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[tor-commits] [tor/master] Move the non-crypto parts of onion.c out of src/core/crypto
commit 98ef3e82e48c2d57c09d5f551b72e7d6bfe5347a
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu Sep 20 13:55:02 2018 -0400
Move the non-crypto parts of onion.c out of src/core/crypto
The parts for handling cell formats should be in src/core/or.
The parts for handling onionskin queues should be in src/core/or.
Only the crypto wrapper belongs in src/core/crypto.
---
src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c | 311 +++++++++++++++++
src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h | 47 +++
src/core/include.am | 8 +-
src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c | 4 +-
src/core/mainloop/main.c | 3 +-
src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 3 +-
src/core/or/circuitlist.c | 3 +-
src/core/or/command.c | 4 +-
src/core/{crypto => or}/onion.c | 636 +---------------------------------
src/core/{crypto => or}/onion.h | 38 --
src/core/or/relay.c | 2 +-
src/feature/relay/onion_queue.c | 361 +++++++++++++++++++
src/feature/relay/onion_queue.h | 23 ++
src/test/test.c | 4 +-
src/test/test_cell_formats.c | 2 +-
src/test/test_workqueue.c | 2 +-
src/tools/tor-print-ed-signing-cert.c | 2 +-
17 files changed, 770 insertions(+), 683 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4978e0d46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file onion_crypto.c
+ * \brief Functions to handle different kinds of circuit extension crypto.
+ *
+ * In this module, we provide a set of abstractions to create a uniform
+ * interface over the three circuit extension handshakes that Tor has used
+ * over the years (TAP, CREATE_FAST, and ntor). These handshakes are
+ * implemented in onion_tap.c, onion_fast.c, and onion_ntor.c respectively.
+ *
+ * All[*] of these handshakes follow a similar pattern: a client, knowing
+ * some key from the relay it wants to extend through, generates the
+ * first part of a handshake. A relay receives that handshake, and sends
+ * a reply. Once the client handles the reply, it knows that it is
+ * talking to the right relay, and it shares some freshly negotiated key
+ * material with that relay.
+ *
+ * We sometimes call the client's part of the handshake an "onionskin".
+ * We do this because historically, Onion Routing used a multi-layer
+ * structure called an "onion" to construct circuits. Each layer of the
+ * onion contained key material chosen by the client, the identity of
+ * the next relay in the circuit, and a smaller onion, encrypted with
+ * the key of the next relay. When we changed Tor to use a telescoping
+ * circuit extension design, it corresponded to sending each layer of the
+ * onion separately -- as a series of onionskins.
+ **/
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
+#include "core/crypto/onion_crypto.h"
+#include "core/crypto/onion_fast.h"
+#include "core/crypto/onion_ntor.h"
+#include "core/crypto/onion_tap.h"
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+
+#include "core/or/crypt_path_st.h"
+#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h"
+
+/** Return a new server_onion_keys_t object with all of the keys
+ * and other info we might need to do onion handshakes. (We make a copy of
+ * our keys for each cpuworker to avoid race conditions with the main thread,
+ * and to avoid locking) */
+server_onion_keys_t *
+server_onion_keys_new(void)
+{
+ server_onion_keys_t *keys = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(server_onion_keys_t));
+ memcpy(keys->my_identity, router_get_my_id_digest(), DIGEST_LEN);
+ dup_onion_keys(&keys->onion_key, &keys->last_onion_key);
+ keys->curve25519_key_map = construct_ntor_key_map();
+ keys->junk_keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t));
+ curve25519_keypair_generate(keys->junk_keypair, 0);
+ return keys;
+}
+/** Release all storage held in <b>keys</b>. */
+void
+server_onion_keys_free_(server_onion_keys_t *keys)
+{
+ if (! keys)
+ return;
+
+ crypto_pk_free(keys->onion_key);
+ crypto_pk_free(keys->last_onion_key);
+ ntor_key_map_free(keys->curve25519_key_map);
+ tor_free(keys->junk_keypair);
+ memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(server_onion_keys_t));
+ tor_free(keys);
+}
+
+/** Release whatever storage is held in <b>state</b>, depending on its
+ * type, and clear its pointer. */
+void
+onion_handshake_state_release(onion_handshake_state_t *state)
+{
+ switch (state->tag) {
+ case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP:
+ crypto_dh_free(state->u.tap);
+ state->u.tap = NULL;
+ break;
+ case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
+ fast_handshake_state_free(state->u.fast);
+ state->u.fast = NULL;
+ break;
+ case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR:
+ ntor_handshake_state_free(state->u.ntor);
+ state->u.ntor = NULL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START
+ * This state should not even exist. */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d",
+ (int)state->tag);
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+}
+
+/** Perform the first step of a circuit-creation handshake of type <b>type</b>
+ * (one of ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_*): generate the initial "onion skin" in
+ * <b>onion_skin_out</b>, and store any state information in <b>state_out</b>.
+ * Return -1 on failure, and the length of the onionskin on acceptance.
+ */
+int
+onion_skin_create(int type,
+ const extend_info_t *node,
+ onion_handshake_state_t *state_out,
+ uint8_t *onion_skin_out)
+{
+ int r = -1;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP:
+ if (!node->onion_key)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (onion_skin_TAP_create(node->onion_key,
+ &state_out->u.tap,
+ (char*)onion_skin_out) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ r = TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
+ break;
+ case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
+ if (fast_onionskin_create(&state_out->u.fast, onion_skin_out) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ r = CREATE_FAST_LEN;
+ break;
+ case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR:
+ if (!extend_info_supports_ntor(node))
+ return -1;
+ if (onion_skin_ntor_create((const uint8_t*)node->identity_digest,
+ &node->curve25519_onion_key,
+ &state_out->u.ntor,
+ onion_skin_out) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ r = NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START
+ * We should never try to create an impossible handshake type. */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d", type);
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ r = -1;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+
+ if (r > 0)
+ state_out->tag = (uint16_t) type;
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* This is the maximum value for keys_out_len passed to
+ * onion_skin_server_handshake, plus 16. We can make it bigger if needed:
+ * It just defines how many bytes to stack-allocate. */
+#define MAX_KEYS_TMP_LEN 128
+
+/** Perform the second (server-side) step of a circuit-creation handshake of
+ * type <b>type</b>, responding to the client request in <b>onion_skin</b>
+ * using the keys in <b>keys</b>. On success, write our response into
+ * <b>reply_out</b>, generate <b>keys_out_len</b> bytes worth of key material
+ * in <b>keys_out_len</b>, a hidden service nonce to <b>rend_nonce_out</b>,
+ * and return the length of the reply. On failure, return -1.
+ */
+int
+onion_skin_server_handshake(int type,
+ const uint8_t *onion_skin, size_t onionskin_len,
+ const server_onion_keys_t *keys,
+ uint8_t *reply_out,
+ uint8_t *keys_out, size_t keys_out_len,
+ uint8_t *rend_nonce_out)
+{
+ int r = -1;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP:
+ if (onionskin_len != TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN)
+ return -1;
+ if (onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake((const char*)onion_skin,
+ keys->onion_key, keys->last_onion_key,
+ (char*)reply_out,
+ (char*)keys_out, keys_out_len)<0)
+ return -1;
+ r = TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN;
+ memcpy(rend_nonce_out, reply_out+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
+ break;
+ case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
+ if (onionskin_len != CREATE_FAST_LEN)
+ return -1;
+ if (fast_server_handshake(onion_skin, reply_out, keys_out, keys_out_len)<0)
+ return -1;
+ r = CREATED_FAST_LEN;
+ memcpy(rend_nonce_out, reply_out+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
+ break;
+ case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR:
+ if (onionskin_len < NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN)
+ return -1;
+ {
+ size_t keys_tmp_len = keys_out_len + DIGEST_LEN;
+ tor_assert(keys_tmp_len <= MAX_KEYS_TMP_LEN);
+ uint8_t keys_tmp[MAX_KEYS_TMP_LEN];
+
+ if (onion_skin_ntor_server_handshake(
+ onion_skin, keys->curve25519_key_map,
+ keys->junk_keypair,
+ keys->my_identity,
+ reply_out, keys_tmp, keys_tmp_len)<0) {
+ /* no need to memwipe here, since the output will never be used */
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(keys_out, keys_tmp, keys_out_len);
+ memcpy(rend_nonce_out, keys_tmp+keys_out_len, DIGEST_LEN);
+ memwipe(keys_tmp, 0, sizeof(keys_tmp));
+ r = NTOR_REPLY_LEN;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START
+ * We should have rejected this far before this point */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d", type);
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ return -1;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Perform the final (client-side) step of a circuit-creation handshake of
+ * type <b>type</b>, using our state in <b>handshake_state</b> and the
+ * server's response in <b>reply</b>. On success, generate <b>keys_out_len</b>
+ * bytes worth of key material in <b>keys_out_len</b>, set
+ * <b>rend_authenticator_out</b> to the "KH" field that can be used to
+ * establish introduction points at this hop, and return 0. On failure,
+ * return -1, and set *msg_out to an error message if this is worth
+ * complaining to the user about. */
+int
+onion_skin_client_handshake(int type,
+ const onion_handshake_state_t *handshake_state,
+ const uint8_t *reply, size_t reply_len,
+ uint8_t *keys_out, size_t keys_out_len,
+ uint8_t *rend_authenticator_out,
+ const char **msg_out)
+{
+ if (handshake_state->tag != type)
+ return -1;
+
+ switch (type) {
+ case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP:
+ if (reply_len != TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN) {
+ if (msg_out)
+ *msg_out = "TAP reply was not of the correct length.";
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(handshake_state->u.tap,
+ (const char*)reply,
+ (char *)keys_out, keys_out_len,
+ msg_out) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, reply+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ return 0;
+ case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
+ if (reply_len != CREATED_FAST_LEN) {
+ if (msg_out)
+ *msg_out = "TAP reply was not of the correct length.";
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (fast_client_handshake(handshake_state->u.fast, reply,
+ keys_out, keys_out_len, msg_out) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, reply+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
+ return 0;
+ case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR:
+ if (reply_len < NTOR_REPLY_LEN) {
+ if (msg_out)
+ *msg_out = "ntor reply was not of the correct length.";
+ return -1;
+ }
+ {
+ size_t keys_tmp_len = keys_out_len + DIGEST_LEN;
+ uint8_t *keys_tmp = tor_malloc(keys_tmp_len);
+ if (onion_skin_ntor_client_handshake(handshake_state->u.ntor,
+ reply,
+ keys_tmp, keys_tmp_len, msg_out) < 0) {
+ tor_free(keys_tmp);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ memcpy(keys_out, keys_tmp, keys_out_len);
+ memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, keys_tmp + keys_out_len, DIGEST_LEN);
+ memwipe(keys_tmp, 0, keys_tmp_len);
+ tor_free(keys_tmp);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d", type);
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ed410ef25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file onion_crypto.h
+ * \brief Header file for onion_crypto.c.
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_ONION_CRYPTO_H
+#define TOR_ONION_CRYPTO_H
+
+typedef struct server_onion_keys_t {
+ uint8_t my_identity[DIGEST_LEN];
+ crypto_pk_t *onion_key;
+ crypto_pk_t *last_onion_key;
+ struct di_digest256_map_t *curve25519_key_map;
+ struct curve25519_keypair_t *junk_keypair;
+} server_onion_keys_t;
+
+void onion_handshake_state_release(onion_handshake_state_t *state);
+
+int onion_skin_create(int type,
+ const extend_info_t *node,
+ onion_handshake_state_t *state_out,
+ uint8_t *onion_skin_out);
+int onion_skin_server_handshake(int type,
+ const uint8_t *onion_skin, size_t onionskin_len,
+ const server_onion_keys_t *keys,
+ uint8_t *reply_out,
+ uint8_t *keys_out, size_t key_out_len,
+ uint8_t *rend_nonce_out);
+int onion_skin_client_handshake(int type,
+ const onion_handshake_state_t *handshake_state,
+ const uint8_t *reply, size_t reply_len,
+ uint8_t *keys_out, size_t key_out_len,
+ uint8_t *rend_authenticator_out,
+ const char **msg_out);
+
+server_onion_keys_t *server_onion_keys_new(void);
+void server_onion_keys_free_(server_onion_keys_t *keys);
+#define server_onion_keys_free(keys) \
+ FREE_AND_NULL(server_onion_keys_t, server_onion_keys_free_, (keys))
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/core/include.am b/src/core/include.am
index 04e27b00d..6246db968 100644
--- a/src/core/include.am
+++ b/src/core/include.am
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES = \
src/app/config/confparse.c \
src/app/config/statefile.c \
src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.c \
- src/core/crypto/onion.c \
+ src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.c \
src/core/crypto/onion_fast.c \
src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.c \
src/core/crypto/onion_tap.c \
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES = \
src/core/or/connection_edge.c \
src/core/or/connection_or.c \
src/core/or/dos.c \
+ src/core/or/onion.c \
src/core/or/policies.c \
src/core/or/protover.c \
src/core/or/reasons.c \
@@ -95,6 +96,7 @@ LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES = \
src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c \
src/feature/relay/dns.c \
src/feature/relay/ext_orport.c \
+ src/feature/relay/onion_queue.c \
src/feature/relay/router.c \
src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c \
src/feature/rend/rendcache.c \
@@ -164,7 +166,7 @@ noinst_HEADERS += \
src/app/config/statefile.h \
src/app/main/ntmain.h \
src/core/crypto/hs_ntor.h \
- src/core/crypto/onion.h \
+ src/core/crypto/onion_crypto.h \
src/core/crypto/onion_fast.h \
src/core/crypto/onion_ntor.h \
src/core/crypto/onion_tap.h \
@@ -202,6 +204,7 @@ noinst_HEADERS += \
src/core/or/entry_port_cfg_st.h \
src/core/or/extend_info_st.h \
src/core/or/listener_connection_st.h \
+ src/core/or/onion.h \
src/core/or/or.h \
src/core/or/or_circuit_st.h \
src/core/or/or_connection_st.h \
@@ -307,6 +310,7 @@ noinst_HEADERS += \
src/feature/relay/dns.h \
src/feature/relay/dns_structs.h \
src/feature/relay/ext_orport.h \
+ src/feature/relay/onion_queue.h \
src/feature/relay/router.h \
src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h \
src/feature/rend/rend_authorized_client_st.h \
diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c b/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c
index a372db3f1..232d7efa9 100644
--- a/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c
+++ b/src/core/mainloop/cpuworker.c
@@ -27,10 +27,12 @@
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
#include "core/mainloop/main.h"
-#include "core/crypto/onion.h"
+#include "core/or/onion.h"
+#include "feature/relay/onion_queue.h"
#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
#include "lib/evloop/workqueue.h"
+#include "core/crypto/onion_crypto.h"
#include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h"
#include "lib/intmath/weakrng.h"
diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/main.c b/src/core/mainloop/main.c
index 2a90192c9..5beccc0a6 100644
--- a/src/core/mainloop/main.c
+++ b/src/core/mainloop/main.c
@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@
#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
#include "app/main/ntmain.h"
-#include "core/crypto/onion.h"
+#include "core/or/onion.h"
+#include "feature/relay/onion_queue.h"
#include "core/mainloop/periodic.h"
#include "core/or/policies.h"
#include "core/or/protover.h"
diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
index ea23c1dfd..99b2fb19a 100644
--- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@
#include "feature/nodelist/microdesc.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
-#include "core/crypto/onion.h"
+#include "core/or/onion.h"
+#include "core/crypto/onion_crypto.h"
#include "core/crypto/onion_tap.h"
#include "core/crypto/onion_fast.h"
#include "core/or/policies.h"
diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitlist.c b/src/core/or/circuitlist.c
index 637feec8d..aead28ded 100644
--- a/src/core/or/circuitlist.c
+++ b/src/core/or/circuitlist.c
@@ -77,7 +77,8 @@
#include "feature/hs/hs_ident.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
-#include "core/crypto/onion.h"
+#include "feature/relay/onion_queue.h"
+#include "core/crypto/onion_crypto.h"
#include "core/crypto/onion_fast.h"
#include "core/or/policies.h"
#include "core/or/relay.h"
diff --git a/src/core/or/command.c b/src/core/or/command.c
index ebddc4a35..f93eb8d85 100644
--- a/src/core/or/command.c
+++ b/src/core/or/command.c
@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@
#include "core/or/dos.h"
#include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
-#include "core/crypto/onion.h"
+#include "core/or/onion.h"
+#include "core/crypto/onion_crypto.h"
#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
#include "core/or/relay.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
@@ -699,4 +700,3 @@ command_setup_listener(channel_listener_t *listener)
channel_listener_set_listener_fn(listener, command_handle_incoming_channel);
}
-
diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion.c b/src/core/or/onion.c
similarity index 50%
rename from src/core/crypto/onion.c
rename to src/core/or/onion.c
index e71bfc1fd..5c2944194 100644
--- a/src/core/crypto/onion.c
+++ b/src/core/or/onion.c
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
/**
* \file onion.c
- * \brief Functions to queue create cells, wrap the various onionskin types,
+ * \brief Functions to queue create cells,
* and parse and create the CREATE cell and its allies.
*
* This module has a few functions, all related to the CREATE/CREATED
@@ -14,27 +14,6 @@
* related EXTEND/EXTENDED handshake that we use over circuits in order to
* extend them an additional hop.
*
- * In this module, we provide a set of abstractions to create a uniform
- * interface over the three circuit extension handshakes that Tor has used
- * over the years (TAP, CREATE_FAST, and ntor). These handshakes are
- * implemented in onion_tap.c, onion_fast.c, and onion_ntor.c respectively.
- *
- * All[*] of these handshakes follow a similar pattern: a client, knowing
- * some key from the relay it wants to extend through, generates the
- * first part of a handshake. A relay receives that handshake, and sends
- * a reply. Once the client handles the reply, it knows that it is
- * talking to the right relay, and it shares some freshly negotiated key
- * material with that relay.
- *
- * We sometimes call the client's part of the handshake an "onionskin".
- * We do this because historically, Onion Routing used a multi-layer
- * structure called an "onion" to construct circuits. Each layer of the
- * onion contained key material chosen by the client, the identity of
- * the next relay in the circuit, and a smaller onion, encrypted with
- * the key of the next relay. When we changed Tor to use a telescoping
- * circuit extension design, it corresponded to sending each layer of the
- * onion separately -- as a series of onionskins.
- *
* Clients invoke these functions when creating or extending a circuit,
* from circuitbuild.c.
*
@@ -57,628 +36,23 @@
* <li>Encoding and decodign EXTEND, EXTENDED, EXTEND2, and EXTENDED2
* relay cells.
* </ul>
- *
- * [*] The CREATE_FAST handshake is weaker than described here; see
- * onion_fast.c for more information.
**/
#include "core/or/or.h"
-#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
-#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
+
#include "app/config/config.h"
-#include "core/mainloop/cpuworker.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h"
-#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
-#include "core/crypto/onion.h"
+#include "core/crypto/onion_crypto.h"
#include "core/crypto/onion_fast.h"
#include "core/crypto/onion_ntor.h"
#include "core/crypto/onion_tap.h"
-#include "core/or/relay.h"
-#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
-#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "core/or/onion.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
#include "core/or/cell_st.h"
-#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h"
-#include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h"
// trunnel
#include "trunnel/ed25519_cert.h"
-/** Type for a linked list of circuits that are waiting for a free CPU worker
- * to process a waiting onion handshake. */
-typedef struct onion_queue_t {
- TOR_TAILQ_ENTRY(onion_queue_t) next;
- or_circuit_t *circ;
- uint16_t handshake_type;
- create_cell_t *onionskin;
- time_t when_added;
-} onion_queue_t;
-
-/** 5 seconds on the onion queue til we just send back a destroy */
-#define ONIONQUEUE_WAIT_CUTOFF 5
-
-/** Array of queues of circuits waiting for CPU workers. An element is NULL
- * if that queue is empty.*/
-static TOR_TAILQ_HEAD(onion_queue_head_t, onion_queue_t)
- ol_list[MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE+1] =
-{ TOR_TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(ol_list[0]), /* tap */
- TOR_TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(ol_list[1]), /* fast */
- TOR_TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(ol_list[2]), /* ntor */
-};
-
-/** Number of entries of each type currently in each element of ol_list[]. */
-static int ol_entries[MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE+1];
-
-static int num_ntors_per_tap(void);
-static void onion_queue_entry_remove(onion_queue_t *victim);
-
-/* XXXX Check lengths vs MAX_ONIONSKIN_{CHALLENGE,REPLY}_LEN.
- *
- * (By which I think I meant, "make sure that no
- * X_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE/REPLY_LEN is greater than
- * MAX_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE/REPLY_LEN." Also, make sure that we can pass
- * over-large values via EXTEND2/EXTENDED2, for future-compatibility.*/
-
-/** Return true iff we have room to queue another onionskin of type
- * <b>type</b>. */
-static int
-have_room_for_onionskin(uint16_t type)
-{
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
- int num_cpus;
- uint64_t tap_usec, ntor_usec;
- uint64_t ntor_during_tap_usec, tap_during_ntor_usec;
-
- /* If we've got fewer than 50 entries, we always have room for one more. */
- if (ol_entries[type] < 50)
- return 1;
- num_cpus = get_num_cpus(options);
- /* Compute how many microseconds we'd expect to need to clear all
- * onionskins in various combinations of the queues. */
-
- /* How long would it take to process all the TAP cells in the queue? */
- tap_usec = estimated_usec_for_onionskins(
- ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP],
- ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP) / num_cpus;
-
- /* How long would it take to process all the NTor cells in the queue? */
- ntor_usec = estimated_usec_for_onionskins(
- ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR],
- ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR) / num_cpus;
-
- /* How long would it take to process the tap cells that we expect to
- * process while draining the ntor queue? */
- tap_during_ntor_usec = estimated_usec_for_onionskins(
- MIN(ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP],
- ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR] / num_ntors_per_tap()),
- ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP) / num_cpus;
-
- /* How long would it take to process the ntor cells that we expect to
- * process while draining the tap queue? */
- ntor_during_tap_usec = estimated_usec_for_onionskins(
- MIN(ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR],
- ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP] * num_ntors_per_tap()),
- ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR) / num_cpus;
-
- /* See whether that exceeds MaxOnionQueueDelay. If so, we can't queue
- * this. */
- if (type == ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR &&
- (ntor_usec + tap_during_ntor_usec) / 1000 >
- (uint64_t)options->MaxOnionQueueDelay)
- return 0;
-
- if (type == ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP &&
- (tap_usec + ntor_during_tap_usec) / 1000 >
- (uint64_t)options->MaxOnionQueueDelay)
- return 0;
-
- /* If we support the ntor handshake, then don't let TAP handshakes use
- * more than 2/3 of the space on the queue. */
- if (type == ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP &&
- tap_usec / 1000 > (uint64_t)options->MaxOnionQueueDelay * 2 / 3)
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/** Add <b>circ</b> to the end of ol_list and return 0, except
- * if ol_list is too long, in which case do nothing and return -1.
- */
-int
-onion_pending_add(or_circuit_t *circ, create_cell_t *onionskin)
-{
- onion_queue_t *tmp;
- time_t now = time(NULL);
-
- if (onionskin->handshake_type > MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE) {
- /* LCOV_EXCL_START
- * We should have rejected this far before this point */
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Handshake %d out of range! Dropping.",
- onionskin->handshake_type);
- return -1;
- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
- }
-
- tmp = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(onion_queue_t));
- tmp->circ = circ;
- tmp->handshake_type = onionskin->handshake_type;
- tmp->onionskin = onionskin;
- tmp->when_added = now;
-
- if (!have_room_for_onionskin(onionskin->handshake_type)) {
-#define WARN_TOO_MANY_CIRC_CREATIONS_INTERVAL (60)
- static ratelim_t last_warned =
- RATELIM_INIT(WARN_TOO_MANY_CIRC_CREATIONS_INTERVAL);
- char *m;
- if (onionskin->handshake_type == ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR &&
- (m = rate_limit_log(&last_warned, approx_time()))) {
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
- "Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit "
- "creation requests! Please consider using the "
- "MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more "
- "restricted exit policy.%s",m);
- tor_free(m);
- }
- tor_free(tmp);
- return -1;
- }
-
- ++ol_entries[onionskin->handshake_type];
- log_info(LD_OR, "New create (%s). Queues now ntor=%d and tap=%d.",
- onionskin->handshake_type == ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR ? "ntor" : "tap",
- ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR],
- ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP]);
-
- circ->onionqueue_entry = tmp;
- TOR_TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ol_list[onionskin->handshake_type], tmp, next);
-
- /* cull elderly requests. */
- while (1) {
- onion_queue_t *head = TOR_TAILQ_FIRST(&ol_list[onionskin->handshake_type]);
- if (now - head->when_added < (time_t)ONIONQUEUE_WAIT_CUTOFF)
- break;
-
- circ = head->circ;
- circ->onionqueue_entry = NULL;
- onion_queue_entry_remove(head);
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
- "Circuit create request is too old; canceling due to overload.");
- if (! TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->marked_for_close) {
- circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/** Return a fairness parameter, to prefer processing NTOR style
- * handshakes but still slowly drain the TAP queue so we don't starve
- * it entirely. */
-static int
-num_ntors_per_tap(void)
-{
-#define DEFAULT_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP 10
-#define MIN_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP 1
-#define MAX_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP 100000
-
- return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "NumNTorsPerTAP",
- DEFAULT_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP,
- MIN_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP,
- MAX_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP);
-}
-
-/** Choose which onion queue we'll pull from next. If one is empty choose
- * the other; if they both have elements, load balance across them but
- * favoring NTOR. */
-static uint16_t
-decide_next_handshake_type(void)
-{
- /* The number of times we've chosen ntor lately when both were available. */
- static int recently_chosen_ntors = 0;
-
- if (!ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR])
- return ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP; /* no ntors? try tap */
-
- if (!ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP]) {
-
- /* Nick wants us to prioritize new tap requests when there aren't
- * any in the queue and we've processed k ntor cells since the last
- * tap cell. This strategy is maybe a good idea, since it starves tap
- * less in the case where tap is rare, or maybe a poor idea, since it
- * makes the new tap cell unfairly jump in front of ntor cells that
- * got here first. In any case this edge case will only become relevant
- * once tap is rare. We should reevaluate whether we like this decision
- * once tap gets more rare. */
- if (ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR] &&
- recently_chosen_ntors <= num_ntors_per_tap())
- ++recently_chosen_ntors;
-
- return ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR; /* no taps? try ntor */
- }
-
- /* They both have something queued. Pick ntor if we haven't done that
- * too much lately. */
- if (++recently_chosen_ntors <= num_ntors_per_tap()) {
- return ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR;
- }
-
- /* Else, it's time to let tap have its turn. */
- recently_chosen_ntors = 0;
- return ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP;
-}
-
-/** Remove the highest priority item from ol_list[] and return it, or
- * return NULL if the lists are empty.
- */
-or_circuit_t *
-onion_next_task(create_cell_t **onionskin_out)
-{
- or_circuit_t *circ;
- uint16_t handshake_to_choose = decide_next_handshake_type();
- onion_queue_t *head = TOR_TAILQ_FIRST(&ol_list[handshake_to_choose]);
-
- if (!head)
- return NULL; /* no onions pending, we're done */
-
- tor_assert(head->circ);
- tor_assert(head->handshake_type <= MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE);
-// tor_assert(head->circ->p_chan); /* make sure it's still valid */
-/* XXX I only commented out the above line to make the unit tests
- * more manageable. That's probably not good long-term. -RD */
- circ = head->circ;
- if (head->onionskin)
- --ol_entries[head->handshake_type];
- log_info(LD_OR, "Processing create (%s). Queues now ntor=%d and tap=%d.",
- head->handshake_type == ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR ? "ntor" : "tap",
- ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR],
- ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP]);
-
- *onionskin_out = head->onionskin;
- head->onionskin = NULL; /* prevent free. */
- circ->onionqueue_entry = NULL;
- onion_queue_entry_remove(head);
- return circ;
-}
-
-/** Return the number of <b>handshake_type</b>-style create requests pending.
- */
-int
-onion_num_pending(uint16_t handshake_type)
-{
- return ol_entries[handshake_type];
-}
-
-/** Go through ol_list, find the onion_queue_t element which points to
- * circ, remove and free that element. Leave circ itself alone.
- */
-void
-onion_pending_remove(or_circuit_t *circ)
-{
- onion_queue_t *victim;
-
- if (!circ)
- return;
-
- victim = circ->onionqueue_entry;
- if (victim)
- onion_queue_entry_remove(victim);
-
- cpuworker_cancel_circ_handshake(circ);
-}
-
-/** Remove a queue entry <b>victim</b> from the queue, unlinking it from
- * its circuit and freeing it and any structures it owns.*/
-static void
-onion_queue_entry_remove(onion_queue_t *victim)
-{
- if (victim->handshake_type > MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE) {
- /* LCOV_EXCL_START
- * We should have rejected this far before this point */
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Handshake %d out of range! Dropping.",
- victim->handshake_type);
- /* XXX leaks */
- return;
- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
- }
-
- TOR_TAILQ_REMOVE(&ol_list[victim->handshake_type], victim, next);
-
- if (victim->circ)
- victim->circ->onionqueue_entry = NULL;
-
- if (victim->onionskin)
- --ol_entries[victim->handshake_type];
-
- tor_free(victim->onionskin);
- tor_free(victim);
-}
-
-/** Remove all circuits from the pending list. Called from tor_free_all. */
-void
-clear_pending_onions(void)
-{
- onion_queue_t *victim, *next;
- int i;
- for (i=0; i<=MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE; i++) {
- for (victim = TOR_TAILQ_FIRST(&ol_list[i]); victim; victim = next) {
- next = TOR_TAILQ_NEXT(victim,next);
- onion_queue_entry_remove(victim);
- }
- tor_assert(TOR_TAILQ_EMPTY(&ol_list[i]));
- }
- memset(ol_entries, 0, sizeof(ol_entries));
-}
-
-/* ============================================================ */
-
-/** Return a new server_onion_keys_t object with all of the keys
- * and other info we might need to do onion handshakes. (We make a copy of
- * our keys for each cpuworker to avoid race conditions with the main thread,
- * and to avoid locking) */
-server_onion_keys_t *
-server_onion_keys_new(void)
-{
- server_onion_keys_t *keys = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(server_onion_keys_t));
- memcpy(keys->my_identity, router_get_my_id_digest(), DIGEST_LEN);
- dup_onion_keys(&keys->onion_key, &keys->last_onion_key);
- keys->curve25519_key_map = construct_ntor_key_map();
- keys->junk_keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t));
- curve25519_keypair_generate(keys->junk_keypair, 0);
- return keys;
-}
-
-/** Release all storage held in <b>keys</b>. */
-void
-server_onion_keys_free_(server_onion_keys_t *keys)
-{
- if (! keys)
- return;
-
- crypto_pk_free(keys->onion_key);
- crypto_pk_free(keys->last_onion_key);
- ntor_key_map_free(keys->curve25519_key_map);
- tor_free(keys->junk_keypair);
- memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(server_onion_keys_t));
- tor_free(keys);
-}
-
-/** Release whatever storage is held in <b>state</b>, depending on its
- * type, and clear its pointer. */
-void
-onion_handshake_state_release(onion_handshake_state_t *state)
-{
- switch (state->tag) {
- case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP:
- crypto_dh_free(state->u.tap);
- state->u.tap = NULL;
- break;
- case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
- fast_handshake_state_free(state->u.fast);
- state->u.fast = NULL;
- break;
- case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR:
- ntor_handshake_state_free(state->u.ntor);
- state->u.ntor = NULL;
- break;
- default:
- /* LCOV_EXCL_START
- * This state should not even exist. */
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d",
- (int)state->tag);
- tor_fragile_assert();
- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
- }
-}
-
-/** Perform the first step of a circuit-creation handshake of type <b>type</b>
- * (one of ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_*): generate the initial "onion skin" in
- * <b>onion_skin_out</b>, and store any state information in <b>state_out</b>.
- * Return -1 on failure, and the length of the onionskin on acceptance.
- */
-int
-onion_skin_create(int type,
- const extend_info_t *node,
- onion_handshake_state_t *state_out,
- uint8_t *onion_skin_out)
-{
- int r = -1;
-
- switch (type) {
- case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP:
- if (!node->onion_key)
- return -1;
-
- if (onion_skin_TAP_create(node->onion_key,
- &state_out->u.tap,
- (char*)onion_skin_out) < 0)
- return -1;
-
- r = TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
- break;
- case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
- if (fast_onionskin_create(&state_out->u.fast, onion_skin_out) < 0)
- return -1;
-
- r = CREATE_FAST_LEN;
- break;
- case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR:
- if (!extend_info_supports_ntor(node))
- return -1;
- if (onion_skin_ntor_create((const uint8_t*)node->identity_digest,
- &node->curve25519_onion_key,
- &state_out->u.ntor,
- onion_skin_out) < 0)
- return -1;
-
- r = NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN;
- break;
- default:
- /* LCOV_EXCL_START
- * We should never try to create an impossible handshake type. */
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d", type);
- tor_fragile_assert();
- r = -1;
- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
- }
-
- if (r > 0)
- state_out->tag = (uint16_t) type;
-
- return r;
-}
-
-/* This is the maximum value for keys_out_len passed to
- * onion_skin_server_handshake, plus 16. We can make it bigger if needed:
- * It just defines how many bytes to stack-allocate. */
-#define MAX_KEYS_TMP_LEN 128
-
-/** Perform the second (server-side) step of a circuit-creation handshake of
- * type <b>type</b>, responding to the client request in <b>onion_skin</b>
- * using the keys in <b>keys</b>. On success, write our response into
- * <b>reply_out</b>, generate <b>keys_out_len</b> bytes worth of key material
- * in <b>keys_out_len</b>, a hidden service nonce to <b>rend_nonce_out</b>,
- * and return the length of the reply. On failure, return -1.
- */
-int
-onion_skin_server_handshake(int type,
- const uint8_t *onion_skin, size_t onionskin_len,
- const server_onion_keys_t *keys,
- uint8_t *reply_out,
- uint8_t *keys_out, size_t keys_out_len,
- uint8_t *rend_nonce_out)
-{
- int r = -1;
-
- switch (type) {
- case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP:
- if (onionskin_len != TAP_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN)
- return -1;
- if (onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake((const char*)onion_skin,
- keys->onion_key, keys->last_onion_key,
- (char*)reply_out,
- (char*)keys_out, keys_out_len)<0)
- return -1;
- r = TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN;
- memcpy(rend_nonce_out, reply_out+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
- break;
- case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
- if (onionskin_len != CREATE_FAST_LEN)
- return -1;
- if (fast_server_handshake(onion_skin, reply_out, keys_out, keys_out_len)<0)
- return -1;
- r = CREATED_FAST_LEN;
- memcpy(rend_nonce_out, reply_out+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
- break;
- case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR:
- if (onionskin_len < NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN)
- return -1;
- {
- size_t keys_tmp_len = keys_out_len + DIGEST_LEN;
- tor_assert(keys_tmp_len <= MAX_KEYS_TMP_LEN);
- uint8_t keys_tmp[MAX_KEYS_TMP_LEN];
-
- if (onion_skin_ntor_server_handshake(
- onion_skin, keys->curve25519_key_map,
- keys->junk_keypair,
- keys->my_identity,
- reply_out, keys_tmp, keys_tmp_len)<0) {
- /* no need to memwipe here, since the output will never be used */
- return -1;
- }
-
- memcpy(keys_out, keys_tmp, keys_out_len);
- memcpy(rend_nonce_out, keys_tmp+keys_out_len, DIGEST_LEN);
- memwipe(keys_tmp, 0, sizeof(keys_tmp));
- r = NTOR_REPLY_LEN;
- }
- break;
- default:
- /* LCOV_EXCL_START
- * We should have rejected this far before this point */
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d", type);
- tor_fragile_assert();
- return -1;
- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
- }
-
- return r;
-}
-
-/** Perform the final (client-side) step of a circuit-creation handshake of
- * type <b>type</b>, using our state in <b>handshake_state</b> and the
- * server's response in <b>reply</b>. On success, generate <b>keys_out_len</b>
- * bytes worth of key material in <b>keys_out_len</b>, set
- * <b>rend_authenticator_out</b> to the "KH" field that can be used to
- * establish introduction points at this hop, and return 0. On failure,
- * return -1, and set *msg_out to an error message if this is worth
- * complaining to the user about. */
-int
-onion_skin_client_handshake(int type,
- const onion_handshake_state_t *handshake_state,
- const uint8_t *reply, size_t reply_len,
- uint8_t *keys_out, size_t keys_out_len,
- uint8_t *rend_authenticator_out,
- const char **msg_out)
-{
- if (handshake_state->tag != type)
- return -1;
-
- switch (type) {
- case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP:
- if (reply_len != TAP_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN) {
- if (msg_out)
- *msg_out = "TAP reply was not of the correct length.";
- return -1;
- }
- if (onion_skin_TAP_client_handshake(handshake_state->u.tap,
- (const char*)reply,
- (char *)keys_out, keys_out_len,
- msg_out) < 0)
- return -1;
-
- memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, reply+DH1024_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
-
- return 0;
- case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST:
- if (reply_len != CREATED_FAST_LEN) {
- if (msg_out)
- *msg_out = "TAP reply was not of the correct length.";
- return -1;
- }
- if (fast_client_handshake(handshake_state->u.fast, reply,
- keys_out, keys_out_len, msg_out) < 0)
- return -1;
-
- memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, reply+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
- return 0;
- case ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR:
- if (reply_len < NTOR_REPLY_LEN) {
- if (msg_out)
- *msg_out = "ntor reply was not of the correct length.";
- return -1;
- }
- {
- size_t keys_tmp_len = keys_out_len + DIGEST_LEN;
- uint8_t *keys_tmp = tor_malloc(keys_tmp_len);
- if (onion_skin_ntor_client_handshake(handshake_state->u.ntor,
- reply,
- keys_tmp, keys_tmp_len, msg_out) < 0) {
- tor_free(keys_tmp);
- return -1;
- }
- memcpy(keys_out, keys_tmp, keys_out_len);
- memcpy(rend_authenticator_out, keys_tmp + keys_out_len, DIGEST_LEN);
- memwipe(keys_tmp, 0, keys_tmp_len);
- tor_free(keys_tmp);
- }
- return 0;
- default:
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "called with unknown handshake state type %d", type);
- tor_fragile_assert();
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
/** Helper: return 0 if <b>cell</b> appears valid, -1 otherwise. If
* <b>unknown_ok</b> is true, allow cells with handshake types we don't
* recognize. */
diff --git a/src/core/crypto/onion.h b/src/core/or/onion.h
similarity index 68%
rename from src/core/crypto/onion.h
rename to src/core/or/onion.h
index ff70f299d..2049fdf41 100644
--- a/src/core/crypto/onion.h
+++ b/src/core/or/onion.h
@@ -17,47 +17,9 @@ struct curve25519_keypair_t;
struct curve25519_public_key_t;
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
-int onion_pending_add(or_circuit_t *circ, struct create_cell_t *onionskin);
-or_circuit_t *onion_next_task(struct create_cell_t **onionskin_out);
-int onion_num_pending(uint16_t handshake_type);
-void onion_pending_remove(or_circuit_t *circ);
-void clear_pending_onions(void);
-
-typedef struct server_onion_keys_t {
- uint8_t my_identity[DIGEST_LEN];
- crypto_pk_t *onion_key;
- crypto_pk_t *last_onion_key;
- struct di_digest256_map_t *curve25519_key_map;
- struct curve25519_keypair_t *junk_keypair;
-} server_onion_keys_t;
-
#define MAX_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN 255
#define MAX_ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN 255
-server_onion_keys_t *server_onion_keys_new(void);
-void server_onion_keys_free_(server_onion_keys_t *keys);
-#define server_onion_keys_free(keys) \
- FREE_AND_NULL(server_onion_keys_t, server_onion_keys_free_, (keys))
-
-void onion_handshake_state_release(onion_handshake_state_t *state);
-
-int onion_skin_create(int type,
- const extend_info_t *node,
- onion_handshake_state_t *state_out,
- uint8_t *onion_skin_out);
-int onion_skin_server_handshake(int type,
- const uint8_t *onion_skin, size_t onionskin_len,
- const server_onion_keys_t *keys,
- uint8_t *reply_out,
- uint8_t *keys_out, size_t key_out_len,
- uint8_t *rend_nonce_out);
-int onion_skin_client_handshake(int type,
- const onion_handshake_state_t *handshake_state,
- const uint8_t *reply, size_t reply_len,
- uint8_t *keys_out, size_t key_out_len,
- uint8_t *rend_authenticator_out,
- const char **msg_out);
-
/** A parsed CREATE, CREATE_FAST, or CREATE2 cell. */
typedef struct create_cell_t {
/** The cell command. One of CREATE{,_FAST,2} */
diff --git a/src/core/or/relay.c b/src/core/or/relay.c
index 2c77abbee..119b677a6 100644
--- a/src/core/or/relay.c
+++ b/src/core/or/relay.c
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
#include "core/mainloop/main.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
-#include "core/crypto/onion.h"
+#include "core/or/onion.h"
#include "core/or/policies.h"
#include "core/or/reasons.h"
#include "core/or/relay.h"
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/onion_queue.c b/src/feature/relay/onion_queue.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..13142bb05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/onion_queue.c
@@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file onion_queue.c
+ * \brief Functions to queue create cells for processing.
+ *
+ * Relays invoke these functions when they receive a CREATE or EXTEND
+ * cell in command.c or relay.c, in order to queue the pending request.
+ * They also invoke them from cpuworker.c, which handles dispatching
+ * onionskin requests to different worker threads.
+ *
+ * <br>
+ *
+ * This module also handles:
+ * <ul>
+ * <li> Queueing incoming onionskins on the relay side before passing
+ * them to worker threads.
+ * <li>Expiring onionskins on the relay side if they have waited for
+ * too long.
+ * </ul>
+ **/
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+
+#include "feature/relay/onion_queue.h"
+
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/cpuworker.h"
+#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
+#include "core/or/onion.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+
+#include "core/or/or_circuit_st.h"
+
+/** Type for a linked list of circuits that are waiting for a free CPU worker
+ * to process a waiting onion handshake. */
+typedef struct onion_queue_t {
+ TOR_TAILQ_ENTRY(onion_queue_t) next;
+ or_circuit_t *circ;
+ uint16_t handshake_type;
+ create_cell_t *onionskin;
+ time_t when_added;
+} onion_queue_t;
+
+/** 5 seconds on the onion queue til we just send back a destroy */
+#define ONIONQUEUE_WAIT_CUTOFF 5
+
+/** Array of queues of circuits waiting for CPU workers. An element is NULL
+ * if that queue is empty.*/
+static TOR_TAILQ_HEAD(onion_queue_head_t, onion_queue_t)
+ ol_list[MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE+1] =
+{ TOR_TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(ol_list[0]), /* tap */
+ TOR_TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(ol_list[1]), /* fast */
+ TOR_TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(ol_list[2]), /* ntor */
+};
+
+/** Number of entries of each type currently in each element of ol_list[]. */
+static int ol_entries[MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE+1];
+
+static int num_ntors_per_tap(void);
+static void onion_queue_entry_remove(onion_queue_t *victim);
+
+/* XXXX Check lengths vs MAX_ONIONSKIN_{CHALLENGE,REPLY}_LEN.
+ *
+ * (By which I think I meant, "make sure that no
+ * X_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE/REPLY_LEN is greater than
+ * MAX_ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE/REPLY_LEN." Also, make sure that we can pass
+ * over-large values via EXTEND2/EXTENDED2, for future-compatibility.*/
+
+/** Return true iff we have room to queue another onionskin of type
+ * <b>type</b>. */
+static int
+have_room_for_onionskin(uint16_t type)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ int num_cpus;
+ uint64_t tap_usec, ntor_usec;
+ uint64_t ntor_during_tap_usec, tap_during_ntor_usec;
+
+ /* If we've got fewer than 50 entries, we always have room for one more. */
+ if (ol_entries[type] < 50)
+ return 1;
+ num_cpus = get_num_cpus(options);
+ /* Compute how many microseconds we'd expect to need to clear all
+ * onionskins in various combinations of the queues. */
+
+ /* How long would it take to process all the TAP cells in the queue? */
+ tap_usec = estimated_usec_for_onionskins(
+ ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP],
+ ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP) / num_cpus;
+
+ /* How long would it take to process all the NTor cells in the queue? */
+ ntor_usec = estimated_usec_for_onionskins(
+ ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR],
+ ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR) / num_cpus;
+
+ /* How long would it take to process the tap cells that we expect to
+ * process while draining the ntor queue? */
+ tap_during_ntor_usec = estimated_usec_for_onionskins(
+ MIN(ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP],
+ ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR] / num_ntors_per_tap()),
+ ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP) / num_cpus;
+
+ /* How long would it take to process the ntor cells that we expect to
+ * process while draining the tap queue? */
+ ntor_during_tap_usec = estimated_usec_for_onionskins(
+ MIN(ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR],
+ ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP] * num_ntors_per_tap()),
+ ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR) / num_cpus;
+
+ /* See whether that exceeds MaxOnionQueueDelay. If so, we can't queue
+ * this. */
+ if (type == ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR &&
+ (ntor_usec + tap_during_ntor_usec) / 1000 >
+ (uint64_t)options->MaxOnionQueueDelay)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (type == ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP &&
+ (tap_usec + ntor_during_tap_usec) / 1000 >
+ (uint64_t)options->MaxOnionQueueDelay)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* If we support the ntor handshake, then don't let TAP handshakes use
+ * more than 2/3 of the space on the queue. */
+ if (type == ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP &&
+ tap_usec / 1000 > (uint64_t)options->MaxOnionQueueDelay * 2 / 3)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Add <b>circ</b> to the end of ol_list and return 0, except
+ * if ol_list is too long, in which case do nothing and return -1.
+ */
+int
+onion_pending_add(or_circuit_t *circ, create_cell_t *onionskin)
+{
+ onion_queue_t *tmp;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+ if (onionskin->handshake_type > MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE) {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START
+ * We should have rejected this far before this point */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Handshake %d out of range! Dropping.",
+ onionskin->handshake_type);
+ return -1;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+
+ tmp = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(onion_queue_t));
+ tmp->circ = circ;
+ tmp->handshake_type = onionskin->handshake_type;
+ tmp->onionskin = onionskin;
+ tmp->when_added = now;
+
+ if (!have_room_for_onionskin(onionskin->handshake_type)) {
+#define WARN_TOO_MANY_CIRC_CREATIONS_INTERVAL (60)
+ static ratelim_t last_warned =
+ RATELIM_INIT(WARN_TOO_MANY_CIRC_CREATIONS_INTERVAL);
+ char *m;
+ if (onionskin->handshake_type == ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR &&
+ (m = rate_limit_log(&last_warned, approx_time()))) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
+ "Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit "
+ "creation requests! Please consider using the "
+ "MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more "
+ "restricted exit policy.%s",m);
+ tor_free(m);
+ }
+ tor_free(tmp);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ++ol_entries[onionskin->handshake_type];
+ log_info(LD_OR, "New create (%s). Queues now ntor=%d and tap=%d.",
+ onionskin->handshake_type == ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR ? "ntor" : "tap",
+ ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR],
+ ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP]);
+
+ circ->onionqueue_entry = tmp;
+ TOR_TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ol_list[onionskin->handshake_type], tmp, next);
+
+ /* cull elderly requests. */
+ while (1) {
+ onion_queue_t *head = TOR_TAILQ_FIRST(&ol_list[onionskin->handshake_type]);
+ if (now - head->when_added < (time_t)ONIONQUEUE_WAIT_CUTOFF)
+ break;
+
+ circ = head->circ;
+ circ->onionqueue_entry = NULL;
+ onion_queue_entry_remove(head);
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
+ "Circuit create request is too old; canceling due to overload.");
+ if (! TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->marked_for_close) {
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return a fairness parameter, to prefer processing NTOR style
+ * handshakes but still slowly drain the TAP queue so we don't starve
+ * it entirely. */
+static int
+num_ntors_per_tap(void)
+{
+#define DEFAULT_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP 10
+#define MIN_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP 1
+#define MAX_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP 100000
+
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "NumNTorsPerTAP",
+ DEFAULT_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP,
+ MIN_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP,
+ MAX_NUM_NTORS_PER_TAP);
+}
+
+/** Choose which onion queue we'll pull from next. If one is empty choose
+ * the other; if they both have elements, load balance across them but
+ * favoring NTOR. */
+static uint16_t
+decide_next_handshake_type(void)
+{
+ /* The number of times we've chosen ntor lately when both were available. */
+ static int recently_chosen_ntors = 0;
+
+ if (!ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR])
+ return ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP; /* no ntors? try tap */
+
+ if (!ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP]) {
+
+ /* Nick wants us to prioritize new tap requests when there aren't
+ * any in the queue and we've processed k ntor cells since the last
+ * tap cell. This strategy is maybe a good idea, since it starves tap
+ * less in the case where tap is rare, or maybe a poor idea, since it
+ * makes the new tap cell unfairly jump in front of ntor cells that
+ * got here first. In any case this edge case will only become relevant
+ * once tap is rare. We should reevaluate whether we like this decision
+ * once tap gets more rare. */
+ if (ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR] &&
+ recently_chosen_ntors <= num_ntors_per_tap())
+ ++recently_chosen_ntors;
+
+ return ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR; /* no taps? try ntor */
+ }
+
+ /* They both have something queued. Pick ntor if we haven't done that
+ * too much lately. */
+ if (++recently_chosen_ntors <= num_ntors_per_tap()) {
+ return ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR;
+ }
+
+ /* Else, it's time to let tap have its turn. */
+ recently_chosen_ntors = 0;
+ return ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP;
+}
+
+/** Remove the highest priority item from ol_list[] and return it, or
+ * return NULL if the lists are empty.
+ */
+or_circuit_t *
+onion_next_task(create_cell_t **onionskin_out)
+{
+ or_circuit_t *circ;
+ uint16_t handshake_to_choose = decide_next_handshake_type();
+ onion_queue_t *head = TOR_TAILQ_FIRST(&ol_list[handshake_to_choose]);
+
+ if (!head)
+ return NULL; /* no onions pending, we're done */
+
+ tor_assert(head->circ);
+ tor_assert(head->handshake_type <= MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE);
+// tor_assert(head->circ->p_chan); /* make sure it's still valid */
+/* XXX I only commented out the above line to make the unit tests
+ * more manageable. That's probably not good long-term. -RD */
+ circ = head->circ;
+ if (head->onionskin)
+ --ol_entries[head->handshake_type];
+ log_info(LD_OR, "Processing create (%s). Queues now ntor=%d and tap=%d.",
+ head->handshake_type == ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR ? "ntor" : "tap",
+ ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR],
+ ol_entries[ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP]);
+
+ *onionskin_out = head->onionskin;
+ head->onionskin = NULL; /* prevent free. */
+ circ->onionqueue_entry = NULL;
+ onion_queue_entry_remove(head);
+ return circ;
+}
+
+/** Return the number of <b>handshake_type</b>-style create requests pending.
+ */
+int
+onion_num_pending(uint16_t handshake_type)
+{
+ return ol_entries[handshake_type];
+}
+
+/** Go through ol_list, find the onion_queue_t element which points to
+ * circ, remove and free that element. Leave circ itself alone.
+ */
+void
+onion_pending_remove(or_circuit_t *circ)
+{
+ onion_queue_t *victim;
+
+ if (!circ)
+ return;
+
+ victim = circ->onionqueue_entry;
+ if (victim)
+ onion_queue_entry_remove(victim);
+
+ cpuworker_cancel_circ_handshake(circ);
+}
+
+/** Remove a queue entry <b>victim</b> from the queue, unlinking it from
+ * its circuit and freeing it and any structures it owns.*/
+static void
+onion_queue_entry_remove(onion_queue_t *victim)
+{
+ if (victim->handshake_type > MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE) {
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_START
+ * We should have rejected this far before this point */
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Handshake %d out of range! Dropping.",
+ victim->handshake_type);
+ /* XXX leaks */
+ return;
+ /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
+ }
+
+ TOR_TAILQ_REMOVE(&ol_list[victim->handshake_type], victim, next);
+
+ if (victim->circ)
+ victim->circ->onionqueue_entry = NULL;
+
+ if (victim->onionskin)
+ --ol_entries[victim->handshake_type];
+
+ tor_free(victim->onionskin);
+ tor_free(victim);
+}
+
+/** Remove all circuits from the pending list. Called from tor_free_all. */
+void
+clear_pending_onions(void)
+{
+ onion_queue_t *victim, *next;
+ int i;
+ for (i=0; i<=MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE; i++) {
+ for (victim = TOR_TAILQ_FIRST(&ol_list[i]); victim; victim = next) {
+ next = TOR_TAILQ_NEXT(victim,next);
+ onion_queue_entry_remove(victim);
+ }
+ tor_assert(TOR_TAILQ_EMPTY(&ol_list[i]));
+ }
+ memset(ol_entries, 0, sizeof(ol_entries));
+}
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/onion_queue.h b/src/feature/relay/onion_queue.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a71f497e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/relay/onion_queue.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file onion_queue.h
+ * \brief Header file for onion_queue.c.
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_ONION_QUEUE_H
+#define TOR_ONION_QUEUE_H
+
+struct create_cell_t;
+
+int onion_pending_add(or_circuit_t *circ, struct create_cell_t *onionskin);
+or_circuit_t *onion_next_task(struct create_cell_t **onionskin_out);
+int onion_num_pending(uint16_t handshake_type);
+void onion_pending_remove(or_circuit_t *circ);
+void clear_pending_onions(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c
index dc8e3bede..e3d1b1c67 100644
--- a/src/test/test.c
+++ b/src/test/test.c
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@
#include "orconfig.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
-
#include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
#include <stdio.h>
@@ -49,7 +48,7 @@
#include "test/test.h"
#include "core/mainloop/main.h"
#include "lib/memarea/memarea.h"
-#include "core/crypto/onion.h"
+#include "core/or/onion.h"
#include "core/crypto/onion_ntor.h"
#include "core/crypto/onion_fast.h"
#include "core/crypto/onion_tap.h"
@@ -64,6 +63,7 @@
#include "feature/rend/rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_st.h"
#include "feature/rend/rend_intro_point_st.h"
#include "feature/rend/rend_service_descriptor_st.h"
+#include "feature/relay/onion_queue.h"
/** Run unit tests for the onion handshake code. */
static void
diff --git a/src/test/test_cell_formats.c b/src/test/test_cell_formats.c
index 2753c4219..daf0296e2 100644
--- a/src/test/test_cell_formats.c
+++ b/src/test/test_cell_formats.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
#include "core/or/connection_or.h"
#include "app/config/config.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
-#include "core/crypto/onion.h"
+#include "core/or/onion.h"
#include "core/crypto/onion_tap.h"
#include "core/crypto/onion_fast.h"
#include "core/crypto/onion_ntor.h"
diff --git a/src/test/test_workqueue.c b/src/test/test_workqueue.c
index 9d48d9277..28fbd6fb9 100644
--- a/src/test/test_workqueue.c
+++ b/src/test/test_workqueue.c
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "lib/thread/threads.h"
-#include "core/crypto/onion.h"
+#include "core/or/onion.h"
#include "lib/evloop/workqueue.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_curve25519.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
diff --git a/src/tools/tor-print-ed-signing-cert.c b/src/tools/tor-print-ed-signing-cert.c
index 0f64059d8..9bb4db0a6 100644
--- a/src/tools/tor-print-ed-signing-cert.c
+++ b/src/tools/tor-print-ed-signing-cert.c
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
-#include "ed25519_cert.h"
+#include "trunnel/ed25519_cert.h"
#include "lib/cc/torint.h" /* TOR_PRIdSZ */
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
#include "lib/malloc/malloc.h"
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