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[tor-commits] [tor/release-0.3.2] Improve v3 onion service logging for intro and rend points
commit a4f34c1106c5cd14ce3eda3877d41ff2f76ff0dd
Author: teor <teor2345@xxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu Oct 26 16:48:02 2017 +1100
Improve v3 onion service logging for intro and rend points
Diagnostics for #23820.
---
src/or/hs_circuit.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----
src/or/hs_client.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/hs_circuit.c b/src/or/hs_circuit.c
index c8c9b4e56..a23edc36a 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_circuit.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_circuit.c
@@ -343,6 +343,17 @@ send_establish_intro(const hs_service_t *service,
memwipe(payload, 0, sizeof(payload));
}
+/* Return a string constant describing the anonymity of service. */
+static const char *
+get_service_anonymity_string(const hs_service_t *service)
+{
+ if (service->config.is_single_onion) {
+ return "single onion";
+ } else {
+ return "hidden";
+ }
+}
+
/* For a given service, the ntor onion key and a rendezvous cookie, launch a
* circuit to the rendezvous point specified by the link specifiers. On
* success, a circuit identifier is attached to the circuit with the needed
@@ -370,7 +381,15 @@ launch_rendezvous_point_circuit(const hs_service_t *service,
&data->onion_pk,
service->config.is_single_onion);
if (info == NULL) {
- /* We are done here, we can't extend to the rendezvous point. */
+ /* We are done here, we can't extend to the rendezvous point.
+ * If you're running an IPv6-only v3 single onion service on 0.3.2 or with
+ * 0.3.2 clients, and somehow disable the option check, it will fail here.
+ */
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND,
+ "Not enough info to open a circuit to a rendezvous point for "
+ "%s service %s.",
+ get_service_anonymity_string(service),
+ safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
goto end;
}
@@ -392,17 +411,19 @@ launch_rendezvous_point_circuit(const hs_service_t *service,
}
}
if (circ == NULL) {
- log_warn(LD_REND, "Giving up on launching rendezvous circuit to %s "
- "for service %s",
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Giving up on launching a rendezvous circuit to %s "
+ "for %s service %s",
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(info)),
+ get_service_anonymity_string(service),
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
goto end;
}
log_info(LD_REND, "Rendezvous circuit launched to %s with cookie %s "
- "for service %s",
+ "for %s service %s",
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(info)),
safe_str_client(hex_str((const char *) data->rendezvous_cookie,
REND_COOKIE_LEN)),
+ get_service_anonymity_string(service),
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
tor_assert(circ->build_state);
/* Rendezvous circuit have a specific timeout for the time spent on trying
diff --git a/src/or/hs_client.c b/src/or/hs_client.c
index 93a913b34..581aa478e 100644
--- a/src/or/hs_client.c
+++ b/src/or/hs_client.c
@@ -727,15 +727,24 @@ client_get_random_intro(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk)
const hs_descriptor_t *desc;
const hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *enc_data;
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ /* Calculate the onion address for logging purposes */
+ char onion_address[HS_SERVICE_ADDR_LEN_BASE32 + 1];
tor_assert(service_pk);
desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(service_pk);
+ /* Assume the service is v3 if the descriptor is missing. This is ok,
+ * because we only use the address in log messages */
+ hs_build_address(service_pk,
+ desc ? desc->plaintext_data.version : HS_VERSION_THREE,
+ onion_address);
if (desc == NULL || !hs_client_any_intro_points_usable(service_pk,
desc)) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to randomly select an introduction point "
- "because descriptor %s.",
- (desc) ? "doesn't have usable intro point" : "is missing");
+ "for service %s because descriptor %s. We can't connect.",
+ safe_str_client(onion_address),
+ (desc) ? "doesn't have any usable intro points"
+ : "is missing (assuming v3 onion address)");
goto end;
}
@@ -763,6 +772,10 @@ client_get_random_intro(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk)
if (ei == NULL) {
/* We can get here for instance if the intro point is a private address
* and we aren't allowed to extend to those. */
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to select introduction point with auth key %s "
+ "for service %s, because we could not extend to it.",
+ safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key)),
+ safe_str_client(onion_address));
continue;
}
@@ -791,14 +804,20 @@ client_get_random_intro(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk)
* set, we are forced to not use anything. */
ei = ei_excluded;
if (options->StrictNodes) {
- log_warn(LD_REND, "Every introduction points are in the ExcludeNodes set "
- "and StrictNodes is set. We can't connect.");
+ log_warn(LD_REND, "Every introduction point for service %s is in the "
+ "ExcludeNodes set and StrictNodes is set. We can't connect.",
+ safe_str_client(onion_address));
extend_info_free(ei);
ei = NULL;
+ } else {
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND, "Every introduction point for service "
+ "%s is unusable or we can't extend to it. We can't connect.",
+ safe_str_client(onion_address));
}
end:
smartlist_free(usable_ips);
+ memwipe(onion_address, 0, sizeof(onion_address));
return ei;
}
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