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[tor-commits] [Git][tpo/applications/mullvad-browser][mullvad-browser-150.0a1-16.0-2] 2 commits: fixup! Firefox preference overrides.



Title: GitLab

Pier Angelo Vendrame pushed to branch mullvad-browser-150.0a1-16.0-2 at The Tor Project / Applications / Mullvad Browser

Commits:

  • 8ac56cce
    by Pier Angelo Vendrame at 2026-04-28T08:52:55+02:00
    fixup! Firefox preference overrides.
    
    BB 44521: Disable widget.wayland.fractional-scale.enabled.
    
    It introduces fingerprinting opportunities to users who manually
    enabled Wayland, so disable it until we decide to make Wayland the
    default also for our browsers.
    
  • 775f0ef3
    by Pier Angelo Vendrame at 2026-04-28T08:53:06+02:00
    fixup! BB 44772: Disable efficient randomization for canvases.
    
    BB 44895: Revert "BB 44772: Disable efficient randomization for canvases."
    
    This reverts commit ced1d9a35c7d8cbb727d8c1c450b2dce62cd7289.
    
    We have investigated this issue more, and this change was not needed
    after all, therefore we can just revert this patch.
    

2 changed files:

Changes:

  • browser/app/profile/001-base-profile.js
    ... ... @@ -585,6 +585,9 @@ pref("widget.wayland.vsync.enabled", false);
    585 585
     // marked with a specific rating is loaded or not.
    
    586 586
     pref("security.restrict_to_adults.always", false);
    
    587 587
     pref("security.restrict_to_adults.respect_platform", false);
    
    588
    +// tor-browser#44521: Disable Wayland fractional scaling at least until we keep
    
    589
    +// Xwayland as the default.
    
    590
    +pref("widget.wayland.fractional-scale.enabled", false);
    
    588 591
     
    
    589 592
     // tor-browser#41943: defense-in-depth, but do not lock anymore (enabled in Firefox 119, http://bugzil.la/1851162)
    
    590 593
     pref("_javascript_.options.spectre.disable_for_isolated_content", false);
    

  • dom/canvas/CanvasUtils.cpp
    ... ... @@ -381,9 +381,14 @@ ImageExtraction ImageExtractionResult(dom::HTMLCanvasElement* aCanvasElement,
    381 381
         return ImageExtraction::Placeholder;
    
    382 382
       }
    
    383 383
     
    
    384
    -  if ((ownerDoc->ShouldResistFingerprinting(
    
    385
    -           RFPTarget::EfficientCanvasRandomization) ||
    
    386
    -       ownerDoc->ShouldResistFingerprinting(RFPTarget::CanvasRandomization) ||
    
    384
    +  if (ownerDoc->ShouldResistFingerprinting(
    
    385
    +          RFPTarget::EfficientCanvasRandomization) &&
    
    386
    +      GetCanvasExtractDataPermission(aPrincipal) !=
    
    387
    +          nsIPermissionManager::ALLOW_ACTION) {
    
    388
    +    return ImageExtraction::EfficientRandomize;
    
    389
    +  }
    
    390
    +
    
    391
    +  if ((ownerDoc->ShouldResistFingerprinting(RFPTarget::CanvasRandomization) ||
    
    387 392
            ownerDoc->ShouldResistFingerprinting(RFPTarget::WebGLRandomization)) &&
    
    388 393
           GetCanvasExtractDataPermission(aPrincipal) !=
    
    389 394
               nsIPermissionManager::ALLOW_ACTION) {
    

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