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[tor-commits] [Git][tpo/applications/tor-browser][tor-browser-153.0esr-16.0-1] fixup! BB 40925: Implemented the Security Level component

Title: GitLab

Pier Angelo Vendrame pushed to branch tor-browser-153.0esr-16.0-1 at The Tor Project / Applications / Tor Browser

Commits:

  • 266b210c
    by Pier Angelo Vendrame at 2026-07-22T15:13:09+02:00 
    fixup! BB 40925: Implemented the Security Level component

BB 45131: Avoid the unsafe getBoolPref in the security level.

In the security level we use getBoolPref without a default value.
Therefore it might throw during the initialization of the security
level.

This case should not happen normally for us, but it might happen if
upstream removes a preference default, and in that case the security
level initialization will fail at startup.
It seems better to handle the case (but add a console warning, so that
we notice it and investigate it).

1 changed file:

Changes:

  • toolkit/components/securitylevel/SecurityLevel.sys.mjs
    ... ... @@ -336,14 +336,22 @@ var read_setting_from_prefs = function (prefNames) {
    336 336 
         // For the given settingIndex, check if all current pref values
    337 337 
         // match the setting.
    338 338 
         for (const prefName of prefNames) {
    339 
    -      const wanted = kSecuritySettings[prefName][settingIndex];
    340 
    -      const actual = Services.prefs.getBoolPref(prefName);
    341 
    -      if (wanted !== actual) {
    342 
    -        possibleSetting = false;
    343 
    -        logger.debug(
    344 
    -          `${prefName} does not match level ${settingIndex}: ${actual}, should be ${wanted}!`
    345 
    -        );
    346 
    -        break;
    339 
    +      try {
    340 
    +        const wanted = kSecuritySettings[prefName][settingIndex];
    341 
    +        const actual = Services.prefs.getBoolPref(prefName);
    342 
    +        if (wanted !== actual) {
    343 
    +          possibleSetting = false;
    344 
    +          logger.debug(
    345 
    +            `${prefName} does not match level ${settingIndex}: ${actual}, should be ${wanted}!`
    346 
    +          );
    347 
    +          break;
    348 
    +        }
    349 
    +      } catch (e) {
    350 
    +        // All the relevant prefs must have a defined default.
    351 
    +        // If we get here, a preference might have been dropped upstream,
    352 
    +        // therefore it makes sense to ignore it to determine the security
    353 
    +        // level, but warn so that we have a look at what went wrong.
    354 
    +        logger.warn(`Cannot get the value for ${prefName}`, e);
    347 355 
           }
    348 356 
         }
    349 357 
         if (possibleSetting) {

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