any grace period checks for the old onion
+ * keys.
+ */
+void
+expire_old_onion_keys(void)
+{
+ char *fname = NULL;
+
+ tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
+
+ /* Free lastonionkey and set it to NULL. */
+ if (lastonionkey) {
+ crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey);
+ lastonionkey = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* We zero out the keypair. See the tor_mem_is_zero() check made in
+ * construct_ntor_key_map() below. */
+ memset(&last_curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(last_curve25519_onion_key));
+
+ tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
+
+ fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old");
+ if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
+ if (tor_unlink(fname) != 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_FS, "Couldn't unlink old onion key file %s: %s",
+ fname, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+ tor_free(fname);
+
+ fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old");
+ if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
+ if (tor_unlink(fname) != 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_FS, "Couldn't unlink old ntor onion key file %s: %s",
+ fname, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+ tor_free(fname);
+}
+
+/** Return the current secret onion key for the ntor handshake. Must only
+ * be called from the main thread. */
+static const curve25519_keypair_t *
+get_current_curve25519_keypair(void)
+{
+ return &curve25519_onion_key;
+}
+/** Return a map from KEYID (the key itself) to keypairs for use in the ntor
+ * handshake. Must only be called from the main thread. */
+di_digest256_map_t *
+construct_ntor_key_map(void)
+{
+ di_digest256_map_t *m = NULL;
+
+ if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)
+ curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+ dimap_add_entry(&m,
+ curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
+ tor_memdup(&curve25519_onion_key,
+ sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t)));
+ }
+ if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)
+ last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+ dimap_add_entry(&m,
+ last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
+ tor_memdup(&last_curve25519_onion_key,
+ sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t)));
+ }
+
+ return m;
+}
+/** Helper used to deallocate a di_digest256_map_t returned by
+ * construct_ntor_key_map. */
+static void
+ntor_key_map_free_helper(void *arg)
+{
+ curve25519_keypair_t *k = arg;
+ memwipe(k, 0, sizeof(*k));
+ tor_free(k);
+}
+/** Release all storage from a keymap returned by construct_ntor_key_map. */
+void
+ntor_key_map_free_(di_digest256_map_t *map)
+{
+ if (!map)
+ return;
+ dimap_free(map, ntor_key_map_free_helper);
+}
+
+/** Return the time when the onion key was last set. This is either the time
+ * when the process launched, or the time of the most recent key rotation since
+ * the process launched.
+ */
+time_t
+get_onion_key_set_at(void)
+{
+ return onionkey_set_at;
+}
+
+/** Set the current server identity key to <b>k</b>.
+ */
+void
+set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
+{
+ crypto_pk_free(server_identitykey);
+ server_identitykey = k;
+ if (crypto_pk_get_digest(server_identitykey,
+ server_identitykey_digest) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute our own identity key digest.");
+ tor_assert(0);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Make sure that we have set up our identity keys to match or not match as
+ * appropriate, and die with an assertion if we have not. */
+static void
+assert_identity_keys_ok(void)
+{
+ if (1)
+ return;
+ tor_assert(client_identitykey);
+ if (public_server_mode(get_options())) {
+ /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be equal */
+ tor_assert(server_identitykey);
+ tor_assert(crypto_pk_eq_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey));
+ } else {
+ /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be unequal */
+ if (server_identitykey)
+ tor_assert(!crypto_pk_eq_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey));
+ }
+}
+
+/** Returns the current server identity key; requires that the key has
+ * been set, and that we are running as a Tor server.
+ */
+crypto_pk_t *
+get_server_identity_key(void)
+{
+ tor_assert(server_identitykey);
+ tor_assert(server_mode(get_options()));
+ assert_identity_keys_ok();
+ return server_identitykey;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff we are a server and the server identity key
+ * has been set. */
+int
+server_identity_key_is_set(void)
+{
+ return server_mode(get_options()) && server_identitykey != NULL;
+}
+
+/** Set the current client identity key to <b>k</b>.
+ */
+void
+set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
+{
+ crypto_pk_free(client_identitykey);
+ client_identitykey = k;
+}
+
+/** Returns the current client identity key for use on outgoing TLS
+ * connections; requires that the key has been set.
+ */
+crypto_pk_t *
+get_tlsclient_identity_key(void)
+{
+ tor_assert(client_identitykey);
+ assert_identity_keys_ok();
+ return client_identitykey;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the client identity key has been set. */
+int
+client_identity_key_is_set(void)
+{
+ return client_identitykey != NULL;
+}
+
+/** Return the key certificate for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL
+ * if we have no such certificate. */
+MOCK_IMPL(authority_cert_t *,
+get_my_v3_authority_cert, (void))
+{
+ return authority_key_certificate;
+}
+
+/** Return the v3 signing key for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL
+ * if we have no such key. */
+crypto_pk_t *
+get_my_v3_authority_signing_key(void)
+{
+ return authority_signing_key;
+}
+
+/** If we're an authority, and we're using a legacy authority identity key for
+ * emergency migration purposes, return the certificate associated with that
+ * key. */
+authority_cert_t *
+get_my_v3_legacy_cert(void)
+{
+ return legacy_key_certificate;
+}
+
+/** If we're an authority, and we're using a legacy authority identity key for
+ * emergency migration purposes, return that key. */
+crypto_pk_t *
+get_my_v3_legacy_signing_key(void)
+{
+ return legacy_signing_key;
+}
+
+/** Replace the previous onion key with the current onion key, and generate
+ * a new previous onion key. Immediately after calling this function,
+ * the OR should:
+ * - schedule all previous cpuworkers to shut down _after_ processing
+ * pending work. (This will cause fresh cpuworkers to be generated.)
+ * - generate and upload a fresh routerinfo.
+ */
+void
+rotate_onion_key(void)
+{
+ char *fname, *fname_prev;
+ crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
+ or_state_t *state = get_or_state();
+ curve25519_keypair_t new_curve25519_keypair;
+ time_t now;
+ fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key");
+ fname_prev = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old");
+ /* There isn't much point replacing an old key with an empty file */
+ if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
+ if (replace_file(fname, fname_prev))
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing rotated onion key");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG,"Error generating onion key");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
+ log_err(LD_FS,"Couldn't write generated onion key to \"%s\".", fname);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ tor_free(fname);
+ tor_free(fname_prev);
+ fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor");
+ fname_prev = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old");
+ if (curve25519_keypair_generate(&new_curve25519_keypair, 1) < 0)
+ goto error;
+ /* There isn't much point replacing an old key with an empty file */
+ if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
+ if (replace_file(fname, fname_prev))
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(&new_curve25519_keypair, fname,
+ "onion") < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_FS,"Couldn't write curve25519 onion key to \"%s\".",fname);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Rotating onion key");
+ tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
+ crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey);
+ lastonionkey = onionkey;
+ onionkey = prkey;
+ memcpy(&last_curve25519_onion_key, &curve25519_onion_key,
+ sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t));
+ memcpy(&curve25519_onion_key, &new_curve25519_keypair,
+ sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t));
+ now = time(NULL);
+ state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now;
+ tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
+ mark_my_descriptor_dirty("rotated onion key");
+ or_state_mark_dirty(state, get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites ? now+3600 : 0);
+ goto done;
+ error:
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't rotate onion key.");
+ if (prkey)
+ crypto_pk_free(prkey);
+ done:
+ memwipe(&new_curve25519_keypair, 0, sizeof(new_curve25519_keypair));
+ tor_free(fname);
+ tor_free(fname_prev);
+}
+
+/** Log greeting message that points to new relay lifecycle document the
+ * first time this function has been called.
+ */
+static void
+log_new_relay_greeting(void)
+{
+ static int already_logged = 0;
+
+ if (already_logged)
+ return;
+
+ tor_log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_GENERAL, "You are running a new relay. "
+ "Thanks for helping the Tor network! If you wish to know "
+ "what will happen in the upcoming weeks regarding its usage, "
+ "have a look at https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of";
+ "-a-new-relay");
+
+ already_logged = 1;
+}
+
+/** Load a curve25519 keypair from the file <b>fname</b>, writing it into
+ * <b>keys_out</b>. If the file isn't found, or is empty, and <b>generate</b>
+ * is true, create a new keypair and write it into the file. If there are
+ * errors, log them at level <b>severity</b>. Generate files using <b>tag</b>
+ * in their ASCII wrapper. */
+static int
+init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(curve25519_keypair_t *keys_out,
+ const char *fname,
+ int generate,
+ int severity,
+ const char *tag)
+{
+ switch (file_status(fname)) {
+ case FN_DIR:
+ case FN_ERROR:
+ tor_log(severity, LD_FS,"Can't read key from \"%s\"", fname);
+ goto error;
+ /* treat empty key files as if the file doesn't exist, and, if generate
+ * is set, replace the empty file in curve25519_keypair_write_to_file() */
+ case FN_NOENT:
+ case FN_EMPTY:
+ if (generate) {
+ if (!have_lockfile()) {
+ if (try_locking(get_options(), 0)<0) {
+ /* Make sure that --list-fingerprint only creates new keys
+ * if there is no possibility for a deadlock. */
+ tor_log(severity, LD_FS, "Another Tor process has locked \"%s\". "
+ "Not writing any new keys.", fname);
+ /*XXXX The 'other process' might make a key in a second or two;
+ * maybe we should wait for it. */
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"; generating fresh key.",
+ fname);
+ if (curve25519_keypair_generate(keys_out, 1) < 0)
+ goto error;
+ if (curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(keys_out, fname, tag)<0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_FS,
+ "Couldn't write generated key to \"%s\".", fname);
+ memwipe(keys_out, 0, sizeof(*keys_out));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"", fname);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ case FN_FILE:
+ {
+ char *tag_in=NULL;
+ if (curve25519_keypair_read_from_file(keys_out, &tag_in, fname) < 0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error loading private key.");
+ tor_free(tag_in);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (!tag_in || strcmp(tag_in, tag)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Unexpected tag %s on private key.",
+ escaped(tag_in));
+ tor_free(tag_in);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ tor_free(tag_in);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ default:
+ tor_assert(0);
+ }
+
+ error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/** Try to load the vote-signing private key and certificate for being a v3
+ * directory authority, and make sure they match. If <b>legacy</b>, load a
+ * legacy key/cert set for emergency key migration; otherwise load the regular
+ * key/cert set. On success, store them into *<b>key_out</b> and
+ * *<b>cert_out</b> respectively, and return 0. On failure, return -1. */
+static int
+load_authority_keyset(int legacy, crypto_pk_t **key_out,
+ authority_cert_t **cert_out)
+{
+ int r = -1;
+ char *fname = NULL, *cert = NULL;
+ const char *eos = NULL;
+ crypto_pk_t *signing_key = NULL;
+ authority_cert_t *parsed = NULL;
+
+ fname = get_keydir_fname(
+ legacy ? "legacy_signing_key" : "authority_signing_key");
+ signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_ERR, NULL);
+ if (!signing_key) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "No version 3 directory key found in %s", fname);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ tor_free(fname);
+ fname = get_keydir_fname(
+ legacy ? "legacy_certificate" : "authority_certificate");
+ cert = read_file_to_str(fname, 0, NULL);
+ if (!cert) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Signing key found, but no certificate found in %s",
+ fname);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ parsed = authority_cert_parse_from_string(cert, &eos);
+ if (!parsed) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse certificate in %s", fname);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (!crypto_pk_eq_keys(signing_key, parsed->signing_key)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Stored signing key does not match signing key in "
+ "certificate");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ crypto_pk_free(*key_out);
+ authority_cert_free(*cert_out);
+
+ *key_out = signing_key;
+ *cert_out = parsed;
+ r = 0;
+ signing_key = NULL;
+ parsed = NULL;
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(fname);
+ tor_free(cert);
+ crypto_pk_free(signing_key);
+ authority_cert_free(parsed);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Load the v3 (voting) authority signing key and certificate, if they are
+ * present. Return -1 if anything is missing, mismatched, or unloadable;
+ * return 0 on success. */
+static int
+init_v3_authority_keys(void)
+{
+ if (load_authority_keyset(0, &authority_signing_key,
+ &authority_key_certificate)<0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (get_options()->V3AuthUseLegacyKey &&
+ load_authority_keyset(1, &legacy_signing_key,
+ &legacy_key_certificate)<0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** If we're a v3 authority, check whether we have a certificate that's
+ * likely to expire soon. Warn if we do, but not too often. */
+void
+v3_authority_check_key_expiry(void)
+{
+ time_t now, expires;
+ static time_t last_warned = 0;
+ int badness, time_left, warn_interval;
+ if (!authdir_mode_v3(get_options()) || !authority_key_certificate)
+ return;
+
+ now = time(NULL);
+ expires = authority_key_certificate->expires;
+ time_left = (int)( expires - now );
+ if (time_left <= 0) {
+ badness = LOG_ERR;
+ warn_interval = 60*60;
+ } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60) {
+ badness = LOG_WARN;
+ warn_interval = 60*60;
+ } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60*7) {
+ badness = LOG_WARN;
+ warn_interval = 24*60*60;
+ } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60*30) {
+ badness = LOG_WARN;
+ warn_interval = 24*60*60*5;
+ } else {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (last_warned + warn_interval > now)
+ return;
+
+ if (time_left <= 0) {
+ tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate has expired."
+ " Generate a new one NOW.");
+ } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60) {
+ tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate expires in %d "
+ "hours; Generate a new one NOW.", time_left/(60*60));
+ } else {
+ tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate expires in %d "
+ "days; Generate a new one soon.", time_left/(24*60*60));
+ }
+ last_warned = now;
+}
+
+/** Get the lifetime of an onion key in days. This value is defined by the
+ * network consesus parameter "onion-key-rotation-days". Always returns a value
+ * between <b>MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS</b> and
+ * <b>MAX_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS</b>.
+ */
+static int
+get_onion_key_rotation_days_(void)
+{
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
+ "onion-key-rotation-days",
+ DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS,
+ MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS,
+ MAX_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS);
+}
+
+/** Get the current lifetime of an onion key in seconds. This value is defined
+ * by the network consesus parameter "onion-key-rotation-days", but the value
+ * is converted to seconds.
+ */
+int
+get_onion_key_lifetime(void)
+{
+ return get_onion_key_rotation_days_()*24*60*60;
+}
+
+/** Get the grace period of an onion key in seconds. This value is defined by
+ * the network consesus parameter "onion-key-grace-period-days", but the value
+ * is converted to seconds.
+ */
+int
+get_onion_key_grace_period(void)
+{
+ int grace_period;
+ grace_period = networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
+ "onion-key-grace-period-days",
+ DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS,
+ MIN_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS,
+ get_onion_key_rotation_days_());
+ return grace_period*24*60*60;
+}
+
+/** Set up Tor's TLS contexts, based on our configuration and keys. Return 0
+ * on success, and -1 on failure. */
+int
+router_initialize_tls_context(void)
+{
+ unsigned int flags = 0;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ int lifetime = options->SSLKeyLifetime;
+ if (public_server_mode(options))
+ flags |= TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER;
+ if (!lifetime) { /* we should guess a good ssl cert lifetime */
+
+ /* choose between 5 and 365 days, and round to the day */
+ unsigned int five_days = 5*24*3600;
+ unsigned int one_year = 365*24*3600;
+ lifetime = crypto_rand_int_range(five_days, one_year);
+ lifetime -= lifetime % (24*3600);
+
+ if (crypto_rand_int(2)) {
+ /* Half the time we expire at midnight, and half the time we expire
+ * one second before midnight. (Some CAs wobble their expiry times a
+ * bit in practice, perhaps to reduce collision attacks; see ticket
+ * 8443 for details about observed certs in the wild.) */
+ lifetime--;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* It's ok to pass lifetime in as an unsigned int, since
+ * config_parse_interval() checked it. */
+ return tor_tls_context_init(flags,
+ get_tlsclient_identity_key(),
+ server_mode(options) ?
+ get_server_identity_key() : NULL,
+ (unsigned int)lifetime);
+}
+
+/** Compute fingerprint (or hashed fingerprint if hashed is 1) and write
+ * it to 'fingerprint' (or 'hashed-fingerprint'). Return 0 on success, or
+ * -1 if Tor should die,
+ */
+STATIC int
+router_write_fingerprint(int hashed)
+{
+ char *keydir = NULL, *cp = NULL;
+ const char *fname = hashed ? "hashed-fingerprint" :
+ "fingerprint";
+ char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ char *fingerprint_line = NULL;
+ int result = -1;
+
+ keydir = get_datadir_fname(fname);
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Dumping %sfingerprint to \"%s\"...",
+ hashed ? "hashed " : "", keydir);
+ if (!hashed) {
+ if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(),
+ fingerprint, 0) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing fingerprint");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (crypto_pk_get_hashed_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(),
+ fingerprint) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing hashed fingerprint");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ tor_asprintf(&fingerprint_line, "%s %s\n", options->Nickname, fingerprint);
+
+ /* Check whether we need to write the (hashed-)fingerprint file. */
+
+ cp = read_file_to_str(keydir, RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL);
+ if (!cp || strcmp(cp, fingerprint_line)) {
+ if (write_str_to_file(keydir, fingerprint_line, 0)) {
+ log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing %sfingerprint line to file",
+ hashed ? "hashed " : "");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Your Tor %s identity key fingerprint is '%s %s'",
+ hashed ? "bridge's hashed" : "server's", options->Nickname,
+ fingerprint);
+
+ result = 0;
+ done:
+ tor_free(cp);
+ tor_free(keydir);
+ tor_free(fingerprint_line);
+ return result;
+}
+
+static int
+init_keys_common(void)
+{
+ if (!key_lock)
+ key_lock = tor_mutex_new();
+
+ /* There are a couple of paths that put us here before we've asked
+ * openssl to initialize itself. */
+ if (crypto_global_init(get_options()->HardwareAccel,
+ get_options()->AccelName,
+ get_options()->AccelDir)) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "Unable to initialize OpenSSL. Exiting.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+init_keys_client(void)
+{
+ crypto_pk_t *prkey;
+ if (init_keys_common() < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new()))
+ return -1;
+ if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
+ crypto_pk_free(prkey);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ set_client_identity_key(prkey);
+ /* Create a TLS context. */
+ if (router_initialize_tls_context() < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Initialize all OR private keys, and the TLS context, as necessary.
+ * On OPs, this only initializes the tls context. Return 0 on success,
+ * or -1 if Tor should die.
+ */
+int
+init_keys(void)
+{
+ char *keydir;
+ const char *mydesc;
+ crypto_pk_t *prkey;
+ char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ char v3_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ dirinfo_type_t type;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ dir_server_t *ds;
+ int v3_digest_set = 0;
+ authority_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+
+ /* OP's don't need persistent keys; just make up an identity and
+ * initialize the TLS context. */
+ if (!server_mode(options)) {
+ return init_keys_client();
+ }
+ if (init_keys_common() < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (create_keys_directory(options) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* 1a. Read v3 directory authority key/cert information. */
+ memset(v3_digest, 0, sizeof(v3_digest));
+ if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) {
+ if (init_v3_authority_keys()<0) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL, "We're configured as a V3 authority, but we "
+ "were unable to load our v3 authority keys and certificate! "
+ "Use tor-gencert to generate them. Dying.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ cert = get_my_v3_authority_cert();
+ if (cert) {
+ if (crypto_pk_get_digest(get_my_v3_authority_cert()->identity_key,
+ v3_digest) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute my v3 authority identity key "
+ "digest.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ v3_digest_set = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* 1b. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */
+ keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_id_key");
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making identity key \"%s\"...",keydir);
+ bool created = false;
+ prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created);
+ tor_free(keydir);
+ if (!prkey) return -1;
+ if (created)
+ log_new_relay_greeting();
+ set_server_identity_key(prkey);
+
+ /* 1c. If we are configured as a bridge, generate a client key;
+ * otherwise, set the server identity key as our client identity
+ * key. */
+ if (public_server_mode(options)) {
+ set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_dup_key(prkey)); /* set above */
+ } else {
+ if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new()))
+ return -1;
+ if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
+ crypto_pk_free(prkey);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ set_client_identity_key(prkey);
+ }
+
+ /* 1d. Load all ed25519 keys */
+ const int new_signing_key = load_ed_keys(options,now);
+ if (new_signing_key < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* 2. Read onion key. Make it if none is found. */
+ keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key");
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making onion key \"%s\"...",keydir);
+ prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created);
+ if (created)
+ log_new_relay_greeting();
+ tor_free(keydir);
+ if (!prkey) return -1;
+ set_onion_key(prkey);
+ if (options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR) {
+ /* only mess with the state file if we're actually running Tor */
+ or_state_t *state = get_or_state();
+ if (state->LastRotatedOnionKey > 100 && state->LastRotatedOnionKey < now) {
+ /* We allow for some parsing slop, but we don't want to risk accepting
+ * values in the distant future. If we did, we might never rotate the
+ * onion key. */
+ onionkey_set_at = state->LastRotatedOnionKey;
+ } else {
+ /* We have no LastRotatedOnionKey set; either we just created the key
+ * or it's a holdover from 0.1.2.4-alpha-dev or earlier. In either case,
+ * start the clock ticking now so that we will eventually rotate it even
+ * if we don't stay up for the full lifetime of an onion key. */
+ state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now;
+ or_state_mark_dirty(state, options->AvoidDiskWrites ?
+ time(NULL)+3600 : 0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old");
+ if (!lastonionkey && file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE) {
+ /* Load keys from non-empty files only.
+ * Missing old keys won't be replaced with freshly generated keys. */
+ prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 0, LOG_ERR, 0);
+ if (prkey)
+ lastonionkey = prkey;
+ }
+ tor_free(keydir);
+
+ {
+ /* 2b. Load curve25519 onion keys. */
+ int r;
+ keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor");
+ r = init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(&curve25519_onion_key,
+ keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, "onion");
+ tor_free(keydir);
+ if (r<0)
+ return -1;
+
+ keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old");
+ if (tor_mem_is_zero((const char *)
+ last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) &&
+ file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE) {
+ /* Load keys from non-empty files only.
+ * Missing old keys won't be replaced with freshly generated keys. */
+ init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(&last_curve25519_onion_key,
+ keydir, 0, LOG_ERR, "onion");
+ }
+ tor_free(keydir);
+ }
+
+ /* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */
+ if (router_initialize_tls_context() < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* 3b. Get an ed25519 link certificate. Note that we need to do this
+ * after we set up the TLS context */
+ if (generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, new_signing_key > 0) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Couldn't make link cert");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* 4. Build our router descriptor. */
+ /* Must be called after keys are initialized. */
+ mydesc = router_get_my_descriptor();
+ if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) {
+ const char *m = NULL;
+ routerinfo_t *ri;
+ /* We need to add our own fingerprint so it gets recognized. */
+ if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key())) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error adding own fingerprint to set of relays");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (mydesc) {
+ was_router_added_t added;
+ ri = router_parse_entry_from_string(mydesc, NULL, 1, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!ri) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Generated a routerinfo we couldn't parse.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ added = dirserv_add_descriptor(ri, &m, "self");
+ if (!WRA_WAS_ADDED(added)) {
+ if (!WRA_WAS_OUTDATED(added)) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL, "Unable to add own descriptor to directory: %s",
+ m?m:"<unknown error>");
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ /* If the descriptor was outdated, that's ok. This can happen
+ * when some config options are toggled that affect workers, but
+ * we don't really need new keys yet so the descriptor doesn't
+ * change and the old one is still fresh. */
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't add own descriptor to directory "
+ "after key init: %s This is usually not a problem.",
+ m?m:"<unknown error>");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* 5. Dump fingerprint and possibly hashed fingerprint to files. */
+ if (router_write_fingerprint(0)) {
+ log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing fingerprint to file");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!public_server_mode(options) && router_write_fingerprint(1)) {
+ log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing hashed fingerprint to file");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!authdir_mode(options))
+ return 0;
+ /* 6. [authdirserver only] load approved-routers file */
+ if (dirserv_load_fingerprint_file() < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error loading fingerprints");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* 6b. [authdirserver only] add own key to approved directories. */
+ crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest);
+ type = ((options->V3AuthoritativeDir ?
+ (V3_DIRINFO|MICRODESC_DIRINFO|EXTRAINFO_DIRINFO) : NO_DIRINFO) |
+ (options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir ? BRIDGE_DIRINFO : NO_DIRINFO));
+
+ ds = router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(digest);
+ if (!ds) {
+ ds = trusted_dir_server_new(options->Nickname, NULL,
+ router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, 0),
+ router_get_advertised_or_port(options),
+ NULL,
+ digest,
+ v3_digest,
+ type, 0.0);
+ if (!ds) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"We want to be a directory authority, but we "
+ "couldn't add ourselves to the authority list. Failing.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ dir_server_add(ds);
+ }
+ if (ds->type != type) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Configured authority type does not match authority "
+ "type in DirAuthority list. Adjusting. (%d v %d)",
+ type, ds->type);
+ ds->type = type;
+ }
+ if (v3_digest_set && (ds->type & V3_DIRINFO) &&
+ tor_memneq(v3_digest, ds->v3_identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "V3 identity key does not match identity declared in "
+ "DirAuthority line. Adjusting.");
+ memcpy(ds->v3_identity_digest, v3_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ }
+
+ if (cert) { /* add my own cert to the list of known certs */
+ log_info(LD_DIR, "adding my own v3 cert");
+ if (trusted_dirs_load_certs_from_string(
+ cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
+ TRUSTED_DIRS_CERTS_SRC_SELF, 0,
+ NULL)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse my own v3 cert! Failing.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0; /* success */
+}
+
+/** The lower threshold of remaining bandwidth required to advertise (or
+ * automatically provide) directory services */
+/* XXX Should this be increased? */
+#define MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER 51200
+
+/** Return true iff we have enough configured bandwidth to advertise or
+ * automatically provide directory services from cache directory
+ * information. */
+int
+router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (options->BandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (options->RelayBandwidthRate > 0 &&
+ options->RelayBandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Helper: Return 1 if we have sufficient resources for serving directory
+ * requests, return 0 otherwise.
+ * dir_port is either 0 or the configured DirPort number.
+ * If AccountingMax is set less than our advertised bandwidth, then don't
+ * serve requests. Likewise, if our advertised bandwidth is less than
+ * MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER, don't bother trying to serve requests.
+ */
+static int
+router_should_be_dirserver(const or_options_t *options, int dir_port)
+{
+ static int advertising=1; /* start out assuming we will advertise */
+ int new_choice=1;
+ const char *reason = NULL;
+
+ if (accounting_is_enabled(options) &&
+ get_options()->AccountingRule != ACCT_IN) {
+ /* Don't spend bytes for directory traffic if we could end up hibernating,
+ * but allow DirPort otherwise. Some relay operators set AccountingMax
+ * because they're confused or to get statistics. Directory traffic has a
+ * much larger effect on output than input so there is no reason to turn it
+ * off if using AccountingRule in. */
+ int interval_length = accounting_get_interval_length();
+ uint32_t effective_bw = get_effective_bwrate(options);
+ uint64_t acc_bytes;
+ if (!interval_length) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "An accounting interval is not allowed to be zero "
+ "seconds long. Raising to 1.");
+ interval_length = 1;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Calculating whether to advertise %s: effective "
+ "bwrate: %u, AccountingMax: %"PRIu64", "
+ "accounting interval length %d",
+ dir_port ? "dirport" : "begindir",
+ effective_bw, (options->AccountingMax),
+ interval_length);
+
+ acc_bytes = options->AccountingMax;
+ if (get_options()->AccountingRule == ACCT_SUM)
+ acc_bytes /= 2;
+ if (effective_bw >=
+ acc_bytes / interval_length) {
+ new_choice = 0;
+ reason = "AccountingMax enabled";
+ }
+ } else if (! router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver(options)) {
+ /* if we're advertising a small amount */
+ new_choice = 0;
+ reason = "BandwidthRate under 50KB";
+ }
+
+ if (advertising != new_choice) {
+ if (new_choice == 1) {
+ if (dir_port > 0)
+ log_notice(LD_DIR, "Advertising DirPort as %d", dir_port);
+ else
+ log_notice(LD_DIR, "Advertising directory service support");
+ } else {
+ tor_assert(reason);
+ log_notice(LD_DIR, "Not advertising Dir%s (Reason: %s)",
+ dir_port ? "Port" : "ectory Service support", reason);
+ }
+ advertising = new_choice;
+ }
+
+ return advertising;
+}
+
+/** Look at a variety of factors, and return 0 if we don't want to
+ * advertise the fact that we have a DirPort open or begindir support, else
+ * return 1.
+ *
+ * Where dir_port or supports_tunnelled_dir_requests are not relevant, they
+ * must be 0.
+ *
+ * Log a helpful message if we change our mind about whether to publish.
+ */
+static int
+decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(const or_options_t *options,
+ uint16_t dir_port,
+ int supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)
+{
+ /* Part one: reasons to publish or not publish that aren't
+ * worth mentioning to the user, either because they're obvious
+ * or because they're normal behavior. */
+
+ /* short circuit the rest of the function */
+ if (!dir_port && !supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)
+ return 0;
+ if (authdir_mode(options)) /* always publish */
+ return 1;
+ if (net_is_disabled())
+ return 0;
+ if (dir_port && !router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, dir_port))
+ return 0;
+ if (supports_tunnelled_dir_requests &&
+ !router_get_advertised_or_port(options))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Part two: consider config options that could make us choose to
+ * publish or not publish that the user might find surprising. */
+ return router_should_be_dirserver(options, dir_port);
+}
+
+/** Front-end to decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(): return 0 if we don't want to
+ * advertise the fact that we have a DirPort open, else return the
+ * DirPort we want to advertise.
+ */
+int
+router_should_advertise_dirport(const or_options_t *options, uint16_t dir_port)
+{
+ /* supports_tunnelled_dir_requests is not relevant, pass 0 */
+ return decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(options, dir_port, 0) ? dir_port : 0;
+}
+
+/** Front-end to decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(): return 0 if we don't want to
+ * advertise the fact that we support begindir requests, else return 1.
+ */
+static int
+router_should_advertise_begindir(const or_options_t *options,
+ int supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)
+{
+ /* dir_port is not relevant, pass 0 */
+ return decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(options, 0,
+ supports_tunnelled_dir_requests);
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the combination of options in <b>options</b> and parameters
+ * in the consensus mean that we don't want to allow exits from circuits
+ * we got from addresses not known to be servers. */
+int
+should_refuse_unknown_exits(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (options->RefuseUnknownExits != -1) {
+ return options->RefuseUnknownExits;
+ } else {
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "refuseunknownexits", 1, 0, 1);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Decide if we're a publishable server. We are a publishable server if:
+ * - We don't have the ClientOnly option set
+ * and
+ * - We have the PublishServerDescriptor option set to non-empty
+ * and
+ * - We have ORPort set
+ * and
+ * - We believe our ORPort and DirPort (if present) are reachable from
+ * the outside; or
+ * - We believe our ORPort is reachable from the outside, and we can't
+ * check our DirPort because the consensus has no exits; or
+ * - We are an authoritative directory server.
+ */
+static int
+decide_if_publishable_server(void)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ if (options->ClientOnly)
+ return 0;
+ if (options->PublishServerDescriptor_ == NO_DIRINFO)
+ return 0;
+ if (!server_mode(options))
+ return 0;
+ if (authdir_mode(options))
+ return 1;
+ if (!router_get_advertised_or_port(options))
+ return 0;
+ if (!check_whether_orport_reachable(options))
+ return 0;
+ if (router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL) {
+ /* All set: there are no exits in the consensus (maybe this is a tiny
+ * test network), so we can't check our DirPort reachability. */
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ return check_whether_dirport_reachable(options);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Initiate server descriptor upload as reasonable (if server is publishable,
+ * etc). <b>force</b> is as for router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers.
+ *
+ * We need to rebuild the descriptor if it's dirty even if we're not
+ * uploading, because our reachability testing *uses* our descriptor to
+ * determine what IP address and ports to test.
+ */
+void
+consider_publishable_server(int force)
+{
+ int rebuilt;
+
+ if (!server_mode(get_options()))
+ return;
+
+ rebuilt = router_rebuild_descriptor(0);
+ if (decide_if_publishable_server()) {
+ set_server_advertised(1);
+ if (rebuilt == 0)
+ router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(force);
+ } else {
+ set_server_advertised(0);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Return the port of the first active listener of type
+ * <b>listener_type</b>. */
+/** XXX not a very good interface. it's not reliable when there are
+ multiple listeners. */
+uint16_t
+router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(int listener_type,
+ sa_family_t family)
+{
+ /* Iterate all connections, find one of the right kind and return
+ the port. Not very sophisticated or fast, but effective. */
+ smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
+ if (conn->type == listener_type && !conn->marked_for_close &&
+ conn->socket_family == family) {
+ return conn->port;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return the port that we should advertise as our ORPort; this is either
+ * the one configured in the ORPort option, or the one we actually bound to
+ * if ORPort is "auto".
+ */
+uint16_t
+router_get_advertised_or_port(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ return router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(options, AF_INET);
+}
+
+/** As router_get_advertised_or_port(), but allows an address family argument.
+ */
+uint16_t
+router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(const or_options_t *options,
+ sa_family_t family)
+{
+ int port = get_first_advertised_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER,
+ family);
+ (void)options;
+
+ /* If the port is in 'auto' mode, we have to use
+ router_get_listener_port_by_type(). */
+ if (port == CFG_AUTO_PORT)
+ return router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER,
+ family);
+
+ return port;
+}
+
+/** Return the port that we should advertise as our DirPort;
+ * this is one of three possibilities:
+ * The one that is passed as <b>dirport</b> if the DirPort option is 0, or
+ * the one configured in the DirPort option,
+ * or the one we actually bound to if DirPort is "auto". */
+uint16_t
+router_get_advertised_dir_port(const or_options_t *options, uint16_t dirport)
+{
+ int dirport_configured = get_primary_dir_port();
+ (void)options;
+
+ if (!dirport_configured)
+ return dirport;
+
+ if (dirport_configured == CFG_AUTO_PORT)
+ return router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER,
+ AF_INET);
+
+ return dirport_configured;
+}
+
+/*
+ * OR descriptor generation.
+ */
+
+/** My routerinfo. */
+static routerinfo_t *desc_routerinfo = NULL;
+/** My extrainfo */
+static extrainfo_t *desc_extrainfo = NULL;
+/** Why did we most recently decide to regenerate our descriptor? Used to
+ * tell the authorities why we're sending it to them. */
+static const char *desc_gen_reason = "uninitialized reason";
+/** Since when has our descriptor been "clean"? 0 if we need to regenerate it
+ * now. */
+static time_t desc_clean_since = 0;
+/** Why did we mark the descriptor dirty? */
+static const char *desc_dirty_reason = "Tor just started";
+/** Boolean: do we need to regenerate the above? */
+static int desc_needs_upload = 0;
+
+/** OR only: If <b>force</b> is true, or we haven't uploaded this
+ * descriptor successfully yet, try to upload our signed descriptor to
+ * all the directory servers we know about.
+ */
+void
+router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(int force)
+{
+ const routerinfo_t *ri;
+ extrainfo_t *ei;
+ char *msg;
+ size_t desc_len, extra_len = 0, total_len;
+ dirinfo_type_t auth = get_options()->PublishServerDescriptor_;
+
+ ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+ if (!ri) {
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No descriptor; skipping upload");
+ return;
+ }
+ ei = router_get_my_extrainfo();
+ if (auth == NO_DIRINFO)
+ return;
+ if (!force && !desc_needs_upload)
+ return;
+
+ log_info(LD_OR, "Uploading relay descriptor to directory authorities%s",
+ force ? " (forced)" : "");
+
+ desc_needs_upload = 0;
+
+ desc_len = ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len;
+ extra_len = ei ? ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len : 0;
+ total_len = desc_len + extra_len + 1;
+ msg = tor_malloc(total_len);
+ memcpy(msg, ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, desc_len);
+ if (ei) {
+ memcpy(msg+desc_len, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, extra_len);
+ }
+ msg[desc_len+extra_len] = 0;
+
+ directory_post_to_dirservers(DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR,
+ (auth & BRIDGE_DIRINFO) ?
+ ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE :
+ ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL,
+ auth, msg, desc_len, extra_len);
+ tor_free(msg);
+}
+
+/** OR only: Check whether my exit policy says to allow connection to
+ * conn. Return 0 if we accept; non-0 if we reject.
+ */
+int
+router_compare_to_my_exit_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port)
+{
+ const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+ if (!me) /* make sure routerinfo exists */
+ return -1;
+
+ /* make sure it's resolved to something. this way we can't get a
+ 'maybe' below. */
+ if (tor_addr_is_null(addr))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* look at router_get_my_routerinfo()->exit_policy for both the v4 and the
+ * v6 policies. The exit_policy field in router_get_my_routerinfo() is a
+ * bit unusual, in that it contains IPv6 and IPv6 entries. We don't want to
+ * look at router_get_my_routerinfo()->ipv6_exit_policy, since that's a port
+ * summary. */
+ if ((tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET ||
+ tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6)) {
+ return compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(addr, port,
+ me->exit_policy) != ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED;
+#if 0
+ } else if (tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6) {
+ return get_options()->IPv6Exit &&
+ desc_routerinfo->ipv6_exit_policy &&
+ compare_tor_addr_to_short_policy(addr, port,
+ me->ipv6_exit_policy) != ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED;
+#endif /* 0 */
+ } else {
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Return true iff my exit policy is reject *:*. Return -1 if we don't
+ * have a descriptor */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star,(void))
+{
+ const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+ if (!me) /* make sure routerinfo exists */
+ return -1;
+
+ return me->policy_is_reject_star;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff I'm a server and <b>digest</b> is equal to
+ * my server identity key digest. */
+int
+router_digest_is_me(const char *digest)
+{
+ return (server_identitykey &&
+ tor_memeq(server_identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN));
+}
+
+/** Return my identity digest. */
+const uint8_t *
+router_get_my_id_digest(void)
+{
+ return (const uint8_t *)server_identitykey_digest;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff I'm a server and <b>digest</b> is equal to
+ * my identity digest. */
+int
+router_extrainfo_digest_is_me(const char *digest)
+{
+ extrainfo_t *ei = router_get_my_extrainfo();
+ if (!ei)
+ return 0;
+
+ return tor_memeq(digest,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN);
+}
+
+/** A wrapper around router_digest_is_me(). */
+int
+router_is_me(const routerinfo_t *router)
+{
+ return router_digest_is_me(router->cache_info.identity_digest);
+}
+
+/** Return a routerinfo for this OR, rebuilding a fresh one if
+ * necessary. Return NULL on error, or if called on an OP. */
+MOCK_IMPL(const routerinfo_t *,
+router_get_my_routerinfo,(void))
+{
+ return router_get_my_routerinfo_with_err(NULL);
+}
+
+/** Return routerinfo of this OR. Rebuild it from
+ * scratch if needed. Set <b>*err</b> to 0 on success or to
+ * appropriate TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_* value on failure.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(const routerinfo_t *,
+router_get_my_routerinfo_with_err,(int *err))
+{
+ if (!server_mode(get_options())) {
+ if (err)
+ *err = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER;
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!desc_clean_since) {
+ int rebuild_err = router_rebuild_descriptor(0);
+ if (rebuild_err < 0) {
+ if (err)
+ *err = rebuild_err;
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!desc_routerinfo) {
+ if (err)
+ *err = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING;
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (err)
+ *err = 0;
+
+ return desc_routerinfo;
+}
+
+/** OR only: Return a signed server descriptor for this OR, rebuilding a fresh
+ * one if necessary. Return NULL on error.
+ */
+const char *
+router_get_my_descriptor(void)
+{
+ const char *body;
+ const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+ if (! me)
+ return NULL;
+ tor_assert(me->cache_info.saved_location == SAVED_NOWHERE);
+ body = signed_descriptor_get_body(&me->cache_info);
+ /* Make sure this is nul-terminated. */
+ tor_assert(!body[me->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len]);
+ log_debug(LD_GENERAL,"my desc is '%s'", body);
+ return body;
+}
+
+/** Return the extrainfo document for this OR, or NULL if we have none.
+ * Rebuilt it (and the server descriptor) if necessary. */
+extrainfo_t *
+router_get_my_extrainfo(void)
+{
+ if (!server_mode(get_options()))
+ return NULL;
+ if (router_rebuild_descriptor(0))
+ return NULL;
+ return desc_extrainfo;
+}
+
+/** Return a human-readable string describing what triggered us to generate
+ * our current descriptor, or NULL if we don't know. */
+const char *
+router_get_descriptor_gen_reason(void)
+{
+ return desc_gen_reason;
+}
+
+/** A list of nicknames that we've warned about including in our family
+ * declaration verbatim rather than as digests. */
+static smartlist_t *warned_nonexistent_family = NULL;
+
+static int router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess);
+
+/** Make a current best guess at our address, either because
+ * it's configured in torrc, or because we've learned it from
+ * dirserver headers. Place the answer in *<b>addr</b> and return
+ * 0 on success, else return -1 if we have no guess.
+ *
+ * If <b>cache_only</b> is true, just return any cached answers, and
+ * don't try to get any new answers.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+router_pick_published_address,(const or_options_t *options, uint32_t *addr,
+ int cache_only))
+{
+ /* First, check the cached output from resolve_my_address(). */
+ *addr = get_last_resolved_addr();
+ if (*addr)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Second, consider doing a resolve attempt right here. */
+ if (!cache_only) {
+ if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, addr, NULL, NULL) >= 0) {
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG,"Success: chose address '%s'.", fmt_addr32(*addr));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Third, check the cached output from router_new_address_suggestion(). */
+ if (router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(addr) >= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* We have no useful cached answers. Return failure. */
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Like router_check_descriptor_address_consistency, but specifically for the
+ * ORPort or DirPort.
+ * listener_type is either CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER or CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER. */
+static void
+router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(uint32_t ipv4h_desc_addr,
+ int listener_type)
+{
+ tor_assert(listener_type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER ||
+ listener_type == CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER);
+
+ /* The first advertised Port may be the magic constant CFG_AUTO_PORT.
+ */
+ int port_v4_cfg = get_first_advertised_port_by_type_af(listener_type,
+ AF_INET);
+ if (port_v4_cfg != 0 &&
+ !port_exists_by_type_addr32h_port(listener_type,
+ ipv4h_desc_addr, port_v4_cfg, 1)) {
+ const tor_addr_t *port_addr = get_first_advertised_addr_by_type_af(
+ listener_type,
+ AF_INET);
+ /* If we're building a descriptor with no advertised address,
+ * something is terribly wrong. */
+ tor_assert(port_addr);
+
+ tor_addr_t desc_addr;
+ char port_addr_str[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
+ char desc_addr_str[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
+
+ tor_addr_to_str(port_addr_str, port_addr, TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN, 0);
+
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&desc_addr, ipv4h_desc_addr);
+ tor_addr_to_str(desc_addr_str, &desc_addr, TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN, 0);
+
+ const char *listener_str = (listener_type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER ?
+ "OR" : "Dir");
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "The IPv4 %sPort address %s does not match the "
+ "descriptor address %s. If you have a static public IPv4 "
+ "address, use 'Address <IPv4>' and 'OutboundBindAddress "
+ "<IPv4>'. If you are behind a NAT, use two %sPort lines: "
+ "'%sPort <PublicPort> NoListen' and '%sPort <InternalPort> "
+ "NoAdvertise'.",
+ listener_str, port_addr_str, desc_addr_str, listener_str,
+ listener_str, listener_str);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Tor relays only have one IPv4 address in the descriptor, which is derived
+ * from the Address torrc option, or guessed using various methods in
+ * router_pick_published_address().
+ * Warn the operator if there is no ORPort on the descriptor address
+ * ipv4h_desc_addr.
+ * Warn the operator if there is no DirPort on the descriptor address.
+ * This catches a few common config errors:
+ * - operators who expect ORPorts and DirPorts to be advertised on the
+ * ports' listen addresses, rather than the torrc Address (or guessed
+ * addresses in the absence of an Address config). This includes
+ * operators who attempt to put their ORPort and DirPort on different
+ * addresses;
+ * - discrepancies between guessed addresses and configured listen
+ * addresses (when the Address option isn't set).
+ * If a listener is listening on all IPv4 addresses, it is assumed that it
+ * is listening on the configured Address, and no messages are logged.
+ * If an operators has specified NoAdvertise ORPorts in a NAT setting,
+ * no messages are logged, unless they have specified other advertised
+ * addresses.
+ * The message tells operators to configure an ORPort and DirPort that match
+ * the Address (using NoListen if needed).
+ */
+static void
+router_check_descriptor_address_consistency(uint32_t ipv4h_desc_addr)
+{
+ router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(ipv4h_desc_addr,
+ CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER);
+ router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(ipv4h_desc_addr,
+ CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER);
+}
+
+/** Build a fresh routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and extra-info document
+ * for this OR. Set r to the generated routerinfo, e to the generated
+ * extra-info document. Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error. Failure to
+ * generate an extra-info document is not an error and is indicated by setting
+ * e to NULL. Caller is responsible for freeing generated documents if 0 is
+ * returned.
+ */
+int
+router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e)
+{
+ routerinfo_t *ri;
+ extrainfo_t *ei;
+ uint32_t addr;
+ char platform[256];
+ int hibernating = we_are_hibernating();
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ if (router_pick_published_address(options, &addr, 0) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Don't know my address while generating descriptor");
+ return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NO_EXT_ADDR;
+ }
+
+ /* Log a message if the address in the descriptor doesn't match the ORPort
+ * and DirPort addresses configured by the operator. */
+ router_check_descriptor_address_consistency(addr);
+
+ ri = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t));
+ ri->cache_info.routerlist_index = -1;
+ ri->nickname = tor_strdup(options->Nickname);
+ ri->addr = addr;
+ ri->or_port = router_get_advertised_or_port(options);
+ ri->dir_port = router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, 0);
+ ri->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests =
+ directory_permits_begindir_requests(options);
+ ri->cache_info.published_on = time(NULL);
+ /* get_onion_key() must invoke from main thread */
+ router_set_rsa_onion_pkey(get_onion_key(), &ri->onion_pkey,
+ &ri->onion_pkey_len);
+
+ ri->onion_curve25519_pkey =
+ tor_memdup(&get_current_curve25519_keypair()->pubkey,
+ sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
+
+ /* For now, at most one IPv6 or-address is being advertised. */
+ {
+ const port_cfg_t *ipv6_orport = NULL;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(get_configured_ports(), const port_cfg_t *, p) {
+ if (p->type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER &&
+ ! p->server_cfg.no_advertise &&
+ ! p->server_cfg.bind_ipv4_only &&
+ tor_addr_family(&p->addr) == AF_INET6) {
+ /* Like IPv4, if the relay is configured using the default
+ * authorities, disallow internal IPs. Otherwise, allow them. */
+ const int default_auth = using_default_dir_authorities(options);
+ if (! tor_addr_is_internal(&p->addr, 0) || ! default_auth) {
+ ipv6_orport = p;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ char addrbuf[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "Unable to use configured IPv6 address \"%s\" in a "
+ "descriptor. Skipping it. "
+ "Try specifying a globally reachable address explicitly.",
+ tor_addr_to_str(addrbuf, &p->addr, sizeof(addrbuf), 1));
+ }
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(p);
+ if (ipv6_orport) {
+ tor_addr_copy(&ri->ipv6_addr, &ipv6_orport->addr);
+ ri->ipv6_orport = ipv6_orport->port;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_server_identity_key());
+ if (BUG(crypto_pk_get_digest(ri->identity_pkey,
+ ri->cache_info.identity_digest) < 0)) {
+ routerinfo_free(ri);
+ return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED;
+ }
+ ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert =
+ tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
+
+ get_platform_str(platform, sizeof(platform));
+ ri->platform = tor_strdup(platform);
+
+ ri->protocol_list = tor_strdup(protover_get_supported_protocols());
+
+ /* compute ri->bandwidthrate as the min of various options */
+ ri->bandwidthrate = get_effective_bwrate(options);
+
+ /* and compute ri->bandwidthburst similarly */
+ ri->bandwidthburst = get_effective_bwburst(options);
+
+ /* Report bandwidth, unless we're hibernating or shutting down */
+ ri->bandwidthcapacity = hibernating ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess();
+
+ if (dns_seems_to_be_broken() || has_dns_init_failed()) {
+ /* DNS is screwed up; don't claim to be an exit. */
+ policies_exit_policy_append_reject_star(&ri->exit_policy);
+ } else {
+ policies_parse_exit_policy_from_options(options,ri->addr,&ri->ipv6_addr,
+ &ri->exit_policy);
+ }
+ ri->policy_is_reject_star =
+ policy_is_reject_star(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET, 1) &&
+ policy_is_reject_star(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET6, 1);
+
+ if (options->IPv6Exit) {
+ char *p_tmp = policy_summarize(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET6);
+ if (p_tmp)
+ ri->ipv6_exit_policy = parse_short_policy(p_tmp);
+ tor_free(p_tmp);
+ }
+
+ if (options->MyFamily && ! options->BridgeRelay) {
+ if (!warned_nonexistent_family)
+ warned_nonexistent_family = smartlist_new();
+ ri->declared_family = smartlist_new();
+ config_line_t *family;
+ for (family = options->MyFamily; family; family = family->next) {
+ char *name = family->value;
+ const node_t *member;
+ if (!strcasecmp(name, options->Nickname))
+ continue; /* Don't list ourself, that's redundant */
+ else
+ member = node_get_by_nickname(name, 0);
+ if (!member) {
+ int is_legal = is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(name);
+ if (!smartlist_contains_string(warned_nonexistent_family, name) &&
+ !is_legal_hexdigest(name)) {
+ if (is_legal)
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "I have no descriptor for the router named \"%s\" in my "
+ "declared family; I'll use the nickname as is, but "
+ "this may confuse clients.", name);
+ else
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named \"%s\" in my "
+ "declared family, but that isn't a legal nickname. "
+ "Skipping it.", escaped(name));
+ smartlist_add_strdup(warned_nonexistent_family, name);
+ }
+ if (is_legal) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(ri->declared_family, name);
+ }
+ } else if (router_digest_is_me(member->identity)) {
+ /* Don't list ourself in our own family; that's redundant */
+ /* XXX shouldn't be possible */
+ } else {
+ char *fp = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
+ fp[0] = '$';
+ base16_encode(fp+1,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
+ member->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ smartlist_add(ri->declared_family, fp);
+ if (smartlist_contains_string(warned_nonexistent_family, name))
+ smartlist_string_remove(warned_nonexistent_family, name);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* remove duplicates from the list */
+ smartlist_sort_strings(ri->declared_family);
+ smartlist_uniq_strings(ri->declared_family);
+ }
+
+ /* Now generate the extrainfo. */
+ ei = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extrainfo_t));
+ ei->cache_info.is_extrainfo = 1;
+ strlcpy(ei->nickname, get_options()->Nickname, sizeof(ei->nickname));
+ ei->cache_info.published_on = ri->cache_info.published_on;
+ ei->cache_info.signing_key_cert =
+ tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
+
+ memcpy(ei->cache_info.identity_digest, ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN);
+ if (extrainfo_dump_to_string(&ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
+ ei, get_server_identity_key(),
+ get_master_signing_keypair()) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate extra-info descriptor.");
+ extrainfo_free(ei);
+ ei = NULL;
+ } else {
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
+ strlen(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
+ router_get_extrainfo_hash(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
+ crypto_digest256((char*) ei->digest256,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
+ DIGEST_SHA256);
+ }
+
+ /* Now finish the router descriptor. */
+ if (ei) {
+ memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN);
+ memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest256,
+ ei->digest256,
+ DIGEST256_LEN);
+ } else {
+ /* ri was allocated with tor_malloc_zero, so there is no need to
+ * zero ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest here. */
+ }
+ if (! (ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body =
+ router_dump_router_to_string(ri, get_server_identity_key(),
+ get_onion_key(),
+ get_current_curve25519_keypair(),
+ get_master_signing_keypair())) ) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate router descriptor.");
+ routerinfo_free(ri);
+ extrainfo_free(ei);
+ return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_GENERATE;
+ }
+ ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
+ strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
+
+ ri->purpose =
+ options->BridgeRelay ? ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE : ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL;
+ if (options->BridgeRelay) {
+ /* Bridges shouldn't be able to send their descriptors unencrypted,
+ anyway, since they don't have a DirPort, and always connect to the
+ bridge authority anonymously. But just in case they somehow think of
+ sending them on an unencrypted connection, don't allow them to try. */
+ ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 0;
+ if (ei)
+ ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 0;
+ } else {
+ ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
+ if (ei)
+ ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
+ }
+
+ router_get_router_hash(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
+ strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body),
+ ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
+
+ if (ei) {
+ tor_assert(!
+ routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri->identity_pkey, ei,
+ &ri->cache_info, NULL));
+ }
+
+ *r = ri;
+ *e = ei;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** If <b>force</b> is true, or our descriptor is out-of-date, rebuild a fresh
+ * routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and extra-info document for this OR.
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error.
+ */
+int
+router_rebuild_descriptor(int force)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ routerinfo_t *ri;
+ extrainfo_t *ei;
+ uint32_t addr;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ if (desc_clean_since && !force)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (router_pick_published_address(options, &addr, 0) < 0 ||
+ router_get_advertised_or_port(options) == 0) {
+ /* Stop trying to rebuild our descriptor every second. We'll
+ * learn that it's time to try again when ip_address_changed()
+ * marks it dirty. */
+ desc_clean_since = time(NULL);
+ return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_OR, "Rebuilding relay descriptor%s", force ? " (forced)" : "");
+
+ err = router_build_fresh_descriptor(&ri, &ei);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo);
+ desc_routerinfo = ri;
+ extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo);
+ desc_extrainfo = ei;
+
+ desc_clean_since = time(NULL);
+ desc_needs_upload = 1;
+ desc_gen_reason = desc_dirty_reason;
+ if (BUG(desc_gen_reason == NULL)) {
+ desc_gen_reason = "descriptor was marked dirty earlier, for no reason.";
+ }
+ desc_dirty_reason = NULL;
+ control_event_my_descriptor_changed();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** If our router descriptor ever goes this long without being regenerated
+ * because something changed, we force an immediate regenerate-and-upload. */
+#define FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL (18*60*60)
+
+/** If our router descriptor seems to be missing or unacceptable according
+ * to the authorities, regenerate and reupload it _this_ often. */
+#define FAST_RETRY_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL (90*60)
+
+/** Mark descriptor out of date if it's been "too long" since we last tried
+ * to upload one. */
+void
+mark_my_descriptor_dirty_if_too_old(time_t now)
+{
+ networkstatus_t *ns;
+ const routerstatus_t *rs;
+ const char *retry_fast_reason = NULL; /* Set if we should retry frequently */
+ const time_t slow_cutoff = now - FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL;
+ const time_t fast_cutoff = now - FAST_RETRY_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL;
+
+ /* If it's already dirty, don't mark it. */
+ if (! desc_clean_since)
+ return;
+
+ /* If it's older than FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL, it's always
+ * time to rebuild it. */
+ if (desc_clean_since < slow_cutoff) {
+ mark_my_descriptor_dirty("time for new descriptor");
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Now we see whether we want to be retrying frequently or no. The
+ * rule here is that we'll retry frequently if we aren't listed in the
+ * live consensus we have, or if the publication time of the
+ * descriptor listed for us in the consensus is very old. */
+ ns = networkstatus_get_live_consensus(now);
+ if (ns) {
+ rs = networkstatus_vote_find_entry(ns, server_identitykey_digest);
+ if (rs == NULL)
+ retry_fast_reason = "not listed in consensus";
+ else if (rs->published_on < slow_cutoff)
+ retry_fast_reason = "version listed in consensus is quite old";
+ }
+
+ if (retry_fast_reason && desc_clean_since < fast_cutoff)
+ mark_my_descriptor_dirty(retry_fast_reason);
+}
+
+/** Call when the current descriptor is out of date. */
+void
+mark_my_descriptor_dirty(const char *reason)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ if (BUG(reason == NULL)) {
+ reason = "marked descriptor dirty for unspecified reason";
+ }
+ if (server_mode(options) && options->PublishServerDescriptor_)
+ log_info(LD_OR, "Decided to publish new relay descriptor: %s", reason);
+ desc_clean_since = 0;
+ if (!desc_dirty_reason)
+ desc_dirty_reason = reason;
+}
+
+/** How frequently will we republish our descriptor because of large (factor
+ * of 2) shifts in estimated bandwidth? Note: We don't use this constant
+ * if our previous bandwidth estimate was exactly 0. */
+#define MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ (3*60*60)
+
+/** Maximum uptime to republish our descriptor because of large shifts in
+ * estimated bandwidth. */
+#define MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE (24*60*60)
+
+/** By which factor bandwidth shifts have to change to be considered large. */
+#define BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR 2
+
+/** Check whether bandwidth has changed a lot since the last time we announced
+ * bandwidth while the uptime is smaller than MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE.
+ * If so, mark our descriptor dirty. */
+void
+check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time_t now)
+{
+ static time_t last_changed = 0;
+ uint64_t prev, cur;
+ const int hibernating = we_are_hibernating();
+
+ /* If the relay uptime is bigger than MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE,
+ * the next regularly scheduled descriptor update (18h) will be enough */
+ if (get_uptime() > MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE && !hibernating)
+ return;
+
+ const routerinfo_t *my_ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+
+ if (!my_ri)
+ return;
+
+ prev = my_ri->bandwidthcapacity;
+
+ /* Consider ourselves to have zero bandwidth if we're hibernating or
+ * shutting down. */
+ cur = hibernating ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess();
+
+ if ((prev != cur && (!prev || !cur)) ||
+ cur > (prev * BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR) ||
+ cur < (prev / BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR) ) {
+ if (last_changed+MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ < now || !prev) {
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,
+ "Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor.");
+ mark_my_descriptor_dirty("bandwidth has changed");
+ last_changed = now;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/** Note at log level severity that our best guess of address has changed from
+ * <b>prev</b> to <b>cur</b>. */
+static void
+log_addr_has_changed(int severity,
+ const tor_addr_t *prev,
+ const tor_addr_t *cur,
+ const char *source)
+{
+ char addrbuf_prev[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
+ char addrbuf_cur[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
+
+ if (BUG(!server_mode(get_options())))
+ return;
+
+ if (tor_addr_to_str(addrbuf_prev, prev, sizeof(addrbuf_prev), 1) == NULL)
+ strlcpy(addrbuf_prev, "???", TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN);
+ if (tor_addr_to_str(addrbuf_cur, cur, sizeof(addrbuf_cur), 1) == NULL)
+ strlcpy(addrbuf_cur, "???", TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN);
+
+ if (!tor_addr_is_null(prev))
+ log_fn(severity, LD_GENERAL,
+ "Our IP Address has changed from %s to %s; "
+ "rebuilding descriptor (source: %s).",
+ addrbuf_prev, addrbuf_cur, source);
+ else
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL,
+ "Guessed our IP address as %s (source: %s).",
+ addrbuf_cur, source);
+}
+
+/** Check whether our own address as defined by the Address configuration
+ * has changed. This is for routers that get their address from a service
+ * like dyndns. If our address has changed, mark our descriptor dirty. */
+void
+check_descriptor_ipaddress_changed(time_t now)
+{
+ uint32_t prev, cur;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ const char *method = NULL;
+ char *hostname = NULL;
+ const routerinfo_t *my_ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+
+ (void) now;
+
+ if (my_ri == NULL) /* make sure routerinfo exists */
+ return;
+
+ /* XXXX ipv6 */
+ prev = my_ri->addr;
+ if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, &method, &hostname) < 0) {
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG,"options->Address didn't resolve into an IP.");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (prev != cur) {
+ char *source;
+ tor_addr_t tmp_prev, tmp_cur;
+
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&tmp_prev, prev);
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&tmp_cur, cur);
+
+ tor_asprintf(&source, "METHOD=%s%s%s", method,
+ hostname ? " HOSTNAME=" : "",
+ hostname ? hostname : "");
+
+ log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, &tmp_prev, &tmp_cur, source);
+ tor_free(source);
+
+ ip_address_changed(0);
+ }
+
+ tor_free(hostname);
+}
+
+/** The most recently guessed value of our IP address, based on directory
+ * headers. */
+static tor_addr_t last_guessed_ip = TOR_ADDR_NULL;
+
+/** A directory server <b>d_conn</b> told us our IP address is
+ * <b>suggestion</b>.
+ * If this address is different from the one we think we are now, and
+ * if our computer doesn't actually know its IP address, then switch. */
+void
+router_new_address_suggestion(const char *suggestion,
+ const dir_connection_t *d_conn)
+{
+ tor_addr_t addr;
+ uint32_t cur = 0; /* Current IPv4 address. */
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ /* first, learn what the IP address actually is */
+ if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, suggestion) == -1) {
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "Malformed X-Your-Address-Is header %s. Ignoring.",
+ escaped(suggestion));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "Got X-Your-Address-Is: %s.", suggestion);
+
+ if (!server_mode(options)) {
+ tor_addr_copy(&last_guessed_ip, &addr);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* XXXX ipv6 */
+ cur = get_last_resolved_addr();
+ if (cur ||
+ resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, NULL, NULL) >= 0) {
+ /* We're all set -- we already know our address. Great. */
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&last_guessed_ip, cur); /* store it in case we
+ need it later */
+ return;
+ }
+ if (tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) {
+ /* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is, say, 127.0.0.1. */
+ return;
+ }
+ if (tor_addr_eq(&d_conn->base_.addr, &addr)) {
+ /* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is their IP. */
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "A directory server told us our IP address is %s, "
+ "but they are just reporting their own IP address. Ignoring.",
+ suggestion);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Okay. We can't resolve our own address, and X-Your-Address-Is is giving
+ * us an answer different from what we had the last time we managed to
+ * resolve it. */
+ if (!tor_addr_eq(&last_guessed_ip, &addr)) {
+ control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
+ "EXTERNAL_ADDRESS ADDRESS=%s METHOD=DIRSERV",
+ suggestion);
+ log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, &last_guessed_ip, &addr,
+ d_conn->base_.address);
+ ip_address_changed(0);
+ tor_addr_copy(&last_guessed_ip, &addr); /* router_rebuild_descriptor()
+ will fetch it */
+ }
+}
+
+/** We failed to resolve our address locally, but we'd like to build
+ * a descriptor and publish / test reachability. If we have a guess
+ * about our address based on directory headers, answer it and return
+ * 0; else return -1. */
+static int
+router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess)
+{
+ if (!tor_addr_is_null(&last_guessed_ip)) {
+ *guess = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&last_guessed_ip);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/** Set <b>platform</b> (max length <b>len</b>) to a NUL-terminated short
+ * string describing the version of Tor and the operating system we're
+ * currently running on.
+ */
+STATIC void
+get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len)
+{
+ tor_snprintf(platform, len, "Tor %s on %s",
+ get_short_version(), get_uname());
+}
+
+/* XXX need to audit this thing and count fenceposts. maybe
+ * refactor so we don't have to keep asking if we're
+ * near the end of maxlen?
+ */
+#define DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
+
+/** OR only: Given a routerinfo for this router, and an identity key to sign
+ * with, encode the routerinfo as a signed server descriptor and return a new
+ * string encoding the result, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+char *
+router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
+ const crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
+ const crypto_pk_t *tap_key,
+ const curve25519_keypair_t *ntor_keypair,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair)
+{
+ char *address = NULL;
+ char *onion_pkey = NULL; /* Onion key, PEM-encoded. */
+ crypto_pk_t *rsa_pubkey = NULL;
+ char *identity_pkey = NULL; /* Identity key, PEM-encoded. */
+ char digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
+ char *extra_info_line = NULL;
+ size_t onion_pkeylen, identity_pkeylen;
+ char *family_line = NULL;
+ char *extra_or_address = NULL;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ smartlist_t *chunks = NULL;
+ char *output = NULL;
+ const int emit_ed_sigs = signing_keypair &&
+ router->cache_info.signing_key_cert;
+ char *ed_cert_line = NULL;
+ char *rsa_tap_cc_line = NULL;
+ char *ntor_cc_line = NULL;
+ char *proto_line = NULL;
+
+ /* Make sure the identity key matches the one in the routerinfo. */
+ if (!crypto_pk_eq_keys(ident_key, router->identity_pkey)) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Tried to sign a router with a private key that didn't "
+ "match router's public key!");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (emit_ed_sigs) {
+ if (!router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included ||
+ !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signed_key,
+ &signing_keypair->pubkey)) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to sign a router descriptor with a mismatched "
+ "ed25519 key chain %d",
+ router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* record our fingerprint, so we can include it in the descriptor */
+ if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(router->identity_pkey, fingerprint, 1)<0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG,"Error computing fingerprint");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (emit_ed_sigs) {
+ /* Encode ed25519 signing cert */
+ char ed_cert_base64[256];
+ char ed_fp_base64[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
+ if (base64_encode(ed_cert_base64, sizeof(ed_cert_base64),
+ (const char*)router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded,
+ router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
+ BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode signing key certificate!");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ed25519_public_to_base64(ed_fp_base64,
+ &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key)<0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode identity key\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_asprintf(&ed_cert_line, "identity-ed25519\n"
+ "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+ "%s"
+ "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+ "master-key-ed25519 %s\n",
+ ed_cert_base64, ed_fp_base64);
+ }
+
+ /* PEM-encode the onion key */
+ rsa_pubkey = router_get_rsa_onion_pkey(router->onion_pkey,
+ router->onion_pkey_len);
+ if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(rsa_pubkey,
+ &onion_pkey,&onion_pkeylen)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"write onion_pkey to string failed!");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* PEM-encode the identity key */
+ if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(router->identity_pkey,
+ &identity_pkey,&identity_pkeylen)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"write identity_pkey to string failed!");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Cross-certify with RSA key */
+ if (tap_key && router->cache_info.signing_key_cert &&
+ router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included) {
+ char buf[256];
+ int tap_cc_len = 0;
+ uint8_t *tap_cc =
+ make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(tap_key,
+ &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key,
+ router->identity_pkey,
+ &tap_cc_len);
+ if (!tap_cc) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"make_tap_onion_key_crosscert failed!");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), (const char*)tap_cc, tap_cc_len,
+ BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"base64_encode(rsa_crosscert) failed!");
+ tor_free(tap_cc);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_free(tap_cc);
+
+ tor_asprintf(&rsa_tap_cc_line,
+ "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+ "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+ "%s"
+ "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n", buf);
+ }
+
+ /* Cross-certify with onion keys */
+ if (ntor_keypair && router->cache_info.signing_key_cert &&
+ router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included) {
+ int sign = 0;
+ char buf[256];
+ /* XXXX Base the expiration date on the actual onion key expiration time?*/
+ tor_cert_t *cert =
+ make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert(ntor_keypair,
+ &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key,
+ router->cache_info.published_on,
+ get_onion_key_lifetime(), &sign);
+ if (!cert) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert failed!");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_assert(sign == 0 || sign == 1);
+
+ if (base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ (const char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len,
+ BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"base64_encode(ntor_crosscert) failed!");
+ tor_cert_free(cert);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_cert_free(cert);
+
+ tor_asprintf(&ntor_cc_line,
+ "ntor-onion-key-crosscert %d\n"
+ "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+ "%s"
+ "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", sign, buf);
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the publication time. */
+ format_iso_time(published, router->cache_info.published_on);
+
+ if (router->declared_family && smartlist_len(router->declared_family)) {
+ char *family = smartlist_join_strings(router->declared_family,
+ " ", 0, NULL);
+ tor_asprintf(&family_line, "family %s\n", family);
+ tor_free(family);
+ } else {
+ family_line = tor_strdup("");
+ }
+
+ if (!tor_digest_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest)) {
+ char extra_info_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ base16_encode(extra_info_digest, sizeof(extra_info_digest),
+ router->cache_info.extra_info_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ if (!tor_digest256_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256)) {
+ char d256_64[BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+1];
+ digest256_to_base64(d256_64, router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256);
+ tor_asprintf(&extra_info_line, "extra-info-digest %s %s\n",
+ extra_info_digest, d256_64);
+ } else {
+ tor_asprintf(&extra_info_line, "extra-info-digest %s\n",
+ extra_info_digest);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (router->ipv6_orport &&
+ tor_addr_family(&router->ipv6_addr) == AF_INET6) {
+ char addr[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
+ const char *a;
+ a = tor_addr_to_str(addr, &router->ipv6_addr, sizeof(addr), 1);
+ if (a) {
+ tor_asprintf(&extra_or_address,
+ "or-address %s:%d\n", a, router->ipv6_orport);
+ log_debug(LD_OR, "My or-address line is <%s>", extra_or_address);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (router->protocol_list) {
+ tor_asprintf(&proto_line, "proto %s\n", router->protocol_list);
+ } else {
+ proto_line = tor_strdup("");
+ }
+
+ address = tor_dup_ip(router->addr);
+ chunks = smartlist_new();
+
+ /* Generate the easy portion of the router descriptor. */
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks,
+ "router %s %s %d 0 %d\n"
+ "%s"
+ "%s"
+ "platform %s\n"
+ "%s"
+ "published %s\n"
+ "fingerprint %s\n"
+ "uptime %ld\n"
+ "bandwidth %d %d %d\n"
+ "%s%s"
+ "onion-key\n%s"
+ "signing-key\n%s"
+ "%s%s"
+ "%s%s%s",
+ router->nickname,
+ address,
+ router->or_port,
+ router_should_advertise_dirport(options, router->dir_port),
+ ed_cert_line ? ed_cert_line : "",
+ extra_or_address ? extra_or_address : "",
+ router->platform,
+ proto_line,
+ published,
+ fingerprint,
+ get_uptime(),
+ (int) router->bandwidthrate,
+ (int) router->bandwidthburst,
+ (int) router->bandwidthcapacity,
+ extra_info_line ? extra_info_line : "",
+ (options->DownloadExtraInfo || options->V3AuthoritativeDir) ?
+ "caches-extra-info\n" : "",
+ onion_pkey, identity_pkey,
+ rsa_tap_cc_line ? rsa_tap_cc_line : "",
+ ntor_cc_line ? ntor_cc_line : "",
+ family_line,
+ we_are_hibernating() ? "hibernating 1\n" : "",
+ "hidden-service-dir\n");
+
+ if (options->ContactInfo && strlen(options->ContactInfo)) {
+ const char *ci = options->ContactInfo;
+ if (strchr(ci, '\n') || strchr(ci, '\r'))
+ ci = escaped(ci);
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "contact %s\n", ci);
+ }
+
+ if (options->BridgeRelay) {
+ const char *bd;
+ if (options->BridgeDistribution && strlen(options->BridgeDistribution)) {
+ bd = options->BridgeDistribution;
+ } else {
+ bd = "any";
+ }
+ if (strchr(bd, '\n') || strchr(bd, '\r'))
+ bd = escaped(bd);
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "bridge-distribution-request %s\n", bd);
+ }
+
+ if (router->onion_curve25519_pkey) {
+ char kbuf[128];
+ base64_encode(kbuf, sizeof(kbuf),
+ (const char *)router->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "ntor-onion-key %s", kbuf);
+ } else {
+ /* Authorities will start rejecting relays without ntor keys in 0.2.9 */
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "A relay must have an ntor onion key");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Write the exit policy to the end of 's'. */
+ if (!router->exit_policy || !smartlist_len(router->exit_policy)) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "reject *:*\n");
+ } else if (router->exit_policy) {
+ char *exit_policy = router_dump_exit_policy_to_string(router,1,0);
+
+ if (!exit_policy)
+ goto err;
+
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", exit_policy);
+ tor_free(exit_policy);
+ }
+
+ if (router->ipv6_exit_policy) {
+ char *p6 = write_short_policy(router->ipv6_exit_policy);
+ if (p6 && strcmp(p6, "reject 1-65535")) {
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks,
+ "ipv6-policy %s\n", p6);
+ }
+ tor_free(p6);
+ }
+
+ if (router_should_advertise_begindir(options,
+ router->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "tunnelled-dir-server\n");
+ }
+
+ /* Sign the descriptor with Ed25519 */
+ if (emit_ed_sigs) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-sig-ed25519 ");
+ crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
+ ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
+ chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA256);
+ ed25519_signature_t sig;
+ char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1];
+ if (ed25519_sign(&sig, (const uint8_t*)digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
+ signing_keypair) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &sig) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf);
+ }
+
+ /* Sign the descriptor with RSA */
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-signature\n");
+
+ crypto_digest_smartlist(digest, DIGEST_LEN, chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA1);
+
+ {
+ char *sig;
+ if (!(sig = router_get_dirobj_signature(digest, DIGEST_LEN, ident_key))) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't sign router descriptor");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ smartlist_add(chunks, sig);
+ }
+
+ /* include a last '\n' */
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "\n");
+
+ output = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
+ {
+ char *s_dup;
+ const char *cp;
+ routerinfo_t *ri_tmp;
+ cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(output);
+ ri_tmp = router_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!ri_tmp) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG,
+ "We just generated a router descriptor we can't parse.");
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "Descriptor was: <<%s>>", output);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_free(s_dup);
+ routerinfo_free(ri_tmp);
+ }
+#endif /* defined(DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING) */
+
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ tor_free(output); /* sets output to NULL */
+ done:
+ if (chunks) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(chunks);
+ }
+ crypto_pk_free(rsa_pubkey);
+ tor_free(address);
+ tor_free(family_line);
+ tor_free(onion_pkey);
+ tor_free(identity_pkey);
+ tor_free(extra_or_address);
+ tor_free(ed_cert_line);
+ tor_free(rsa_tap_cc_line);
+ tor_free(ntor_cc_line);
+ tor_free(extra_info_line);
+ tor_free(proto_line);
+
+ return output;
+}
+
+/**
+ * OR only: Given <b>router</b>, produce a string with its exit policy.
+ * If <b>include_ipv4</b> is true, include IPv4 entries.
+ * If <b>include_ipv6</b> is true, include IPv6 entries.
+ */
+char *
+router_dump_exit_policy_to_string(const routerinfo_t *router,
+ int include_ipv4,
+ int include_ipv6)
+{
+ if ((!router->exit_policy) || (router->policy_is_reject_star)) {
+ return tor_strdup("reject *:*");
+ }
+
+ return policy_dump_to_string(router->exit_policy,
+ include_ipv4,
+ include_ipv6);
+}
+
+/** Load the contents of <b>filename</b>, find the last line starting with
+ * <b>end_line</b>, ensure that its timestamp is not more than 25 hours in
+ * the past or more than 1 hour in the future with respect to <b>now</b>,
+ * and write the file contents starting with that line to *<b>out</b>.
+ * Return 1 for success, 0 if the file does not exist or is empty, or -1
+ * if the file does not contain a line matching these criteria or other
+ * failure. */
+static int
+load_stats_file(const char *filename, const char *end_line, time_t now,
+ char **out)
+{
+ int r = -1;
+ char *fname = get_datadir_fname(filename);
+ char *contents, *start = NULL, *tmp, timestr[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ time_t written;
+ switch (file_status(fname)) {
+ case FN_FILE:
+ /* X022 Find an alternative to reading the whole file to memory. */
+ if ((contents = read_file_to_str(fname, 0, NULL))) {
+ tmp = strstr(contents, end_line);
+ /* Find last block starting with end_line */
+ while (tmp) {
+ start = tmp;
+ tmp = strstr(tmp + 1, end_line);
+ }
+ if (!start)
+ goto notfound;
+ if (strlen(start) < strlen(end_line) + 1 + sizeof(timestr))
+ goto notfound;
+ strlcpy(timestr, start + 1 + strlen(end_line), sizeof(timestr));
+ if (parse_iso_time(timestr, &written) < 0)
+ goto notfound;
+ if (written < now - (25*60*60) || written > now + (1*60*60))
+ goto notfound;
+ *out = tor_strdup(start);
+ r = 1;
+ }
+ notfound:
+ tor_free(contents);
+ break;
+ /* treat empty stats files as if the file doesn't exist */
+ case FN_NOENT:
+ case FN_EMPTY:
+ r = 0;
+ break;
+ case FN_ERROR:
+ case FN_DIR:
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ tor_free(fname);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Write the contents of <b>extrainfo</b> and aggregated statistics to
+ * *<b>s_out</b>, signing them with <b>ident_key</b>. Return 0 on
+ * success, negative on failure. */
+int
+extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
+ crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ char identity[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ char *bandwidth_usage;
+ int result;
+ static int write_stats_to_extrainfo = 1;
+ char sig[DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN+1];
+ char *s = NULL, *pre, *contents, *cp, *s_dup = NULL;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new();
+ extrainfo_t *ei_tmp = NULL;
+ const int emit_ed_sigs = signing_keypair &&
+ extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert;
+ char *ed_cert_line = NULL;
+
+ base16_encode(identity, sizeof(identity),
+ extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ format_iso_time(published, extrainfo->cache_info.published_on);
+ bandwidth_usage = rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines();
+ if (emit_ed_sigs) {
+ if (!extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included ||
+ !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signed_key,
+ &signing_keypair->pubkey)) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to sign a extrainfo descriptor with a "
+ "mismatched ed25519 key chain %d",
+ extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ char ed_cert_base64[256];
+ if (base64_encode(ed_cert_base64, sizeof(ed_cert_base64),
+ (const char*)extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded,
+ extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
+ BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode signing key certificate!");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_asprintf(&ed_cert_line, "identity-ed25519\n"
+ "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+ "%s"
+ "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", ed_cert_base64);
+ } else {
+ ed_cert_line = tor_strdup("");
+ }
+
+ tor_asprintf(&pre, "extra-info %s %s\n%spublished %s\n%s",
+ extrainfo->nickname, identity,
+ ed_cert_line,
+ published, bandwidth_usage);
+ smartlist_add(chunks, pre);
+
+ if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET))
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "geoip-db-digest %s\n",
+ geoip_db_digest(AF_INET));
+ if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET6))
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "geoip6-db-digest %s\n",
+ geoip_db_digest(AF_INET6));
+
+ if (options->ExtraInfoStatistics && write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Adding stats to extra-info descriptor.");
+ if (options->DirReqStatistics &&
+ load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"dirreq-stats",
+ "dirreq-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
+ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
+ }
+ if (options->HiddenServiceStatistics &&
+ load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"hidserv-stats",
+ "hidserv-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
+ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
+ }
+ if (options->EntryStatistics &&
+ load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"entry-stats",
+ "entry-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
+ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
+ }
+ if (options->CellStatistics &&
+ load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"buffer-stats",
+ "cell-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
+ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
+ }
+ if (options->ExitPortStatistics &&
+ load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"exit-stats",
+ "exit-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
+ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
+ }
+ if (options->ConnDirectionStatistics &&
+ load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"conn-stats",
+ "conn-bi-direct", now, &contents) > 0) {
+ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
+ }
- }
-
- if (options->PaddingStatistics) {
- contents = rep_hist_get_padding_count_lines();
- if (contents)
- smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
++ if (options->PaddingStatistics) {
++ contents = rep_hist_get_padding_count_lines();
++ if (contents)
++ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
++ }
+ }
+
+ /* Add information about the pluggable transports we support. */
+ if (options->ServerTransportPlugin) {
+ char *pluggable_transports = pt_get_extra_info_descriptor_string();
+ if (pluggable_transports)
+ smartlist_add(chunks, pluggable_transports);
+ }
+
+ if (should_record_bridge_info(options) && write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
+ const char *bridge_stats = geoip_get_bridge_stats_extrainfo(now);
+ if (bridge_stats) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, bridge_stats);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (emit_ed_sigs) {
+ char sha256_digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-sig-ed25519 ");
+ crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(sha256_digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
+ ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
+ chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA256);
+ ed25519_signature_t ed_sig;
+ char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1];
+ if (ed25519_sign(&ed_sig, (const uint8_t*)sha256_digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
+ signing_keypair) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &ed_sig) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf);
+ }
+
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-signature\n");
+ s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
+
+ while (strlen(s) > MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE - DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN) {
+ /* So long as there are at least two chunks (one for the initial
+ * extra-info line and one for the router-signature), we can keep removing
+ * things. */
+ if (smartlist_len(chunks) > 2) {
+ /* We remove the next-to-last element (remember, len-1 is the last
+ element), since we need to keep the router-signature element. */
+ int idx = smartlist_len(chunks) - 2;
+ char *e = smartlist_get(chunks, idx);
+ smartlist_del_keeporder(chunks, idx);
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor "
+ "with statistics that exceeds the 50 KB "
+ "upload limit. Removing last added "
+ "statistics.");
+ tor_free(e);
+ tor_free(s);
+ s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extra-info descriptors that "
+ "exceeds the 50 KB upload limit.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig));
+ if (router_get_extrainfo_hash(s, strlen(s), digest) < 0 ||
+ router_append_dirobj_signature(sig, sizeof(sig), digest, DIGEST_LEN,
+ ident_key) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not append signature to extra-info "
+ "descriptor.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, sig);
+ tor_free(s);
+ s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
+
+ cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(s);
+ ei_tmp = extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!ei_tmp) {
+ if (write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor "
+ "with statistics that we can't parse. Not "
+ "adding statistics to this or any future "
+ "extra-info descriptors.");
+ write_stats_to_extrainfo = 0;
+ result = extrainfo_dump_to_string(s_out, extrainfo, ident_key,
+ signing_keypair);
+ goto done;
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extrainfo descriptor we "
+ "can't parse.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *s_out = s;
+ s = NULL; /* prevent free */
+ result = 0;
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ result = -1;
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(s);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, chunk, tor_free(chunk));
+ smartlist_free(chunks);
+ tor_free(s_dup);
+ tor_free(ed_cert_line);
+ extrainfo_free(ei_tmp);
+ tor_free(bandwidth_usage);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** Forget that we have issued any router-related warnings, so that we'll
+ * warn again if we see the same errors. */
+void
+router_reset_warnings(void)
+{
+ if (warned_nonexistent_family) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_nonexistent_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_clear(warned_nonexistent_family);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Release all static resources held in router.c */
+void
+router_free_all(void)
+{
+ crypto_pk_free(onionkey);
+ crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey);
+ crypto_pk_free(server_identitykey);
+ crypto_pk_free(client_identitykey);
+
+ tor_mutex_free(key_lock);
+ routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo);
+ extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo);
+ crypto_pk_free(authority_signing_key);
+ authority_cert_free(authority_key_certificate);
+ crypto_pk_free(legacy_signing_key);
+ authority_cert_free(legacy_key_certificate);
+
+ memwipe(&curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(curve25519_onion_key));
+ memwipe(&last_curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(last_curve25519_onion_key));
+
+ if (warned_nonexistent_family) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_nonexistent_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(warned_nonexistent_family);
+ }
+}
+/* From the given RSA key object, convert it to ASN-1 encoded format and set
+ * the newly allocated object in onion_pkey_out. The length of the key is set
+ * in onion_pkey_len_out. */
+void
+router_set_rsa_onion_pkey(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char **onion_pkey_out,
+ size_t *onion_pkey_len_out)
+{
+ int len;
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ tor_assert(pk);
+ tor_assert(onion_pkey_out);
+ tor_assert(onion_pkey_len_out);
+
+ len = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(pk, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (BUG(len < 0)) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ *onion_pkey_out = tor_memdup(buf, len);
+ *onion_pkey_len_out = len;
+
+ done:
+ return;
+}
+
+/* From an ASN-1 encoded onion pkey, return a newly allocated RSA key object.
+ * It is the caller responsability to free the returned object.
+ *
+ * Return NULL if the pkey is NULL, malformed or if the length is 0. */
+crypto_pk_t *
+router_get_rsa_onion_pkey(const char *pkey, size_t pkey_len)
+{
+ if (!pkey || pkey_len == 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return crypto_pk_asn1_decode(pkey, pkey_len);
+}
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