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[tor-commits] [tor/master] channel: Continue refactor NETINFO process function
commit 78bc52c47c8d7c3747ea3335b571fd98a15a47b1
Author: David Goulet <dgoulet@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon Jul 6 09:06:22 2020 -0400
channel: Continue refactor NETINFO process function
In the spirit of reducing technical debt. Move code that marks a channel as a
client into its own function and document it properly.
No behavior change, only code movement.
Related to #40022
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
src/core/or/channeltls.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 50 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/core/or/channeltls.c b/src/core/or/channeltls.c
index 9b2ac7d16..fc93ea8d5 100644
--- a/src/core/or/channeltls.c
+++ b/src/core/or/channeltls.c
@@ -1723,6 +1723,50 @@ can_process_netinfo_cell(const channel_tls_t *chan)
return true;
}
+/** Mark the given channel endpoint as a client (which means either a tor
+ * client or a tor bridge).
+ *
+ * This MUST be done on an _unauthenticated_ channel. It is a mistake to mark
+ * an authenticated channel as a client.
+ *
+ * The following is done on the channel:
+ *
+ * 1. Marked as a client.
+ * 2. Type of circuit ID type is set.
+ * 3. The underlying OR connection is initialized with the address of the
+ * endpoint.
+ */
+static void
+mark_channel_tls_endpoint_as_client(channel_tls_t *chan)
+{
+ /* Ending up here for an authenticated link is a mistake. */
+ if (BUG(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ tor_assert(tor_digest_is_zero(
+ (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
+ authenticated_rsa_peer_id)));
+ tor_assert(fast_mem_is_zero(
+ (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
+ authenticated_ed25519_peer_id.pubkey), 32));
+ /* If the client never authenticated, it's a tor client or bridge
+ * relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND requests (nor could we, as
+ * there are no authenticated peer IDs) */
+ channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan));
+ channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), NULL,
+ chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS);
+
+ connection_or_init_conn_from_address(chan->conn,
+ &(chan->conn->base_.addr),
+ chan->conn->base_.port,
+ /* zero, checked above */
+ (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
+ authenticated_rsa_peer_id),
+ NULL, /* Ed25519 ID: Also checked as zero */
+ 0);
+}
+
/**
* Process a 'netinfo' cell
*
@@ -1768,30 +1812,13 @@ channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan)
return;
}
} else {
- /* we're the server. If the client never authenticated, we have
- some housekeeping to do.*/
+ /* We're the server. If the client never authenticated, we have some
+ * housekeeping to do.
+ *
+ * It's a tor client or bridge relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND
+ * requests (nor could we, as there are no authenticated peer IDs) */
if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated)) {
- tor_assert(tor_digest_is_zero(
- (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
- authenticated_rsa_peer_id)));
- tor_assert(fast_mem_is_zero(
- (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
- authenticated_ed25519_peer_id.pubkey), 32));
- /* If the client never authenticated, it's a tor client or bridge
- * relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND requests (nor could we, as
- * there are no authenticated peer IDs) */
- channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan));
- channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), NULL,
- chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS);
-
- connection_or_init_conn_from_address(chan->conn,
- &(chan->conn->base_.addr),
- chan->conn->base_.port,
- /* zero, checked above */
- (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state->
- authenticated_rsa_peer_id),
- NULL, /* Ed25519 ID: Also checked as zero */
- 0);
+ mark_channel_tls_endpoint_as_client(chan);
}
}
}
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