[tor-commits] [webwml/staging] faq: add update on netflow padding (fixes #22958)

[hiro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

commit 74b08c7a16ef3a21b9148755bcffcd03801924f8
Author: traumschule <traumschuleriebau@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Aug 21 06:51:47 2018 +0200

    faq: add update on netflow padding (fixes #22958)
---
 docs/en/faq.wml | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/en/faq.wml b/docs/en/faq.wml
index 3287072d..70e63620 100644
--- a/docs/en/faq.wml
+++ b/docs/en/faq.wml
@@ -4112,13 +4112,8 @@ receive a fixed number of cells. This approach is more well-understood in
 the context of high-latency systems. See e.g.
 <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#pet05-serjantov";>
 Message Splitting Against the Partial Adversary by Andrei Serjantov and
-Steven J. Murdoch</a>.
-    </p>
-    <p>
-But since we don't currently understand what network and padding
-parameters, if any, could provide increased end-to-end security, our
-current strategy is to minimize the number of places that the adversary
-could possibly see.
+Steven J. Murdoch</a>. Also see our <a href="SendPadding">update on netflow
+    padding below</a>.
     </p>
 
     <hr>
@@ -4281,6 +4276,26 @@ only solution is to have no opinion.
     optimistic.
     </p>
 
+    <p>
+    We did however since
+    <a href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/251-netflow-padding.txt";>
+    implement netflow padding</a> to collapse netflow records for improved
+    security. Now padding is sent between a client's Tor connection and its guard
+    bidirectionally at a random interval that we control from the consensus,
+    with a default of 4 to 14 seconds if the connection is idle. This has the
+    goal of stymying some of the potential traffic analysis attacks out there --
+    website fingerprinting, end-to-end correlation, and the things in between.
+    </p>
+
+    <p>For details see the
+    <a href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/network-team-hackfest-wilmington-watch";>
+    blog post</a> by the Tor network team, the
+    <a href="https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-August/009326.html";>
+    announcement</a> on the tor-dev mailinglist or read further
+    <a href="https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/bibtex.html";>publications</a> on
+    padding.
+    </p>
+
     <hr>
 
     <a id="Steganography"></a>



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