Author: weasel
Date: 2008-06-04 04:39:02 -0400 (Wed, 04 Jun 2008)
New Revision: 14933
Added:
tor/trunk/debian/tor.NEWS
Modified:
tor/trunk/debian/changelog
tor/trunk/debian/control
tor/trunk/debian/tor.postinst
Log:
Forward port debian 0.2.0.26-rc-1 to trunk
Modified: tor/trunk/debian/changelog
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/debian/changelog 2008-06-04 08:05:18 UTC (rev 14932)
+++ tor/trunk/debian/changelog 2008-06-04 08:39:02 UTC (rev 14933)
@@ -4,6 +4,29 @@
-- Peter Palfrader <weasel@xxxxxxxxxx> Wed, 19 Mar 2008 20:09:25 +0100
+tor (0.2.0.26-rc-1) experimental; urgency=critical
+
+ * New upstream version.
+ * Conflict with old libssls.
+ * On upgrading from versions prior to, including, 0.1.2.19-2, or
+ from versions later than 0.2.0 and prior to 0.2.0.26-rc do the
+ following, and if we are a server (we have a /var/lib/tor/keys
+ directory)
+ - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key out of the way.
+ - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_onion_key.old out of the way.
+ - move /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key out of the way if it was
+ created on or after 2006-09-17, which is the day the bad
+ libssl was uploaded to Debian unstable.
+ * Add a NEWS file explaining this change.
+
+ -- Peter Palfrader <weasel@xxxxxxxxxx> Tue, 13 May 2008 16:11:21 +0200
+
+tor (0.2.0.24-rc-1) experimental; urgency=low
+
+ * New upstream version.
+
+ -- Peter Palfrader <weasel@xxxxxxxxxx> Wed, 23 Apr 2008 02:25:22 +0200
+
tor (0.2.0.23-rc-1) experimental; urgency=low
* New upstream version.
Modified: tor/trunk/debian/control
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/debian/control 2008-06-04 08:05:18 UTC (rev 14932)
+++ tor/trunk/debian/control 2008-06-04 08:39:02 UTC (rev 14933)
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
Package: tor
Architecture: any
Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}, adduser, tsocks
+Conflicts: libssl0.9.8 (<< 0.9.8g-9)
Recommends: privoxy | polipo (>= 1), socat, logrotate
Suggests: mixmaster, mixminion, anon-proxy
Description: anonymizing overlay network for TCP
Added: tor/trunk/debian/tor.NEWS
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/debian/tor.NEWS (rev 0)
+++ tor/trunk/debian/tor.NEWS 2008-06-04 08:39:02 UTC (rev 14933)
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+tor (0.2.0.26-rc-1) experimental; urgency=critical
+
+ * weak cryptographic keys
+
+ It has been discovered that the random number generator in Debian's
+ openssl package is predictable. This is caused by an incorrect
+ Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166). As a
+ result, cryptographic key material may be guessable.
+
+ See Debian Security Advisory number 1571 (DSA-1571) for more information:
+ http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html
+
+ If you run a Tor server using this package please see
+ /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY
+
+ -- Peter Palfrader <weasel@xxxxxxxxxx> Tue, 13 May 2008 12:49:05 +0200
Modified: tor/trunk/debian/tor.postinst
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/debian/tor.postinst 2008-06-04 08:05:18 UTC (rev 14932)
+++ tor/trunk/debian/tor.postinst 2008-06-04 08:39:02 UTC (rev 14933)
@@ -51,6 +51,71 @@
find /var/log/tor -type d -print0 | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty chmod 02750
find /var/log/tor -type f -print0 | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty chmod 00640
+
+move_away_keys=0
+
+if [ "$1" = "configure" ] &&
+ [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys ] &&
+ [ ! -z "$2" ]; then
+ if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt 0.1.2.19-2; then
+ move_away_keys=1
+ elif dpkg --compare-versions "$2" gt 0.2.0 &&
+ dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt 0.2.0.26-rc; then
+ move_away_keys=1
+ fi
+fi
+if [ "$move_away_keys" = "1" ]; then
+ echo "Retiring possibly compromised keys. See /usr/share/doc/tor/NEWS.Debian.gz"
+ echo "and /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY for"
+ echo "further information."
+ if ! [ -d /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package ]; then
+ mkdir /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package
+ cat > /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY << EOF
+It has been discovered that the random number generator in Debian's
+openssl package is predictable. This is caused by an incorrect
+Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166). As a
+result, cryptographic key material may be guessable.
+
+See Debian Security Advisory number 1571 (DSA-1571) for more information:
+http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html
+
+The Debian package for Tor has moved away the onion keys upon package
+upgrade, and it will have moved away your identity key if it was created
+in the affected timeframe. There is no sure way to automatically tell
+if your key was created with an affected openssl library, so this move
+is done unconditionally.
+
+If you have restarted Tor since this change (and the package probably
+did that for you already unless you configured your system differently)
+then the Tor daemon already created new keys for itself and in all
+likelyhood is already working just fine with new keys.
+
+If you are absolutely certain that your identity key was created with
+a non-affected version of openssl and for some reason you have to retain
+the old identity, then you can move back the copy of secret_id_key to
+/var/lib/tor/keys. Do not move back the onion keys, they were created
+only recently since they are temporary keys with a lifetime of only a few
+days anyway.
+
+Sincerely,
+Peter Palfrader, Tue, 13 May 2008 13:32:23 +0200
+EOF
+ fi
+ for f in secret_onion_key secret_onion_key.old; do
+ if [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys/"$f" ]; then
+ mv -v /var/lib/tor/keys/"$f" /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/"$f"
+ fi
+ done
+ if [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key ]; then
+ id_mtime=`/usr/bin/stat -c %Y /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key`
+ sept=`date -d '2006-09-10' +%s`
+ if [ "$id_mtime" -gt "$sept" ] ; then
+ mv -v /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/secret_id_key
+ fi
+ fi
+fi
+
+
#DEBHELPER#
exit 0