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[tor-commits] [tor/master] Replace "people" with the appropriate network component in comments
commit d5df9fa2356ed1f9d38d659efa335bb9bb134228
Author: J. Ryan Stinnett <jryans@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri Dec 9 14:13:11 2016 -1000
Replace "people" with the appropriate network component in comments
Fixes #18145.
---
src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 +-
src/or/circuitstats.c | 2 +-
src/or/circuituse.c | 2 +-
src/or/config.c | 2 +-
src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +-
src/or/dirserv.c | 6 +++---
src/or/dnsserv.c | 2 +-
src/or/hibernate.c | 6 +++---
src/or/or.h | 2 +-
src/or/router.c | 6 +++---
src/or/routerlist.c | 2 +-
11 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index f60a8bf..9bd0125 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -1164,7 +1164,7 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
/* Check if they asked us for 0000..0000. We support using
* an empty fingerprint for the first hop (e.g. for a bridge relay),
- * but we don't want to let people send us extend cells for empty
+ * but we don't want to let clients send us extend cells for empty
* fingerprints -- a) because it opens the user up to a mitm attack,
* and b) because it lets an attacker force the relay to hold open a
* new TLS connection for each extend request. */
diff --git a/src/or/circuitstats.c b/src/or/circuitstats.c
index 418acc0..6cb99e4 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitstats.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitstats.c
@@ -1431,7 +1431,7 @@ circuit_build_times_network_check_changed(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
#define MAX_TIMEOUT ((int32_t) (INT32_MAX/2))
/* Check to see if this has happened before. If so, double the timeout
- * to give people on abysmally bad network connections a shot at access */
+ * to give clients on abysmally bad network connections a shot at access */
if (cbt->timeout_ms >= circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout()) {
if (cbt->timeout_ms > MAX_TIMEOUT || cbt->close_ms > MAX_TIMEOUT) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Insanely large circuit build timeout value. "
diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c
index 04c5af9..e109cef 100644
--- a/src/or/circuituse.c
+++ b/src/or/circuituse.c
@@ -2598,7 +2598,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn)
log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC,
"Attaching apconn to circ %u (stream %d sec old).",
(unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id, conn_age);
- /* print the circ's path, so people can figure out which circs are
+ /* print the circ's path, so clients can figure out which circs are
* sucking. */
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_APP|LD_CIRC,circ);
diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c
index 6948bdb..a4d063d 100644
--- a/src/or/config.c
+++ b/src/or/config.c
@@ -1899,7 +1899,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options)
addressmap_clear_invalid_automaps(options);
/* How long should we delay counting bridge stats after becoming a bridge?
- * We use this so we don't count people who used our bridge thinking it is
+ * We use this so we don't count clients who used our bridge thinking it is
* a relay. If you change this, don't forget to change the log message
* below. It's 4 hours (the time it takes to stop being used by clients)
* plus some extra time for clock skew. */
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c
index 3874d52..fb077bb 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_edge.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c
@@ -1300,7 +1300,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn,
* an internal address? If so, we should reject it if we're configured to
* do so. */
if (options->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) {
- /* Don't let people try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */
+ /* Don't let clients try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */
tor_addr_t addr;
int ok;
ok = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(
diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c
index 399d5ea..e106628 100644
--- a/src/or/dirserv.c
+++ b/src/or/dirserv.c
@@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ directory_caches_dir_info(const or_options_t *options)
should_refuse_unknown_exits(options);
}
-/** Return 1 if we want to allow remote people to ask us directory
+/** Return 1 if we want to allow remote clients to ask us directory
* requests via the "begin_dir" interface, which doesn't require
* having any separate port open. */
int
@@ -2236,8 +2236,8 @@ dirserv_set_routerstatus_testing(routerstatus_t *rs)
}
/** Routerstatus <b>rs</b> is part of a group of routers that are on
- * too narrow an IP-space. Clear out its flags: we don't want people
- * using it.
+ * too narrow an IP-space. Clear out its flags since we don't want it be used
+ * because of its Sybil-like appearance.
*/
static void
clear_status_flags_on_sybil(routerstatus_t *rs)
diff --git a/src/or/dnsserv.c b/src/or/dnsserv.c
index c5c0a88..8768b2a 100644
--- a/src/or/dnsserv.c
+++ b/src/or/dnsserv.c
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ dnsserv_reject_request(entry_connection_t *conn)
}
/** Look up the original name that corresponds to 'addr' in req. We use this
- * to preserve case in order to facilitate people using 0x20-hacks to avoid
+ * to preserve case in order to facilitate clients using 0x20-hacks to avoid
* DNS poisoning. */
static const char *
evdns_get_orig_address(const struct evdns_server_request *req,
diff --git a/src/or/hibernate.c b/src/or/hibernate.c
index aaf5c4b..c2b3bbb 100644
--- a/src/or/hibernate.c
+++ b/src/or/hibernate.c
@@ -424,8 +424,8 @@ configure_accounting(time_t now)
if (-0.50 <= delta && delta <= 0.50) {
/* The start of the period is now a little later or earlier than we
* remembered. That's fine; we might lose some bytes we could otherwise
- * have written, but better to err on the side of obeying people's
- * accounting settings. */
+ * have written, but better to err on the side of obeying accounting
+ * settings. */
log_info(LD_ACCT, "Accounting interval moved by %.02f%%; "
"that's fine.", delta*100);
interval_end_time = start_of_accounting_period_after(now);
@@ -896,7 +896,7 @@ hibernate_go_dormant(time_t now)
log_notice(LD_ACCT,"Going dormant. Blowing away remaining connections.");
/* Close all OR/AP/exit conns. Leave dir conns because we still want
- * to be able to upload server descriptors so people know we're still
+ * to be able to upload server descriptors so clients know we're still
* running, and download directories so we can detect if we're obsolete.
* Leave control conns because we still want to be controllable.
*/
diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h
index 7e11bf0..0e508e9 100644
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@ -3883,7 +3883,7 @@ typedef struct {
uint64_t BandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, are we willing
* to use in a second? */
uint64_t MaxAdvertisedBandwidth; /**< How much bandwidth are we willing to
- * tell people we have? */
+ * tell other nodes we have? */
uint64_t RelayBandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we
* willing to use for all relayed conns? */
uint64_t RelayBandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, will we
diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c
index 917caaa..2d8208a 100644
--- a/src/or/router.c
+++ b/src/or/router.c
@@ -1178,9 +1178,9 @@ router_should_be_directory_server(const or_options_t *options, int dir_port)
if (accounting_is_enabled(options) &&
get_options()->AccountingRule != ACCT_IN) {
/* Don't spend bytes for directory traffic if we could end up hibernating,
- * but allow DirPort otherwise. Some people set AccountingMax because
- * they're confused or to get statistics. Directory traffic has a much
- * larger effect on output than input so there is no reason to turn it
+ * but allow DirPort otherwise. Some relay operators set AccountingMax
+ * because they're confused or to get statistics. Directory traffic has a
+ * much larger effect on output than input so there is no reason to turn it
* off if using AccountingRule in. */
int interval_length = accounting_get_interval_length();
uint32_t effective_bw = get_effective_bwrate(options);
diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c
index 9bcca76..5fd16ed 100644
--- a/src/or/routerlist.c
+++ b/src/or/routerlist.c
@@ -4483,7 +4483,7 @@ router_load_extrainfo_from_string(const char *s, const char *eos,
ei->cache_info.identity_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
smartlist_string_remove(requested_fingerprints, fp);
- /* We silently let people stuff us with extrainfos we didn't ask for,
+ /* We silently let relays stuff us with extrainfos we didn't ask for,
* so long as we would have wanted them anyway. Since we always fetch
* all the extrainfos we want, and we never actually act on them
* inside Tor, this should be harmless. */
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