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[tor-commits] [tor/release-0.3.2] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.9' into maint-0.3.1
commit 2bcd264a28e2d6bec1e806e779bf82435c9c7505
Merge: 3930ffdf6 cb92d47de
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri Feb 16 09:48:11 2018 -0500
Merge branch 'maint-0.2.9' into maint-0.3.1
changes/bug24952 | 5 +
changes/bug25223 | 4 +
changes/ticket24902 | 13 +
changes/ticket25122 | 4 +
changes/ticket25202 | 4 +
doc/tor.1.txt | 95 ++++++
src/common/address.c | 27 +-
src/common/address.h | 2 +
src/common/address_set.c | 129 +++++++
src/common/address_set.h | 35 ++
src/common/include.am | 2 +
src/common/log.c | 2 +-
src/common/torlog.h | 4 +-
src/or/channel.c | 9 +-
src/or/channel.h | 3 +-
src/or/channeltls.c | 2 +-
src/or/command.c | 13 +
src/or/config.c | 25 ++
src/or/connection.c | 16 +
src/or/dos.c | 794 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/or/dos.h | 140 ++++++++
src/or/geoip.c | 205 ++++++++++--
src/or/geoip.h | 29 ++
src/or/include.am | 2 +
src/or/main.c | 2 +
src/or/networkstatus.c | 13 +-
src/or/nodelist.c | 78 +++++
src/or/nodelist.h | 3 +
src/or/or.h | 33 ++
src/or/relay.c | 14 +-
src/or/rendmid.c | 12 +
src/or/status.c | 2 +
src/test/include.am | 2 +
src/test/test.c | 20 ++
src/test/test.h | 2 +
src/test/test_address_set.c | 174 ++++++++++
src/test/test_dos.c | 497 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
37 files changed, 2371 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)
diff --cc doc/tor.1.txt
index c4c569836,a7ee7d11c..a6b4f2fc4
--- a/doc/tor.1.txt
+++ b/doc/tor.1.txt
@@@ -2405,9 -2438,104 +2405,104 @@@ The following options are used to confi
non-anonymous HiddenServiceSingleHopMode. Enables direct connections in the
server-side hidden service protocol. If you are using this option,
you need to disable all client-side services on your Tor instance,
- including setting SOCKSPort to "0".
- (Default: 0)
+ including setting SOCKSPort to "0". Can not be changed while tor is
+ running. (Default: 0)
+ DENIAL OF SERVICE MITIGATION OPTIONS
+ ------------------------------------
+
+ The following options are useful only for a public relay. They control the
+ Denial of Service mitigation subsystem.
+
+ [[DoSCircuitCreationEnabled]] **DoSCircuitCreationEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
+
+ Enable circuit creation DoS mitigation. If enabled, tor will cache client
+ IPs along with statistics in order to detect circuit DoS attacks. If an
+ address is positively identified, tor will activate defenses against the
+ address. See the DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType option for more details.
+ This is a client to relay detection only. "auto" means use the consensus
+ parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
+ (Default: auto)
+
+ [[DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections]] **DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections** __NUM__::
+
+ Minimum threshold of concurrent connections before a client address can be
+ flagged as executing a circuit creation DoS. In other words, once a client
+ address reaches the circuit rate and has a minimum of NUM concurrent
+ connections, a detection is positive. "0" means use the consensus
+ parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 3.
+ (Default: 0)
+
+ [[DoSCircuitCreationRate]] **DoSCircuitCreationRate** __NUM__::
+
+ The allowed circuit creation rate per second applied per client IP
+ address. If this option is 0, it obeys a consensus parameter. If not
+ defined in the consensus, the value is 3.
+ (Default: 0)
+
+ [[DoSCircuitCreationBurst]] **DoSCircuitCreationBurst** __NUM__::
+
+ The allowed circuit creation burst per client IP address. If the circuit
+ rate and the burst are reached, a client is marked as executing a circuit
+ creation DoS. "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the
+ consensus, the value is 90.
+ (Default: 0)
+
+ [[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType** __NUM__::
+
+ This is the type of defense applied to a detected client address. The
+ possible values are:
+
+ 1: No defense.
+ 2: Refuse circuit creation for the DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod period of time.
+ +
+ "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus,
+ the value is 2.
+ (Default: 0)
+
+ [[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**::
+
+ The base time period in seconds that the DoS defense is activated for. The
+ actual value is selected randomly for each activation from N+1 to 3/2 * N.
+ "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus,
+ the value is 3600 seconds (1 hour). (Default: 0)
+
+ [[DoSConnectionEnabled]] **DoSConnectionEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
+
+ Enable the connection DoS mitigation. For client address only, this allows
+ tor to mitigate against large number of concurrent connections made by a
+ single IP address. "auto" means use the consensus parameter. If not
+ defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
+ (Default: auto)
+
+ [[DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount]] **DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount** __NUM__::
+
+ The maximum threshold of concurrent connection from a client IP address.
+ Above this limit, a defense selected by DoSConnectionDefenseType is
+ applied. "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the
+ consensus, the value is 100.
+ (Default: 0)
+
+ [[DoSConnectionDefenseType]] **DoSConnectionDefenseType** __NUM__::
+
+ This is the type of defense applied to a detected client address for the
+ connection mitigation. The possible values are:
+
+ 1: No defense.
+ 2: Immediately close new connections.
+ +
+ "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus,
+ the value is 2.
+ (Default: 0)
+
+ [[DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous]] **DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
+
+ Refuse establishment of rendezvous points for single hop clients. In other
+ words, if a client directly connects to the relay and sends an
+ ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell, it is silently dropped. "auto" means use the
+ consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0.
+ (Default: auto)
+
TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS
-----------------------
diff --cc src/common/log.c
index 6a5819064,4db1c9f0d..87c260799
--- a/src/common/log.c
+++ b/src/common/log.c
@@@ -1177,7 -1177,7 +1177,7 @@@ static const char *domain_list[] =
"GENERAL", "CRYPTO", "NET", "CONFIG", "FS", "PROTOCOL", "MM",
"HTTP", "APP", "CONTROL", "CIRC", "REND", "BUG", "DIR", "DIRSERV",
"OR", "EDGE", "ACCT", "HIST", "HANDSHAKE", "HEARTBEAT", "CHANNEL",
- "SCHED", "GUARD", "CONSDIFF", NULL
- "SCHED", "DOS", NULL
++ "SCHED", "GUARD", "CONSDIFF", "DOS", NULL
};
/** Return a bitmask for the log domain for which <b>domain</b> is the name,
diff --cc src/common/torlog.h
index 6e374b1c1,20b7d938f..0149ce9a5
--- a/src/common/torlog.h
+++ b/src/common/torlog.h
@@@ -99,12 -99,10 +99,14 @@@
#define LD_CHANNEL (1u<<21)
/** Scheduler */
#define LD_SCHED (1u<<22)
+/** Guard nodes */
+#define LD_GUARD (1u<<23)
+/** Generation and application of consensus diffs. */
+#define LD_CONSDIFF (1u<<24)
+ /** Denial of Service mitigation. */
-#define LD_DOS (1u<<23)
++#define LD_DOS (1u<<25)
/** Number of logging domains in the code. */
- #define N_LOGGING_DOMAINS 25
-#define N_LOGGING_DOMAINS 24
++#define N_LOGGING_DOMAINS 26
/** This log message is not safe to send to a callback-based logger
* immediately. Used as a flag, not a log domain. */
diff --cc src/or/channel.c
index 2970b9679,54e10666d..9f652b584
--- a/src/or/channel.c
+++ b/src/or/channel.c
@@@ -2696,9 -2570,20 +2696,10 @@@ channel_do_open_actions(channel_t *chan
router_set_status(chan->identity_digest, 1);
} else {
/* only report it to the geoip module if it's not a known router */
- if (!router_get_by_id_digest(chan->identity_digest)) {
+ if (!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(chan->identity_digest)) {
if (channel_get_addr_if_possible(chan, &remote_addr)) {
char *transport_name = NULL;
+ channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan);
if (chan->get_transport_name(chan, &transport_name) < 0)
transport_name = NULL;
diff --cc src/or/config.c
index f11c183b8,3b4027433..96cbbc7c7
--- a/src/or/config.c
+++ b/src/or/config.c
@@@ -301,8 -240,21 +302,21 @@@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] =
OBSOLETE("DisableIOCP"),
OBSOLETE("DisableV2DirectoryInfo_"),
OBSOLETE("DynamicDHGroups"),
- VPORT(DNSPort, LINELIST, NULL),
- V(DNSListenAddress, LINELIST, NULL),
+ VPORT(DNSPort),
+ OBSOLETE("DNSListenAddress"),
+ /* DoS circuit creation options. */
+ V(DoSCircuitCreationEnabled, AUTOBOOL, "auto"),
+ V(DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections, UINT, "0"),
+ V(DoSCircuitCreationRate, UINT, "0"),
+ V(DoSCircuitCreationBurst, UINT, "0"),
+ V(DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType, INT, "0"),
+ V(DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod, INTERVAL, "0"),
+ /* DoS connection options. */
+ V(DoSConnectionEnabled, AUTOBOOL, "auto"),
+ V(DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount, UINT, "0"),
+ V(DoSConnectionDefenseType, INT, "0"),
+ /* DoS single hop client options. */
+ V(DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous, AUTOBOOL, "auto"),
V(DownloadExtraInfo, BOOL, "0"),
V(TestingEnableConnBwEvent, BOOL, "0"),
V(TestingEnableCellStatsEvent, BOOL, "0"),
diff --cc src/or/include.am
index 1ef5afa01,5108a08e5..5d5ff5c41
--- a/src/or/include.am
+++ b/src/or/include.am
@@@ -48,12 -43,9 +48,13 @@@ LIBTOR_A_SOURCES =
src/or/dirvote.c \
src/or/dns.c \
src/or/dnsserv.c \
+ src/or/dos.c \
src/or/fp_pair.c \
src/or/geoip.c \
+ src/or/hs_intropoint.c \
+ src/or/hs_circuitmap.c \
+ src/or/hs_ntor.c \
+ src/or/hs_service.c \
src/or/entrynodes.c \
src/or/ext_orport.c \
src/or/hibernate.c \
diff --cc src/or/main.c
index 0d91803d4,fcd8dc902..197dfd430
--- a/src/or/main.c
+++ b/src/or/main.c
@@@ -3239,8 -2990,7 +3240,9 @@@ tor_free_all(int postfork
control_free_all();
sandbox_free_getaddrinfo_cache();
protover_free_all();
+ bridges_free_all();
+ consdiffmgr_free_all();
+ dos_free_all();
if (!postfork) {
config_free_all();
or_state_free_all();
diff --cc src/or/or.h
index 95281e701,024a9cff0..9e7833386
--- a/src/or/or.h
+++ b/src/or/or.h
@@@ -4562,22 -4515,34 +4566,51 @@@ typedef struct
/** If 1, we skip all OOS checks. */
int DisableOOSCheck;
+ /** Autobool: Should we include Ed25519 identities in extend2 cells?
+ * If -1, we should do whatever the consensus parameter says. */
+ int ExtendByEd25519ID;
+
+ /** Bool (default: 1): When testing routerinfos as a directory authority,
+ * do we enforce Ed25519 identity match? */
+ /* NOTE: remove this option someday. */
+ int AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys;
+
+ /** Bool (default: 0): Tells if a %include was used on torrc */
+ int IncludeUsed;
+
+ /** The seconds after expiration which we as a relay should keep old
+ * consensuses around so that we can generate diffs from them. If 0,
+ * use the default. */
+ int MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs;
++
+ /** Autobool: Is the circuit creation DoS mitigation subsystem enabled? */
+ int DoSCircuitCreationEnabled;
+ /** Minimum concurrent connection needed from one single address before any
+ * defense is used. */
+ int DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections;
+ /** Circuit rate used to refill the token bucket. */
+ int DoSCircuitCreationRate;
+ /** Maximum allowed burst of circuits. Reaching that value, the address is
+ * detected as malicious and a defense might be used. */
+ int DoSCircuitCreationBurst;
+ /** When an address is marked as malicous, what defense should be used
+ * against it. See the dos_cc_defense_type_t enum. */
+ int DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType;
+ /** For how much time (in seconds) the defense is applicable for a malicious
+ * address. A random time delta is added to the defense time of an address
+ * which will be between 1 second and half of this value. */
+ int DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod;
+
+ /** Autobool: Is the DoS connection mitigation subsystem enabled? */
+ int DoSConnectionEnabled;
+ /** Maximum concurrent connection allowed per address. */
+ int DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount;
+ /** When an address is reaches the maximum count, what defense should be
+ * used against it. See the dos_conn_defense_type_t enum. */
+ int DoSConnectionDefenseType;
+
+ /** Autobool: Do we refuse single hop client rendezvous? */
+ int DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous;
} or_options_t;
/** Persistent state for an onion router, as saved to disk. */
diff --cc src/or/relay.c
index a86ae9bc4,22ce76752..7a074d63d
--- a/src/or/relay.c
+++ b/src/or/relay.c
@@@ -2618,11 -2469,15 +2618,15 @@@ static time_t last_time_under_memory_pr
STATIC int
cell_queues_check_size(void)
{
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
size_t alloc = cell_queues_get_total_allocation();
alloc += buf_get_total_allocation();
- alloc += tor_zlib_get_total_allocation();
+ alloc += tor_compress_get_total_allocation();
const size_t rend_cache_total = rend_cache_get_total_allocation();
alloc += rend_cache_total;
+ const size_t geoip_client_cache_total =
+ geoip_client_cache_total_allocation();
+ alloc += geoip_client_cache_total;
if (alloc >= get_options()->MaxMemInQueues_low_threshold) {
last_time_under_memory_pressure = approx_time();
if (alloc >= get_options()->MaxMemInQueues) {
@@@ -2632,8 -2487,16 +2636,14 @@@
if (rend_cache_total > get_options()->MaxMemInQueues / 5) {
const size_t bytes_to_remove =
rend_cache_total - (size_t)(get_options()->MaxMemInQueues / 10);
- rend_cache_clean_v2_descs_as_dir(now, bytes_to_remove);
- alloc -= rend_cache_total;
- alloc += rend_cache_get_total_allocation();
+ alloc -= hs_cache_handle_oom(time(NULL), bytes_to_remove);
}
+ if (geoip_client_cache_total > get_options()->MaxMemInQueues / 5) {
+ const size_t bytes_to_remove =
+ geoip_client_cache_total -
+ (size_t)(get_options()->MaxMemInQueues / 10);
+ alloc -= geoip_client_cache_handle_oom(now, bytes_to_remove);
+ }
circuits_handle_oom(alloc);
return 1;
}
diff --cc src/or/rendmid.c
index 23c3dedda,441d5043c..89739e129
--- a/src/or/rendmid.c
+++ b/src/or/rendmid.c
@@@ -11,7 -12,7 +12,8 @@@
#include "circuitlist.h"
#include "circuituse.h"
#include "config.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
+ #include "dos.h"
#include "relay.h"
#include "rendmid.h"
#include "rephist.h"
diff --cc src/test/include.am
index d5ae0bec1,0ee3d1169..723b4964e
--- a/src/test/include.am
+++ b/src/test/include.am
@@@ -104,7 -88,7 +105,8 @@@ src_test_test_SOURCES =
src/test/test_controller.c \
src/test/test_controller_events.c \
src/test/test_crypto.c \
+ src/test/test_crypto_openssl.c \
+ src/test/test_dos.c \
src/test/test_data.c \
src/test/test_dir.c \
src/test/test_dir_common.c \
diff --cc src/test/test.c
index 68f5f90fd,0fef69790..911ef0c24
--- a/src/test/test.c
+++ b/src/test/test.c
@@@ -1203,7 -1216,7 +1222,8 @@@ struct testgroup_t testgroups[] =
{ "control/", controller_tests },
{ "control/event/", controller_event_tests },
{ "crypto/", crypto_tests },
+ { "crypto/openssl/", crypto_openssl_tests },
+ { "dos/", dos_tests },
{ "dir/", dir_tests },
{ "dir_handle_get/", dir_handle_get_tests },
{ "dir/md/", microdesc_tests },
diff --cc src/test/test.h
index 6abaf39e6,028082386..ea1b16ade
--- a/src/test/test.h
+++ b/src/test/test.h
@@@ -198,7 -191,7 +199,8 @@@ extern struct testcase_t container_test
extern struct testcase_t controller_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t controller_event_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t crypto_tests[];
+extern struct testcase_t crypto_openssl_tests[];
+ extern struct testcase_t dos_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t dir_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t dir_handle_get_tests[];
extern struct testcase_t entryconn_tests[];
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