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[tor-commits] [torspec/master] Explain more about primary guards and about building circuits
commit b729833befc66d94ce0510356290586e43402dee
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Wed Feb 1 08:54:07 2017 -0500
Explain more about primary guards and about building circuits
In path-spec: explain our rules (post-21242) for waiting to build
circuits.
In guard-spec:
- explain what to do about missing descriptors
- explain parallel use of multiple primary guards, based on parameters.
---
guard-spec.txt | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
path-spec.txt | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/guard-spec.txt b/guard-spec.txt
index 59c66b8..87e16a7 100644
--- a/guard-spec.txt
+++ b/guard-spec.txt
@@ -451,8 +451,10 @@
When we want to build a circuit, and we need to pick a guard:
* If any entry in PRIMARY_GUARDS has {is_reachable} status of
- <maybe> or <yes>, return the first such guard. The circuit is
- <usable_on_completion>.
+ <maybe> or <yes>, return one of the first
+ {NUM_USABLE_PRIMARY_GUARDS} or
+ {NUM_USABLE_PRIMARY_DIRECTORY_GUARDS} such guards, chosen
+ uniformly at random. The circuit is <usable_on_completion>.
[Note: We do not use {is_pending} on primary guards, since we
are willing to try to build multiple circuits through them
@@ -620,6 +622,18 @@
circuits are neither built nor in-progress; that <complete>
circuits are built; and that the other states are in-progress.
+4.12. When we are missing descriptors
+ [Section:MISSING_DESCRIPTORS]
+
+ We need either a router descriptor or a microdescriptor in order
+ to build a circuit through a guard. If we do not have such a
+ descriptor for a guard, we can still use the guard for one-hop
+ directory fetches, but not for longer circuits.
+
+ (Also, when we are missing descriptors for our first
+ {NUM_USABLE_PRIMARY_GUARDS} primary guards, we don't build
+ circuits at all until we have fetched them.)
+
A. Appendices
A.1. Parameters with suggested values. [Section:PARAM_VALS]
@@ -663,6 +677,10 @@ A.1. Parameters with suggested values. [Section:PARAM_VALS]
{param:GUARD_CONFIRMED_MIN_LIFETIME} -- 60 days
+ {param:NUM_USABLE_PRIMARY_GUARDS} -- 1
+
+ {param:NUM_USABLE_PRIMARY_DIRECTORY_GUARDS} -- 3
+
A.2. Random values [Section:RANDOM]
Frequently, we want to randomize the expiration time of something
diff --git a/path-spec.txt b/path-spec.txt
index ceb6c77..6e88cb3 100644
--- a/path-spec.txt
+++ b/path-spec.txt
@@ -112,6 +112,39 @@ of their choices.
2.1. When we build
+2.1.0. We don't build circuits until we have enough directory info
+
+ There's a class of possible attacks where our directory servers
+ only give us information about the relays that they would like us
+ to use. To prevent this attack, we don't build multi-hop
+ circuits for real traffic (like those in 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.4
+ below) until we have enough directory information to be
+ reasonably confident this attack isn't being done to us.
+
+ Here, "enough" directory information is defined as:
+
+ * Having a consensus that's been valid at some point in the
+ last REASONABLY_LIVE_TIME interval (24 hourts).
+
+ * Having enough descriptors that we could build at least some
+ fraction F of all bandwidth-weighted paths, without taking
+ ExitNodes/EntryNodes/etc into account.
+
+ (F is set by the PathsNeededToBuildCircuits option,
+ defaulting to the 'min_paths_for_circs_pct' consensus
+ parameter, with a final default value of 60%.)
+
+ * Having enough descriptors that we could build at least some
+ fraction F of all bandwidth-weighted paths, _while_ taking
+ ExitNodes/EntryNodes/etc into account.
+
+ (F is as above.)
+
+ * Having a descriptor for every one of the first
+ NUM_GUARDS_TO_USE guards among our primary guards. (see
+ guard-spec.txt)
+
+
2.1.1. Clients build circuits preemptively
When running as a client, Tor tries to maintain at least a certain
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