[tor-commits] [tpo/staging] Update content.lr

[gus@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

commit b22b5006656e6caf685727ce87b9b83539123774
Author: Antonela <hola@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Jun 2 11:55:25 2020 -0300

    Update content.lr
---
 content/releases/tor-browser-95/contents.lr | 13 +++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/content/releases/tor-browser-95/contents.lr b/content/releases/tor-browser-95/contents.lr
index 74f51ee0..dc1e1361 100644
--- a/content/releases/tor-browser-95/contents.lr
+++ b/content/releases/tor-browser-95/contents.lr
@@ -53,11 +53,20 @@ In this release, we have improved the way Tor Browser communicates with users ab
 
 **Onion Names**
 
-Because of cryptographic protections, onion service URLs are not easy for humans to remember (ie, torproject.org vs. expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion). This makes it hard for users to discover or return to an onion site. We found that organically, developers have approached this problem in different ways, mostly with solutions tailored for their service. Given that there is no solution that works perfectly for all our user groups, we also approached this problem from a broad angle. For this release, we partnered with the [Freedom of the Press Foundation](https://freedom.press/) and [HTTPS Everywhere](https://www.eff.org/https-everywhere) to develop the first proof-of-concept for human-memorable names for onion services addresses.
+Because of cryptographic protections, onion service URLs are not easy for humans to remember (ie, https://torproject.org vs. http://expyuzz4wqqyqhjn.onion/). This makes it hard for users to discover or return to an onion site. We found that organically, developers have approached this problem in different ways, mostly with solutions tailored for their service. Given that there is no solution that works perfectly for all our user groups, we also approached this problem from a broad angle. For this release, we partnered with Freedom of the Press Foundation (FPF) and the Electronic Frontier Foundation's HTTPS Everywhere to develop the first proof-of-concept human-memorable names for SecureDrop onion services addresses:
+
+    The Intercept:
+        theintercept.securedrop.tor.onion
+        http://xpxduj55x2j27l2qytu2tcetykyfxbjbafin3x4i3ywddzphkbrd3jyd.onion
+    Lucy Parsons Labs:
+        lucyparsonslabs.securedrop.tor.onion
+        http://qn4qfeeslglmwxgb.onion
+
+Freedom of the Press Foundation has reached out to a small number of additional media organizations for participation, and Tor and FPF will jointly consider next steps based on feedback on this initial proof-of-concept.
 
 <img class="w-100" src="/static/images/tb95/onion-names@xxxxxx" alt="Tor Browser 9.5 Onion Names"/>
 
-  
+
 **Give Feedback**
 
 If you find a bug or have a suggestion for how we could improve this release, please let us know. Thanks to all of the teams across Tor, and the many volunteers, who contributed to this release.



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