[tor-commits] [tor-design-2012/master] Other systems

[sjm217@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

commit 64c504ddb2b6df6f6315cc1fe891b433bcf56bca
Author: Steven Murdoch <Steven.Murdoch@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Mon Jan 6 18:53:34 2014 +0000

    Other systems
---
 tor-design-2012.bib |   11 ++++++++++-
 tor-design-2012.tex |   47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 2 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tor-design-2012.bib b/tor-design-2012.bib
index 981761e..c52046d 100644
--- a/tor-design-2012.bib
+++ b/tor-design-2012.bib
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@
   note =         {\url{http://www.privoxy.org/}}
 }
 
-@Misc{i2p,
+@Comment{i2p,
   key =          {i2p},
   title =        {{I2P}},
   note =         {\url{http://www.i2p.net/}}
@@ -1487,6 +1487,15 @@ Stefan Katzenbeisser and Fernando P\'{e}rez-Gonz\'{a}lez},
   bookurl = {http://petsymposium.org/2008/},
 }
 
+@inproceedings{i2p,
+	title = {Peer Profiling and Selection in the {I2P} Anonymous Network},
+	author = {{zzz} and Schimmer, Lars}, 
+	year = {2009},
+	month = {March},
+	address = {TU Dresden, Germany},
+	booktitle = {{PET}-{CON}}
+}
+
 %%% Local Variables:
 %%% mode: latex
 %%% TeX-master: "tor-design"
diff --git a/tor-design-2012.tex b/tor-design-2012.tex
index 1efb544..731d7ef 100644
--- a/tor-design-2012.tex
+++ b/tor-design-2012.tex
@@ -351,17 +351,19 @@ crosses several servers, and each server only knows the adjacent
 servers in the circuit, no single server can link a user to her
 communication partners.
 
-The {\bf Java Anon Proxy} (also known as JAP or Web MIXes) uses
-fixed shared routes known as \emph{cascades}.  As with a
-single-hop proxy, this approach aggregates users into larger
-anonymity sets, but again an attacker only needs to observe both
-ends of the cascade to bridge all the system's traffic.  The
-Java Anon Proxy's design calls for padding between end users and
-the head of the cascade~\cite{web-mix}. However, it is not
-demonstrated whether the current implementation's padding policy
-improves anonymity.
-% They're called JonDos now; I don't know if the above paragraph is at all
-% accurate about their current design. -NM
+{\bf JonDo} (previously known as JAP or Web MIXes) uses fixed
+shared routes known as \emph{cascades}.  As with a single-hop
+proxy, this approach aggregates users into larger anonymity
+sets, but again an attacker only needs to observe both ends of
+the cascade to bridge all the system's traffic.  JonDo's design
+calls for padding between end users and the head of the
+cascade~\cite{web-mix}. However, it is not demonstrated whether
+the current implementation's padding policy improves anonymity.
+% They're called JonDos now; I don't know if the above paragraph
+% is at all accurate about their current design. -NM
+%
+% From what I can tell on their website, this is still correct
+% -SJM
 
 {\bf PipeNet}~\cite{back01, pipenet}, another low-latency design
 proposed around the same time as Onion Routing, gave stronger
@@ -387,20 +389,27 @@ systems are designed primarily for communication among peers,
 although Herbivore users can make external connections by
 requesting a peer to serve as a proxy.
 
-Systems like {\bf Freedom} and the original Onion Routing build
-circuits all at once, using a layered ``onion'' of public-key
-encrypted messages, each layer of which provides session keys
-and the address of the next server in the circuit. Tor as
-described herein, Tarzan, MorphMix, {\bf
-  Cebolla}~\cite{cebolla}, and Rennhard's {\bf Anonymity
-  Network}~\cite{anonnet} build circuits in stages, extending
-them one hop at a time.
+Systems like {\bf Freedom}, {\bf I2P}~\cite{i2p}, and the
+original Onion Routing build circuits all at once, using a
+layered ``onion'' of public-key encrypted messages, each layer
+of which provides session keys and the address of the next
+server in the circuit. Tor as described herein, Tarzan,
+MorphMix, {\bf Cebolla}~\cite{cebolla}, and Rennhard's {\bf
+Anonymity Network}~\cite{anonnet} build circuits in stages,
+extending them one hop at a time.
 Section~\ref{subsubsec:constructing-a-circuit} describes how
 this approach enables perfect forward secrecy.
 
 % We should also mention designs like I2P, Phantom, Salsa.  There are lots of
 % proposals here of varying degrees of quality.  We should sift through them
 % all. -NM
+%
+% We don't want to turn into a survey of the many many design
+% variations out there, but IMO should just list the papers
+% which we would like a Tor researcher to be familiar with
+% before started. I would prioritize historically important
+% systems like what we have listedg, anything particularly
+% distinctive, and deployed systems.
 
 Circuit-based designs must choose which protocol layer to
 anonymize. They may intercept IP packets directly, and relay



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