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[or-cvs] r15549: Updated and improved Finnish translation (website/trunk/fi)

To: or-cvs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [or-cvs] r15549: Updated and improved Finnish translation (website/trunk/fi)
From: djhasis@xxxxxxxx
Date: Sat, 28 Jun 2008 09:21:46 -0400 (EDT)
Delivered-to: archiver@xxxxxxxx
Delivered-to: or-cvs-outgoing@xxxxxxxx
Delivered-to: or-cvs@xxxxxxxx
Delivery-date: Sat, 28 Jun 2008 09:22:10 -0400
Reply-to: or-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sender: owner-or-cvs@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Author: djhasis
Date: 2008-06-28 09:21:34 -0400 (Sat, 28 Jun 2008)
New Revision: 15549

Added:
   website/trunk/fi/donate.wml
   website/trunk/fi/people.wml
   website/trunk/fi/volunteer.wml
Modified:
   website/trunk/fi/download-unix.wml
   website/trunk/fi/download.wml
Log:
Updated and improved Finnish translation

Added: website/trunk/fi/donate.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fi/donate.wml	                        (rev 0)
+++ website/trunk/fi/donate.wml	2008-06-28 13:21:34 UTC (rev 15549)
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+## translation metadata
+# Based-On-Revision: 15530
+# Last-Translator: djhasis(at)gmail.com
+
+#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor: Lahjoita!" CHARSET="UTF-8"
+
+<div class="main-column">
+
+<h2>Lahjoita Tor-projektille!</h2>
+<hr />
+
+<p>
+Jos pidät Tor-ohjelmasta tai -verkosta ja haluat auttaa tukemalla Tor-projektia, ole hyvä ja harkitse lahjoituksen tekoa auttaakseen meitä jatkamaan työtämme.  Tarjomme muutaman tavan tehdä lahjoituksen:</p>
+<ul>
+<li><a href="#check">Check, Money Order, or Postal Order</a></li>
+<li><a href="#paypal">PayPal</a></li>
+<li><a href="#wire">ACH/e-check/Wire Transfers</a></li>
+<li><a href="#eurobank">European Bank Transfers</a></li>
+<li><a href="#funds">What happens to my donation?</a></li>
+</ul>
+
+<p>As of December 2006, Tor is a US 501[c][3] research/educational
+nonprofit.  Donations to The Tor Project may be tax deductible to persons
+who are in the US or who pay taxes in countries with reciprocity with
+the US on charitable donations.  If you have any questions, please
+<a href="mailto:donations@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx";>contact us</a> directly.  We're happy
+to discuss major gifts, planned giving, and public acknowledgement of donations
+with you.
+</p>
+
+<p>Donations of $65 or more qualify you for a <a href="<page
+tshirt>">bright green Tor t-shirt</a>. Help us keep Tor under <a
+href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#Funding";>active
+development</a>!
+</p>
+
+<a id="check"></a>
+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#check">Checks, Money Orders, and Postal
+Orders</a></h3>
+<p>
+These payments can be sent to:
+</p>
+<blockquote><p>
+The Tor Project<br />
+122 Scott Circle<br />
+Dedham, MA  02026 USA</p>
+</blockquote>
+
+<p>
+Attention US citizens: if you would like an acknowledgement letter,
+please inform us with your donation.  A canceled check, money/postal order receipt, or
+appraisal of donated property are valid records according to the IRS.  
+</p>
+
+<a id="paypal"></a>
+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#paypal">PayPal</a></h3>
+<form id="subscribe" action="https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr";
+method="post">
+  <p>
+The most useful approach is to become a Tor project "member" for a
+<b>recurring payment</b> each month. Consistent
+donations let us worry less about fund-raising and focus more on
+development. You can become a member by clicking on this button (you
+will need a <a
+href="http://paypal.com/";>PayPal</a> account):<br />
+<input type="radio" name="a3" value="50.00" />$50
+<input type="radio" name="a3" value="20.00" checked="checked" />$20
+<input type="radio" name="a3" value="10.00" />$10
+<input type="radio" name="a3" value="5.00" />$5
+<input type="hidden" name="p3" value="1" />
+<input type="hidden" name="t3" value="M" />
+<input type="hidden" name="sra" value="1" />
+<input type="hidden" name="src" value="1" />
+<input type="hidden" name="no_shipping" value="1" />
+<input type="hidden" name="no_note" value="1" />
+<input type="image"
+ src="https://www.paypal.com/en_US/i/btn/btn_donateCC_LG.gif"; name="submit"
+ alt="Make payments with PayPal - it's fast, free and secure!">
+<input type="hidden" name="cmd" value="_xclick-subscriptions" />
+<input type="hidden" name="business" value="donations@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx" />
+<input type="hidden" name="item_name" value="Tor Project Membership" />
+<input type="hidden" name="return" value="https://www.torproject.org/";>
+<input type="hidden" name="cancel_return"
+ value="https://www.torproject.org/donate";>
+</p>
+</form>
+
+<form id="donate" action="https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr"; method="post">
+<p>You can also make a <b>one-time donation</b> (via PayPal, but
+doesn't require any account):<br />
+<input type="radio" name="amount" value="100.00" />$100
+<input type="radio" name="amount" value="50.00" />$50
+<input type="radio" name="amount" value="20.00" checked="checked" />$20
+<input type="radio" name="amount" value="10.00" />$10
+<input type="radio" name="amount" value="" />other
+<input type="hidden" name="no_shipping" value="1" />
+<input type="image"
+ src="https://www.paypal.com/en_US/i/btn/btn_donateCC_LG.gif";
+ name="submit" alt="Make payments with PayPal - it's fast, free and secure!">
+<input type="hidden" name="cmd" value="_xclick" />
+<input type="hidden" name="business" value="donations@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx" />
+<input type="hidden" name="item_name" value="Tor" />
+<input type="hidden" name="return" value="https://www.torproject.org/";>
+<input type="hidden" name="cancel_return" value="https://www.torproject.org/donate";>
+</p>
+</form>
+
+<a id="wire"></a>
+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#wire">ACH/e-check/Wire Transfers</a></h3>
+<p>In the US, ACH or e-check transfers are a fine way to donate.  
+We're happy to accept wire transfers over US$100.  Domestic United
+States ACH/e-check transfers are normally free for the sender, whereas wire transfers will incur fees.
+If you are located in Europe, <a href="#eurobank">please see below</a>.</p>
+
+<p>
+Organization Address:<br />
+The Tor Project<br />
+122 Scott Circle<br />
+Dedham, MA 02026<br />
+</p>
+<p>
+account number: 63904958202<br />
+routing number: 011075150<br />
+SWIFT Code: SVRNUS33//FW011075150<br />
+</p>
+<p>
+Bank Address:<br />
+Sovereign Bank<br />
+1130 Berkshire Boulevard<br />
+Wyomissing, PA 19610<br />
+</p>
+
+<a id="eurobank"></a>
+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#eurobank">European Bank Transfers</a></h3>
+<p>In Europe, we have a funding arrangement with the <a
+href="http://www.ccc.de/";>Chaos Computer Club</a>.  Your donations go
+into a separate bank account managed by the CCC, and they use the funds
+to do beneficial activities for Tor in Europe.  Residents from any of the <a
+href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_Euro_Payments_Area";>31 SEPA
+member states</a> can wire up to 50.000
+Euro at the cost of a domestic transaction (i.e., usually free if
+submitted electronically).</p>
+
+<p>
+The account information is:<br />
+Wau Holland Stiftung<br />
+IBAN DE57 5204 0021 0277 281202<br />
+SWIFT BIC COBADEFFXXX<br />
+</p>
+<p>
+Classic style German account information is:<br />
+Konto: 2772812-02<br />
+Inhaber: Wau Holland Stiftung<br />
+Bank: Commerzbank Kassel<br />
+BLZ: 52040021<br />
+</p>
+<p>WHS issues a donation receipt upon request (if provided with address
+information).
+</p>
+
+<a id="funds"></a>
+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#funds">What happens to my donation?</a></h3>
+<p>Your funds are deposited into our general fund.  You join our 
+<a href="<page sponsors>">many sponsors</a> in funding the future of Tor and online anonymity.  
+In 2007, the Tor Project spent and received its funds as follows: </p>
+<p><img
+src="http://chart.apis.google.com/chart?cht=p&amp;chtt=Who%20funds%20The%20Tor%20Project?&amp;chco=00df00&amp;chd=t:56,31,13&amp;chs=450x225&amp;chl=Governments%2056%|NGOs%2031%|Individuals%2013%" alt="Who funds the Tor Project?"/>
+<img
+src="http://chart.apis.google.com/chart?cht=p&amp;chtt=How%20does%20The%20Tor%20Project%20allocate%20funds?&amp;chco=00df00&amp;chd=t:72,13,15&amp;chs=450x225&amp;chl=Development%2072%|Operational%2013%|Taxes%2015%" alt="How does the Tor Project allocate funds?"/></p>
+
+<hr />
+<strong>The Tor Project respects the confidentiality of our supporters,
+when requested. We do not lend, rent, or sell our lists of donors at
+any time.</strong>
+
+  </div><!-- #main -->
+
+#include <foot.wmi>
+

Modified: website/trunk/fi/download-unix.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fi/download-unix.wml	2008-06-28 12:45:23 UTC (rev 15548)
+++ website/trunk/fi/download-unix.wml	2008-06-28 13:21:34 UTC (rev 15549)
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@
 </tr>
 
 <tr bgcolor="e5e5e5">
-<td>Lähdekoodipaketit</td>
+<td>Lähdekoodit</td>
 <td>
 <a href="<package-source-stable>"><version-stable></a> (<a href="<package-source-stable-sig>">sig</a>)
 </td>
@@ -353,10 +353,9 @@
 <a id="Stable"></a>
 <a id="Testing"></a>
 <p>
-For a list of what has changed in each stable Tor release, see the
-<a href="<svnsandbox>ReleaseNotes">ReleaseNotes</a>. For a list of
-changes in both stable and development versions, see the
-<a href="<svnsandbox>ChangeLog">ChangeLog</a>.
+Vakaan Tor-julkaisun muutoksia voi lukea englanninkielellä tiedostosta
+<a href="<svnsandbox>ReleaseNotes">ReleaseNotes / Julkaisutiedot</a>. Muutokset sekä vakaissa ja kehitysversioissa voi lukea englanninkielellä  tiedostosta 
+<a href="<svnsandbox>ChangeLog">ChangeLog / Muutosloki</a>.
 </p>
 
 </div><!-- #main -->

Modified: website/trunk/fi/download.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fi/download.wml	2008-06-28 12:45:23 UTC (rev 15548)
+++ website/trunk/fi/download.wml	2008-06-28 13:21:34 UTC (rev 15549)
@@ -200,8 +200,7 @@
 <h2><a class="anchor" href="#packagediff">Mitä eroja on vakaalla &amp; epävakaalla</a></h2>
 
 <p>
-Stable packages are released when we believe the features and code will
-not change for many months. These typically include a stable version of Vidalia, Privoxy, and Torbutton.
+Vakaat julkaisut ovat sillaisia joiden toiminnot ja koodi eivät tule muuttumaan useampaan kuukauteen. 
 </p>
 <p>
 Unstable/Alpha packages are released so you can help us test new features and bugfixes. Even though they have a higher version number
@@ -312,7 +311,7 @@
 
 <tr bgcolor="#e5e5e5">
   <td>
-    Source tarballs<br />
+    Lähdekoodipaketit<br />
     <kbd>./configure &amp;&amp; make &amp;&amp; src/or/tor</kbd>
   </td>
   <td>
@@ -351,10 +350,9 @@
 <a id="Stable"></a>
 <a id="Testing"></a>
 <p>
-For a list of what has changed in each stable Tor release, see the
-<a href="<svnsandbox>ReleaseNotes">ReleaseNotes</a>. For a list of
-changes in both stable and development versions, see the
-<a href="<svnsandbox>ChangeLog">ChangeLog</a>.
+Vakaan Tor-julkaisun muutoksia voi lukea englanninkielellä tiedostosta
+<a href="<svnsandbox>ReleaseNotes">ReleaseNotes / Julkaisutiedot</a>. Muutokset sekä vakaissa ja kehitysversioissa voi lukea englanninkielellä  tiedostosta 
+<a href="<svnsandbox>ChangeLog">ChangeLog / Muutosloki</a>.
 </p>
 
 </div><!-- #main -->

Added: website/trunk/fi/people.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fi/people.wml	                        (rev 0)
+++ website/trunk/fi/people.wml	2008-06-28 13:21:34 UTC (rev 15549)
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+## translation metadata
+# Based-On-Revision: 15491
+# Last-Translator: djhasis(at)gmail.com
+
+#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor: Henkilöt" CHARSET="UTF-8" CHARSET="UTF-8"
+
+<div class="main-column">
+
+<h2>Tor: Henkilöt</h2>
+<hr />
+
+<p>The Tor Project is a 501(c)(3) non-profit based in
+the United States. Yrityksen virallinen osoite on:<br>
+<blockquote>
+The Tor Project<br>
+122 Scott Circle<br>
+Dedham, MA  02026 USA<br>
+</blockquote>
+
+<p>Yritys koostuu monista vapaaehtoisista henkilöistä sekä muutamasta työntekijästä.</p>
+
+<a id="Core"></a>
+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#Core">PääTor-henkilöt:</a></h3>
+
+<dl>
+<dt>Jacob Appelbaum</dt><dd>Runs the <a
+href="http://check.torproject.org/";>Tor DNSEL</a> <a
+href="http://exitlist.torproject.org/";>site</a>, the <a
+href="https://translation.torproject.org/";>Tor Translation Portal</a>, and also
+the in-progress Tor weather site.</dd>
+<dt>Roger Dingledine (Tor project leader; Director)</dt><dd>Original
+developer of Tor; now plays pretty much all the roles to keep
+everything on track.</dd>
+<dt>Matt Edman</dt><dd>Developer for <a
+href="http://vidalia-project.net/";>Vidalia</a>, a cross-platform Tor GUI
+included in the Windows and OS X bundles.</dd>
+<dt>Andrew Lewman (Director)</dt><dd>Manages building packages for
+Windows, OS X, Red Hat, and SuSE. Also provides common sense on topics
+like how to run a non-profit and generally helps keep everything moving
+forward.</dd>
+<dt>Karsten Loesing</dt><dd> Worked during the 2007 Google Summer of
+Code on <a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/svn/trunk/doc/spec/proposals/114-distributed-storage.txt";>distributing
+and securing the publishing and fetching of hidden service
+descriptors</a>.</dd>
+<dt>Nick Mathewson (Chief architect; Director)</dt><dd>One of the
+three original designers of Tor; does a lot of the ongoing design work.
+One of the two main developers, along with Roger.</dd>
+<dt>Steven Murdoch (Researcher)</dt><dd>Researcher at the University
+of Cambridge, currently funded by The Tor Project to improve
+the security, performance, and usability of Tor. Creator of the
+<a href="https://torbrowser.torproject.org/";>Tor Browser Bundle</a>.</dd>
+<dt>Peter Palfrader</dt><dd>Manages the Debian packages,
+runs one of the directory authorities, runs the website and the wiki,
+and generally helps out a lot.</dd>
+<dt>Mike Perry</dt><dd>Author of <a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/svn/torflow/README";>TorFlow</a>, a Tor
+controller that builds paths through the Tor network and
+measures various properties and behaviors. Working now on a <a
+href="https://torbutton.torproject.org/dev/";>much more comprehensive
+version of Torbutton</a>.</dd>
+<dt>Paul Syverson</dt><dd>Inventor of <a
+href="http://www.onion-router.net/";>Onion Routing</a>, original designer
+of Tor along with Roger and Nick, and project leader for original design,
+development, and deployment of Tor. Currently helps out with research
+and design.</dd>
+</dl>
+
+<a id="Board"></a>
+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#Board">Tor-projektin johtokunta:</a></h3>
+
+<dl>
+<dt>Ian Goldberg (Director)</dt><dd>Cryptographer,
+privacy expert, and professor; one of the designers of <a
+href="http://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/";>Off-the-Record Messaging</a>.</dd>
+<dt>Xianghui (Isaac) Mao (Director)</dt><dd>Chinese blogging and privacy
+activist.  His current activities can be found at <a
+href="http://isaacmao.com/";>his website</a>.<dd>
+<dt>Wendy Seltzer (Director)</dt><dd>Lawyer,
+cyberlaw professor, and founder of <a
+href="http://chillingeffects.org/";>ChillingEffects.org</a>.</dd>
+<dt>Fred von Lohmann (Director)</dt><dd>Fred is a Senior
+Intellectual Property Attorney at the Electronic Frontier
+Foundation (EFF). His complete bio can be found at the <a
+href="http://www.eff.org/about/staff/?f=fred_von_lohmann.html";>EFF
+Staff Site</a>.</dd>
+<dt>Along with Roger, Nick, and Andrew listed above as Directors.</dt>
+</dl>
+
+<a id="Translators"></a>
+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#Translators">Pääkääntäjät:</a></h3>
+
+<dl>
+<dt>Bogdan Drozdowski</dt><dd><a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/index.html.pl";>puolankieli</a>.</dd>
+<dt>fredzupy</dt><dd><a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/index.html.fr";>ranskankieli</a>.</dd>
+<dt>Ruben Garcia</dt><dd><a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/index.html.es";>espanjankieli</a>.</dd>
+<dt>Jens Kubieziel</dt><dd><a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/index.html.de";>saksankieli</a>.</dd>
+<dt>Pei Hanru</dt><dd><a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/index.html.zh-cn";>yksinkertaistettu kiinankieli</a>.</dd>
+<dt>Jan Reister</dt><dd><a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/index.html.it";>italiankieli</a>.</dd>
+<dt>Masaki Taniguchi</dt><dd><a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/index.html.ja";>japaninkieli</a>.</dd>
+<dt>Jan Woning</dt><dd><a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/index.html.nl";>hollanninkieli</a>.</dd>
+<dt>ygrek</dt><dd><a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/index.html.ru";>venäjänkieli</a>.</dd>
+</dl>
+
+<a id="Volunteers"></a>
+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#Volunteers">Monet vapaaehtoiset:</a></h3>
+
+<dl>
+<dt>Anonym</dt><dd>Maintainer of the Incognito LiveCD.</dd>
+<dt>Kevin Bankston</dt><dd>EFF lawyer who helped write the <a
+href="<page eff/tor-legal-faq>">Tor Legal FAQ</a> and
+tirelessly answers the phone when somebody in the world has a legal
+question about Tor.</dd>
+<dt>Jeff Blum</dt><dd>Our Site Editor volunteer who is helping to update
+the content of the Tor website.</dd>
+<dt>Kasimir Gabert</dt><dd>Maintains the <a
+href="https://torstatus.kgprog.com/";>TorStatus</a> statistics pages.</dd>
+<dt>Geoff Goodell</dt><dd>Runs one of the directory authorities, used to
+run the Blossom project which uses Tor as its overlay network, and runs
+the <a href="http://lefkada.eecs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/exit.py";>exit.py</a>
+Tor relay list.</dd>
+<dt>Robert Hogan</dt><dd>Developer for the <a
+href="http://tork.sf.net/";>TorK</a> Tor controller.</dd>
+<dt>Fabian Keil</dt><dd>One of the core Privoxy developers, and also a
+Tor fan. He's the reason Tor and Privoxy still work well together.</dd>
+<dt>Julius Mittenzwei</dt><dd>A lawyer with the CCC in
+Germany. Coordinates the German Tor community with respect to legal
+questions and concerns.</dd>
+<dt>Shava Nerad</dt><dd>Our former Development Director.  She works on PR and community relations.</dd>
+<dt>Lasse Øverlier</dt><dd>Writes research papers on Tor: attacks,
+defenses, and resource management, especially for hidden services.</dd>
+<dt>Martin Peck and Kyle Williams</dt><dd>Developers for
+JanusVM, a VMWare-based
+transparent Tor proxy that makes Tor easier to set up and use.</dd>
+<dt>Steve Topletz</dt><dd>Developer for Torpark (now called Xerobank
+Browser), a preconfigured Tor+Firefox bundle for Windows.</dd>
+<dt>Tup (a pseudonym -- he's managed to stay anonymous even from
+us!)</dt><dd>Periodically adds new features for making Tor more
+transparent to use. Also maintains the <a
+href="http://p56soo2ibjkx23xo.onion/";>TorDNSEL code</a>.</dd>
+<dt>Ethan Zuckerman</dt><dd>A blogger who has written some
+<a href="http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/?p=1019";>interesting</a>
+<a href="http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/tools/guide/";>tutorials</a>
+for how, when, and whether to use Tor. He also teaches activists around
+the world about Tor and related tools.</dd>
+<dt>All our relay operators, people who write <a
+href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/";>research papers</a> about Tor,
+people who teach others about Tor, etc.</dt>
+</dl>
+
+<a id="GSoC"></a>
+<a id="Past"></a>
+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#Past">Aikaisemmille työntekijöille kiitokset:</a></h3>
+
+<dl>
+<dt>Benedikt Boss</dt><dd>Worked during the 2007 Google Summer of Code on <a
+href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/topf/trunk/README";>TOPF</a>,
+a fuzzer for Tor; mentored by Roger.</dd>
+<dt>Ren Bucholz</dt><dd>Our fine logo and images.</dd>
+<dt>Pat Double</dt><dd>Creator of the Incognito LiveCD.</dd>
+<dt>Justin Hipple</dt><dd>The other developer for Vidalia.</dd>
+<dt>Christian King</dt><dd> Worked during the 2007 Google Summer of Code
+on making Tor relays stable on
+Windows, by developing a <a
+href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/libevent-urz/trunk/README";>buffer
+implementation for libevent</a>; mentored by Nick.</dd>
+<dt>Joe Kowalski</dt><dd>Original author and provider of the torstatus
+script formerly run on nighteffect.</dd>
+<dt>Adam Langley</dt><dd>Our fine eventdns code.</dd>
+<dt>Rebecca McKinnon</dt><dd>Former Director of Tor.  Co-Founder of <a
+href="http://www.globalvoicesonline.org/";>Global Voices Online</a>.</dd>
+<dt>Matej Pfajfar</dt><dd>Author of the original onion routing code that
+Tor is based on, so we didn't have to start from scratch.</dd>
+<dt>Johannes Renner</dt><dd> Worked during the 2007 Google Summer of
+Code on modifying <a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/svn/torflow/README";>TorFlow</a>
+to measure various properties of the Tor network; mentored by Mike
+Perry.</dd>
+<dt>Scott Squires</dt><dd>Alkuperäinen kehittäjä lisäosalle <a
+href="https://torbutton.torproject.org/";>Torbutton</a>.</dd>
+</dl>
+
+<p>Please don't contact us individually about Tor topics &mdash; if
+you have a problem or question, please look through the <a href="<page
+contact>">contact page</a> for appropriate addresses.</p>
+
+  </div><!-- #main -->
+
+#include <foot.wmi>
+

Added: website/trunk/fi/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/fi/volunteer.wml	                        (rev 0)
+++ website/trunk/fi/volunteer.wml	2008-06-28 13:21:34 UTC (rev 15549)
@@ -0,0 +1,1173 @@
+## translation metadata
+# Based-On-Revision: 15123
+# Last-Translator: djhasis(at)gmail.com
+
+#include "head.wmi" TITLE="Tor: Auta" CHARSET="UTF-8"
+
+<div class="main-column">
+
+<!-- PUT CONTENT AFTER THIS TAG -->
+<h2>A few things everyone can do now:</h2>
+<ol>
+<li>Please consider <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-relay>">running
+a relay</a> to help the Tor network grow.</li>
+<li>Tell your friends! Get them to run relays. Get them to run hidden
+services. Get them to tell their friends.</li>
+<li>If you like Tor's goals, please <a href="<page donate>">take a moment
+to donate to support further Tor development</a>. We're also looking
+for more sponsors &mdash; if you know any companies, NGOs, agencies,
+or other organizations that want anonymity / privacy / communications
+security, let them know about us.</li>
+<li>We're looking for more <a href="<page torusers>">good examples of Tor
+users and Tor use cases</a>. If you use Tor for a scenario or purpose not
+yet described on that page, and you're comfortable sharing it with us,
+we'd love to hear from you.</li>
+</ol>
+
+<a id="Usability"></a>
+<h2><a class="anchor" href="#Usability">Supporting Applications</a></h2>
+<ol>
+<li>We need more good ways to intercept DNS requests so they don't "leak" their
+request to a local observer while we're trying to be anonymous. (This
+happens because the application does the DNS resolve before going to
+the SOCKS proxy.)</li>
+<li>Tsocks/dsocks items:
+<ul>
+<li>We need to <a
+href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TSocksPatches";>apply
+all our tsocks patches</a> and maintain a new fork. We'll host it if
+you want.</li>
+<li>We should patch Dug Song's "dsocks" program to use Tor's
+<i>mapaddress</i> commands from the controller interface, so we
+don't waste a whole round-trip inside Tor doing the resolve before
+connecting.</li>
+<li>We need to make our <i>torify</i> script detect which of tsocks or
+dsocks is installed, and call them appropriately. This probably means
+unifying their interfaces, and might involve sharing code between them
+or discarding one entirely.</li>
+</ul>
+</li>
+<li>People running relays tell us they want to have one BandwidthRate
+during some part of the day, and a different BandwidthRate at other
+parts of the day. Rather than coding this inside Tor, we should have a
+little script that speaks via the <a href="<page gui/index>">Tor
+Controller Interface</a>, and does a setconf to change the bandwidth
+rate. There is one for Unix and Mac already (it uses bash and cron),
+but Windows users still need a solution.
+</li>
+<li>Tor can <a
+href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#ChooseEntryExit";>exit
+the Tor network from a particular exit node</a>, but we should be able
+to specify just a country and have something automatically pick. The
+best bet is to fetch Blossom's directory also, and run a local Blossom
+client that fetches this directory securely (via Tor and checking its
+signature), intercepts <tt>.country.blossom</tt> hostnames, and does
+the right thing.</li>
+<li>Speaking of geolocation data, somebody should draw a map of the Earth
+with a pin-point for each Tor relay. Bonus points if it updates as the
+network grows and changes. Unfortunately, the easy ways to do this involve
+sending all the data to Google and having them draw the map for you. How
+much does this impact privacy, and do we have any other good options?</li>
+</ol>
+
+<a id="Documentation"></a>
+<h2><a class="anchor" href="#Documentation">Documentation</a></h2>
+<ol>
+<li>Please help Matt Edman with the documentation and how-tos for his
+Tor controller,
+<a href="http://vidalia-project.net/";>Vidalia</a>.</li>
+<li>Evaluate and document
+<a href="https://wiki.torproject.org/wiki/TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO";>our
+list of programs</a> that can be configured to use Tor.</li>
+<li>We need better documentation for dynamically intercepting
+connections and sending them through Tor. tsocks (Linux), dsocks (BSD),
+and freecap (Windows) seem to be good candidates, as would better
+use of our new TransPort feature.</li>
+<li>We have a huge list of <a href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/SupportPrograms";>potentially useful
+programs that interface to Tor</a>. Which ones are useful in which
+situations? Please help us test them out and document your results.</li>
+<li>Help translate the web page and documentation into other
+languages. See the <a href="<page translation>">translation
+guidelines</a> if you want to help out. We especially need Arabic or
+Farsi translations, for the many Tor users in censored areas.</li>
+</ol>
+
+<a id="Coding"></a>
+<a id="Summer"></a>
+<a id="Projects"></a>
+<h2><a class="anchor" href="#Projects">Good Coding Projects</a></h2>
+
+<p>
+You may find some of these projects to be good <a href="<page
+gsoc>">Google Summer of Code 2008</a> ideas. We have labelled each idea
+with how useful it would be to the overall Tor project
+(priority), how much work we expect it would be (effort level), how much
+clue you should start with (skill level), and which of our <a href="<page
+people>#Core">core developers</a> would be good mentors. There are plenty
+of other good ideas to work on too &mdash; see for example the <a
+href="<svnsandbox>doc/spec/proposals/">current proposals</a> list, or
+just make up your own ideas.
+</p>
+
+<ol>
+
+<li>
+<b>Tor Exit Scanner improvements</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Mike</i>
+<br />
+Applications as of 1 Apr 00:00 UTC: <i>5</i>
+<br />
+The Tor exit node scanner 'SoaT', part of the <a
+href="<svnsandbox>torflow/">Torflow project</a>, makes connections out
+of each Tor exit node and compares the content it gets back with what it
+"should" get back. The goal is to notice misconfigured, broken, and even
+malicious exit relays. Alas, the code is
+currently written in rather rickety perl and relies on MD5sums of
+entire documents in order to determine if exit nodes are modifying
+content. The problem with this is threefold: 1) Perl sucks at life.
+2) The scanner can't verify pages that are dynamic, and attackers can
+focus malicious content injection on only those dynamic pages. 3)
+Pages change after a while (or based on GeoIP) and begin generating
+false positives.
+<br />
+Ideally, soat.pl would be reimplemented in a sane language with a
+robust html parser library (since the rest of Torflow is in Python
+that would be nice, but it is not required), and calculate signatures only for
+tags and content likely to be targeted by a malicious attacker (script
+tags, object links, images, css). It should also be robust in the face of
+changes to content outside of Tor, and ultimately even GeoIP localized
+content.
+<br />
+This scanner would likely be run by the Directory Authorities and
+report its results to the control port via the AuthDirBadExit config
+setting.
+<br />
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Tor Node Scanner improvements</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Mike</i>
+<br />
+Applications as of 1 Apr 00:00 UTC: <i>1</i>
+<br />
+Similar to the exit scanner (or perhaps even during exit scanning),
+statistics can be gathered about the reliability of nodes. Nodes that
+fail too high a percentage of their circuits should not be given
+Guard status. Perhaps they should have their reported bandwidth
+penalized by some ratio as well, or just get marked as Invalid. In
+addition, nodes that exhibit a very low average stream capacity but
+advertise a very high node bandwidth can also be marked as Invalid.
+Much of this statistics gathering is already done, it just needs to be
+transformed into something that can be reported to the Directory
+Authorities to blacklist/penalize nodes in such a way that clients
+will listen.
+<br />
+In addition, these same statistics can be gathered about the traffic
+through a node. Events can be added to the <a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/svn/torctl/doc/howto.txt";>Tor Control
+Protocol</a> to
+report if a circuit extend attempt through the node succeeds or fails, and
+passive statistics can be gathered on both bandwidth and reliability
+of other nodes via a node-based monitor using these events. Such a
+scanner would also report information on oddly-behaving nodes to
+the Directory Authorities, but a communication channel for this
+currently does not exist and would need to be developed as well.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Help track the overall Tor Network status</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Roger, Nick, Mike</i>
+<br />
+It would be great to set up an automated system for tracking network
+health over time, graphing it, etc. Part of this project would involve
+inventing better metrics for assessing network health and growth. Is the
+average uptime of the network increasing? How many relays are qualifying
+for Guard status this month compared to last month? What's the turnover
+in terms of new relays showing up and relays shutting off? Periodically
+people collect brief snapshots, but where it gets really interesting is
+when we start tracking data points over time.
+<br />
+Data could be collected from the "Tor Node Scanner" item above, from
+the server descriptors that each relay publishes, and from other
+sources. Results over time could be integrated into one of the <a
+href="https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/";>Tor Status</a> web pages, or be
+kept separate. Speaking of the Tor Status pages, take a look at Roger's
+<a href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Jan-2008/msg00300.html";>Tor
+Status wish list</a>.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Tor path selection improvements</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Low to Medium</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Roger, Nick, Mike</i>
+<br />
+Applications as of 1 Apr 00:00 UTC: <i>3</i>
+<br />
+Some simple improvements can be made to Tor's path selection to vastly
+improve Tor speed. For instance, some of the (unofficial) <a
+href="http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/FireFoxTorPerf";>Tor
+Performance Recommendations</a> on the wiki are to increase the number of
+guards and decrease the CircuitBuildTimeout. Ideally, the client would
+<a href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Feb-2008/msg00012.html";>learn
+these values by gathering statistics on circuit construction
+time</a> (and/or using values gained from Torflow), and set the timeouts
+low enough such that some high percentile (75%, 90%, 1-stddev?) of
+circuits succeed, yet extremely slow nodes are avoided. This would
+involve some statistics gathering+basic research, and some changes to
+Tor path selection code.
+<br />
+In addition, to improve path security, some elements from the <a
+href="http://www.torproject.org/svn/trunk/doc/spec/proposals/115-two-hop-paths.txt";>Two
+Hop Paths proposal</a> could be done as part of this (since it will
+likely touch the same code anyways), regardless of the adoption of
+that proposal. In particular, clients probably should avoid guards that
+seem to fail an excessive percentage of their circuits through them,
+and non-firewalled clients should issue a warning if they are only able
+to connect to a limited set of guard nodes. See also
+<a href="http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Feb-2008/msg00003.html";>this
+or-dev post</a>.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Translation Wiki</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Jacob</i>
+<br />
+We need a way to edit and translate sections of the website. Currently
+the website is made up of a bunch of <a href="<svnwebsite>en/">wml
+files</a>, and <a href="<page translation>">translators</a> fetch these
+wml files, translate them in an editor, and either send us the translation
+or use svn to commit them back. The current "cost" of publication of
+website changes is quite high even for English language users. For a
+single word change or any type of
+minor change, the page may never be corrected or translated. It would
+be nice to have a wiki that was specifically geared towards translation
+and would somehow track the upstream (English) versions to indicate when
+a fresh translation is needed, like our current
+<a href="<page translation-status>">translation status page</a>. This
+seems mostly like a job for a wiki
+integrator or wiki software author. Certainly the person would need to
+be interested in human languages and translation. They should at least
+be minimally familiar with what Tor is; but they would not have to interact
+with the software, only the documentation and the website.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Better Debian/Ubuntu Packaging for Tor+Vidalia</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Peter, Matt</i>
+<br />
+Applications as of 1 Apr 00:00 UTC: <i>1</i>
+<br />
+Vidalia currently doesn't play nicely on Debian and Ubuntu with the
+default Tor packages. The current Tor packages automatically start Tor
+as a daemon running as the debian-tor user and (sensibly) do not have a
+<a href="<svnsandbox>doc/spec/control-spec.txt">ControlPort</a> defined
+in the default torrc. Consequently, Vidalia will try
+to start its own Tor process since it could not connect to the existing
+Tor, and Vidalia's Tor process will then exit with an error message
+the user likely doesn't understand since Tor cannot bind its listening
+ports &mdash; they're already in use by the original Tor daemon.
+<br />
+The current solution involves either telling the user to stop the
+existing Tor daemon and let Vidalia start its own Tor process, or
+explaining to the user how to set a control port and password in their
+torrc. A better solution on Debian would be to use Tor's ControlSocket,
+which allows Vidalia to talk to Tor via a Unix domain socket, and could
+possibly be enabled by default in Tor's Debian packages. Vidalia can
+then authenticate to Tor using filesystem-based (cookie) authentication
+if the user running Vidalia is also in the debian-tor group.
+<br />
+This project will first involve adding support for Tor's ControlSocket
+to Vidalia. The student will then develop and test Debian and Ubuntu
+packages for Vidalia that conform to Debian's packaging standards and
+make sure they work well with the existing Tor packages. We can also
+set up an apt repository to host the new Vidalia packages.
+<br />
+The next challenge would be to find an intuitive usable way for Vidalia
+to be able to change Tor's configuration (torrc) even though it is
+located in <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code> and thus immutable. The best
+idea we've come up with so far is to feed Tor a new configuration via
+the ControlSocket when Vidalia starts, but that's bad because Tor starts
+each boot with a different configuration than the user wants. The second
+best idea
+we've come up with is for Vidalia to write out a temporary torrc file
+and ask the user to manually move it to <code>/etc/tor/torrc</code>,
+but that's bad because users shouldn't have to mess with files directly.
+<br />
+A student undertaking this project should have prior knowledge of
+Debian package management and some C++ development experience. Previous
+experience with Qt is helpful, but not required.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Improving Tor's ability to resist censorship</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Nick</i>
+<br />
+The Tor 0.2.0.x series makes <a
+href="<svnsandbox>doc/design-paper/blocking.html">significant
+improvements</a> in resisting national and organizational censorship.
+But Tor still needs better mechanisms for some parts of its
+anti-censorship design.  For example, current Tors can only listen on a
+single address/port combination at a time.  There's
+<a href="<svnsandbox>doc/spec/proposals/118-multiple-orports.txt">a
+proposal to address this limitation</a> and allow clients to connect
+to any given Tor on multiple addresses and ports, but it needs more
+work.  Another anti-censorship project (far more difficult) is to try
+to make Tor more scanning-resistant.  Right now, an adversary can identify
+<a href="<svnsandbox>doc/spec/proposals/125-bridges.txt">Tor bridges</a>
+just by trying to connect to them, following the Tor protocol, and
+seeing if they respond.  To solve this, bridges could
+<a href="<svnsandbox>doc/design-paper/blocking.html#tth_sEc9.3">act like
+webservers</a> (HTTP or HTTPS) when contacted by port-scanning tools,
+and not act like bridges until the user provides a bridge-specific key.
+<br />
+This project involves a lot of research and design. One of the big
+challenges will be identifying and crafting approaches that can still
+resist an adversary even after the adversary knows the design, and
+then trading off censorship resistance with usability and robustness.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Tor/Polipo/Vidalia Auto-Update Framework</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Matt, Jacob</i>
+<br />
+We're in need of a good authenticated-update framework.
+Vidalia already has the ability to notice when the user is running an
+outdated or unrecommended version of Tor, using signed statements inside
+the Tor directory information. Currently, Vidalia simply pops
+up a little message box that lets the user know they should manually
+upgrade. The goal of this project would be to extend Vidalia with the
+ability to also fetch and install the updated Tor software for the
+user. We should do the fetches via Tor when possible, but also fall back
+to direct fetches in a smart way. Time permitting, we would also like
+to be able to update other
+applications included in the bundled installers, such as Polipo and
+Vidalia itself.
+<br />
+To complete this project, the student will first need to first investigate
+the existing auto-update frameworks (e.g., Sparkle on OS X) to evaluate
+their strengths, weaknesses, security properties, and ability to be
+integrated into Vidalia. If none are found to be suitable, the student
+will design their own auto-update framework, document the design, and
+then discuss the design with other developers to assess any security
+issues. The student will then implement their framework (or integrate
+an existing one) and test it.
+<br />
+A student undertaking this project should have good C++ development
+experience. Previous experience with Qt is helpful, but not required. The
+student should also have a good understanding of common security
+practices, such as package signature verification. Good writing ability
+is also important for this project, since a vital step of the project
+will be producing a design document for others to review and discuss
+with the student prior to implementation.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>An Improved and More Usable Network Map in Vidalia</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Matt</i>
+<br />
+One of Vidalia's existing features is a network map that shows the user
+the approximate geographic location of relays in the Tor network and
+plots the paths the user's traffic takes as it is tunneled through the
+Tor network. The map is currently not very interactive and has rather
+poor graphics. Instead, we would like to leverage KDE's Marble widget
+that gives us a better quality map and enables improved interactivity,
+such as allowing the user to click on individual relays or circuits to
+display additional information. We might also consider adding the ability
+for users to click on a particular relay or a country containing one or
+more Tor exit relays and say, "I want my connections to foo.com to exit
+from here."
+<br />
+This project will first involve the student getting familiar with Vidalia
+and the Marble widget's API. The student will then integrate the widget
+into Vidalia and customize Marble to be better suited for our application,
+such as making circuits clickable, storing cached map data in Vidalia's
+own data directory, and customizing some of the widget's dialogs.
+<br />
+A student undertaking this project should have good C++ development
+experience. Previous experience with Qt and CMake is helpful, but not
+required.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Tor Controller Status Event Interface</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Matt, Roger</i>
+<br />
+There are a number of status changes inside Tor of which the user may need
+to be informed. For example, if the user is trying to set up his Tor as a
+relay and Tor decides that its ports are not reachable from outside
+the user's network, we should alert the user. Currently, all the user
+gets is a couple log messages in Vidalia's 'message log' window, which they
+likely never see since they don't receive a notification that something
+has gone wrong. Even if the user does actually look at the message log,
+most of the messages make little sense to the novice user.
+<br />
+Tor has the ability to inform Vidalia of many such status changes, and
+we recently implemented support for a couple of these events. Still,
+there are many more status events the user should be informed of and we
+need a better UI for actually displaying them to the user.
+<br />
+The goal of this project then is to design and implement a UI for
+displaying Tor status events to the user. For example, we might put a
+little badge on Vidalia's tray icon that alerts the user to new status
+events they should look at. Double-clicking the icon could bring up a
+dialog that summarizes recent status events in simple terms and maybe
+suggests a remedy for any negative events if they can be corrected by
+the user. Of course, this is just an example and the student is free to
+suggest another approach.
+<br />
+A student undertaking this project should have good UI design and layout
+and some C++ development experience. Previous experience with Qt and
+Qt's Designer will be very helpful, but are not required. Some
+English writing ability will also be useful, since this project will
+likely involve writing small amounts of help documentation that should
+be understandable by non-technical users. Bonus points for some graphic
+design/Photoshop fu, since we might want/need some shiny new icons too.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Improvements on our active browser configuration tester</b> -
+<a href="https://check.torproject.org/";>https://check.torproject.org/</a>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Low</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Low to Medium</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Jacob, Steven</i>
+<br />
+Applications as of 1 Apr 00:00 UTC: <i>1</i>
+<br />
+We currently have a functional web page to detect if Tor is working. It
+has a few places where it falls short. It requires improvements with
+regard to default languages and functionality. It currently only responds
+in English. In addition, it is a hack of a perl script that should have
+never seen the light of day. It should probably be rewritten in python
+with multi-lingual support in mind. It currently uses the <a
+href="http://exitlist.torproject.org/";>Tor DNS exit list</a>
+and should continue to do so in the future. It currently result in certain
+false positives and these should be discovered, documented, and fixed
+where possible. Anyone working on this project should be interested in
+DNS, basic perl or preferably python programming skills, and will have
+to interact minimally with Tor to test their code.
+<br />
+If you want to make the project more exciting
+and involve more design and coding, take a look at <a
+href="<svnsandbox>doc/spec/proposals/131-verify-tor-usage.txt">proposal
+131-verify-tor-usage.txt</a>.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Improvements on our DNS Exit List service</b> -
+<a href="http://exitlist.torproject.org/";>http://exitlist.torproject.org/</a>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Low</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Low</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Jacob, Tup</i>
+<br />
+The <a href="http://p56soo2ibjkx23xo.onion/";>exitlist software</a>
+is written by our fabulous anonymous
+contributer Tup. It's a DNS server written in Haskell that supports part of our <a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/svn/trunk/doc/contrib/torel-design.txt";>exitlist
+design document</a>. Currently, it is functional and it is used by
+check.torproject.org and other users. The issues that are outstanding
+are mostly aesthetic. This wonderful service could use a much better
+website using the common Tor theme. It would be best served with better
+documentation for common services that use an RBL. It could use more
+publicity. A person working on this project should be interested in DNS,
+basic RBL configuration for popular services, and writing documentation.
+The person would require minimal Tor interaction &mdash; testing their
+own documentation at the very least. Furthermore, it would be useful
+if they were interested in Haskell and wanted to implement more of the
+torel-design.txt suggestions.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Testing integration of Tor with web browsers for our end users</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Jacob, Mike, Greg</i>
+<br />
+Applications as of 1 Apr 00:00 UTC: <i>1</i>
+<br />
+The Tor project currently lacks a solid test suite to ensure that a
+user has a properly and safely configured web browser. It should test for as
+many known issues as possible. It should attempt to decloak the
+user in any way possible. Two current webpages that track these
+kinds of issues are run by Greg Fleischer and HD Moore. Greg keeps a nice <a
+href="http://pseudo-flaw.net/tor/torbutton/";>list of issues along
+with their proof of concept code, bug issues, etc</a>. HD Moore runs
+the <a href="http://metasploit.com/research/projects/decloak/";>metasploit
+decloak website</a>. A student interested in defending Tor could start
+by collecting as many workable and known methods for decloaking a
+Tor user. (<a href="https://torcheck.xenobite.eu/";>This page</a> may
+be helpful as a start.) The student should be familiar with the common
+pitfalls but
+possibly have new methods in mind for implementing decloaking issues. The
+website should ensure that it tells a user what their problem is. It
+should help them to fix the problem or direct them to the proper support
+channels. The student should be closely familiar with using Tor and how
+to prevent Tor information leakage.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Libevent and Tor integration improvements</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Nick</i>
+<br />
+Tor should make better use of the more recent features of Niels
+Provos's <a href="http://monkey.org/~provos/libevent/";>Libevent</a>
+library.  Tor already uses Libevent for its low-level asynchronous IO
+calls, and could also use Libevent's increasingly good implementations
+of network buffers and of HTTP.  This wouldn't be simply a matter of
+replacing Tor's internal calls with calls to Libevent: instead, we'll
+need to refactor Tor to use Libevent calls that do not follow the
+same models as Tor's existing backends. Also, we'll need to add
+missing functionality to Libevent as needed &mdash; most difficult likely
+will be adding OpenSSL support on top of Libevent's buffer abstraction.
+Also tricky will be adding rate-limiting to Libevent.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Tuneup Tor!</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Nick, Roger, Mike</i>
+<br />
+Right now, Tor relays measure and report their own bandwidth, and Tor
+clients choose which relays to use in part based on that bandwidth.
+This approach is vulnerable to
+<a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#bauer:wpes2007";>attacks where
+relays lie about their bandwidth</a>;
+to address this, Tor currently caps the maximum bandwidth
+it's willing to believe any relay provides.  This is a limited fix, and
+a waste of bandwidth capacity to boot.  Instead,
+Tor should possibly measure bandwidth in a more distributed way, perhaps
+as described in the
+<a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/author.html#snader08";>"A Tune-up for
+Tor"</a> paper
+by Snader and Borisov. A student could use current testing code to
+double-check this paper's findings and verify the extent to which they
+dovetail with Tor as deployed in the wild, and determine good ways to
+incorporate them into their suggestions Tor network without adding too
+much communications overhead between relays and directory
+authorities.
+</li>
+
+<!--
+<li>
+<b>Improving the Tor QA process: Continuous Integration for Windows builds</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Jacob, Andrew</i>
+<br />
+It would be useful to have automated build processes for Windows and
+probably other platforms. The purpose of having a continuous integration
+build environment is to ensure that Windows isn't left behind for any of
+the software projects used in the Tor project or its accompanying.<br />
+Buildbot may be a good choice for this as it appears to support all of
+the platforms Tor does. See the
+<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BuildBot";>wikipedia entry for
+buildbot</a>.<br />
+There may be better options and the person undertaking this task should
+evaluate other options. Any person working on this automatic build
+process should have experience or be willing to learn how to build all
+of the respective Tor related code bases from scratch. Furthermore, the
+person should have some experience building software in Windows
+environments as this is the target audience we want to ensure we do not
+leave behind. It would require close work with the Tor source code but
+probably only in the form of building, not authoring.<br />
+Additionally, we need to automate our performance testing for all platforms.
+We've got buildbot (except on Windows &mdash; as noted above) to automate
+our regular integration and compile testing already,
+but we need to get our network simulation tests (as built in torflow)
+updated for more recent versions of Tor, and designed to launch a test
+network either on a single machine, or across several, so we can test
+changes in performance on machines in different roles automatically.
+</li>
+-->
+
+<li>
+<b>Improve our unit testing process</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Nick</i>
+<br />
+Tor needs to be far more tested. This is a multi-part effort. To start
+with, our unit test coverage should rise substantially, especially in
+the areas outside the utility functions. This will require significant
+refactoring of some parts of Tor, in order to dissociate as much logic
+as possible from globals.
+<br />
+Additionally, we need to automate our performance testing. We've got
+buildbot to automate our regular integration and compile testing already
+(though we need somebody to set it up on Windows),
+but we need to get our network simulation tests (as built in TorFlow: see
+the "Tor Node Scanner improvements" item)
+updated for more recent versions of Tor, and designed to launch a test
+network either on a single machine, or across several, so we can test
+changes in performance on machines in different roles automatically.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Help revive an independent Tor client implementation</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Karsten, Nick</i>
+<br />
+Applications as of 1 Apr 00::00 UTC: <i>4</i>
+<br />
+Reanimate one of the approaches to implement a Tor client in Java,
+e.g. the <a href="http://onioncoffee.sourceforge.net/";>OnionCoffee
+project</a>, and make it run on <a
+href="http://code.google.com/android/";>Android</a>. The first step
+would be to port the existing code and execute it in an Android
+environment. Next, the code should be updated to support the newer Tor
+protocol versions like the <a href="<svnsandbox>doc/spec/dir-spec.txt">v3
+directory protocol</a>. Further, support for requesting or even
+providing Tor hidden services would be neat, but not required.
+<br />
+The student should be able to understand and write new Java code, including
+a Java cryptography API. Being able to read C code would be helpful,
+too. The student should be willing to read the existing documentation,
+implement code based on it, and refine the documentation
+when things are underdocumented. This project is mostly about coding and
+to a small degree about design.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Automatic system tests and automatically starting private Tor networks</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Karsten, Nick, Roger</i>
+<br />
+Applications as of 1 Apr 00:00 UTC: <i>2</i>
+<br />
+Write a tool that runs automatic system tests in addition
+to the existing unit tests. The Java-based Tor simulator <a
+href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/puppetor/trunk/";>PuppeTor</a>
+might be a good start for starting up a private Tor network, using it
+for a while, and verifying that at least parts of it are working. This
+project requires to conceive a blueprint for performing system tests
+of private Tor networks, before starting to code. Typical types of
+tests range from performing single requests over the private network to
+manipulating exchanged messages and see if nodes handle corrupt messages
+appropriately.
+<br />
+The student should be able to obtain a good understanding
+of how Tor works and what problems and bugs could arise to design good
+test cases. Understanding the existing Tor code structure and documentation is
+vital. If PuppeTor is used, the student should also be able to understand
+and possibly extend an existing Java application. This project is partly
+about design and partly about coding.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Bring moniTor to life</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Low to Medium</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Karsten, Jacob</i>
+<br />
+Applications as of 1 Apr 00::00 UTC: <i>2</i>
+<br />
+Implement a <a href="http://www.ss64.com/bash/top.html";>top-like</a>
+management tool for Tor relays. The purpose of such a tool would be
+to monitor a local Tor relay via its control port and include useful
+system information of the underlying machine. When running this tool, it
+would dynamically update its content like top does for Linux processes.
+<a href="http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Jan-2008/msg00005.html";>This
+or-dev post</a> might be a good first read.
+<br />
+The student should be familiar
+with or willing to learn about administering a Tor relay and configuring
+it via its control port. As an initial prototype is written in Python,
+some knowledge about writing Python code would be helpful, too. This
+project is one part about identifying requirements to such a
+tool and designing its interface, and one part lots of coding.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Torbutton improvements</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>High</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Mike</i>
+<br/>
+Torbutton has a number of improvements that can be made in the post-1.2
+timeframe. Most of these are documented as feature requests in the <a
+href="https://bugs.torproject.org/flyspray/index.php?tasks=all&amp;project=5";>Torbutton
+flyspray section</a>. Good examples include: stripping off node.exit on http
+headers, more fine-grained control over formfill blocking, improved referrer
+spoofing based on the domain of the site (a-la <a
+href="https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/953";>refcontrol extension</a>),
+tighter integration with Vidalia for reporting Tor status, a New Identity
+button with Tor integration and multiple identity management, and anything
+else you might think of.
+<br />
+This work would be independent coding in Javascript and the fun world of <a
+href="http://www.mozilla.org/keymaster/gatekeeper/there.is.only.xul";>XUL</a>,
+with not too much involvement in the Tor internals.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Porting Polipo to Windows</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Andrew, Steven, Roger</i>
+<br />
+Help port <a
+href="http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~jch/software/polipo/";>Polipo</a> to
+Windows. Example topics to tackle include:
+1) handle spaces in path names and understand the filesystem
+namespace &mdash; that is, where application data, personal data,
+and program data typically reside in various versions of Windows. 2) the
+ability to handle ipv6 communications. 3) the ability to asynchronously
+query name servers, find the system nameservers, and manage netbios
+and dns queries. 4) use native regex capabilities of Windows, rather
+than using 3rd party GNU regex libraries. 5) manage events and buffers
+natively (i.e. in Unix-like OSes, Polipo defaults to 25% of ram, in
+Windows it's whatever the config specifies). 6) some sort of GUI config
+and reporting tool, bonus if it has a systray icon with right clickable
+menu options. Double bonus if it's cross-platform compatible.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Make our diagrams beautiful and automated</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Low</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Low</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Andrew</i>
+<br />
+We need a way to generate the website diagrams (for example, the "How
+Tor Works" pictures on the <a href="<page overview>">overview page</a>
+from source, so we can translate them as UTF-8 text rather than edit
+them by hand with Gimp. We might want to
+integrate this as an wml file so translations are easy and images are
+generated in multiple languages whenever we build the website. See the
+"Translation Wiki" idea above.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Improve the LiveCD offerings for the Tor community</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Low</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Low</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Anonym, Jacob, Roger</i>
+<br />
+How can we make the <a
+href="http://anonymityanywhere.com/incognito/";>Incognito LiveCD</a>
+easier to maintain, improve, and document?
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Rework and extend Blossom</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium to High</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Goodell</i>
+<br />
+Rework and extend Blossom (a tool for monitoring and
+selecting appropriate Tor circuits based upon exit node requirements
+specified by the user) to gather data in a self-contained way, with
+parameters easily configurable by the user.  Blossom is presently
+implemented as a single Python script that interfaces with Tor using the
+Controller interface and depends upon metadata about Tor nodes obtained
+via external processes, such as a webpage indicating status of the nodes
+plus publically available data from DNS, whois, etc.  This project has
+two parts: (1) Determine which additional metadata may be useful and
+rework Blossom so that it cleanly obtains the metadata on its own rather
+than depend upon external scripts (this may, for example, involve
+additional threads or inter-process communication), and (2) develop a
+means by which the user can easily configure Blossom, starting with a
+configuration file and possibly working up to a web configuration engine.
+Knowledge of Tor and Python are important; knowledge of
+TCP, interprocess communication, and Perl will also be helpful.  An
+interest in network neutrality is important as well, since the
+principles of evaluating and understanding internet inconsistency are at
+the core of the Blossom effort.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Improve Blossom: Allow users to qualitatively describe exit nodes they desire</b>
+<br />
+Priority: <i>Low</i>
+<br />
+Effort Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Skill Level: <i>Medium</i>
+<br />
+Likely Mentors: <i>Goodell</i>
+<br />
+Develop and implement a means of affording Blossom
+users the ability to qualitatively describe the exit node that they
+want.  The Internet is an inconsistent place: some Tor exit nodes see
+the world differently than others.  As presently implemented, Blossom (a
+tool for monitoring and selecting appropriate Tor circuits based upon
+exit node requirements specified by the user) lacks a sufficiently rich
+language to describe how the different vantage points are different.
+For example, some exit nodes may have an upstream network that filters
+certain kinds of traffic or certain websites.  Other exit nodes may
+provide access to special content as a result of their location, perhaps
+as a result of discrimination on the part of the content providers
+themselves.  This project has two parts: (1) develop a language for
+describing characteristics of networks in which exit nodes reside, and
+(2) incorporate this language into Blossom so that users can select Tor
+paths based upon the description.
+Knowledge of Tor and Python are important; knowledge of
+TCP, interprocess communication, and Perl will also be helpful.  An
+interest in network neutrality is important as well, since the
+principles of evaluating and understanding internet inconsistency are at
+the core of the Blossom effort.
+</li>
+
+<li>
+<b>Bring up new ideas!</b>
+<br />
+Don't like any of these? Look at the <a
+href="<svnsandbox>doc/design-paper/roadmap-future.pdf">Tor development
+roadmap</a> for more ideas.
+</li>
+
+</ol>
+
+<h2><a class="anchor" href="#Coding">Coding and Design</a></h2>
+<ol>
+<li>Tor relays don't work well on Windows XP. On
+Windows, Tor uses the standard <tt>select()</tt> system
+call, which uses space in the non-page pool. This means
+that a medium sized Tor relay will empty the non-page pool, <a
+href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/WindowsBufferProblems";>causing
+havoc and system crashes</a>. We should probably be using overlapped IO
+instead. One solution would be to teach <a
+href="http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/";>libevent</a> how to use
+overlapped IO rather than select() on Windows, and then adapt Tor to
+the new libevent interface. Christian King made a
+<a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/libevent-urz/trunk/";>good
+start</a> on this in the summer of 2007.</li>
+<li>We need to actually start building our <a href="<page
+documentation>#DesignDoc">blocking-resistance design</a>. This involves
+fleshing out the design, modifying many different pieces of Tor, adapting
+<a href="http://vidalia-project.net/";>Vidalia</a> so it supports the
+new features, and planning for deployment.</li>
+<li>We need a flexible simulator framework for studying end-to-end
+traffic confirmation attacks. Many researchers have whipped up ad hoc
+simulators to support their intuition either that the attacks work
+really well or that some defense works great. Can we build a simulator
+that's clearly documented and open enough that everybody knows it's
+giving a reasonable answer? This will spur a lot of new research.
+See the entry <a href="#Research">below</a> on confirmation attacks for
+details on the research side of this task &mdash; who knows, when it's
+done maybe you can help write a paper or three also.</li>
+<li>Tor 0.1.1.x and later include support for hardware crypto accelerators
+via OpenSSL. Nobody has ever tested it, though. Does somebody want to get
+a card and let us know how it goes?</li>
+<li>Perform a security analysis of Tor with <a
+href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fuzz_testing";>"fuzz"</a>. Determine
+if there are good fuzzing libraries out there for what we want. Win fame by
+getting credit when we put out a new release because of you!</li>
+<li>Tor uses TCP for transport and TLS for link
+encryption. This is nice and simple, but it means all cells
+on a link are delayed when a single packet gets dropped, and
+it means we can only reasonably support TCP streams. We have a <a
+href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#TransportIPnotTCP";>list
+of reasons why we haven't shifted to UDP transport</a>, but it would
+be great to see that list get shorter. We also have a proposed <a
+href="<svnsandbox>doc/spec/proposals/100-tor-spec-udp.txt">specification
+for Tor and
+UDP</a> &mdash; please let us know what's wrong with it.</li>
+<li>We're not that far from having IPv6 support for destination addresses
+(at exit nodes). If you care strongly about IPv6, that's probably the
+first place to start.</li>
+</ol>
+
+<a id="Research"></a>
+<h2><a class="anchor" href="#Research">Research</a></h2>
+<ol>
+<li>The "website fingerprinting attack": make a list of a few
+hundred popular websites, download their pages, and make a set of
+"signatures" for each site. Then observe a Tor client's traffic. As
+you watch him receive data, you quickly approach a guess about which
+(if any) of those sites he is visiting. First, how effective is
+this attack on the deployed Tor codebase? Then start exploring
+defenses: for example, we could change Tor's cell size from 512
+bytes to 1024 bytes, we could employ padding techniques like <a
+href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#timing-fc2004";>defensive dropping</a>,
+or we could add traffic delays. How much of an impact do these have,
+and how much usability impact (using some suitable metric) is there from
+a successful defense in each case?</li>
+<li>The "end-to-end traffic confirmation attack":
+by watching traffic at Alice and at Bob, we can <a
+href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#danezis:pet2004";>compare
+traffic signatures and become convinced that we're watching the same
+stream</a>. So far Tor accepts this as a fact of life and assumes this
+attack is trivial in all cases. First of all, is that actually true? How
+much traffic of what sort of distribution is needed before the adversary
+is confident he has won? Are there scenarios (e.g. not transmitting much)
+that slow down the attack? Do some traffic padding or traffic shaping
+schemes work better than others?</li>
+<li>A related question is: Does running a relay/bridge provide additional
+protection against these timing attacks? Can an external adversary that can't
+see inside TLS links still recognize individual streams reliably?
+Does the amount of traffic carried degrade this ability any? What if the
+client-relay deliberately delayed upstream relayed traffic to create a queue
+that could be used to mimic timings of client downstream traffic to make it
+look like it was also relayed? This same queue could also be used for masking
+timings in client upstream traffic with the techniques from <a
+href="http://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/#ShWa-Timing06";>adaptive padding</a>,
+but without the need for additional traffic. Would such an interleaving of
+client upstream traffic obscure timings for external adversaries? Would the
+strategies need to be adjusted for asymmetric links? For example, on
+asymmetric links, is it actually possible to differentiate client traffic from
+natural bursts due to their asymmetric capacity? Or is it easier than
+symmetric links for some other reason?</li>
+<li>Repeat Murdoch and Danezis's <a
+href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/projects/anon/#torta";>attack from
+Oakland 05</a> on the current Tor network. See if you can learn why it
+works well on some nodes and not well on others. (My theory is that the
+fast nodes with spare capacity resist the attack better.) If that's true,
+then experiment with the RelayBandwidthRate and RelayBandwidthBurst
+options to run a relay that is used as a client while relaying the
+attacker's traffic: as we crank down the RelayBandwidthRate, does the
+attack get harder? What's the right ratio of RelayBandwidthRate to
+actually capacity? Or is it a ratio at all? While we're at it, does a
+much larger set of candidate relays increase the false positive rate
+or other complexity for the attack? (The Tor network is now almost two
+orders of magnitude larger than it was when they wrote their paper.) Be
+sure to read <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue";>Don't
+Clog the Queue</a> too.</li>
+<li>The "routing zones attack": most of the literature thinks of
+the network path between Alice and her entry node (and between the
+exit node and Bob) as a single link on some graph. In practice,
+though, the path traverses many autonomous systems (ASes), and <a
+href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#feamster:wpes2004";>it's not uncommon
+that the same AS appears on both the entry path and the exit path</a>.
+Unfortunately, to accurately predict whether a given Alice, entry,
+exit, Bob quad will be dangerous, we need to download an entire Internet
+routing zone and perform expensive operations on it. Are there practical
+approximations, such as avoiding IP addresses in the same /8 network?</li>
+<li>Other research questions regarding geographic diversity consider
+the tradeoff between choosing an efficient circuit and choosing a random
+circuit. Look at Stephen Rollyson's <a
+href="http://swiki.cc.gatech.edu:8080/ugResearch/uploads/7/ImprovingTor.pdf";>position
+paper</a> on how to discard particularly slow choices without hurting
+anonymity "too much". This line of reasoning needs more work and more
+thinking, but it looks very promising.</li>
+<li>Tor doesn't work very well when relays have asymmetric bandwidth
+(e.g. cable or DSL). Because Tor has separate TCP connections between
+each hop, if the incoming bytes are arriving just fine and the outgoing
+bytes are all getting dropped on the floor, the TCP push-back mechanisms
+don't really transmit this information back to the incoming streams.
+Perhaps Tor should detect when it's dropping a lot of outgoing packets,
+and rate-limit incoming streams to regulate this itself? I can imagine
+a build-up and drop-off scheme where we pick a conservative rate-limit,
+slowly increase it until we get lost packets, back off, repeat. We
+need somebody who's good with networks to simulate this and help design
+solutions; and/or we need to understand the extent of the performance
+degradation, and use this as motivation to reconsider UDP transport.</li>
+<li>A related topic is congestion control. Is our
+current design sufficient once we have heavy use? Maybe
+we should experiment with variable-sized windows rather
+than fixed-size windows? That seemed to go well in an <a
+href="http://www.psc.edu/networking/projects/hpn-ssh/theory.php";>ssh
+throughput experiment</a>. We'll need to measure and tweak, and maybe
+overhaul if the results are good.</li>
+<li>To let dissidents in remote countries use Tor without being blocked
+at their country's firewall, we need a way to get tens of thousands of
+relays, not just a few hundred. We can imagine a Tor client GUI that
+has a "Tor for Freedom" button at the top that opens a port and relays a
+few KB/s of traffic into the Tor network. (A few KB/s shouldn't be too
+much hassle, and there are few abuse issues since they're not being exit
+nodes.) But how do we distribute a list of these volunteer clients to the
+good dissidents in an automated way that doesn't let the country-level
+firewalls intercept and enumerate them? This probably needs to work on a
+human-trust level. See our <a href="<page documentation>#DesignDoc">early
+blocking-resistance design document</a> and our
+<a
+href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#BlockingResistance";>FAQ
+entry</a> on this, and then read the <a
+href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/topic.html#Communications_20Censorship";>censorship
+resistance section of anonbib</a>.</li>
+<li>Our censorship-resistance goals include preventing
+an attacker who's looking at Tor traffic on the wire from <a
+href="https://www.torproject.org/svn/trunk/doc/design-paper/blocking.html#sec:network-fingerprint";>distinguishing
+it from normal SSL traffic</a>. Obviously we can't achieve perfect
+steganography and still remain usable, but for a first step we'd like to
+block any attacks that can win by observing only a few packets. One of
+the remaining attacks we haven't examined much is that Tor cells are 512
+bytes, so the traffic on the wire may well be a multiple of 512 bytes.
+How much does the batching and overhead in TLS records blur this on the
+wire? Do different buffer flushing strategies in Tor affect this? Could
+a bit of padding help a lot, or is this an attack we must accept?</li>
+<li>Tor circuits are built one hop at a time, so in theory we have the
+ability to make some streams exit from the second hop, some from the
+third, and so on. This seems nice because it breaks up the set of exiting
+streams that a given relay can see. But if we want each stream to be safe,
+the "shortest" path should be at least 3 hops long by our current logic, so
+the rest will be even longer. We need to examine this performance / security
+tradeoff.</li>
+<li>It's not that hard to DoS Tor relays or directory authorities. Are client
+puzzles the right answer? What other practical approaches are there? Bonus
+if they're backward-compatible with the current Tor protocol.</li>
+<li>Programs like <a
+href="https://torbutton.torproject.org/dev/";>Torbutton</a> aim to hide
+your browser's UserAgent string by replacing it with a uniform answer for
+every Tor user. That way the attacker can't splinter Tor's anonymity set
+by looking at that header. It tries to pick a string that is commonly used
+by non-Tor users too, so it doesn't stand out. Question one: how badly
+do we hurt ourselves by periodically updating the version of Firefox
+that Torbutton claims to be? If we update it too often, we splinter the
+anonymity sets ourselves. If we don't update it often enough, then all the
+Tor users stand out because they claim to be running a quite old version
+of Firefox. The answer here probably depends on the Firefox versions seen
+in the wild. Question two: periodically people ask us to cycle through N
+UserAgent strings rather than stick with one. Does this approach help,
+hurt, or not matter? Consider: cookies and recognizing Torbutton users
+by their rotating UserAgents; malicious websites who only attack certain
+browsers; and whether the answers to question one impact this answer.
+</li>
+</ol>
+
+<p>
+<a href="<page contact>">Let us know</a> if you've made progress on any
+of these!
+</p>
+
+  </div><!-- #main -->
+
+#include <foot.wmi>
+
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