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[tor-commits] [tor/master] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.4'
commit de66bd397c61d88228fa4c1d4b7e5b7f9c08a115
Merge: 9bb0ac4bf f68aab83b
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue Aug 21 19:20:37 2018 -0400
Merge branch 'maint-0.3.4'
changes/bug27226 | 5 ++
src/lib/tls/tortls.c | 10 ++--
src/test/test_tortls.c | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
3 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
diff --cc src/lib/tls/tortls.c
index 073cae02b,000000000..7135820d2
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/lib/tls/tortls.c
+++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls.c
@@@ -1,2671 -1,0 +1,2673 @@@
+/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file tortls.c
+ * \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
+ * TLS, SSL, and X.509 functions from OpenSSL.
+ **/
+
+/* (Unlike other tor functions, these
+ * are prefixed with tor_ in order to avoid conflicting with OpenSSL
+ * functions and variables.)
+ */
+
+#include "orconfig.h"
+
+#define TORTLS_PRIVATE
+#define TORTLS_OPENSSL_PRIVATE
+
+#ifdef _WIN32 /*wrkard for dtls1.h >= 0.9.8m of "#include <winsock.h>"*/
+ #include <winsock2.h>
+ #include <ws2tcpip.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+
+/* Some versions of OpenSSL declare SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile twice in
+ * srtp.h. Suppress the GCC warning so we can build with -Wredundant-decl. */
+DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC
+#error "We require OpenSSL with ECC support"
+#endif
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl3.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/tls1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
+
+#define TORTLS_PRIVATE
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/log/log.h"
+#include "lib/log/util_bug.h"
+#include "lib/container/smartlist.h"
+#include "lib/string/compat_string.h"
+#include "lib/string/printf.h"
+#include "lib/net/socket.h"
+#include "lib/intmath/cmp.h"
+#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
+#include "lib/encoding/time_fmt.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "lib/arch/bytes.h"
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \
+ X509_get0_notBefore(cert)
+#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \
+ X509_get0_notAfter(cert)
+#ifndef X509_get_notBefore
+#define X509_get_notBefore(cert) \
+ X509_getm_notBefore(cert)
+#endif
+#ifndef X509_get_notAfter
+#define X509_get_notAfter(cert) \
+ X509_getm_notAfter(cert)
+#endif
+#else /* ! OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
+#define X509_get_notBefore_const(cert) \
+ ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notBefore((X509 *)cert))
+#define X509_get_notAfter_const(cert) \
+ ((const ASN1_TIME*) X509_get_notAfter((X509 *)cert))
+#endif
+
+/* Copied from or.h */
+#define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \
+ "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
+
+/** How long do identity certificates live? (sec) */
+#define IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME (365*24*60*60)
+
+#define ADDR(tls) (((tls) && (tls)->address) ? tls->address : "peer")
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f')
+/* This is a version of OpenSSL before 1.0.0f. It does not have
+ * the CVE-2011-4576 fix, and as such it can't use RELEASE_BUFFERS and
+ * SSL3 safely at the same time.
+ */
+#define DISABLE_SSL3_HANDSHAKE
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V(1,0,0,'f') */
+
+/* We redefine these so that we can run correctly even if the vendor gives us
+ * a version of OpenSSL that does not match its header files. (Apple: I am
+ * looking at you.)
+ */
+#ifndef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L
+#endif
+#ifndef SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
+#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x0010
+#endif
+
+/** Return values for tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers.
+ *
+ * @{
+ */
+/** An error occurred when examining the client ciphers */
+#define CIPHERS_ERR -1
+/** The client cipher list indicates that a v1 handshake was in use. */
+#define CIPHERS_V1 1
+/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the
+ * v3 handshake, but that it is (probably!) lying about what ciphers it
+ * supports */
+#define CIPHERS_V2 2
+/** The client cipher list indicates that the client is using the v2 or the
+ * v3 handshake, and that it is telling the truth about what ciphers it
+ * supports */
+#define CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED 3
+/** @} */
+
+/** The ex_data index in which we store a pointer to an SSL object's
+ * corresponding tor_tls_t object. */
+STATIC int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index = -1;
+
+/** Helper: Allocate tor_tls_object_ex_data_index. */
+STATIC void
+tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void)
+{
+ if (tor_tls_object_ex_data_index == -1) {
+ tor_tls_object_ex_data_index =
+ SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ tor_assert(tor_tls_object_ex_data_index != -1);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Helper: given a SSL* pointer, return the tor_tls_t object using that
+ * pointer. */
+STATIC tor_tls_t *
+tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ tor_tls_t *result = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index);
+ if (result)
+ tor_assert(result->magic == TOR_TLS_MAGIC);
+ return result;
+}
+
+static void tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx);
+static void tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx);
+
+static int check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert,
+ time_t now,
+ int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance);
+
+/** Global TLS contexts. We keep them here because nobody else needs
+ * to touch them.
+ *
+ * @{ */
+STATIC tor_tls_context_t *server_tls_context = NULL;
+STATIC tor_tls_context_t *client_tls_context = NULL;
+/**@}*/
+
+/** True iff tor_tls_init() has been called. */
+static int tls_library_is_initialized = 0;
+
+/* Module-internal error codes. */
+#define TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_ (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 2)
+#define TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ (MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL_ - 1)
+
+/** Write a description of the current state of <b>tls</b> into the
+ * <b>sz</b>-byte buffer at <b>buf</b>. */
+void
+tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz)
+{
+ const char *ssl_state;
+ const char *tortls_state;
+
+ if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!tls || !tls->ssl)) {
+ strlcpy(buf, "(No SSL object)", sz);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ssl_state = SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl);
+ switch (tls->state) {
+#define CASE(st) case TOR_TLS_ST_##st: tortls_state = " in "#st ; break
+ CASE(HANDSHAKE);
+ CASE(OPEN);
+ CASE(GOTCLOSE);
+ CASE(SENTCLOSE);
+ CASE(CLOSED);
+ CASE(RENEGOTIATE);
+#undef CASE
+ case TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT:
+ tortls_state = "";
+ break;
+ default:
+ tortls_state = " in unknown TLS state";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ tor_snprintf(buf, sz, "%s%s", ssl_state, tortls_state);
+}
+
+/** Log a single error <b>err</b> as returned by ERR_get_error(), which was
+ * received while performing an operation <b>doing</b> on <b>tls</b>. Log
+ * the message at <b>severity</b>, in log domain <b>domain</b>. */
+void
+tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err,
+ int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
+{
+ const char *state = NULL, *addr;
+ const char *msg, *lib, *func;
+
+ state = (tls && tls->ssl)?SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl):"---";
+
+ addr = tls ? tls->address : NULL;
+
+ /* Some errors are known-benign, meaning they are the fault of the other
+ * side of the connection. The caller doesn't know this, so override the
+ * priority for those cases. */
+ switch (ERR_GET_REASON(err)) {
+ case SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST:
+ case SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST:
+ case SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH:
+#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+ case SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE:
+#endif
+ case SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL:
+ case SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL:
+ severity = LOG_INFO;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err);
+ lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err);
+ func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err);
+ if (!msg) msg = "(null)";
+ if (!lib) lib = "(null)";
+ if (!func) func = "(null)";
+ if (doing) {
+ tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error while %s%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)",
+ doing, addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
+ msg, lib, func, state);
+ } else {
+ tor_log(severity, domain, "TLS error%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)",
+ addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
+ msg, lib, func, state);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Log all pending tls errors at level <b>severity</b> in log domain
+ * <b>domain</b>. Use <b>doing</b> to describe our current activities.
+ */
+STATIC void
+tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
+{
+ unsigned long err;
+
+ while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
+ tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, err, severity, domain, doing);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Convert an errno (or a WSAerrno on windows) into a TOR_TLS_* error
+ * code. */
+STATIC int
+tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e)
+{
+ switch (e) {
+ case SOCK_ERRNO(ECONNRESET): // most common
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNRESET;
+ case SOCK_ERRNO(ETIMEDOUT):
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_TIMEOUT;
+ case SOCK_ERRNO(EHOSTUNREACH):
+ case SOCK_ERRNO(ENETUNREACH):
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_NO_ROUTE;
+ case SOCK_ERRNO(ECONNREFUSED):
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNREFUSED; // least common
+ default:
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Given a TOR_TLS_* error code, return a string equivalent. */
+const char *
+tor_tls_err_to_string(int err)
+{
+ if (err >= 0)
+ return "[Not an error.]";
+ switch (err) {
+ case TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC: return "misc error";
+ case TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO: return "unexpected close";
+ case TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNREFUSED: return "connection refused";
+ case TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNRESET: return "connection reset";
+ case TOR_TLS_ERROR_NO_ROUTE: return "host unreachable";
+ case TOR_TLS_ERROR_TIMEOUT: return "connection timed out";
+ case TOR_TLS_CLOSE: return "closed";
+ case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: return "want to read";
+ case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE: return "want to write";
+ default: return "(unknown error code)";
+ }
+}
+
+#define CATCH_SYSCALL 1
+#define CATCH_ZERO 2
+
+/** Given a TLS object and the result of an SSL_* call, use
+ * SSL_get_error to determine whether an error has occurred, and if so
+ * which one. Return one of TOR_TLS_{DONE|WANTREAD|WANTWRITE|ERROR}.
+ * If extra&CATCH_SYSCALL is true, return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_ instead of
+ * reporting syscall errors. If extra&CATCH_ZERO is true, return
+ * TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ instead of reporting zero-return errors.
+ *
+ * If an error has occurred, log it at level <b>severity</b> and describe the
+ * current action as <b>doing</b>.
+ */
+STATIC int
+tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra,
+ const char *doing, int severity, int domain)
+{
+ int err = SSL_get_error(tls->ssl, r);
+ int tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ switch (err) {
+ case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
+ return TOR_TLS_DONE;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+ return TOR_TLS_WANTREAD;
+ case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+ return TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE;
+ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
+ if (extra&CATCH_SYSCALL)
+ return TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_;
+ if (r == 0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS error: unexpected close while %s (%s)",
+ doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO;
+ } else {
+ int e = tor_socket_errno(tls->socket);
+ tor_log(severity, LD_NET,
+ "TLS error: <syscall error while %s> (errno=%d: %s; state=%s)",
+ doing, e, tor_socket_strerror(e),
+ SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ tor_error = tor_errno_to_tls_error(e);
+ }
+ tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
+ return tor_error;
+ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
+ if (extra&CATCH_ZERO)
+ return TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_;
+ tor_log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS connection closed while %s in state %s",
+ doing, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
+ return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
+ default:
+ tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Initialize OpenSSL, unless it has already been initialized.
+ */
+static void
+tor_tls_init(void)
+{
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+
+ if (!tls_library_is_initialized) {
+#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+ OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL);
+#else
+ SSL_library_init();
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+#endif
+
+#if (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && \
+ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1))
+ long version = OpenSSL_version_num();
+
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START : we can't test these lines on the same machine */
+ if (version >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,0,1)) {
+ /* Warn if we could *almost* be running with much faster ECDH.
+ If we're built for a 64-bit target, using OpenSSL 1.0.1, but we
+ don't have one of the built-in __uint128-based speedups, we are
+ just one build operation away from an accelerated handshake.
+
+ (We could be looking at OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 instead of
+ doing this test, but that gives compile-time options, not runtime
+ behavior.)
+ */
+ EC_KEY *key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+ const EC_GROUP *g = key ? EC_KEY_get0_group(key) : NULL;
+ const EC_METHOD *m = g ? EC_GROUP_method_of(g) : NULL;
+ const int warn = (m == EC_GFp_simple_method() ||
+ m == EC_GFp_mont_method() ||
+ m == EC_GFp_nist_method());
+ EC_KEY_free(key);
+
+ if (warn)
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "We were built to run on a 64-bit CPU, with "
+ "OpenSSL 1.0.1 or later, but with a version of OpenSSL "
+ "that apparently lacks accelerated support for the NIST "
+ "P-224 and P-256 groups. Building openssl with such "
+ "support (using the enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128 option "
+ "when configuring it) would make ECDH much faster.");
+ }
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+#endif /* (SIZEOF_VOID_P >= 8 && ... */
+
+ tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
+
+ tls_library_is_initialized = 1;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Free all global TLS structures. */
+void
+tor_tls_free_all(void)
+{
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+
+ if (server_tls_context) {
+ tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server_tls_context;
+ server_tls_context = NULL;
+ tor_tls_context_decref(ctx);
+ }
+ if (client_tls_context) {
+ tor_tls_context_t *ctx = client_tls_context;
+ client_tls_context = NULL;
+ tor_tls_context_decref(ctx);
+ }
+}
+
+/** We need to give OpenSSL a callback to verify certificates. This is
+ * it: We always accept peer certs and complete the handshake. We
+ * don't validate them until later.
+ */
+STATIC int
+always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok,
+ X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx)
+{
+ (void) preverify_ok;
+ (void) x509_ctx;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Return a newly allocated X509 name with commonName <b>cname</b>. */
+static X509_NAME *
+tor_x509_name_new(const char *cname)
+{
+ int nid;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START : these branches will only fail on OOM errors */
+ if (!(name = X509_NAME_new()))
+ return NULL;
+ if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("commonName")) == NID_undef) goto error;
+ if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, nid, MBSTRING_ASC,
+ (unsigned char*)cname, -1, -1, 0)))
+ goto error;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
+ return name;
+
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START : these lines will only execute on out of memory errors*/
+ error:
+ X509_NAME_free(name);
+ return NULL;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+}
+
+/** Generate and sign an X509 certificate with the public key <b>rsa</b>,
+ * signed by the private key <b>rsa_sign</b>. The commonName of the
+ * certificate will be <b>cname</b>; the commonName of the issuer will be
+ * <b>cname_sign</b>. The cert will be valid for <b>cert_lifetime</b>
+ * seconds, starting from some time in the past.
+ *
+ * Return a certificate on success, NULL on failure.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(STATIC X509 *,
+tor_tls_create_certificate,(crypto_pk_t *rsa,
+ crypto_pk_t *rsa_sign,
+ const char *cname,
+ const char *cname_sign,
+ unsigned int cert_lifetime))
+{
+ /* OpenSSL generates self-signed certificates with random 64-bit serial
+ * numbers, so let's do that too. */
+#define SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE 8
+
+ time_t start_time, end_time;
+ BIGNUM *serial_number = NULL;
+ unsigned char serial_tmp[SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE];
+ EVP_PKEY *sign_pkey = NULL, *pkey=NULL;
+ X509 *x509 = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *name = NULL, *name_issuer=NULL;
+
+ tor_tls_init();
+
+ /* Make sure we're part-way through the certificate lifetime, rather
+ * than having it start right now. Don't choose quite uniformly, since
+ * then we might pick a time where we're about to expire. Lastly, be
+ * sure to start on a day boundary. */
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ /* Our certificate lifetime will be cert_lifetime no matter what, but if we
+ * start cert_lifetime in the past, we'll have 0 real lifetime. instead we
+ * start up to (cert_lifetime - min_real_lifetime - start_granularity) in
+ * the past. */
+ const time_t min_real_lifetime = 24*3600;
+ const time_t start_granularity = 24*3600;
+ time_t earliest_start_time;
+ /* Don't actually start in the future! */
+ if (cert_lifetime <= min_real_lifetime + start_granularity) {
+ earliest_start_time = now - 1;
+ } else {
+ earliest_start_time = now + min_real_lifetime + start_granularity
+ - cert_lifetime;
+ }
+ start_time = crypto_rand_time_range(earliest_start_time, now);
+ /* Round the start time back to the start of a day. */
+ start_time -= start_time % start_granularity;
+
+ end_time = start_time + cert_lifetime;
+
+ tor_assert(rsa);
+ tor_assert(cname);
+ tor_assert(rsa_sign);
+ tor_assert(cname_sign);
+ if (!(sign_pkey = crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_(rsa_sign,1)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_(rsa,0)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!(x509 = X509_new()))
+ goto error;
+ if (!(X509_set_version(x509, 2)))
+ goto error;
+
+ { /* our serial number is 8 random bytes. */
+ crypto_rand((char *)serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp));
+ if (!(serial_number = BN_bin2bn(serial_tmp, sizeof(serial_tmp), NULL)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!(BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial_number, X509_get_serialNumber(x509))))
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ if (!(name = tor_x509_name_new(cname)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!(X509_set_subject_name(x509, name)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!(name_issuer = tor_x509_name_new(cname_sign)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!(X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name_issuer)))
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time))
+ goto error;
+ if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509),0,&end_time))
+ goto error;
+ if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey))
+ goto error;
+
+ if (!X509_sign(x509, sign_pkey, EVP_sha256()))
+ goto error;
+
+ goto done;
+ error:
+ if (x509) {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ x509 = NULL;
+ }
+ done:
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "generating certificate");
+ if (sign_pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(sign_pkey);
+ if (pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (serial_number)
+ BN_clear_free(serial_number);
+ if (name)
+ X509_NAME_free(name);
+ if (name_issuer)
+ X509_NAME_free(name_issuer);
+ return x509;
+
+#undef SERIAL_NUMBER_SIZE
+}
+
+/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when the client might be
+ * claiming extra unsupported ciphers in order to avoid fingerprinting. */
+static const char SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] =
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ /* This one can never actually get selected, since if the client lists it,
+ * we will assume that the client is honest, and not use this list.
+ * Nonetheless we list it if it's available, so that the server doesn't
+ * conclude that it has no valid ciphers if it's running with TLS1.3.
+ */
+ TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":"
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA;
+
+/** List of ciphers that servers should select from when we actually have
+ * our choice of what cipher to use. */
+static const char UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST[] =
+ /* Here are the TLS 1.3 ciphers we like, in the order we prefer. */
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ TLS1_3_TXT_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
+ TLS1_3_TXT_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256
+ TLS1_3_TXT_AES_128_CCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+
+ /* This list is autogenerated with the gen_server_ciphers.py script;
+ * don't hand-edit it. */
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256 ":"
+#endif
+ /* Required */
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":"
+ /* Required */
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":"
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+ TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305 ":"
+#endif
+#ifdef TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+ TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+#endif
+ ;
+
+/* Note: to set up your own private testing network with link crypto
+ * disabled, set your Tors' cipher list to
+ * (SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA). If you do this, you won't be able to communicate
+ * with any of the "real" Tors, though. */
+
+#define CIPHER(id, name) name ":"
+#define XCIPHER(id, name)
+/** List of ciphers that clients should advertise, omitting items that
+ * our OpenSSL doesn't know about. */
+static const char CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST[] =
+#include "ciphers.inc"
+ /* Tell it not to use SSLv2 ciphers, so that it can select an SSLv3 version
+ * of any cipher we say. */
+ "!SSLv2"
+ ;
+#undef CIPHER
+#undef XCIPHER
+
+/** Free all storage held in <b>cert</b> */
+void
+tor_x509_cert_free_(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ if (! cert)
+ return;
+ if (cert->cert)
+ X509_free(cert->cert);
+ tor_free(cert->encoded);
+ memwipe(cert, 0x03, sizeof(*cert));
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since cert will never be NULL here */
+ tor_free(cert);
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
+}
+
+/**
+ * Allocate a new tor_x509_cert_t to hold the certificate "x509_cert".
+ *
+ * Steals a reference to x509_cert.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(STATIC tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_x509_cert_new,(X509 *x509_cert))
+{
+ tor_x509_cert_t *cert;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ int length;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+ if (!x509_cert)
+ return NULL;
+
+ length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, &buf);
+ cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_x509_cert_t));
+ if (length <= 0 || buf == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ cert->encoded_len = (size_t) length;
+ cert->encoded = tor_malloc(length);
+ memcpy(cert->encoded, buf, length);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+ cert->cert = x509_cert;
+
+ crypto_common_digests(&cert->cert_digests,
+ (char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
+
+ if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert)) &&
+ (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) {
+ crypto_pk_t *pk = crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(rsa);
+ if (crypto_pk_get_common_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests) < 0) {
+ crypto_pk_free(pk);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ cert->pkey_digests_set = 1;
+ crypto_pk_free(pk);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ }
+
+ return cert;
+ err:
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START for the same reason as the exclusion above */
+ tor_free(cert);
+ log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Couldn't wrap encoded X509 certificate.");
+ X509_free(x509_cert);
+ return NULL;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+}
+
+/** Return a new copy of <b>cert</b>. */
+tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_dup(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ tor_assert(cert);
+ X509 *x509 = cert->cert;
+ return tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(x509));
+}
+
+/** Read a DER-encoded X509 cert, of length exactly <b>certificate_len</b>,
+ * from a <b>certificate</b>. Return a newly allocated tor_x509_cert_t on
+ * success and NULL on failure. */
+tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len)
+{
+ X509 *x509;
+ const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char *)certificate;
+ tor_x509_cert_t *newcert;
+ tor_assert(certificate);
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+
+ if (certificate_len > INT_MAX)
+ goto err;
+
+ x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int)certificate_len);
+
+ if (!x509)
+ goto err; /* Couldn't decode */
+ if (cp - certificate != (int)certificate_len) {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ goto err; /* Didn't use all the bytes */
+ }
+ newcert = tor_x509_cert_new(x509);
+ if (!newcert) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (newcert->encoded_len != certificate_len ||
+ fast_memneq(newcert->encoded, certificate, certificate_len)) {
+ /* Cert wasn't in DER */
+ tor_x509_cert_free(newcert);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return newcert;
+ err:
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "decoding a certificate");
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** Set *<b>encoded_out</b> and *<b>size_out</b> to <b>cert</b>'s encoded DER
+ * representation and length, respectively. */
+void
+tor_x509_cert_get_der(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert,
+ const uint8_t **encoded_out, size_t *size_out)
+{
+ tor_assert(cert);
+ tor_assert(encoded_out);
+ tor_assert(size_out);
+ *encoded_out = cert->encoded;
+ *size_out = cert->encoded_len;
+}
+
+/** Return a set of digests for the public key in <b>cert</b>, or NULL if this
+ * cert's public key is not one we know how to take the digest of. */
+const common_digests_t *
+tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ if (cert->pkey_digests_set)
+ return &cert->pkey_digests;
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** Return a set of digests for the public key in <b>cert</b>. */
+const common_digests_t *
+tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ return &cert->cert_digests;
+}
+
+/** Remove a reference to <b>ctx</b>, and free it if it has no more
+ * references. */
+static void
+tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ tor_assert(ctx);
+ if (--ctx->refcnt == 0) {
+ SSL_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_link_cert);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_id_cert);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(ctx->my_auth_cert);
+ crypto_pk_free(ctx->link_key);
+ crypto_pk_free(ctx->auth_key);
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_START since ctx will never be NULL here */
+ tor_free(ctx);
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_BR_STOP */
+ }
+}
+
+/** Set *<b>link_cert_out</b> and *<b>id_cert_out</b> to the link certificate
+ * and ID certificate that we're currently using for our V3 in-protocol
+ * handshake's certificate chain. If <b>server</b> is true, provide the certs
+ * that we use in server mode (auth, ID); otherwise, provide the certs that we
+ * use in client mode. (link, ID) */
+int
+tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server,
+ const tor_x509_cert_t **link_cert_out,
+ const tor_x509_cert_t **id_cert_out)
+{
+ tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server ? server_tls_context : client_tls_context;
+ if (! ctx)
+ return -1;
+ if (link_cert_out)
+ *link_cert_out = server ? ctx->my_link_cert : ctx->my_auth_cert;
+ if (id_cert_out)
+ *id_cert_out = ctx->my_id_cert;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return the authentication key that we use to authenticate ourselves as a
+ * client in the V3 in-protocol handshake.
+ */
+crypto_pk_t *
+tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void)
+{
+ if (! client_tls_context)
+ return NULL;
+ return client_tls_context->auth_key;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return a newly allocated copy of the public key that a certificate
+ * certifies. Watch out! This returns NULL if the cert's key is not RSA.
+ */
+crypto_pk_t *
+tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
+{
+ crypto_pk_t *result = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
+ RSA *rsa;
+ if (!pkey)
+ return NULL;
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
+ if (!rsa) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ result = crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(rsa);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the other side of <b>tls</b> has authenticated to us, and
+ * the key certified in <b>cert</b> is the same as the key they used to do it.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_x509_cert_t *cert))
+{
- X509 *peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
++ tor_x509_cert_t *peer = tor_tls_get_peer_cert((tor_tls_t *)tls);
++ if (!peer)
++ return 0;
++
++ X509 *peercert = peer->cert;
+ EVP_PKEY *link_key = NULL, *cert_key = NULL;
+ int result;
+
- if (!peercert)
- return 0;
+ link_key = X509_get_pubkey(peercert);
+ cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
+
+ result = link_key && cert_key && EVP_PKEY_cmp(cert_key, link_key) == 1;
+
- X509_free(peercert);
++ tor_x509_cert_free(peer);
+ if (link_key)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(link_key);
+ if (cert_key)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** Check whether <b>cert</b> is well-formed, currently live, and correctly
+ * signed by the public key in <b>signing_cert</b>. If <b>check_rsa_1024</b>,
+ * make sure that it has an RSA key with 1024 bits; otherwise, just check that
+ * the key is long enough. Return 1 if the cert is good, and 0 if it's bad or
+ * we couldn't check it. */
+int
+tor_tls_cert_is_valid(int severity,
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *cert,
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *signing_cert,
+ time_t now,
+ int check_rsa_1024)
+{
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+ EVP_PKEY *cert_key;
+ int r, key_ok = 0;
+
+ if (!signing_cert || !cert)
+ goto bad;
+
+ EVP_PKEY *signing_key = X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert->cert);
+ if (!signing_key)
+ goto bad;
+ r = X509_verify(cert->cert, signing_key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(signing_key);
+ if (r <= 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ /* okay, the signature checked out right. Now let's check the check the
+ * lifetime. */
+ if (check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert->cert, now,
+ 48*60*60, 30*24*60*60) < 0)
+ goto bad;
+
+ cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
+ if (check_rsa_1024 && cert_key) {
+ RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(cert_key);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+ if (rsa && RSA_bits(rsa) == 1024)
+#else
+ if (rsa && BN_num_bits(rsa->n) == 1024)
+#endif
+ key_ok = 1;
+ if (rsa)
+ RSA_free(rsa);
+ } else if (cert_key) {
+ int min_bits = 1024;
+#ifdef EVP_PKEY_EC
+ if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(cert_key) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ min_bits = 128;
+#endif
+ if (EVP_PKEY_bits(cert_key) >= min_bits)
+ key_ok = 1;
+ }
+ EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key);
+ if (!key_ok)
+ goto bad;
+
+ /* XXXX compare DNs or anything? */
+
+ return 1;
+ bad:
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "checking a certificate");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Increase the reference count of <b>ctx</b>. */
+static void
+tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
+{
+ ++ctx->refcnt;
+}
+
+/** Create new global client and server TLS contexts.
+ *
+ * If <b>server_identity</b> is NULL, this will not generate a server
+ * TLS context. If TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER is set in <b>flags</b>, use
+ * the same TLS context for incoming and outgoing connections, and
+ * ignore <b>client_identity</b>. If one of TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P{224,256}
+ * is set in <b>flags</b>, use that ECDHE group if possible; otherwise use
+ * the default ECDHE group. */
+int
+tor_tls_context_init(unsigned flags,
+ crypto_pk_t *client_identity,
+ crypto_pk_t *server_identity,
+ unsigned int key_lifetime)
+{
+ int rv1 = 0;
+ int rv2 = 0;
+ const int is_public_server = flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER;
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+
+ if (is_public_server) {
+ tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx;
+ tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx;
+
+ tor_assert(server_identity != NULL);
+
+ rv1 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&server_tls_context,
+ server_identity,
+ key_lifetime, flags, 0);
+
+ if (rv1 >= 0) {
+ new_ctx = server_tls_context;
+ tor_tls_context_incref(new_ctx);
+ old_ctx = client_tls_context;
+ client_tls_context = new_ctx;
+
+ if (old_ctx != NULL) {
+ tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (server_identity != NULL) {
+ rv1 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&server_tls_context,
+ server_identity,
+ key_lifetime,
+ flags,
+ 0);
+ } else {
+ tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = server_tls_context;
+ server_tls_context = NULL;
+
+ if (old_ctx != NULL) {
+ tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv2 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&client_tls_context,
+ client_identity,
+ key_lifetime,
+ flags,
+ 1);
+ }
+
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_CRYPTO, "constructing a TLS context");
+ return MIN(rv1, rv2);
+}
+
+/** Create a new global TLS context.
+ *
+ * You can call this function multiple times. Each time you call it,
+ * it generates new certificates; all new connections will use
+ * the new SSL context.
+ */
+STATIC int
+tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
+ crypto_pk_t *identity,
+ unsigned int key_lifetime,
+ unsigned int flags,
+ int is_client)
+{
+ tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx = tor_tls_context_new(identity,
+ key_lifetime,
+ flags,
+ is_client);
+ tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = *ppcontext;
+
+ if (new_ctx != NULL) {
+ *ppcontext = new_ctx;
+
+ /* Free the old context if one existed. */
+ if (old_ctx != NULL) {
+ /* This is safe even if there are open connections: we reference-
+ * count tor_tls_context_t objects. */
+ tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ((new_ctx != NULL) ? 0 : -1);
+}
+
+/** The group we should use for ecdhe when none was selected. */
+#define NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group NID_X9_62_prime256v1
+
+#define RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS 2048
+
+/** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes.
+ * <b>identity</b> should be set to the identity key used to sign the
+ * certificate.
+ */
+STATIC tor_tls_context_t *
+tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime,
+ unsigned flags, int is_client)
+{
+ crypto_pk_t *rsa = NULL, *rsa_auth = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ tor_tls_context_t *result = NULL;
+ X509 *cert = NULL, *idcert = NULL, *authcert = NULL;
+ char *nickname = NULL, *nn2 = NULL;
+
+ tor_tls_init();
+ nickname = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
+#ifdef DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE
+ nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
+#else
+ nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".com");
+#endif
+
+ /* Generate short-term RSA key for use with TLS. */
+ if (!(rsa = crypto_pk_new()))
+ goto error;
+ if (crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(rsa, RSA_LINK_KEY_BITS)<0)
+ goto error;
+ if (!is_client) {
+ /* Generate short-term RSA key for use in the in-protocol ("v3")
+ * authentication handshake. */
+ if (!(rsa_auth = crypto_pk_new()))
+ goto error;
+ if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa_auth)<0)
+ goto error;
+ /* Create a link certificate signed by identity key. */
+ cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname, nn2,
+ key_lifetime);
+ /* Create self-signed certificate for identity key. */
+ idcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(identity, identity, nn2, nn2,
+ IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME);
+ /* Create an authentication certificate signed by identity key. */
+ authcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa_auth, identity, nickname, nn2,
+ key_lifetime);
+ if (!cert || !idcert || !authcert) {
+ log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Error creating certificate");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
+ result->refcnt = 1;
+ if (!is_client) {
+ result->my_link_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(cert));
+ result->my_id_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(idcert));
+ result->my_auth_cert = tor_x509_cert_new(X509_dup(authcert));
+ if (!result->my_link_cert || !result->my_id_cert || !result->my_auth_cert)
+ goto error;
+ result->link_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa);
+ result->auth_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa_auth);
+ }
+
+#if 0
+ /* Tell OpenSSL to only use TLS1. This may have subtly different results
+ * from SSLv23_method() with SSLv2 and SSLv3 disabled, so we need to do some
+ * investigation before we consider adjusting it. It should be compatible
+ * with existing Tors. */
+ if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method())))
+ goto error;
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+ /* Tell OpenSSL to use TLS 1.0 or later but not SSL2 or SSL3. */
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD
+ if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_method())))
+ goto error;
+#else
+ if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method())))
+ goto error;
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_TLS_METHOD) */
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3);
+
+ /* Prefer the server's ordering of ciphers: the client's ordering has
+ * historically been chosen for fingerprinting resistance. */
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE);
+
+ /* Disable TLS tickets if they're supported. We never want to use them;
+ * using them can make our perfect forward secrecy a little worse, *and*
+ * create an opportunity to fingerprint us (since it's unusual to use them
+ * with TLS sessions turned off).
+ *
+ * In 0.2.4, clients advertise support for them though, to avoid a TLS
+ * distinguishability vector. This can give us worse PFS, though, if we
+ * get a server that doesn't set SSL_OP_NO_TICKET. With luck, there will
+ * be few such servers by the time 0.2.4 is more stable.
+ */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+ if (! is_client) {
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
+ }
+#endif
+
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE);
+
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
+ SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION);
+#endif
+ /* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
+ * as authenticating any earlier-received data.
+ */
+ {
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
+ }
+
+ /* Don't actually allow compression; it uses RAM and time, it makes TLS
+ * vulnerable to CRIME-style attacks, and most of the data we transmit over
+ * TLS is encrypted (and therefore uncompressible) anyway. */
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
+#endif
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ if (result->ctx->comp_methods)
+ result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL;
+#endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
+
+#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
+#endif
+ if (! is_client) {
+ if (cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,cert))
+ goto error;
+ X509_free(cert); /* We just added a reference to cert. */
+ cert=NULL;
+ if (idcert) {
+ X509_STORE *s = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(result->ctx);
+ tor_assert(s);
+ X509_STORE_add_cert(s, idcert);
+ X509_free(idcert); /* The context now owns the reference to idcert */
+ idcert = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
+ if (!is_client) {
+ tor_assert(rsa);
+ if (!(pkey = crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_(rsa,1)))
+ goto error;
+ if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey))
+ goto error;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ pkey = NULL;
+ if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx))
+ goto error;
+ }
+ {
+ crypto_dh_t *dh = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_TLS);
+ tor_assert(dh);
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, crypto_dh_get_dh_(dh));
+ crypto_dh_free(dh);
+ }
+ if (! is_client) {
+ int nid;
+ EC_KEY *ec_key;
+ if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P224)
+ nid = NID_secp224r1;
+ else if (flags & TOR_TLS_CTX_USE_ECDHE_P256)
+ nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ else
+ nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group;
+ /* Use P-256 for ECDHE. */
+ ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ if (ec_key != NULL) /*XXXX Handle errors? */
+ SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(result->ctx, ec_key);
+ EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(result->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
+ always_accept_verify_cb);
+ /* let us realloc bufs that we're writing from */
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
+
+ if (rsa)
+ crypto_pk_free(rsa);
+ if (rsa_auth)
+ crypto_pk_free(rsa_auth);
+ X509_free(authcert);
+ tor_free(nickname);
+ tor_free(nn2);
+ return result;
+
+ error:
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating TLS context");
+ tor_free(nickname);
+ tor_free(nn2);
+ if (pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (rsa)
+ crypto_pk_free(rsa);
+ if (rsa_auth)
+ crypto_pk_free(rsa_auth);
+ if (result)
+ tor_tls_context_decref(result);
+ if (cert)
+ X509_free(cert);
+ if (idcert)
+ X509_free(idcert);
+ if (authcert)
+ X509_free(authcert);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/** Invoked when a TLS state changes: log the change at severity 'debug' */
+STATIC void
+tor_tls_debug_state_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
+{
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START since this depends on whether debug is captured or not */
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "SSL %p is now in state %s [type=%d,val=%d].",
+ ssl, SSL_state_string_long(ssl), type, val);
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+}
+
+/* Return the name of the negotiated ciphersuite in use on <b>tls</b> */
+const char *
+tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return SSL_get_cipher(tls->ssl);
+}
+
+/* Here's the old V2 cipher list we sent from 0.2.1.1-alpha up to
+ * 0.2.3.17-beta. If a client is using this list, we can't believe the ciphers
+ * that it claims to support. We'll prune this list to remove the ciphers
+ * *we* don't recognize. */
+STATIC uint16_t v2_cipher_list[] = {
+ 0xc00a, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ 0xc014, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x0039, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
+ 0x0038, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
+ 0xc00f, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ 0xc005, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x0035, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA */
+ 0xc007, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0xc009, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ 0xc011, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0xc013, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x0033, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
+ 0x0032, /* TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
+ 0xc00c, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0xc00e, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ 0xc002, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0xc004, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x0004, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5 */
+ 0x0005, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA */
+ 0x002f, /* TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA */
+ 0xc008, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0xc012, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0x0016, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0x0013, /* SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0xc00d, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0xc003, /* TLS1_TXT_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0xfeff, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA */
+ 0x000a, /* SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA */
+ 0
+};
+/** Have we removed the unrecognized ciphers from v2_cipher_list yet? */
+static int v2_cipher_list_pruned = 0;
+
+/** Return 0 if <b>m</b> does not support the cipher with ID <b>cipher</b>;
+ * return 1 if it does support it, or if we have no way to tell. */
+STATIC int
+find_cipher_by_id(const SSL *ssl, const SSL_METHOD *m, uint16_t cipher)
+{
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND
+ (void) m;
+ {
+ unsigned char cipherid[3];
+ tor_assert(ssl);
+ set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher));
+ cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting
+ * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2
+ * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */
+ c = SSL_CIPHER_find((SSL*)ssl, cipherid);
+ if (c)
+ tor_assert((SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c) & 0xffff) == cipher);
+ return c != NULL;
+ }
+#else /* !(defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND)) */
+
+# if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR)
+ if (m && m->get_cipher_by_char) {
+ unsigned char cipherid[3];
+ set_uint16(cipherid, tor_htons(cipher));
+ cipherid[2] = 0; /* If ssl23_get_cipher_by_char finds no cipher starting
+ * with a two-byte 'cipherid', it may look for a v2
+ * cipher with the appropriate 3 bytes. */
+ c = m->get_cipher_by_char(cipherid);
+ if (c)
+ tor_assert((c->id & 0xffff) == cipher);
+ return c != NULL;
+ }
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_STRUCT_SSL_METHOD_ST_GET_CIPHER_BY_CHAR) */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
+ if (m && m->get_cipher && m->num_ciphers) {
+ /* It would seem that some of the "let's-clean-up-openssl" forks have
+ * removed the get_cipher_by_char function. Okay, so now you get a
+ * quadratic search.
+ */
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < m->num_ciphers(); ++i) {
+ c = m->get_cipher(i);
+ if (c && (c->id & 0xffff) == cipher) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */
+ (void) ssl;
+ (void) m;
+ (void) cipher;
+ return 1; /* No way to search */
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_CIPHER_FIND) */
+}
+
+/** Remove from v2_cipher_list every cipher that we don't support, so that
+ * comparing v2_cipher_list to a client's cipher list will give a sensible
+ * result. */
+static void
+prune_v2_cipher_list(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ uint16_t *inp, *outp;
+#ifdef HAVE_TLS_METHOD
+ const SSL_METHOD *m = TLS_method();
+#else
+ const SSL_METHOD *m = SSLv23_method();
+#endif
+
+ inp = outp = v2_cipher_list;
+ while (*inp) {
+ if (find_cipher_by_id(ssl, m, *inp)) {
+ *outp++ = *inp++;
+ } else {
+ inp++;
+ }
+ }
+ *outp = 0;
+
+ v2_cipher_list_pruned = 1;
+}
+
+/** Examine the client cipher list in <b>ssl</b>, and determine what kind of
+ * client it is. Return one of CIPHERS_ERR, CIPHERS_V1, CIPHERS_V2,
+ * CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED.
+ **/
+STATIC int
+tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(const SSL *ssl,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers)
+{
+ int i, res;
+ tor_tls_t *tor_tls;
+ if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!v2_cipher_list_pruned))
+ prune_v2_cipher_list(ssl);
+
+ tor_tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
+ if (tor_tls && tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type)
+ return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type;
+
+ /* If we reached this point, we just got a client hello. See if there is
+ * a cipher list. */
+ if (!peer_ciphers) {
+ log_info(LD_NET, "No ciphers on session");
+ res = CIPHERS_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ /* Now we need to see if there are any ciphers whose presence means we're
+ * dealing with an updated Tor. */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
+ const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+ if (strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA) &&
+ strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) &&
+ strcmp(ciphername, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) &&
+ strcmp(ciphername, "(NONE)")) {
+ log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a non-version-1 cipher called '%s'", ciphername);
+ // return 1;
+ goto v2_or_higher;
+ }
+ }
+ res = CIPHERS_V1;
+ goto done;
+ v2_or_higher:
+ {
+ const uint16_t *v2_cipher = v2_cipher_list;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
+ uint16_t id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(cipher) & 0xffff;
+ if (id == 0x00ff) /* extended renegotiation indicator. */
+ continue;
+ if (!id || id != *v2_cipher) {
+ res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED;
+ goto dump_ciphers;
+ }
+ ++v2_cipher;
+ }
+ if (*v2_cipher != 0) {
+ res = CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED;
+ goto dump_ciphers;
+ }
+ res = CIPHERS_V2;
+ }
+
+ dump_ciphers:
+ {
+ smartlist_t *elts = smartlist_new();
+ char *s;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(peer_ciphers); ++i) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(peer_ciphers, i);
+ const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+ smartlist_add(elts, (char*)ciphername);
+ }
+ s = smartlist_join_strings(elts, ":", 0, NULL);
+ log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a %s V2/V3 cipher list from %s. It is: '%s'",
+ (res == CIPHERS_V2) ? "fictitious" : "real", ADDR(tor_tls), s);
+ tor_free(s);
+ smartlist_free(elts);
+ }
+ done:
+ if (tor_tls)
+ return tor_tls->client_cipher_list_type = res;
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the cipher list suggested by the client for <b>ssl</b> is
+ * a list that indicates that the client knows how to do the v2 TLS connection
+ * handshake. */
+STATIC int
+tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers;
+#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS
+ ciphers = SSL_get_client_ciphers(ssl);
+#else
+ SSL_SESSION *session;
+ if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) {
+ log_info(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?");
+ return CIPHERS_ERR;
+ }
+ ciphers = session->ciphers;
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_CIPHERS) */
+
+ return tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, ciphers) >= CIPHERS_V2;
+}
+
+/** Invoked when we're accepting a connection on <b>ssl</b>, and the connection
+ * changes state. We use this:
+ * <ul><li>To alter the state of the handshake partway through, so we
+ * do not send or request extra certificates in v2 handshakes.</li>
+ * <li>To detect renegotiation</li></ul>
+ */
+STATIC void
+tor_tls_server_info_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
+{
+ tor_tls_t *tls;
+ (void) val;
+
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(ssl == NULL) {
+ return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
+ }
+
+ tor_tls_debug_state_callback(ssl, type, val);
+
+ if (type != SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP)
+ return;
+
+ OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE ssl_state = SSL_get_state(ssl);
+ if (! STATE_IS_SW_SERVER_HELLO(ssl_state))
+ return;
+ tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
+ if (tls) {
+ /* Check whether we're watching for renegotiates. If so, this is one! */
+ if (tls->negotiated_callback)
+ tls->got_renegotiate = 1;
+ if (tls->server_handshake_count < 127) /*avoid any overflow possibility*/
+ ++tls->server_handshake_count;
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Now check the cipher list. */
+ if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(ssl)) {
+ if (tls->wasV2Handshake)
+ return; /* We already turned this stuff off for the first handshake;
+ * This is a renegotiation. */
+
+ /* Yes, we're casting away the const from ssl. This is very naughty of us.
+ * Let's hope openssl doesn't notice! */
+
+ /* Set SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN to keep from sending back any extra certs. */
+ SSL_set_mode((SSL*) ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
+ /* Don't send a hello request. */
+ SSL_set_verify((SSL*) ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
+
+ if (tls) {
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START this line is not reachable */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/** Callback to get invoked on a server after we've read the list of ciphers
+ * the client supports, but before we pick our own ciphersuite.
+ *
+ * We can't abuse an info_cb for this, since by the time one of the
+ * client_hello info_cbs is called, we've already picked which ciphersuite to
+ * use.
+ *
+ * Technically, this function is an abuse of this callback, since the point of
+ * a session_secret_cb is to try to set up and/or verify a shared-secret for
+ * authentication on the fly. But as long as we return 0, we won't actually be
+ * setting up a shared secret, and all will be fine.
+ */
+STATIC int
+tor_tls_session_secret_cb(SSL *ssl, void *secret, int *secret_len,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers,
+ CONST_IF_OPENSSL_1_1_API SSL_CIPHER **cipher,
+ void *arg)
+{
+ (void) secret;
+ (void) secret_len;
+ (void) peer_ciphers;
+ (void) cipher;
+ (void) arg;
+
+ if (tor_tls_classify_client_ciphers(ssl, peer_ciphers) ==
+ CIPHERS_UNRESTRICTED) {
+ SSL_set_cipher_list(ssl, UNRESTRICTED_SERVER_CIPHER_LIST);
+ }
+
+ SSL_set_session_secret_cb(ssl, NULL, NULL);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+static void
+tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ SSL_set_session_secret_cb(tls->ssl, tor_tls_session_secret_cb, NULL);
+}
+
+/** Create a new TLS object from a file descriptor, and a flag to
+ * determine whether it is functioning as a server.
+ */
+tor_tls_t *
+tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer)
+{
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ tor_tls_t *result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
+ tor_tls_context_t *context = isServer ? server_tls_context :
+ client_tls_context;
+ result->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
+
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+ tor_assert(context); /* make sure somebody made it first */
+ if (!(result->ssl = SSL_new(context->ctx))) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating SSL object");
+ tor_free(result);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+ /* Browsers use the TLS hostname extension, so we should too. */
+ if (!isServer) {
+ char *fake_hostname = crypto_random_hostname(4,25, "www.",".com");
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, fake_hostname);
+ tor_free(fake_hostname);
+ }
+#endif /* defined(SSL_set_tlsext_host_name) */
+
+ if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(result->ssl,
+ isServer ? SERVER_CIPHER_LIST : CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST)) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "setting ciphers");
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL);
+#endif
+ SSL_free(result->ssl);
+ tor_free(result);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ result->socket = sock;
+ bio = BIO_new_socket(sock, BIO_NOCLOSE);
+ if (! bio) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "opening BIO");
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL);
+#endif
+ SSL_free(result->ssl);
+ tor_free(result);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ {
+ int set_worked =
+ SSL_set_ex_data(result->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, result);
+ if (!set_worked) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,
+ "Couldn't set the tls for an SSL*; connection will fail");
+ }
+ }
+ SSL_set_bio(result->ssl, bio, bio);
+ tor_tls_context_incref(context);
+ result->context = context;
+ result->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
+ result->isServer = isServer;
+ result->wantwrite_n = 0;
+ result->last_write_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(bio);
+ result->last_read_count = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(bio);
+ if (result->last_write_count || result->last_read_count) {
+ log_warn(LD_NET, "Newly created BIO has read count %lu, write count %lu",
+ result->last_read_count, result->last_write_count);
+ }
+ if (isServer) {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
+ } else {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
+ }
+
+ if (isServer)
+ tor_tls_setup_session_secret_cb(result);
+
+ goto done;
+ err:
+ result = NULL;
+ done:
+ /* Not expected to get called. */
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating tor_tls_t object");
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** Make future log messages about <b>tls</b> display the address
+ * <b>address</b>.
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_set_logged_address(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *address)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_free(tls->address);
+ tls->address = tor_strdup(address);
+}
+
+/** Set <b>cb</b> to be called with argument <b>arg</b> whenever <b>tls</b>
+ * next gets a client-side renegotiate in the middle of a read. Do not
+ * invoke this function until <em>after</em> initial handshaking is done!
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
+ void (*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg),
+ void *arg)
+{
+ tls->negotiated_callback = cb;
+ tls->callback_arg = arg;
+ tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
+ if (cb) {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_server_info_callback);
+ } else {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_debug_state_callback);
+ }
+}
+
+/** If this version of openssl requires it, turn on renegotiation on
+ * <b>tls</b>.
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ /* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
+ * as authenticating any earlier-received data. */
+ SSL_set_options(tls->ssl,
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
+}
+
+/** If this version of openssl supports it, turn off renegotiation on
+ * <b>tls</b>. (Our protocol never requires this for security, but it's nice
+ * to use belt-and-suspenders here.)
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+#ifdef SUPPORT_UNSAFE_RENEGOTIATION_FLAG
+ tls->ssl->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
+#else
+ (void) tls;
+#endif
+}
+
+/** Assert that the flags that allow legacy renegotiation are still set */
+void
+tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+#if defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && \
+ SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION != 0
+ long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl);
+ tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
+#else
+ (void) tls;
+#endif /* defined(SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION) && ... */
+}
+
+/** Return whether this tls initiated the connect (client) or
+ * received it (server). */
+int
+tor_tls_is_server(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ return tls->isServer;
+}
+
+/** Release resources associated with a TLS object. Does not close the
+ * underlying file descriptor.
+ */
+void
+tor_tls_free_(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ if (!tls)
+ return;
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+ {
+ size_t r,w;
+ tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tls,&r,&w); /* ensure written_by_tls is updated */
+ }
+#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
+ SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(tls->ssl, NULL);
+#endif
+ SSL_free(tls->ssl);
+ tls->ssl = NULL;
+ tls->negotiated_callback = NULL;
+ if (tls->context)
+ tor_tls_context_decref(tls->context);
+ tor_free(tls->address);
+ tls->magic = 0x99999999;
+ tor_free(tls);
+}
+
+/** Underlying function for TLS reading. Reads up to <b>len</b>
+ * characters from <b>tls</b> into <b>cp</b>. On success, returns the
+ * number of characters read. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
+ * TOR_TLS_CLOSE, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_read,(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len))
+{
+ int r, err;
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+ tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
+ tor_assert(len<INT_MAX);
+ r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, cp, (int)len);
+ if (r > 0) {
+ if (tls->got_renegotiate) {
+ /* Renegotiation happened! */
+ log_info(LD_NET, "Got a TLS renegotiation from %s", ADDR(tls));
+ if (tls->negotiated_callback)
+ tls->negotiated_callback(tls, tls->callback_arg);
+ tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
+ }
+ return r;
+ }
+ err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading", LOG_DEBUG, LD_NET);
+ if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_ || err == TOR_TLS_CLOSE) {
+ log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d; TLS is closed",r);
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
+ return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
+ } else {
+ tor_assert(err != TOR_TLS_DONE);
+ log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d, err=%d",r,err);
+ return err;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Total number of bytes that we've used TLS to send. Used to track TLS
+ * overhead. */
+STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_over_tls = 0;
+/** Total number of bytes that TLS has put on the network for us. Used to
+ * track TLS overhead. */
+STATIC uint64_t total_bytes_written_by_tls = 0;
+
+/** Underlying function for TLS writing. Write up to <b>n</b>
+ * characters from <b>cp</b> onto <b>tls</b>. On success, returns the
+ * number of characters written. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
+ * TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n)
+{
+ int r, err;
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+ tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
+ tor_assert(n < INT_MAX);
+ if (n == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (tls->wantwrite_n) {
+ /* if WANTWRITE last time, we must use the _same_ n as before */
+ tor_assert(n >= tls->wantwrite_n);
+ log_debug(LD_NET,"resuming pending-write, (%d to flush, reusing %d)",
+ (int)n, (int)tls->wantwrite_n);
+ n = tls->wantwrite_n;
+ tls->wantwrite_n = 0;
+ }
+ r = SSL_write(tls->ssl, cp, (int)n);
+ err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "writing", LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
+ if (err == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
+ total_bytes_written_over_tls += r;
+ return r;
+ }
+ if (err == TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE || err == TOR_TLS_WANTREAD) {
+ tls->wantwrite_n = n;
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+/** Perform initial handshake on <b>tls</b>. When finished, returns
+ * TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
+ * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ int r;
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+ tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE);
+
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+
+ OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE oldstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl);
+
+ if (tls->isServer) {
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_accept on %p (%s)", tls,
+ SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ r = SSL_accept(tls->ssl);
+ } else {
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_connect on %p (%s)", tls,
+ SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ r = SSL_connect(tls->ssl);
+ }
+
+ OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE newstate = SSL_get_state(tls->ssl);
+
+ if (oldstate != newstate)
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "After call, %p was in state %s",
+ tls, SSL_state_string_long(tls->ssl));
+ /* We need to call this here and not earlier, since OpenSSL has a penchant
+ * for clearing its flags when you say accept or connect. */
+ tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls);
+ r = tor_tls_get_error(tls,r,0, "handshaking", LOG_INFO, LD_HANDSHAKE);
+ if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) {
+ tls_log_errors(tls, tls->isServer ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "handshaking");
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ }
+ if (r == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
+ return tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Perform the final part of the initial TLS handshake on <b>tls</b>. This
+ * should be called for the first handshake only: it determines whether the v1
+ * or the v2 handshake was used, and adjusts things for the renegotiation
+ * handshake as appropriate.
+ *
+ * tor_tls_handshake() calls this on its own; you only need to call this if
+ * bufferevent is doing the handshake for you.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ int r = TOR_TLS_DONE;
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+ if (tls->isServer) {
+ SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, NULL);
+ SSL_set_verify(tls->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, always_accept_verify_cb);
+ SSL_clear_mode(tls->ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
+ if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl)) {
+ /* This check is redundant, but back when we did it in the callback,
+ * we might have not been able to look up the tor_tls_t if the code
+ * was buggy. Fixing that. */
+ if (!tls->wasV2Handshake) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "For some reason, wasV2Handshake didn't"
+ " get set. Fixing that.");
+ }
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+ log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Completed V2 TLS handshake with client; waiting"
+ " for renegotiation.");
+ } else {
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Client-side */
+ tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
+ /* XXXX this can move, probably? -NM */
+ if (SSL_set_cipher_list(tls->ssl, SERVER_CIPHER_LIST) == 0) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "re-setting ciphers");
+ r = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ }
+ }
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "finishing the handshake");
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Shut down an open tls connection <b>tls</b>. When finished, returns
+ * TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
+ * or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_shutdown(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ int r, err;
+ char buf[128];
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+
+ while (1) {
+ if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
+ /* If we've already called shutdown once to send a close message,
+ * we read until the other side has closed too.
+ */
+ do {
+ r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, buf, 128);
+ } while (r>0);
+ err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading to shut down",
+ LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
+ if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_) {
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE;
+ /* fall through... */
+ } else {
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = SSL_shutdown(tls->ssl);
+ if (r == 1) {
+ /* If shutdown returns 1, the connection is entirely closed. */
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
+ return TOR_TLS_DONE;
+ }
+ err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_SYSCALL|CATCH_ZERO, "shutting down",
+ LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
+ if (err == TOR_TLS_SYSCALL_) {
+ /* The underlying TCP connection closed while we were shutting down. */
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
+ return TOR_TLS_DONE;
+ } else if (err == TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN_) {
+ /* The TLS connection says that it sent a shutdown record, but
+ * isn't done shutting down yet. Make sure that this hasn't
+ * happened before, then go back to the start of the function
+ * and try to read.
+ */
+ if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE ||
+ tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
+ log_warn(LD_NET,
+ "TLS returned \"half-closed\" value while already half-closed");
+ return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
+ }
+ tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE;
+ /* fall through ... */
+ } else {
+ return err;
+ }
+ } /* end loop */
+}
+
+/** Return true iff this TLS connection is authenticated.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ X509 *cert;
+ cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
+ tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
+ if (!cert)
+ return 0;
+ X509_free(cert);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Return a newly allocated copy of the peer certificate, or NULL if there
+ * isn't one. */
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_tls_get_peer_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
+{
+ X509 *cert;
+ cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
+ tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
+ if (!cert)
+ return NULL;
+ return tor_x509_cert_new(cert);
+}
+
+/** Return a newly allocated copy of the cerficate we used on the connection,
+ * or NULL if somehow we didn't use one. */
+MOCK_IMPL(tor_x509_cert_t *,
+tor_tls_get_own_cert,(tor_tls_t *tls))
+{
+ X509 *cert = SSL_get_certificate(tls->ssl);
+ tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE,
+ "getting own-connection certificate");
+ if (!cert)
+ return NULL;
+ /* Fun inconsistency: SSL_get_peer_certificate increments the reference
+ * count, but SSL_get_certificate does not. */
+ X509 *duplicate = X509_dup(cert);
+ if (BUG(duplicate == NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ return tor_x509_cert_new(duplicate);
+}
+
+/** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */
+static void
+log_cert_lifetime(int severity, const X509 *cert, const char *problem,
+ time_t now)
+{
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ char *s1=NULL, *s2=NULL;
+ char mytime[33];
+ struct tm tm;
+ size_t n;
+
+ if (problem)
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
+ "Certificate %s. Either their clock is set wrong, or your clock "
+ "is wrong.",
+ problem);
+
+ if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't allocate BIO!"); goto end;
+ }
+ if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore_const(cert)))) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf);
+ s1 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length);
+
+ (void)BIO_reset(bio);
+ if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter_const(cert)))) {
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime");
+ goto end;
+ }
+ BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf);
+ s2 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length);
+
+ n = strftime(mytime, 32, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y UTC", tor_gmtime_r(&now, &tm));
+ if (n > 0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
+ "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. Your time is %s.)",
+ s1,s2,mytime);
+ } else {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,
+ "(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. "
+ "Couldn't get your time.)",
+ s1, s2);
+ }
+
+ end:
+ /* Not expected to get invoked */
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "getting certificate lifetime");
+ if (bio)
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ tor_free(s1);
+ tor_free(s2);
+}
+
+/** Helper function: try to extract a link certificate and an identity
+ * certificate from <b>tls</b>, and store them in *<b>cert_out</b> and
+ * *<b>id_cert_out</b> respectively. Log all messages at level
+ * <b>severity</b>.
+ *
+ * Note that a reference is added to cert_out, so it needs to be
+ * freed. id_cert_out doesn't. */
+MOCK_IMPL(STATIC void,
+try_to_extract_certs_from_tls,(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
+ X509 **cert_out, X509 **id_cert_out))
+{
+ X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
+ int num_in_chain, i;
+ *cert_out = *id_cert_out = NULL;
+ if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
+ return;
+ *cert_out = cert;
+ if (!(chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl)))
+ return;
+ num_in_chain = sk_X509_num(chain);
+ /* 1 means we're receiving (server-side), and it's just the id_cert.
+ * 2 means we're connecting (client-side), and it's both the link
+ * cert and the id_cert.
+ */
+ if (num_in_chain < 1) {
+ log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,
+ "Unexpected number of certificates in chain (%d)",
+ num_in_chain);
+ return;
+ }
+ for (i=0; i<num_in_chain; ++i) {
+ id_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ if (X509_cmp(id_cert, cert) != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ *id_cert_out = id_cert;
+}
+
+/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a
+ * certificate chain that is currently valid and signed, then set
+ * *<b>identity_key</b> to the identity certificate's key and return
+ * 0. Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level <b>severity</b>.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_t **identity_key)
+{
+ X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL;
+ RSA *rsa;
+ int r = -1;
+
+ check_no_tls_errors();
+ *identity_key = NULL;
+
+ try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(severity, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
+ if (!cert)
+ goto done;
+ if (!id_cert) {
+ log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"No distinct identity certificate found");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "before verifying certificate");
+
+ if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) ||
+ X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) {
+ log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0");
+ tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "verifying certificate");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(id_pkey);
+ if (!rsa)
+ goto done;
+ *identity_key = crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(rsa);
+
+ r = 0;
+
+ done:
+ if (cert)
+ X509_free(cert);
+ if (id_pkey)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(id_pkey);
+
+ /* This should never get invoked, but let's make sure in case OpenSSL
+ * acts unexpectedly. */
+ tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "finishing tor_tls_verify");
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Check whether the certificate set on the connection <b>tls</b> is expired
+ * give or take <b>past_tolerance</b> seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take
+ * <b>future_tolerance</b> seconds. Return 0 for valid, -1 for failure.
+ *
+ * NOTE: you should call tor_tls_verify before tor_tls_check_lifetime.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_check_lifetime(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
+ time_t now,
+ int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance)
+{
+ X509 *cert;
+ int r = -1;
+
+ if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
+ goto done;
+
+ if (check_cert_lifetime_internal(severity, cert, now,
+ past_tolerance, future_tolerance) < 0)
+ goto done;
+
+ r = 0;
+ done:
+ if (cert)
+ X509_free(cert);
+ /* Not expected to get invoked */
+ tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "checking certificate lifetime");
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Helper: check whether <b>cert</b> is expired give or take
+ * <b>past_tolerance</b> seconds, or not-yet-valid give or take
+ * <b>future_tolerance</b> seconds. (Relative to the current time
+ * <b>now</b>.) If it is live, return 0. If it is not live, log a message
+ * and return -1. */
+static int
+check_cert_lifetime_internal(int severity, const X509 *cert,
+ time_t now,
+ int past_tolerance, int future_tolerance)
+{
+ time_t t;
+
+ t = now + future_tolerance;
+ if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore_const(cert), &t) > 0) {
+ log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "not yet valid", now);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ t = now - past_tolerance;
+ if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter_const(cert), &t) < 0) {
+ log_cert_lifetime(severity, cert, "already expired", now);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+/* Testing only: return a new x509 cert with the same contents as <b>inp</b>,
+ but with the expiration time <b>new_expiration_time</b>, signed with
+ <b>signing_key</b>. */
+STATIC tor_x509_cert_t *
+tor_x509_cert_replace_expiration(const tor_x509_cert_t *inp,
+ time_t new_expiration_time,
+ crypto_pk_t *signing_key)
+{
+ X509 *newc = X509_dup(inp->cert);
+ X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(newc), 0, &new_expiration_time);
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = crypto_pk_get_evp_pkey_(signing_key, 1);
+ tor_assert(X509_sign(newc, pk, EVP_sha256()));
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ return tor_x509_cert_new(newc);
+}
+#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
+
+/** Return the number of bytes available for reading from <b>tls</b>.
+ */
+int
+tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ return SSL_pending(tls->ssl);
+}
+
+/** If <b>tls</b> requires that the next write be of a particular size,
+ * return that size. Otherwise, return 0. */
+size_t
+tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return tls->wantwrite_n;
+}
+
+/** Sets n_read and n_written to the number of bytes read and written,
+ * respectively, on the raw socket used by <b>tls</b> since the last time this
+ * function was called on <b>tls</b>. */
+void
+tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written)
+{
+ BIO *wbio, *tmpbio;
+ unsigned long r, w;
+ r = (unsigned long) BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl));
+ /* We want the number of bytes actually for real written. Unfortunately,
+ * sometimes OpenSSL replaces the wbio on tls->ssl with a buffering bio,
+ * which makes the answer turn out wrong. Let's cope with that. Note
+ * that this approach will fail if we ever replace tls->ssl's BIOs with
+ * buffering bios for reasons of our own. As an alternative, we could
+ * save the original BIO for tls->ssl in the tor_tls_t structure, but
+ * that would be tempting fate. */
+ wbio = SSL_get_wbio(tls->ssl);
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)
+ /* BIO structure is opaque as of OpenSSL 1.1.0-pre5-dev. Again, not
+ * supposed to use this form of the version macro, but the OpenSSL developers
+ * introduced major API changes in the pre-release stage.
+ */
+ if (BIO_method_type(wbio) == BIO_TYPE_BUFFER &&
+ (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL)
+ wbio = tmpbio;
+#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5)) */
+ if (wbio->method == BIO_f_buffer() && (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL)
+ wbio = tmpbio;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_VER(1,1,0,0,5) */
+ w = (unsigned long) BIO_number_written(wbio);
+
+ /* We are ok with letting these unsigned ints go "negative" here:
+ * If we wrapped around, this should still give us the right answer, unless
+ * we wrapped around by more than ULONG_MAX since the last time we called
+ * this function.
+ */
+ *n_read = (size_t)(r - tls->last_read_count);
+ *n_written = (size_t)(w - tls->last_write_count);
+ if (*n_read > INT_MAX || *n_written > INT_MAX) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Preposterously large value in tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes. "
+ "r=%lu, last_read=%lu, w=%lu, last_written=%lu",
+ r, tls->last_read_count, w, tls->last_write_count);
+ }
+ total_bytes_written_by_tls += *n_written;
+ tls->last_read_count = r;
+ tls->last_write_count = w;
+}
+
+/** Return a ratio of the bytes that TLS has sent to the bytes that we've told
+ * it to send. Used to track whether our TLS records are getting too tiny. */
+MOCK_IMPL(double,
+tls_get_write_overhead_ratio,(void))
+{
+ if (total_bytes_written_over_tls == 0)
+ return 1.0;
+
+ return ((double)total_bytes_written_by_tls) /
+ ((double)total_bytes_written_over_tls);
+}
+
+/** Implement check_no_tls_errors: If there are any pending OpenSSL
+ * errors, log an error message. */
+void
+check_no_tls_errors_(const char *fname, int line)
+{
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ return;
+ log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Unhandled OpenSSL errors found at %s:%d: ",
+ tor_fix_source_file(fname), line);
+ tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, NULL);
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the initial TLS connection at <b>tls</b> did not use a v2
+ * TLS handshake. Output is undefined if the handshake isn't finished. */
+int
+tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
+}
+
+/** Return the number of server handshakes that we've noticed doing on
+ * <b>tls</b>. */
+int
+tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return tls->server_handshake_count;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the server TLS connection <b>tls</b> got the renegotiation
+ * request it was waiting for. */
+int
+tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls)
+{
+ return tls->got_renegotiate;
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM
+static size_t
+SSL_get_client_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len == 0)
+ return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ tor_assert(s->s3);
+ memcpy(out, s->s3->client_random, len);
+ return len;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_CLIENT_RANDOM) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM
+static size_t
+SSL_get_server_random(SSL *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
+{
+ if (len == 0)
+ return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE;
+ tor_assert(len == SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
+ tor_assert(s->s3);
+ memcpy(out, s->s3->server_random, len);
+ return len;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_GET_SERVER_RANDOM) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY
+STATIC size_t
+SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(SSL_SESSION *s, uint8_t *out, size_t len)
+{
+ tor_assert(s);
+ if (len == 0)
+ return s->master_key_length;
+ tor_assert(len == (size_t)s->master_key_length);
+ tor_assert(out);
+ memcpy(out, s->master_key, len);
+ return len;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SSL_SESSION_GET_MASTER_KEY) */
+
+/** Set the DIGEST256_LEN buffer at <b>secrets_out</b> to the value used in
+ * the v3 handshake to prove that the client knows the TLS secrets for the
+ * connection <b>tls</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_get_tlssecrets,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out))
+{
+#define TLSSECRET_MAGIC "Tor V3 handshake TLS cross-certification"
+ uint8_t buf[128];
+ size_t len;
+ tor_assert(tls);
+
+ SSL *const ssl = tls->ssl;
+ SSL_SESSION *const session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
+
+ tor_assert(ssl);
+ tor_assert(session);
+
+ const size_t server_random_len = SSL_get_server_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
+ const size_t client_random_len = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, NULL, 0);
+ const size_t master_key_len = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, NULL, 0);
+
+ tor_assert(server_random_len);
+ tor_assert(client_random_len);
+ tor_assert(master_key_len);
+
+ len = client_random_len + server_random_len + strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1;
+ tor_assert(len <= sizeof(buf));
+
+ {
+ size_t r = SSL_get_client_random(ssl, buf, client_random_len);
+ tor_assert(r == client_random_len);
+ }
+
+ {
+ size_t r = SSL_get_server_random(ssl,
+ buf+client_random_len,
+ server_random_len);
+ tor_assert(r == server_random_len);
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *master_key = tor_malloc_zero(master_key_len);
+ {
+ size_t r = SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, master_key, master_key_len);
+ tor_assert(r == master_key_len);
+ }
+
+ uint8_t *nextbuf = buf + client_random_len + server_random_len;
+ memcpy(nextbuf, TLSSECRET_MAGIC, strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1);
+
+ /*
+ The value is an HMAC, using the TLS master key as the HMAC key, of
+ client_random | server_random | TLSSECRET_MAGIC
+ */
+ crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)secrets_out,
+ (char*)master_key,
+ master_key_len,
+ (char*)buf, len);
+ memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ memwipe(master_key, 0, master_key_len);
+ tor_free(master_key);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Using the RFC5705 key material exporting construction, and the
+ * provided <b>context</b> (<b>context_len</b> bytes long) and
+ * <b>label</b> (a NUL-terminated string), compute a 32-byte secret in
+ * <b>secrets_out</b> that only the parties to this TLS session can
+ * compute. Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+tor_tls_export_key_material,(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out,
+ const uint8_t *context,
+ size_t context_len,
+ const char *label))
+{
+ tor_assert(tls);
+ tor_assert(tls->ssl);
+
+ int r = SSL_export_keying_material(tls->ssl,
+ secrets_out, DIGEST256_LEN,
+ label, strlen(label),
+ context, context_len, 1);
+ return (r == 1) ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+/** Examine the amount of memory used and available for buffers in <b>tls</b>.
+ * Set *<b>rbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the read
+ * buffer and *<b>rbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
+ * Set *<b>wbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the write
+ * buffer and *<b>wbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.*/
+int
+tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls,
+ size_t *rbuf_capacity, size_t *rbuf_bytes,
+ size_t *wbuf_capacity, size_t *wbuf_bytes)
+{
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)
+ (void)tls;
+ (void)rbuf_capacity;
+ (void)rbuf_bytes;
+ (void)wbuf_capacity;
+ (void)wbuf_bytes;
+
+ return -1;
+#else /* !(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0)) */
+ if (tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf)
+ *rbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len;
+ else
+ *rbuf_capacity = 0;
+ if (tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf)
+ *wbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.len;
+ else
+ *wbuf_capacity = 0;
+ *rbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left;
+ *wbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left;
+ return 0;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) */
+}
+
+/** Check whether the ECC group requested is supported by the current OpenSSL
+ * library instance. Return 1 if the group is supported, and 0 if not.
+ */
+int
+evaluate_ecgroup_for_tls(const char *ecgroup)
+{
+ EC_KEY *ec_key;
+ int nid;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!ecgroup)
+ nid = NID_tor_default_ecdhe_group;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P256"))
+ nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ else if (!strcasecmp(ecgroup, "P224"))
+ nid = NID_secp224r1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+
+ ec_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid);
+ ret = (ec_key != NULL);
+ EC_KEY_free(ec_key);
+
+ return ret;
+}
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