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[tor-commits] [webwml/staging] Change hidden -> onion. (See #24285)
commit c9be58275d14ab068a0f6e429f44cbaa42bf6e3c
Author: kat <kat@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Sun Nov 19 16:01:11 2017 -0500
Change hidden -> onion. (See #24285)
Renamed files, made new files with old names for redirects, updated
links to use new URLs.
---
about/en/overview.wml | 2 +-
docs/en/faq-abuse.wml | 2 +-
docs/en/faq.wml | 2 +-
docs/en/hidden-services.wml | 159 +------------------------
docs/en/onion-services.wml | 162 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
docs/en/sidenav.wmi | 2 +-
docs/en/tor-hidden-service.wml | 255 +---------------------------------------
docs/en/tor-onion-service.wml | 258 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
docs/torbutton/en/sidenav.wmi | 2 +-
include/foot.wmi | 2 +-
10 files changed, 430 insertions(+), 416 deletions(-)
diff --git a/about/en/overview.wml b/about/en/overview.wml
index 11d1fdcb..d60f1c39 100644
--- a/about/en/overview.wml
+++ b/about/en/overview.wml
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
Individuals use Tor to keep websites from tracking them and their family
members, or to connect to news sites, instant messaging services, or the
like when these are blocked by their local Internet providers. Tor's <a
- href="<page docs/hidden-services>">onion services</a>
+ href="<page docs/onion-services>">onion services</a>
let users publish web sites and other services without needing to reveal
the location of the site. Individuals also use Tor for socially sensitive
communication: chat rooms and web forums for rape and abuse survivors,
diff --git a/docs/en/faq-abuse.wml b/docs/en/faq-abuse.wml
index 484865f7..d916bf97 100644
--- a/docs/en/faq-abuse.wml
+++ b/docs/en/faq-abuse.wml
@@ -353,7 +353,7 @@ using technology?</a></li>
<h3><a class="anchor" href="#RemoveContent">I want some content removed from a .onion address.</a></h3>
<p>The Tor Project does not host, control, nor have the ability to
discover the owner or location of a .onion address. The .onion address is
- an address from <a href="<page docs/hidden-services>">an onion
+ an address from <a href="<page docs/onion-services>">an onion
service</a>. The name you see ending in .onion is an onion service descriptor.
It's an automatically generated name which can be located on any Tor
relay or client anywhere on the Internet. Onion services are designed
diff --git a/docs/en/faq.wml b/docs/en/faq.wml
index a558a8fd..65d476ee 100644
--- a/docs/en/faq.wml
+++ b/docs/en/faq.wml
@@ -3062,7 +3062,7 @@ diversity,
onion service?</a></h3>
<p>
- See the <a href="<page docs/tor-hidden-service>">
+ See the <a href="<page docs/tor-onion-service>">
official onion service configuration instructions</a>.
</p>
diff --git a/docs/en/hidden-services.wml b/docs/en/hidden-services.wml
index 6dc141b9..a5da823a 100644
--- a/docs/en/hidden-services.wml
+++ b/docs/en/hidden-services.wml
@@ -1,162 +1,7 @@
## translation metadata
# Revision: $Revision$
-# Translation-Priority: 3-low
+# Status: obsolete
-#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor: Onion Service Protocol" CHARSET="UTF-8"
-<div id="content" class="clearfix">
- <div id="breadcrumbs">
- <a href="<page index>">Home » </a>
- <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation » </a>
- <a href="<page docs/hidden-services>">Onion Services</a>
- </div>
- <div id="maincol">
- <h2>Tor: Onion Service Protocol</h2>
- <hr>
+#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Redirecting" REDIRECT="docs/onion-services"
- <p>
- Tor makes it possible for users to hide their locations while offering
- various kinds of services, such as web publishing or an instant
- messaging server. Using Tor "rendezvous points," other Tor users can
- connect to these onion services, formerly known as hidden services, each
- without knowing the other's network identity. This page describes the
- technical details of how this rendezvous protocol works. For a more direct
- how-to, see our <a href="<page docs/tor-hidden-service>">configuring onion
- services</a> page. </p>
-
- <p>
- An onion service needs to advertise its existence in the Tor network before
- clients will be able to contact it. Therefore, the service randomly picks
- some relays, builds circuits to them, and asks them to act as
- <em>introduction points</em> by telling them its public key. Note
- that in the following figures the green links are circuits rather
- than direct connections. By using a full Tor circuit, it's hard for
- anyone to associate an introduction point with the onion server's IP
- address. While the introduction points and others are told the onion
- service's identity (public key), we don't want them to learn about the
- onion server's location (IP address).
- </p>
-
- <img alt="Tor onion service step one" src="$(IMGROOT)/tor-onion-services-1.png">
- # maybe add a speech bubble containing "PK" to Bob, because that's what
- # Bob tells to his introduction points
-
- <p>
- Step two: the onion service assembles an <em>onion service descriptor</em>,
- containing its public key and a summary of each introduction point, and
- signs this descriptor with its private key. It uploads that descriptor to
- a distributed hash table. The descriptor will be found by clients
- requesting XYZ.onion where XYZ is a 16 character name derived from the
- service's public key. After this step, the onion service is set up. </p>
-
- <p>
- Although it might seem impractical to use an automatically-generated
- service name, it serves an important goal: Everyone – including
- the introduction points, the distributed hash table directory, and of
- course the clients – can verify that they are talking to the right
- onion service. See also <a
- href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle";>Zooko's
- conjecture</a> that out of Decentralized, Secure, and Human-Meaningful, you
- can achieve at most two. Perhaps one day somebody will implement a <a
- href="http://www.skyhunter.com/marcs/petnames/IntroPetNames.html";>Petname</a>
- design for onion service names? </p>
-
- <img alt="Tor onion service step two" src="$(IMGROOT)/tor-onion-services-2.png">
- # maybe replace "database" with "DHT"; further: how incorrect
- # is it to *not* add DB to the Tor cloud, now that begin dir cells are in
- # use?
-
- <p>
- Step three: A client that wants to contact an onion service needs
- to learn about its onion address first. After that, the client can
- initiate connection establishment by downloading the descriptor from
- the distributed hash table. If there is a descriptor for XYZ.onion
- (the onion service could also be offline or have left long ago,
- or there could be a typo in the onion address), the client now
- knows the set of introduction points and the right public key to
- use. Around this time, the client also creates a circuit to another
- randomly picked relay and asks it to act as <em>rendezvous point</em>
- by telling it a one-time secret.
- </p>
-
- <img alt="Tor onion service step three" src="$(IMGROOT)/tor-onion-services-3.png">
- # maybe add "cookie" to speech bubble, separated from the surrounded
- # "IP1-3" and "PK"
-
- <p>
- Step four: When the descriptor is present and the rendezvous
- point is ready, the client assembles an <em>introduce</em> message
- (encrypted to the onion service's public key) including the address
- of the rendezvous point and the one-time secret. The client sends
- this message to one of the introduction points, requesting it be
- delivered to the onion service. Again, communication takes place
- via a Tor circuit: nobody can relate sending the introduce message
- to the client's IP address, so the client remains anonymous.
- </p>
-
- <img alt="Tor onion service step four" src="$(IMGROOT)/tor-onion-services-4.png">
-
- <p>
- Step five: The onion service decrypts the client's introduce message
- and finds the address of the rendezvous point and the one-time secret
- in it. The service creates a circuit to the rendezvous point and
- sends the one-time secret to it in a rendezvous message.
- </p>
-
- <p>
- At this point it is of special importance that the onion service sticks to
- the same set of <a
- href="<wikifaq>#Whatsthisaboutentryguardformerlyknownashelpernodes">entry
- guards</a> when creating new circuits. Otherwise an attacker
- could run his own relay and force an onion service to create an arbitrary
- number of circuits in the hope that the corrupt relay is picked as entry
- node and he learns the onion server's IP address via timing analysis. This
- attack was described by Øverlier and Syverson in their paper titled
- <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#hs-attack06";>Locating Hidden
- Servers</a>.
- </p>
-
- <img alt="Tor onion service step five" src="$(IMGROOT)/tor-onion-services-5.png">
- # it should say "Bob connects to Alice's ..."
-
- <p>
- In the last step, the rendezvous point notifies the client about successful
- connection establishment. After that, both client and onion service can
- use their circuits to the rendezvous point for communicating with each
- other. The rendezvous point simply relays (end-to-end encrypted) messages
- from client to service and vice versa.
- </p>
-
- <p>
- One of the reasons for not using the introduction circuit
- for actual communication is that no single relay should
- appear to be responsible for a given onion service. This is why the
- rendezvous point never learns about the onion service's identity.
- </p>
-
- <p>
- In general, the complete connection between client and onion service
- consists of 6 relays: 3 of them were picked by the client with the third
- being the rendezvous point and the other 3 were picked by the onion
- service.
- </p>
-
- <img alt="Tor onion service step six" src="$(IMGROOT)/tor-onion-services-6.png">
-
- <p>
- There are more detailed descriptions about the onion service protocol than
- this one. See the
- <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Tor design paper</a>
- for an in-depth design description and the
- <a href="<specblob>rend-spec.txt">rendezvous specification</a>
- for the message formats.
- </p>
- </div>
- <!-- END MAINCOL -->
- <div id = "sidecol">
-#include "side.wmi"
-#include "info.wmi"
- </div>
- <!-- END SIDECOL -->
-</div>
-<!-- END CONTENT -->
#include <foot.wmi>
diff --git a/docs/en/onion-services.wml b/docs/en/onion-services.wml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a73ff7d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/en/onion-services.wml
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+## translation metadata
+# Revision: $Revision$
+# Translation-Priority: 3-low
+
+#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor: Onion Service Protocol" CHARSET="UTF-8"
+<div id="content" class="clearfix">
+ <div id="breadcrumbs">
+ <a href="<page index>">Home » </a>
+ <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation » </a>
+ <a href="<page docs/onion-services>">Onion Services</a>
+ </div>
+ <div id="maincol">
+ <h2>Tor: Onion Service Protocol</h2>
+ <hr>
+
+ <p>
+ Tor makes it possible for users to hide their locations while offering
+ various kinds of services, such as web publishing or an instant
+ messaging server. Using Tor "rendezvous points," other Tor users can
+ connect to these onion services, formerly known as hidden services, each
+ without knowing the other's network identity. This page describes the
+ technical details of how this rendezvous protocol works. For a more direct
+ how-to, see our <a href="<page docs/tor-onion-service>">configuring onion
+ services</a> page. </p>
+
+ <p>
+ An onion service needs to advertise its existence in the Tor network before
+ clients will be able to contact it. Therefore, the service randomly picks
+ some relays, builds circuits to them, and asks them to act as
+ <em>introduction points</em> by telling them its public key. Note
+ that in the following figures the green links are circuits rather
+ than direct connections. By using a full Tor circuit, it's hard for
+ anyone to associate an introduction point with the onion server's IP
+ address. While the introduction points and others are told the onion
+ service's identity (public key), we don't want them to learn about the
+ onion server's location (IP address).
+ </p>
+
+ <img alt="Tor onion service step one" src="$(IMGROOT)/tor-onion-services-1.png">
+ # maybe add a speech bubble containing "PK" to Bob, because that's what
+ # Bob tells to his introduction points
+
+ <p>
+ Step two: the onion service assembles an <em>onion service descriptor</em>,
+ containing its public key and a summary of each introduction point, and
+ signs this descriptor with its private key. It uploads that descriptor to
+ a distributed hash table. The descriptor will be found by clients
+ requesting XYZ.onion where XYZ is a 16 character name derived from the
+ service's public key. After this step, the onion service is set up. </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Although it might seem impractical to use an automatically-generated
+ service name, it serves an important goal: Everyone – including
+ the introduction points, the distributed hash table directory, and of
+ course the clients – can verify that they are talking to the right
+ onion service. See also <a
+ href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zooko%27s_triangle";>Zooko's
+ conjecture</a> that out of Decentralized, Secure, and Human-Meaningful, you
+ can achieve at most two. Perhaps one day somebody will implement a <a
+ href="http://www.skyhunter.com/marcs/petnames/IntroPetNames.html";>Petname</a>
+ design for onion service names? </p>
+
+ <img alt="Tor onion service step two" src="$(IMGROOT)/tor-onion-services-2.png">
+ # maybe replace "database" with "DHT"; further: how incorrect
+ # is it to *not* add DB to the Tor cloud, now that begin dir cells are in
+ # use?
+
+ <p>
+ Step three: A client that wants to contact an onion service needs
+ to learn about its onion address first. After that, the client can
+ initiate connection establishment by downloading the descriptor from
+ the distributed hash table. If there is a descriptor for XYZ.onion
+ (the onion service could also be offline or have left long ago,
+ or there could be a typo in the onion address), the client now
+ knows the set of introduction points and the right public key to
+ use. Around this time, the client also creates a circuit to another
+ randomly picked relay and asks it to act as <em>rendezvous point</em>
+ by telling it a one-time secret.
+ </p>
+
+ <img alt="Tor onion service step three" src="$(IMGROOT)/tor-onion-services-3.png">
+ # maybe add "cookie" to speech bubble, separated from the surrounded
+ # "IP1-3" and "PK"
+
+ <p>
+ Step four: When the descriptor is present and the rendezvous
+ point is ready, the client assembles an <em>introduce</em> message
+ (encrypted to the onion service's public key) including the address
+ of the rendezvous point and the one-time secret. The client sends
+ this message to one of the introduction points, requesting it be
+ delivered to the onion service. Again, communication takes place
+ via a Tor circuit: nobody can relate sending the introduce message
+ to the client's IP address, so the client remains anonymous.
+ </p>
+
+ <img alt="Tor onion service step four" src="$(IMGROOT)/tor-onion-services-4.png">
+
+ <p>
+ Step five: The onion service decrypts the client's introduce message
+ and finds the address of the rendezvous point and the one-time secret
+ in it. The service creates a circuit to the rendezvous point and
+ sends the one-time secret to it in a rendezvous message.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ At this point it is of special importance that the onion service sticks to
+ the same set of <a
+ href="<wikifaq>#Whatsthisaboutentryguardformerlyknownashelpernodes">entry
+ guards</a> when creating new circuits. Otherwise an attacker
+ could run his own relay and force an onion service to create an arbitrary
+ number of circuits in the hope that the corrupt relay is picked as entry
+ node and he learns the onion server's IP address via timing analysis. This
+ attack was described by Øverlier and Syverson in their paper titled
+ <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#hs-attack06";>Locating Hidden
+ Servers</a>.
+ </p>
+
+ <img alt="Tor onion service step five" src="$(IMGROOT)/tor-onion-services-5.png">
+ # it should say "Bob connects to Alice's ..."
+
+ <p>
+ In the last step, the rendezvous point notifies the client about successful
+ connection establishment. After that, both client and onion service can
+ use their circuits to the rendezvous point for communicating with each
+ other. The rendezvous point simply relays (end-to-end encrypted) messages
+ from client to service and vice versa.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ One of the reasons for not using the introduction circuit
+ for actual communication is that no single relay should
+ appear to be responsible for a given onion service. This is why the
+ rendezvous point never learns about the onion service's identity.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ In general, the complete connection between client and onion service
+ consists of 6 relays: 3 of them were picked by the client with the third
+ being the rendezvous point and the other 3 were picked by the onion
+ service.
+ </p>
+
+ <img alt="Tor onion service step six" src="$(IMGROOT)/tor-onion-services-6.png">
+
+ <p>
+ There are more detailed descriptions about the onion service protocol than
+ this one. See the
+ <a href="<svnprojects>design-paper/tor-design.pdf">Tor design paper</a>
+ for an in-depth design description and the
+ <a href="<specblob>rend-spec.txt">rendezvous specification</a>
+ for the message formats.
+ </p>
+ </div>
+ <!-- END MAINCOL -->
+ <div id = "sidecol">
+#include "side.wmi"
+#include "info.wmi"
+ </div>
+ <!-- END SIDECOL -->
+</div>
+<!-- END CONTENT -->
+#include <foot.wmi>
diff --git a/docs/en/sidenav.wmi b/docs/en/sidenav.wmi
index 9de6463d..926a3141 100644
--- a/docs/en/sidenav.wmi
+++ b/docs/en/sidenav.wmi
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
{'url' => 'docs/tor-doc-relay',
'txt' => 'Configuring a Relay graphically',
},
- {'url' => 'docs/tor-hidden-service',
+ {'url' => 'docs/tor-onion-service',
'txt' => 'Configuring an Onion Service',
},
{'url' => 'docs/bridges',
diff --git a/docs/en/tor-hidden-service.wml b/docs/en/tor-hidden-service.wml
index 854843ea..de687709 100644
--- a/docs/en/tor-hidden-service.wml
+++ b/docs/en/tor-hidden-service.wml
@@ -1,258 +1,7 @@
## translation metadata
# Revision: $Revision$
-# Translation-Priority: 3-low
+# Status: obsolete
-#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: Onion Service Configuration Instructions" CHARSET="UTF-8"
-<div id="content" class="clearfix">
- <div id="breadcrumbs">
- <a href="<page index>">Home » </a>
- <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation » </a>
- <a href="<page docs/tor-hidden-service>">Tor Onion Service</a>
- </div>
- <div id="maincol">
- <h1>Configuring Onion Services for <a href="<page index>">Tor</a></h1>
- <hr>
+#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Redirecting" REDIRECT="docs/tor-onion-service"
- <p>Tor allows clients and relays to offer onion services. That is,
- you can offer a web server, SSH server, etc., without revealing your
- IP address to its users. In fact, because you don't use any public address,
- you can run an onion service from behind your firewall.
- </p>
-
- <p>If you have Tor installed, you can see onion services in action
- by visiting this <a href="http://duskgytldkxiuqc6.onion/";>sample
- site</a>.
- </p>
-
- <p>
- This page describes the steps for setting up your own onion service
- website. For the technical details of how the onion service protocol
- works, see our <a href="<page docs/hidden-services>">onion service
- protocol</a> page.
- </p>
-
- <hr>
- <a id="zero"></a>
- <h2><a class="anchor" href="#zero">Step Zero: Get Tor working</a></h2>
- <br>
-
- <p>Before you start, you need to make sure:</p>
- <ol>
- <li>Tor is up and running,</li>
- <li>You actually set it up correctly.</li>
- </ol>
-
- <p>Windows users should follow the <a
- href="<page docs/tor-doc-windows>">Windows
- howto</a>, OS X users should follow the <a
- href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>">OS
- X howto</a>, and Linux/BSD/Unix users should follow the <a
- href="<page docs/tor-doc-unix>">Unix howto</a>.
- </p>
-
- <hr>
- <a id="one"></a>
- <h2><a class="anchor" href="#one">Step One: Install a web server locally</a></h2>
- <br>
-
- <p>
- First, you need to set up a web server locally. Setting up a web
- server can be complex. We're not going to cover how to set up a web
- server here. If you get stuck or want to do more, find a friend who
- can help you. We recommend you install a new separate web server for
- your onion service, since even if you already have one installed,
- you may be using it (or want to use it later) for a normal website.
- </p>
-
- <p>
- You need to configure your web server so it doesn't give away any
- information about you, your computer, or your location. Be sure to
- bind the web server only to localhost (if people could get to it
- directly, they could confirm that your computer is the one offering
- the onion service). Be sure that its error messages don't list
- your hostname or other hints. Consider putting the web server in a
- sandbox or VM to limit the damage from code vulnerabilities.
- </p>
-
- <p>
- Once your web server is set up, make
- sure it works: open your browser and go to <a
- href="http://localhost:8080/";>http://localhost:8080/</a>, where
- 8080 is the webserver port you chose during setup (you can choose any
- port, 8080 is just an example). Then try putting a file in the main
- html directory, and make sure it shows up when you access the site.
- </p>
-
- <hr>
- <a id="two"></a>
- <h2><a class="anchor" href="#two">Step Two: Configure your onion service</a></h2>
- <br>
-
- <p>Next, you need to configure your onion service to point to your
- local web server.
- </p>
-
- <p>First, open your torrc file in your favorite text editor. (See
- <a href="<page docs/faq>#torrc">the torrc FAQ entry</a> to learn
- what this means.) Go to the middle section and look for the line</p>
-
- <pre>
- \############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
- </pre>
-
- <p>
- This section of the file consists of groups of lines, each representing
- one onion service. Right now they are all commented out (the lines
- start with #), so onion services are disabled. Each group of lines
- consists of one <var>HiddenServiceDir</var> line, and one or more
- <var>HiddenServicePort</var> lines:</p>
- <ul>
- <li><var>HiddenServiceDir</var> is a directory where Tor will store
- information about that onion service. In particular, Tor will create a
- file here named <var>hostname</var> which will tell you the onion URL. You
- don't need to add any files to this directory. Make sure this is not the
- same directory as the hidserv directory you created when setting up thttpd,
- as your HiddenServiceDir contains secret information!</li>
- <li><var>HiddenServicePort</var> lets you specify a virtual port (that is,
- what port people accessing the onion service will think they're using) and
- an IP address and port for redirecting connections to this virtual
- port.</li> </ul>
-
- <p>Add the following lines to your torrc:
- </p>
-
- <pre>
- HiddenServiceDir /Library/Tor/var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
- HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:8080
- </pre>
-
- <p>You're going to want to change the <var>HiddenServiceDir</var> line, so
- it points to an actual directory that is readable/writeable by the user
- that will be running Tor. The above line should work if you're using the OS
- X Tor package. On Unix, try "/home/username/hidden_service/" and fill in
- your own username in place of "username". On Windows you might pick:</p>
- <pre> HiddenServiceDir C:\Users\username\Documents\tor\hidden_service
- HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:8080 </pre>
-
- <p>Note that since 0.2.6, both <var>SocksPort</var> and <var>HiddenServicePort</var> support Unix sockets.
- This means that you can point the <var>HiddenServicePort</var> to a Unix socket:</p>
- <pre>
- HiddenServiceDir /Library/Tor/var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
- HiddenServicePort 80 unix:/path/to/socket
- </pre>
-
- <p>Now save the torrc and restart your tor.</p>
-
- <p>If Tor starts up again, great. Otherwise, something is wrong. First look
- at your logfiles for hints. It will print some warnings or error messages.
- That should give you an idea what went wrong. Typically there are typos in
- the torrc or wrong directory permissions (See <a href="<page
- docs/faq>#Logs">the logging FAQ entry</a> if you don't know how to enable
- or find your log file.) </p>
-
- <p>When Tor starts, it will automatically create the
- <var>HiddenServiceDir</var> that you specified (if necessary), and it will
- create two files there.</p>
-
- <dl>
- <dt><var>private_key</var></dt>
- <dd>First, Tor will generate a new public/private keypair for your onion
- service. It is written into a file called "private_key". Don't share this key
- with others -- if you do they will be able to impersonate your onion
- service.</dd>
- <dt><var>hostname</var></dt>
- <dd>The other file Tor will create is called "hostname". This contains
- a short summary of your public key -- it will look something like
- <tt>duskgytldkxiuqc6.onion</tt>. This is the public name for your service,
- and you can tell it to people, publish it on websites, put it on business
- cards, etc.</dd>
- </dl>
-
- <p>If Tor runs as a different user than you, for example on
- OS X, Debian, or Red Hat, then you may need to become root to be able
- to view these files.</p>
-
- <p>Now that you've restarted Tor, it is busy picking introduction points
- in the Tor network, and generating an <em>onion service
- descriptor</em>. This is a signed list of introduction points along with
- the service's full public key. It anonymously publishes this descriptor
- to the directory servers, and other people anonymously fetch it from the
- directory servers when they're trying to access your service.
- </p>
-
- <p>Try it now: paste the contents of the hostname file into your web
- browser. If it works, you'll get the html page you set up in step one.
- If it doesn't work, look in your logs for some hints, and keep playing
- with it until it works.
- </p>
-
- <hr>
- <a id="three"></a>
- <h2><a class="anchor" href="#three">Step Three: More advanced tips</a></h2>
- <br>
-
- <p>If you plan to keep your service available for a long time, you might
- want to make a backup copy of the <var>private_key</var> file somewhere.
- </p>
-
- <p>If you want to forward multiple virtual ports for a single onion
- service, just add more <var>HiddenServicePort</var> lines.
- If you want to run multiple onion services from the same Tor
- client, just add another <var>HiddenServiceDir</var> line. All the following
- <var>HiddenServicePort</var> lines refer to this <var>HiddenServiceDir</var> line, until
- you add another <var>HiddenServiceDir</var> line:
- </p>
-
- <pre>
- HiddenServiceDir /usr/local/etc/tor/hidden_service/
- HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:8080
-
- HiddenServiceDir /usr/local/etc/tor/other_hidden_service/
- HiddenServicePort 6667 127.0.0.1:6667
- HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
- </pre>
-
- <p>Onion services operators need to practice proper operational security
- and system administration to maintain security. For some security
- suggestions please make sure you read over Riseup's <a
- href="https://help.riseup.net/en/security/network-security/tor/onionservices-best-practices";>"Tor
- Hidden (Onion) Services Best Practices" document</a>. Also, here are some
- more anonymity issues you should keep in mind:
-
- </p>
- <ul>
- <li>As mentioned above, be careful of letting your web server reveal
- identifying information about you, your computer, or your location.
- For example, readers can probably determine whether it's thttpd or
- Apache, and learn something about your operating system.</li>
- <li>If your computer isn't online all the time, your onion service
- won't be either. This leaks information to an observant adversary.</li>
- <li>It is generally a better idea to host onion services on a Tor client
- rather than a Tor relay, since relay uptime and other properties are
- publicly visible.</li>
- <li>The longer an onion service is online, the higher the risk that its
- location is discovered. The most prominent attacks are building a
- profile of the onion service's availability and matching induced
- traffic patterns.</li>
- </ul>
-
- <p>Another common issue is whether to use HTTPS on your relay or
- not. Have a look at this <a
- href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/facebook-hidden-services-and-https-certs";>post</a> on the Tor Blog to learn more about these issues.
- </p>
-
- <p>Finally, feel free to use the <a
- href="https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-onions/";>[tor-onions]
- mailing list</a> to discuss the secure administration and operation of
- Tor onion services.</p>
-
- </div>
- <!-- END MAINCOL -->
- <div id = "sidecol">
-#include "side.wmi"
-#include "info.wmi"
- </div>
- <!-- END SIDECOL -->
-</div>
-<!-- END CONTENT -->
#include <foot.wmi>
diff --git a/docs/en/tor-onion-service.wml b/docs/en/tor-onion-service.wml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8fc9e894
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/en/tor-onion-service.wml
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+## translation metadata
+# Revision: $Revision$
+# Translation-Priority: 3-low
+
+#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor Project: Onion Service Configuration Instructions" CHARSET="UTF-8"
+<div id="content" class="clearfix">
+ <div id="breadcrumbs">
+ <a href="<page index>">Home » </a>
+ <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation » </a>
+ <a href="<page docs/tor-onion-service>">Tor Onion Service</a>
+ </div>
+ <div id="maincol">
+ <h1>Configuring Onion Services for <a href="<page index>">Tor</a></h1>
+ <hr>
+
+ <p>Tor allows clients and relays to offer onion services. That is,
+ you can offer a web server, SSH server, etc., without revealing your
+ IP address to its users. In fact, because you don't use any public address,
+ you can run an onion service from behind your firewall.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>If you have Tor installed, you can see onion services in action
+ by visiting this <a href="http://duskgytldkxiuqc6.onion/";>sample
+ site</a>.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ This page describes the steps for setting up your own onion service
+ website. For the technical details of how the onion service protocol
+ works, see our <a href="<page docs/onion-services>">onion service
+ protocol</a> page.
+ </p>
+
+ <hr>
+ <a id="zero"></a>
+ <h2><a class="anchor" href="#zero">Step Zero: Get Tor working</a></h2>
+ <br>
+
+ <p>Before you start, you need to make sure:</p>
+ <ol>
+ <li>Tor is up and running,</li>
+ <li>You actually set it up correctly.</li>
+ </ol>
+
+ <p>Windows users should follow the <a
+ href="<page docs/tor-doc-windows>">Windows
+ howto</a>, OS X users should follow the <a
+ href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>">OS
+ X howto</a>, and Linux/BSD/Unix users should follow the <a
+ href="<page docs/tor-doc-unix>">Unix howto</a>.
+ </p>
+
+ <hr>
+ <a id="one"></a>
+ <h2><a class="anchor" href="#one">Step One: Install a web server locally</a></h2>
+ <br>
+
+ <p>
+ First, you need to set up a web server locally. Setting up a web
+ server can be complex. We're not going to cover how to set up a web
+ server here. If you get stuck or want to do more, find a friend who
+ can help you. We recommend you install a new separate web server for
+ your onion service, since even if you already have one installed,
+ you may be using it (or want to use it later) for a normal website.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ You need to configure your web server so it doesn't give away any
+ information about you, your computer, or your location. Be sure to
+ bind the web server only to localhost (if people could get to it
+ directly, they could confirm that your computer is the one offering
+ the onion service). Be sure that its error messages don't list
+ your hostname or other hints. Consider putting the web server in a
+ sandbox or VM to limit the damage from code vulnerabilities.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>
+ Once your web server is set up, make
+ sure it works: open your browser and go to <a
+ href="http://localhost:8080/";>http://localhost:8080/</a>, where
+ 8080 is the webserver port you chose during setup (you can choose any
+ port, 8080 is just an example). Then try putting a file in the main
+ html directory, and make sure it shows up when you access the site.
+ </p>
+
+ <hr>
+ <a id="two"></a>
+ <h2><a class="anchor" href="#two">Step Two: Configure your onion service</a></h2>
+ <br>
+
+ <p>Next, you need to configure your onion service to point to your
+ local web server.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>First, open your torrc file in your favorite text editor. (See
+ <a href="<page docs/faq>#torrc">the torrc FAQ entry</a> to learn
+ what this means.) Go to the middle section and look for the line</p>
+
+ <pre>
+ \############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>
+ This section of the file consists of groups of lines, each representing
+ one onion service. Right now they are all commented out (the lines
+ start with #), so onion services are disabled. Each group of lines
+ consists of one <var>HiddenServiceDir</var> line, and one or more
+ <var>HiddenServicePort</var> lines:</p>
+ <ul>
+ <li><var>HiddenServiceDir</var> is a directory where Tor will store
+ information about that onion service. In particular, Tor will create a
+ file here named <var>hostname</var> which will tell you the onion URL. You
+ don't need to add any files to this directory. Make sure this is not the
+ same directory as the hidserv directory you created when setting up thttpd,
+ as your HiddenServiceDir contains secret information!</li>
+ <li><var>HiddenServicePort</var> lets you specify a virtual port (that is,
+ what port people accessing the onion service will think they're using) and
+ an IP address and port for redirecting connections to this virtual
+ port.</li> </ul>
+
+ <p>Add the following lines to your torrc:
+ </p>
+
+ <pre>
+ HiddenServiceDir /Library/Tor/var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
+ HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:8080
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>You're going to want to change the <var>HiddenServiceDir</var> line, so
+ it points to an actual directory that is readable/writeable by the user
+ that will be running Tor. The above line should work if you're using the OS
+ X Tor package. On Unix, try "/home/username/hidden_service/" and fill in
+ your own username in place of "username". On Windows you might pick:</p>
+ <pre> HiddenServiceDir C:\Users\username\Documents\tor\hidden_service
+ HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:8080 </pre>
+
+ <p>Note that since 0.2.6, both <var>SocksPort</var> and <var>HiddenServicePort</var> support Unix sockets.
+ This means that you can point the <var>HiddenServicePort</var> to a Unix socket:</p>
+ <pre>
+ HiddenServiceDir /Library/Tor/var/lib/tor/hidden_service/
+ HiddenServicePort 80 unix:/path/to/socket
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Now save the torrc and restart your tor.</p>
+
+ <p>If Tor starts up again, great. Otherwise, something is wrong. First look
+ at your logfiles for hints. It will print some warnings or error messages.
+ That should give you an idea what went wrong. Typically there are typos in
+ the torrc or wrong directory permissions (See <a href="<page
+ docs/faq>#Logs">the logging FAQ entry</a> if you don't know how to enable
+ or find your log file.) </p>
+
+ <p>When Tor starts, it will automatically create the
+ <var>HiddenServiceDir</var> that you specified (if necessary), and it will
+ create two files there.</p>
+
+ <dl>
+ <dt><var>private_key</var></dt>
+ <dd>First, Tor will generate a new public/private keypair for your onion
+ service. It is written into a file called "private_key". Don't share this key
+ with others -- if you do they will be able to impersonate your onion
+ service.</dd>
+ <dt><var>hostname</var></dt>
+ <dd>The other file Tor will create is called "hostname". This contains
+ a short summary of your public key -- it will look something like
+ <tt>duskgytldkxiuqc6.onion</tt>. This is the public name for your service,
+ and you can tell it to people, publish it on websites, put it on business
+ cards, etc.</dd>
+ </dl>
+
+ <p>If Tor runs as a different user than you, for example on
+ OS X, Debian, or Red Hat, then you may need to become root to be able
+ to view these files.</p>
+
+ <p>Now that you've restarted Tor, it is busy picking introduction points
+ in the Tor network, and generating an <em>onion service
+ descriptor</em>. This is a signed list of introduction points along with
+ the service's full public key. It anonymously publishes this descriptor
+ to the directory servers, and other people anonymously fetch it from the
+ directory servers when they're trying to access your service.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>Try it now: paste the contents of the hostname file into your web
+ browser. If it works, you'll get the html page you set up in step one.
+ If it doesn't work, look in your logs for some hints, and keep playing
+ with it until it works.
+ </p>
+
+ <hr>
+ <a id="three"></a>
+ <h2><a class="anchor" href="#three">Step Three: More advanced tips</a></h2>
+ <br>
+
+ <p>If you plan to keep your service available for a long time, you might
+ want to make a backup copy of the <var>private_key</var> file somewhere.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>If you want to forward multiple virtual ports for a single onion
+ service, just add more <var>HiddenServicePort</var> lines.
+ If you want to run multiple onion services from the same Tor
+ client, just add another <var>HiddenServiceDir</var> line. All the following
+ <var>HiddenServicePort</var> lines refer to this <var>HiddenServiceDir</var> line, until
+ you add another <var>HiddenServiceDir</var> line:
+ </p>
+
+ <pre>
+ HiddenServiceDir /usr/local/etc/tor/hidden_service/
+ HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:8080
+
+ HiddenServiceDir /usr/local/etc/tor/other_hidden_service/
+ HiddenServicePort 6667 127.0.0.1:6667
+ HiddenServicePort 22 127.0.0.1:22
+ </pre>
+
+ <p>Onion services operators need to practice proper operational security
+ and system administration to maintain security. For some security
+ suggestions please make sure you read over Riseup's <a
+ href="https://help.riseup.net/en/security/network-security/tor/onionservices-best-practices";>"Tor
+ Hidden (Onion) Services Best Practices" document</a>. Also, here are some
+ more anonymity issues you should keep in mind:
+
+ </p>
+ <ul>
+ <li>As mentioned above, be careful of letting your web server reveal
+ identifying information about you, your computer, or your location.
+ For example, readers can probably determine whether it's thttpd or
+ Apache, and learn something about your operating system.</li>
+ <li>If your computer isn't online all the time, your onion service
+ won't be either. This leaks information to an observant adversary.</li>
+ <li>It is generally a better idea to host onion services on a Tor client
+ rather than a Tor relay, since relay uptime and other properties are
+ publicly visible.</li>
+ <li>The longer an onion service is online, the higher the risk that its
+ location is discovered. The most prominent attacks are building a
+ profile of the onion service's availability and matching induced
+ traffic patterns.</li>
+ </ul>
+
+ <p>Another common issue is whether to use HTTPS on your relay or
+ not. Have a look at this <a
+ href="https://blog.torproject.org/blog/facebook-hidden-services-and-https-certs";>post</a> on the Tor Blog to learn more about these issues.
+ </p>
+
+ <p>Finally, feel free to use the <a
+ href="https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-onions/";>[tor-onions]
+ mailing list</a> to discuss the secure administration and operation of
+ Tor onion services.</p>
+
+ </div>
+ <!-- END MAINCOL -->
+ <div id = "sidecol">
+#include "side.wmi"
+#include "info.wmi"
+ </div>
+ <!-- END SIDECOL -->
+</div>
+<!-- END CONTENT -->
+#include <foot.wmi>
diff --git a/docs/torbutton/en/sidenav.wmi b/docs/torbutton/en/sidenav.wmi
index 85f63833..bae74dc4 100644
--- a/docs/torbutton/en/sidenav.wmi
+++ b/docs/torbutton/en/sidenav.wmi
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
{'url' => 'docs/tor-doc-relay',
'txt' => 'Configuring a Relay graphically',
},
- {'url' => 'docs/tor-hidden-service',
+ {'url' => 'docs/tor-onion-service',
'txt' => 'Configuring an Onion Service',
},
{'url' => 'docs/bridges',
diff --git a/include/foot.wmi b/include/foot.wmi
index 83adcde8..f99a2ee3 100644
--- a/include/foot.wmi
+++ b/include/foot.wmi
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
<ul>
<li><a href="<page donate/donate-foot>">Donate</a></li>
<li><a href="<page docs/documentation>#MailingLists">Mailing Lists</a></li>
- <li><a href="<page docs/hidden-services>">Onion Services</a></li>
+ <li><a href="<page docs/onion-services>">Onion Services</a></li>
<li><a href="<page getinvolved/translation>">Translations</a></li>
# <li><a href="<page getinvolved/open-positions>">Careers</a></li>
</ul>
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