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[tor-commits] [tor/master] Move key-loading and crosscert-checking out of feature/relay
commit 934859cf80902e6a16fb69d884fadc8ea831779f
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue Sep 25 14:19:48 2018 -0400
Move key-loading and crosscert-checking out of feature/relay
This is also used by onion services, so it needs to go in another
module.
---
src/core/include.am | 3 +
src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 3 +-
src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.c | 755 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.h | 55 +++
src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c | 37 ++
src/feature/nodelist/torcert.h | 6 +
src/feature/relay/router.c | 91 +----
src/feature/relay/router.h | 2 -
src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c | 682 +-----------------------------------
src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h | 41 ---
src/feature/rend/rendservice.c | 5 +-
src/test/fuzz/fuzz_descriptor.c | 4 +-
src/test/test_routerkeys.c | 1 +
13 files changed, 874 insertions(+), 811 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/core/include.am b/src/core/include.am
index 0bd4626c4..954b3bb55 100644
--- a/src/core/include.am
+++ b/src/core/include.am
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES = \
src/feature/hs/hs_stats.c \
src/feature/hs_common/replaycache.c \
src/feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.c \
+ src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.c \
+ src/feature/dirauth/keypin.c \
src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c \
src/feature/nodelist/dirlist.c \
src/feature/nodelist/microdesc.c \
@@ -289,6 +291,7 @@ noinst_HEADERS += \
src/feature/hs/hsdir_index_st.h \
src/feature/hs_common/replaycache.h \
src/feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.h \
+ src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.h \
src/feature/nodelist/authcert.h \
src/feature/nodelist/authority_cert_st.h \
src/feature/nodelist/desc_store_st.h \
diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
index dc7bb41ee..aa031bd70 100644
--- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
+++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
#include "core/or/relay.h"
#include "feature/rend/rendservice.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
-#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
+//#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/node_select.h"
#include "feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.h"
#include "app/config/statefile.h"
diff --git a/src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.c b/src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4621e39c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file loadkey.c
+ * \brief Read keys from disk, creating as needed
+ *
+ * This code is shared by relays and onion services, which both need
+ * this functionality.
+ **/
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "app/main/main.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
+
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_pwbox.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/term/getpass.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
+
+#define ENC_KEY_HEADER "Boxed Ed25519 key"
+#define ENC_KEY_TAG "master"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+/** Try to read an RSA key from <b>fname</b>. If <b>fname</b> doesn't exist
+ * and <b>generate</b> is true, create a new RSA key and save it in
+ * <b>fname</b>. Return the read/created key, or NULL on error. Log all
+ * errors at level <b>severity</b>. If <b>created_out/b> is non-NULL and a
+ * new key was created, set *<b>created_out</b> to true.
+ */
+crypto_pk_t *
+init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate, int severity,
+ bool *created_out)
+{
+ crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
+
+ if (created_out) {
+ *created_out = false;
+ }
+
+ if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing key");
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ switch (file_status(fname)) {
+ case FN_DIR:
+ case FN_ERROR:
+ tor_log(severity, LD_FS,"Can't read key from \"%s\"", fname);
+ goto error;
+ /* treat empty key files as if the file doesn't exist, and,
+ * if generate is set, replace the empty file in
+ * crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename() */
+ case FN_NOENT:
+ case FN_EMPTY:
+ if (generate) {
+ if (!have_lockfile()) {
+ if (try_locking(get_options(), 0)<0) {
+ /* Make sure that --list-fingerprint only creates new keys
+ * if there is no possibility for a deadlock. */
+ tor_log(severity, LD_FS, "Another Tor process has locked \"%s\". "
+ "Not writing any new keys.", fname);
+ /*XXXX The 'other process' might make a key in a second or two;
+ * maybe we should wait for it. */
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"; generating fresh key.",
+ fname);
+ if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error generating onion key");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (! crypto_pk_is_valid_private_key(prkey)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Generated key seems invalid");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Generated key seems valid");
+ if (created_out) {
+ *created_out = true;
+ }
+ if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_FS,
+ "Couldn't write generated key to \"%s\".", fname);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ } else {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"", fname);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ return prkey;
+ case FN_FILE:
+ if (crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(prkey, fname)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error loading private key.");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ return prkey;
+ default:
+ tor_assert(0);
+ }
+
+ error:
+ if (prkey)
+ crypto_pk_free(prkey);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* DOCDOC */
+static ssize_t
+do_getpass(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t buflen,
+ int twice, const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (options->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_OFF) {
+ tor_assert(buflen);
+ buf[0] = 0;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ char *prompt2 = NULL;
+ char *buf2 = NULL;
+ int fd = -1;
+ ssize_t length = -1;
+
+ if (options->use_keygen_passphrase_fd) {
+ twice = 0;
+ fd = options->keygen_passphrase_fd;
+ length = read_all_from_fd(fd, buf, buflen-1);
+ if (length >= 0)
+ buf[length] = 0;
+ goto done_reading;
+ }
+
+ if (twice) {
+ const char msg[] = "One more time:";
+ size_t p2len = strlen(prompt) + 1;
+ if (p2len < sizeof(msg))
+ p2len = sizeof(msg);
+ prompt2 = tor_malloc(p2len);
+ memset(prompt2, ' ', p2len);
+ memcpy(prompt2 + p2len - sizeof(msg), msg, sizeof(msg));
+
+ buf2 = tor_malloc_zero(buflen);
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ length = tor_getpass(prompt, buf, buflen);
+ if (length < 0)
+ goto done_reading;
+
+ if (! twice)
+ break;
+
+ ssize_t length2 = tor_getpass(prompt2, buf2, buflen);
+
+ if (length != length2 || tor_memneq(buf, buf2, length)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "That didn't match.\n");
+ } else {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ done_reading:
+ if (twice) {
+ tor_free(prompt2);
+ memwipe(buf2, 0, buflen);
+ tor_free(buf2);
+ }
+
+ if (options->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON && length == 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return length;
+}
+
+/* DOCDOC */
+int
+read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
+ const char *fname)
+{
+ int r = -1;
+ uint8_t *secret = NULL;
+ size_t secret_len = 0;
+ char pwbuf[256];
+ uint8_t encrypted_key[256];
+ char *tag = NULL;
+ int saved_errno = 0;
+
+ ssize_t encrypted_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(fname,
+ ENC_KEY_HEADER,
+ &tag,
+ encrypted_key,
+ sizeof(encrypted_key));
+ if (encrypted_len < 0) {
+ saved_errno = errno;
+ log_info(LD_OR, "%s is missing", fname);
+ r = 0;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(tag, ENC_KEY_TAG)) {
+ saved_errno = EINVAL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ while (1) {
+ ssize_t pwlen =
+ do_getpass("Enter passphrase for master key:", pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), 0,
+ get_options());
+ if (pwlen < 0) {
+ saved_errno = EINVAL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ const int r_unbox = crypto_unpwbox(&secret, &secret_len,
+ encrypted_key, encrypted_len,
+ pwbuf, pwlen);
+ if (r_unbox == UNPWBOX_CORRUPTED) {
+ log_err(LD_OR, "%s is corrupted.", fname);
+ saved_errno = EINVAL;
+ goto done;
+ } else if (r_unbox == UNPWBOX_OKAY) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Otherwise, passphrase is bad, so try again till user does ctrl-c or gets
+ * it right. */
+ }
+
+ if (secret_len != ED25519_SECKEY_LEN) {
+ log_err(LD_OR, "%s is corrupted.", fname);
+ saved_errno = EINVAL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ memcpy(out->seckey, secret, ED25519_SECKEY_LEN);
+ r = 1;
+
+ done:
+ memwipe(encrypted_key, 0, sizeof(encrypted_key));
+ memwipe(pwbuf, 0, sizeof(pwbuf));
+ tor_free(tag);
+ if (secret) {
+ memwipe(secret, 0, secret_len);
+ tor_free(secret);
+ }
+ if (saved_errno)
+ errno = saved_errno;
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* DOCDOC */
+int
+write_encrypted_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key,
+ const char *fname)
+{
+ int r = -1;
+ char pwbuf0[256];
+ uint8_t *encrypted_key = NULL;
+ size_t encrypted_len = 0;
+
+ if (do_getpass("Enter new passphrase:", pwbuf0, sizeof(pwbuf0), 1,
+ get_options()) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "NO/failed passphrase");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (strlen(pwbuf0) == 0) {
+ if (get_options()->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON)
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (crypto_pwbox(&encrypted_key, &encrypted_len,
+ key->seckey, sizeof(key->seckey),
+ pwbuf0, strlen(pwbuf0), 0) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_OR, "crypto_pwbox failed!?");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(fname,
+ ENC_KEY_HEADER,
+ ENC_KEY_TAG,
+ encrypted_key, encrypted_len) < 0)
+ goto done;
+ r = 1;
+ done:
+ if (encrypted_key) {
+ memwipe(encrypted_key, 0, encrypted_len);
+ tor_free(encrypted_key);
+ }
+ memwipe(pwbuf0, 0, sizeof(pwbuf0));
+ return r;
+}
+
+/* DOCDOC */
+static int
+write_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key, int encrypted,
+ const char *fname,
+ const char *fname_tag,
+ const char *encrypted_fname)
+{
+ if (encrypted) {
+ int r = write_encrypted_secret_key(key, encrypted_fname);
+ if (r == 1) {
+ /* Success! */
+
+ /* Try to unlink the unencrypted key, if any existed before */
+ if (strcmp(fname, encrypted_fname))
+ unlink(fname);
+ return r;
+ } else if (r != 0) {
+ /* Unrecoverable failure! */
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "Not encrypting the secret key.\n");
+ }
+ return ed25519_seckey_write_to_file(key, fname, fname_tag);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read an ed25519 key and associated certificates from files beginning with
+ * <b>fname</b>, with certificate type <b>cert_type</b>. On failure, return
+ * NULL; on success return the keypair.
+ *
+ * The <b>options</b> is used to look at the change_key_passphrase value when
+ * writing to disk a secret key. It is safe to be NULL even in that case.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create the key (and
+ * certificate if requested) if it doesn't exist, and save it to disk.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT is set in <b>flags</b>, load/create a certificate
+ * too and store it in *<b>cert_out</b>. Fail if the cert can't be
+ * found/created. To create a certificate, <b>signing_key</b> must be set to
+ * the key that should sign it; <b>now</b> to the current time, and
+ * <b>lifetime</b> to the lifetime of the key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create and save new key
+ * whether we can read the old one or not.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG is set in <b>flags</b>, set the extra_strong
+ * flag when creating the secret key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT is set in <b>flags</b>, and
+ * we create a new certificate, create it with the signing key embedded.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT is set in <b>flags</b>, and we create a new key,
+ * store the public key in a separate file from the secret key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK is set in <b>flags</b>, and we find a
+ * public key file but no secret key file, return successfully anyway.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET is set in <b>flags</b>, do not try to load a
+ * secret key unless no public key is found. Do not return a secret key. (but
+ * create and save one if needed).
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED is set, we look for an encrypted secret key
+ * and consider encrypting any new secret key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR is set, and there is any issue loading the keys
+ * from disk _other than their absence_ (full or partial), we do not try to
+ * replace them.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN is set, have log messages about failures
+ * refer to the --keygen option.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME is set, use the provided file name for the
+ * secret key file, encrypted or not.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET is set, we won't try to load the master
+ * secret key and we log a message at <b>severity</b> that we've done so.
+ */
+ed25519_keypair_t *
+ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
+ int severity,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+ time_t now,
+ time_t lifetime,
+ uint8_t cert_type,
+ struct tor_cert_st **cert_out,
+ const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ char *secret_fname = NULL;
+ char *encrypted_secret_fname = NULL;
+ char *public_fname = NULL;
+ char *cert_fname = NULL;
+ const char *loaded_secret_fname = NULL;
+ int created_pk = 0, created_sk = 0, created_cert = 0;
+ const int try_to_load = ! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE);
+ const int encrypt_key = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED);
+ const int norepair = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR);
+ const int split = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT);
+ const int omit_secret = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET);
+ const int offline_secret = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET);
+ const int explicit_fname = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME);
+
+ /* we don't support setting both of these flags at once. */
+ tor_assert((flags & (INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT)) !=
+ (INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT));
+
+ char tag[8];
+ tor_snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "type%d", (int)cert_type);
+
+ tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+ char *got_tag = NULL;
+ ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
+
+ if (explicit_fname) {
+ secret_fname = tor_strdup(fname);
+ encrypted_secret_fname = tor_strdup(fname);
+ } else {
+ tor_asprintf(&secret_fname, "%s_secret_key", fname);
+ tor_asprintf(&encrypted_secret_fname, "%s_secret_key_encrypted", fname);
+ }
+ tor_asprintf(&public_fname, "%s_public_key", fname);
+ tor_asprintf(&cert_fname, "%s_cert", fname);
+
+ /* Try to read the secret key. */
+ int have_secret = 0;
+ int load_secret = try_to_load &&
+ !offline_secret &&
+ (!omit_secret || file_status(public_fname)==FN_NOENT);
+ if (load_secret) {
+ int rv = ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(&keypair->seckey,
+ &got_tag, secret_fname);
+ if (rv == 0) {
+ have_secret = 1;
+ loaded_secret_fname = secret_fname;
+ tor_assert(got_tag);
+ } else {
+ if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", secret_fname,
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Should we try for an encrypted key? */
+ int have_encrypted_secret_file = 0;
+ if (!have_secret && try_to_load && encrypt_key) {
+ int r = read_encrypted_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
+ encrypted_secret_fname);
+ if (r > 0) {
+ have_secret = 1;
+ have_encrypted_secret_file = 1;
+ tor_free(got_tag); /* convince coverity we aren't leaking */
+ got_tag = tor_strdup(tag);
+ loaded_secret_fname = encrypted_secret_fname;
+ } else if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s",
+ encrypted_secret_fname, strerror(errno));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (try_to_load) {
+ /* Check if it's there anyway, so we don't replace it. */
+ if (file_status(encrypted_secret_fname) != FN_NOENT)
+ have_encrypted_secret_file = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (have_secret) {
+ if (strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", loaded_secret_fname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Derive the public key */
+ if (ed25519_public_key_generate(&keypair->pubkey, &keypair->seckey)<0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s can't produce a public key",
+ loaded_secret_fname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we do split keys here, try to read the pubkey. */
+ int found_public = 0;
+ if (try_to_load && (!have_secret || split)) {
+ ed25519_public_key_t pubkey_tmp;
+ tor_free(got_tag);
+ found_public = ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&pubkey_tmp,
+ &got_tag, public_fname) == 0;
+ if (!found_public && errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", public_fname,
+ strerror(errno));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (found_public && strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", public_fname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (found_public) {
+ if (have_secret) {
+ /* If we have a secret key and we're reloading the public key,
+ * the key must match! */
+ if (! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s does not match %s! If you are trying "
+ "to restore from backup, make sure you didn't mix up the "
+ "key files. If you are absolutely sure that %s is the right "
+ "key for this relay, delete %s or move it out of the way.",
+ public_fname, loaded_secret_fname,
+ loaded_secret_fname, public_fname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* We only have the public key; better use that. */
+ tor_assert(split);
+ memcpy(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp, sizeof(pubkey_tmp));
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* We have no public key file, but we do have a secret key, make the
+ * public key file! */
+ if (have_secret) {
+ if (ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag)
+ < 0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't repair %s", public_fname);
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ tor_log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_OR,
+ "Found secret key but not %s. Regenerating.",
+ public_fname);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If the secret key is absent and it's not allowed to be, fail. */
+ if (!have_secret && found_public &&
+ !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK)) {
+ if (have_encrypted_secret_file) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We needed to load a secret key from %s, "
+ "but it was encrypted. Try 'tor --keygen' instead, so you "
+ "can enter the passphrase.",
+ secret_fname);
+ } else if (offline_secret) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We wanted to load a secret key from %s, "
+ "but you're keeping it offline. (OfflineMasterKey is set.)",
+ secret_fname);
+ } else {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We needed to load a secret key from %s, "
+ "but couldn't find it. %s", secret_fname,
+ (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN) ?
+ "If you're keeping your master secret key offline, you will "
+ "need to run 'tor --keygen' to generate new signing keys." :
+ "Did you forget to copy it over when you copied the rest of the "
+ "signing key material?");
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* If it's absent, and we're not supposed to make a new keypair, fail. */
+ if (!have_secret && !found_public && !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE)) {
+ if (split) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "No key found in %s or %s.",
+ secret_fname, public_fname);
+ } else {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "No key found in %s.", secret_fname);
+ }
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* If the secret key is absent, but the encrypted key would be present,
+ * that's an error */
+ if (!have_secret && !found_public && have_encrypted_secret_file) {
+ tor_assert(!encrypt_key);
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Found an encrypted secret key, "
+ "but not public key file %s!", public_fname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* if it's absent, make a new keypair... */
+ if (!have_secret && !found_public) {
+ tor_free(keypair);
+ keypair = ed_key_new(signing_key, flags, now, lifetime,
+ cert_type, &cert);
+ if (!keypair) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create keypair");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ created_pk = created_sk = created_cert = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* Write it to disk if we're supposed to do with a new passphrase, or if
+ * we just created it. */
+ if (created_sk || (have_secret && options != NULL &&
+ options->change_key_passphrase)) {
+ if (write_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
+ encrypt_key,
+ secret_fname, tag, encrypted_secret_fname) < 0
+ ||
+ (split &&
+ ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag) < 0)
+ ||
+ (cert &&
+ crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
+ tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write keys or cert to file.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* If we're not supposed to get a cert, we're done. */
+ if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
+ goto done;
+
+ /* Read a cert. */
+ tor_free(got_tag);
+ uint8_t certbuf[256];
+ ssize_t cert_body_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(
+ cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
+ &got_tag, certbuf, sizeof(certbuf));
+ if (cert_body_len >= 0 && !strcmp(got_tag, tag))
+ cert = tor_cert_parse(certbuf, cert_body_len);
+
+ /* If we got it, check it to the extent we can. */
+ int bad_cert = 0;
+
+ if (! cert) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was unparseable");
+ bad_cert = 1;
+ } else if (!tor_memeq(cert->signed_key.pubkey, keypair->pubkey.pubkey,
+ ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was for wrong key");
+ bad_cert = 1;
+ } else if (signing_key &&
+ tor_cert_checksig(cert, &signing_key->pubkey, now) < 0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Can't check certificate: %s",
+ tor_cert_describe_signature_status(cert));
+ bad_cert = 1;
+ } else if (cert->cert_expired) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate is expired");
+ bad_cert = 1;
+ } else if (signing_key && cert->signing_key_included &&
+ ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&signing_key->pubkey, &cert->signing_key)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate signed by unexpectd key!");
+ bad_cert = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (bad_cert) {
+ tor_cert_free(cert);
+ cert = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* If we got a cert, we're done. */
+ if (cert)
+ goto done;
+
+ /* If we didn't get a cert, and we're not supposed to make one, fail. */
+ if (!signing_key || !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Without signing key, can't create certificate");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* We have keys but not a certificate, so make one. */
+ uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
+ if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
+ cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
+ cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
+ &keypair->pubkey,
+ now, lifetime,
+ cert_flags);
+
+ if (! cert) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create certificate");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Write it to disk. */
+ created_cert = 1;
+ if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
+ tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write cert to disk.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ done:
+ if (cert_out)
+ *cert_out = cert;
+ else
+ tor_cert_free(cert);
+
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ err:
+ if (keypair)
+ memwipe(keypair, 0, sizeof(*keypair));
+ tor_free(keypair);
+ tor_cert_free(cert);
+ if (cert_out)
+ *cert_out = NULL;
+ if (created_sk)
+ unlink(secret_fname);
+ if (created_pk)
+ unlink(public_fname);
+ if (created_cert)
+ unlink(cert_fname);
+
+ cleanup:
+ tor_free(encrypted_secret_fname);
+ tor_free(secret_fname);
+ tor_free(public_fname);
+ tor_free(cert_fname);
+ tor_free(got_tag);
+
+ return keypair;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create a new signing key and (optionally) certficiate; do not read or write
+ * from disk. See ed_key_init_from_file() for more information.
+ */
+ed25519_keypair_t *
+ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+ uint32_t flags,
+ time_t now,
+ time_t lifetime,
+ uint8_t cert_type,
+ struct tor_cert_st **cert_out)
+{
+ if (cert_out)
+ *cert_out = NULL;
+
+ const int extra_strong = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG);
+ ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
+ if (ed25519_keypair_generate(keypair, extra_strong) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
+ return keypair;
+
+ tor_assert(signing_key);
+ tor_assert(cert_out);
+ uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
+ if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
+ cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
+ tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
+ &keypair->pubkey,
+ now, lifetime,
+ cert_flags);
+ if (! cert)
+ goto err;
+
+ *cert_out = cert;
+ return keypair;
+
+ err:
+ tor_free(keypair);
+ return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.h b/src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7717bda29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.h
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file loadkey.h
+ * \brief Header file for loadkey.c
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_LOADKEY_H
+#define TOR_LOADKEY_H
+
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
+
+crypto_pk_t *init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate,
+ int severity, bool *created_out);
+
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE (1u<<0)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE (1u<<1)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT (1u<<2)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK (1u<<3)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT (1u<<4)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG (1u<<5)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT (1u<<6)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET (1u<<7)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED (1u<<8)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR (1u<<9)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN (1u<<10)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET (1u<<11)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME (1u<<12)
+
+struct tor_cert_st;
+ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
+ int severity,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+ time_t now,
+ time_t lifetime,
+ uint8_t cert_type,
+ struct tor_cert_st **cert_out,
+ const or_options_t *options);
+ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+ uint32_t flags,
+ time_t now,
+ time_t lifetime,
+ uint8_t cert_type,
+ struct tor_cert_st **cert_out);
+
+int read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
+ const char *fname);
+int write_encrypted_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
+ const char *fname);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c b/src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c
index fe67e5640..675d5c97b 100644
--- a/src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c
+++ b/src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c
@@ -638,6 +638,43 @@ or_handshake_certs_ed25519_ok(int severity,
return 1;
}
+/** Check whether an RSA-TAP cross-certification is correct. Return 0 if it
+ * is, -1 if it isn't. */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+check_tap_onion_key_crosscert,(const uint8_t *crosscert,
+ int crosscert_len,
+ const crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_pkey,
+ const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest))
+{
+ uint8_t *cc = tor_malloc(crypto_pk_keysize(onion_pkey));
+ int cc_len =
+ crypto_pk_public_checksig(onion_pkey,
+ (char*)cc,
+ crypto_pk_keysize(onion_pkey),
+ (const char*)crosscert,
+ crosscert_len);
+ if (cc_len < 0) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (cc_len < DIGEST_LEN + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Short signature on cross-certification with TAP key");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (tor_memneq(cc, rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN) ||
+ tor_memneq(cc + DIGEST_LEN, master_id_pkey->pubkey,
+ ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect cross-certification with TAP key");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ tor_free(cc);
+ return 0;
+ err:
+ tor_free(cc);
+ return -1;
+}
+
/**
* Check the Ed certificates and/or the RSA certificates, as appropriate. If
* we obtained an Ed25519 identity, set *ed_id_out. If we obtained an RSA
diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/torcert.h b/src/feature/nodelist/torcert.h
index 5fa97679d..cb5e23cc3 100644
--- a/src/feature/nodelist/torcert.h
+++ b/src/feature/nodelist/torcert.h
@@ -107,4 +107,10 @@ void or_handshake_certs_check_both(int severity,
int tor_cert_encode_ed22519(const tor_cert_t *cert, char **cert_str_out);
+MOCK_DECL(int, check_tap_onion_key_crosscert,(const uint8_t *crosscert,
+ int crosscert_len,
+ const crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey,
+ const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_pkey,
+ const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest));
+
#endif /* !defined(TORCERT_H_INCLUDED) */
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/router.c b/src/feature/relay/router.c
index 622cfeb86..7f72c7f35 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/router.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/router.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include "core/or/policies.h"
#include "core/or/protover.h"
#include "core/or/relay.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
@@ -540,85 +541,6 @@ log_new_relay_greeting(void)
already_logged = 1;
}
-/** Try to read an RSA key from <b>fname</b>. If <b>fname</b> doesn't exist
- * and <b>generate</b> is true, create a new RSA key and save it in
- * <b>fname</b>. Return the read/created key, or NULL on error. Log all
- * errors at level <b>severity</b>. If <b>log_greeting</b> is non-zero and a
- * new key was created, log_new_relay_greeting() is called.
- */
-crypto_pk_t *
-init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate, int severity,
- int log_greeting)
-{
- crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
-
- if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing key");
- goto error;
- }
-
- switch (file_status(fname)) {
- case FN_DIR:
- case FN_ERROR:
- tor_log(severity, LD_FS,"Can't read key from \"%s\"", fname);
- goto error;
- /* treat empty key files as if the file doesn't exist, and,
- * if generate is set, replace the empty file in
- * crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename() */
- case FN_NOENT:
- case FN_EMPTY:
- if (generate) {
- if (!have_lockfile()) {
- if (try_locking(get_options(), 0)<0) {
- /* Make sure that --list-fingerprint only creates new keys
- * if there is no possibility for a deadlock. */
- tor_log(severity, LD_FS, "Another Tor process has locked \"%s\". "
- "Not writing any new keys.", fname);
- /*XXXX The 'other process' might make a key in a second or two;
- * maybe we should wait for it. */
- goto error;
- }
- }
- log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"; generating fresh key.",
- fname);
- if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error generating onion key");
- goto error;
- }
- if (! crypto_pk_is_valid_private_key(prkey)) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Generated key seems invalid");
- goto error;
- }
- log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Generated key seems valid");
- if (log_greeting) {
- log_new_relay_greeting();
- }
- if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_FS,
- "Couldn't write generated key to \"%s\".", fname);
- goto error;
- }
- } else {
- tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"", fname);
- goto error;
- }
- return prkey;
- case FN_FILE:
- if (crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(prkey, fname)) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error loading private key.");
- goto error;
- }
- return prkey;
- default:
- tor_assert(0);
- }
-
- error:
- if (prkey)
- crypto_pk_free(prkey);
- return NULL;
-}
-
/** Load a curve25519 keypair from the file <b>fname</b>, writing it into
* <b>keys_out</b>. If the file isn't found, or is empty, and <b>generate</b>
* is true, create a new keypair and write it into the file. If there are
@@ -708,7 +630,7 @@ load_authority_keyset(int legacy, crypto_pk_t **key_out,
fname = get_keydir_fname(
legacy ? "legacy_signing_key" : "authority_signing_key");
- signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_ERR, 0);
+ signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_ERR, NULL);
if (!signing_key) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "No version 3 directory key found in %s", fname);
goto done;
@@ -1042,9 +964,12 @@ init_keys(void)
/* 1b. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */
keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_id_key");
log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making identity key \"%s\"...",keydir);
- prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, 1);
+ bool created = false;
+ prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created);
tor_free(keydir);
if (!prkey) return -1;
+ if (created)
+ log_new_relay_greeting();
set_server_identity_key(prkey);
/* 1c. If we are configured as a bridge, generate a client key;
@@ -1070,7 +995,9 @@ init_keys(void)
/* 2. Read onion key. Make it if none is found. */
keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key");
log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making onion key \"%s\"...",keydir);
- prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, 1);
+ prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created);
+ if (created)
+ log_new_relay_greeting();
tor_free(keydir);
if (!prkey) return -1;
set_onion_key(prkey);
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/router.h b/src/feature/relay/router.h
index cf0d27a45..e6a163973 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/router.h
+++ b/src/feature/relay/router.h
@@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ crypto_pk_t *get_my_v3_legacy_signing_key(void);
void dup_onion_keys(crypto_pk_t **key, crypto_pk_t **last);
void expire_old_onion_keys(void);
void rotate_onion_key(void);
-crypto_pk_t *init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate,
- int severity, int log_greeting);
void v3_authority_check_key_expiry(void);
int get_onion_key_lifetime(void);
int get_onion_key_grace_period(void);
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
index 47af0f812..c13359795 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
@@ -18,14 +18,12 @@
#include "app/config/config.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_pwbox.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
-#include "lib/term/getpass.h"
#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
#include "lib/tls/x509.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
#define ENC_KEY_HEADER "Boxed Ed25519 key"
#define ENC_KEY_TAG "master"
@@ -34,647 +32,6 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
-/* DOCDOC */
-static ssize_t
-do_getpass(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t buflen,
- int twice, const or_options_t *options)
-{
- if (options->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_OFF) {
- tor_assert(buflen);
- buf[0] = 0;
- return 0;
- }
-
- char *prompt2 = NULL;
- char *buf2 = NULL;
- int fd = -1;
- ssize_t length = -1;
-
- if (options->use_keygen_passphrase_fd) {
- twice = 0;
- fd = options->keygen_passphrase_fd;
- length = read_all_from_fd(fd, buf, buflen-1);
- if (length >= 0)
- buf[length] = 0;
- goto done_reading;
- }
-
- if (twice) {
- const char msg[] = "One more time:";
- size_t p2len = strlen(prompt) + 1;
- if (p2len < sizeof(msg))
- p2len = sizeof(msg);
- prompt2 = tor_malloc(p2len);
- memset(prompt2, ' ', p2len);
- memcpy(prompt2 + p2len - sizeof(msg), msg, sizeof(msg));
-
- buf2 = tor_malloc_zero(buflen);
- }
-
- while (1) {
- length = tor_getpass(prompt, buf, buflen);
- if (length < 0)
- goto done_reading;
-
- if (! twice)
- break;
-
- ssize_t length2 = tor_getpass(prompt2, buf2, buflen);
-
- if (length != length2 || tor_memneq(buf, buf2, length)) {
- fprintf(stderr, "That didn't match.\n");
- } else {
- break;
- }
- }
-
- done_reading:
- if (twice) {
- tor_free(prompt2);
- memwipe(buf2, 0, buflen);
- tor_free(buf2);
- }
-
- if (options->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON && length == 0)
- return -1;
-
- return length;
-}
-
-/* DOCDOC */
-int
-read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
- const char *fname)
-{
- int r = -1;
- uint8_t *secret = NULL;
- size_t secret_len = 0;
- char pwbuf[256];
- uint8_t encrypted_key[256];
- char *tag = NULL;
- int saved_errno = 0;
-
- ssize_t encrypted_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(fname,
- ENC_KEY_HEADER,
- &tag,
- encrypted_key,
- sizeof(encrypted_key));
- if (encrypted_len < 0) {
- saved_errno = errno;
- log_info(LD_OR, "%s is missing", fname);
- r = 0;
- goto done;
- }
- if (strcmp(tag, ENC_KEY_TAG)) {
- saved_errno = EINVAL;
- goto done;
- }
-
- while (1) {
- ssize_t pwlen =
- do_getpass("Enter passphrase for master key:", pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), 0,
- get_options());
- if (pwlen < 0) {
- saved_errno = EINVAL;
- goto done;
- }
- const int r_unbox = crypto_unpwbox(&secret, &secret_len,
- encrypted_key, encrypted_len,
- pwbuf, pwlen);
- if (r_unbox == UNPWBOX_CORRUPTED) {
- log_err(LD_OR, "%s is corrupted.", fname);
- saved_errno = EINVAL;
- goto done;
- } else if (r_unbox == UNPWBOX_OKAY) {
- break;
- }
-
- /* Otherwise, passphrase is bad, so try again till user does ctrl-c or gets
- * it right. */
- }
-
- if (secret_len != ED25519_SECKEY_LEN) {
- log_err(LD_OR, "%s is corrupted.", fname);
- saved_errno = EINVAL;
- goto done;
- }
- memcpy(out->seckey, secret, ED25519_SECKEY_LEN);
- r = 1;
-
- done:
- memwipe(encrypted_key, 0, sizeof(encrypted_key));
- memwipe(pwbuf, 0, sizeof(pwbuf));
- tor_free(tag);
- if (secret) {
- memwipe(secret, 0, secret_len);
- tor_free(secret);
- }
- if (saved_errno)
- errno = saved_errno;
- return r;
-}
-
-/* DOCDOC */
-int
-write_encrypted_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key,
- const char *fname)
-{
- int r = -1;
- char pwbuf0[256];
- uint8_t *encrypted_key = NULL;
- size_t encrypted_len = 0;
-
- if (do_getpass("Enter new passphrase:", pwbuf0, sizeof(pwbuf0), 1,
- get_options()) < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_OR, "NO/failed passphrase");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (strlen(pwbuf0) == 0) {
- if (get_options()->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON)
- return -1;
- else
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (crypto_pwbox(&encrypted_key, &encrypted_len,
- key->seckey, sizeof(key->seckey),
- pwbuf0, strlen(pwbuf0), 0) < 0) {
- log_warn(LD_OR, "crypto_pwbox failed!?");
- goto done;
- }
- if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(fname,
- ENC_KEY_HEADER,
- ENC_KEY_TAG,
- encrypted_key, encrypted_len) < 0)
- goto done;
- r = 1;
- done:
- if (encrypted_key) {
- memwipe(encrypted_key, 0, encrypted_len);
- tor_free(encrypted_key);
- }
- memwipe(pwbuf0, 0, sizeof(pwbuf0));
- return r;
-}
-
-/* DOCDOC */
-static int
-write_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key, int encrypted,
- const char *fname,
- const char *fname_tag,
- const char *encrypted_fname)
-{
- if (encrypted) {
- int r = write_encrypted_secret_key(key, encrypted_fname);
- if (r == 1) {
- /* Success! */
-
- /* Try to unlink the unencrypted key, if any existed before */
- if (strcmp(fname, encrypted_fname))
- unlink(fname);
- return r;
- } else if (r != 0) {
- /* Unrecoverable failure! */
- return r;
- }
-
- fprintf(stderr, "Not encrypting the secret key.\n");
- }
- return ed25519_seckey_write_to_file(key, fname, fname_tag);
-}
-
-/**
- * Read an ed25519 key and associated certificates from files beginning with
- * <b>fname</b>, with certificate type <b>cert_type</b>. On failure, return
- * NULL; on success return the keypair.
- *
- * The <b>options</b> is used to look at the change_key_passphrase value when
- * writing to disk a secret key. It is safe to be NULL even in that case.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create the key (and
- * certificate if requested) if it doesn't exist, and save it to disk.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT is set in <b>flags</b>, load/create a certificate
- * too and store it in *<b>cert_out</b>. Fail if the cert can't be
- * found/created. To create a certificate, <b>signing_key</b> must be set to
- * the key that should sign it; <b>now</b> to the current time, and
- * <b>lifetime</b> to the lifetime of the key.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create and save new key
- * whether we can read the old one or not.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG is set in <b>flags</b>, set the extra_strong
- * flag when creating the secret key.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT is set in <b>flags</b>, and
- * we create a new certificate, create it with the signing key embedded.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT is set in <b>flags</b>, and we create a new key,
- * store the public key in a separate file from the secret key.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK is set in <b>flags</b>, and we find a
- * public key file but no secret key file, return successfully anyway.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET is set in <b>flags</b>, do not try to load a
- * secret key unless no public key is found. Do not return a secret key. (but
- * create and save one if needed).
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED is set, we look for an encrypted secret key
- * and consider encrypting any new secret key.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR is set, and there is any issue loading the keys
- * from disk _other than their absence_ (full or partial), we do not try to
- * replace them.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN is set, have log messages about failures
- * refer to the --keygen option.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME is set, use the provided file name for the
- * secret key file, encrypted or not.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET is set, we won't try to load the master
- * secret key and we log a message at <b>severity</b> that we've done so.
- */
-ed25519_keypair_t *
-ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
- int severity,
- const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
- time_t now,
- time_t lifetime,
- uint8_t cert_type,
- struct tor_cert_st **cert_out,
- const or_options_t *options)
-{
- char *secret_fname = NULL;
- char *encrypted_secret_fname = NULL;
- char *public_fname = NULL;
- char *cert_fname = NULL;
- const char *loaded_secret_fname = NULL;
- int created_pk = 0, created_sk = 0, created_cert = 0;
- const int try_to_load = ! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE);
- const int encrypt_key = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED);
- const int norepair = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR);
- const int split = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT);
- const int omit_secret = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET);
- const int offline_secret = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET);
- const int explicit_fname = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME);
-
- /* we don't support setting both of these flags at once. */
- tor_assert((flags & (INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT)) !=
- (INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT));
-
- char tag[8];
- tor_snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "type%d", (int)cert_type);
-
- tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
- char *got_tag = NULL;
- ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
-
- if (explicit_fname) {
- secret_fname = tor_strdup(fname);
- encrypted_secret_fname = tor_strdup(fname);
- } else {
- tor_asprintf(&secret_fname, "%s_secret_key", fname);
- tor_asprintf(&encrypted_secret_fname, "%s_secret_key_encrypted", fname);
- }
- tor_asprintf(&public_fname, "%s_public_key", fname);
- tor_asprintf(&cert_fname, "%s_cert", fname);
-
- /* Try to read the secret key. */
- int have_secret = 0;
- int load_secret = try_to_load &&
- !offline_secret &&
- (!omit_secret || file_status(public_fname)==FN_NOENT);
- if (load_secret) {
- int rv = ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(&keypair->seckey,
- &got_tag, secret_fname);
- if (rv == 0) {
- have_secret = 1;
- loaded_secret_fname = secret_fname;
- tor_assert(got_tag);
- } else {
- if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", secret_fname,
- strerror(errno));
- goto err;
- }
- }
- }
-
- /* Should we try for an encrypted key? */
- int have_encrypted_secret_file = 0;
- if (!have_secret && try_to_load && encrypt_key) {
- int r = read_encrypted_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
- encrypted_secret_fname);
- if (r > 0) {
- have_secret = 1;
- have_encrypted_secret_file = 1;
- tor_free(got_tag); /* convince coverity we aren't leaking */
- got_tag = tor_strdup(tag);
- loaded_secret_fname = encrypted_secret_fname;
- } else if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s",
- encrypted_secret_fname, strerror(errno));
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- if (try_to_load) {
- /* Check if it's there anyway, so we don't replace it. */
- if (file_status(encrypted_secret_fname) != FN_NOENT)
- have_encrypted_secret_file = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (have_secret) {
- if (strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", loaded_secret_fname);
- goto err;
- }
- /* Derive the public key */
- if (ed25519_public_key_generate(&keypair->pubkey, &keypair->seckey)<0) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s can't produce a public key",
- loaded_secret_fname);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- /* If we do split keys here, try to read the pubkey. */
- int found_public = 0;
- if (try_to_load && (!have_secret || split)) {
- ed25519_public_key_t pubkey_tmp;
- tor_free(got_tag);
- found_public = ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&pubkey_tmp,
- &got_tag, public_fname) == 0;
- if (!found_public && errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", public_fname,
- strerror(errno));
- goto err;
- }
- if (found_public && strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", public_fname);
- goto err;
- }
- if (found_public) {
- if (have_secret) {
- /* If we have a secret key and we're reloading the public key,
- * the key must match! */
- if (! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp)) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s does not match %s! If you are trying "
- "to restore from backup, make sure you didn't mix up the "
- "key files. If you are absolutely sure that %s is the right "
- "key for this relay, delete %s or move it out of the way.",
- public_fname, loaded_secret_fname,
- loaded_secret_fname, public_fname);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- /* We only have the public key; better use that. */
- tor_assert(split);
- memcpy(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp, sizeof(pubkey_tmp));
- }
- } else {
- /* We have no public key file, but we do have a secret key, make the
- * public key file! */
- if (have_secret) {
- if (ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag)
- < 0) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't repair %s", public_fname);
- goto err;
- } else {
- tor_log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_OR,
- "Found secret key but not %s. Regenerating.",
- public_fname);
- }
- }
- }
- }
-
- /* If the secret key is absent and it's not allowed to be, fail. */
- if (!have_secret && found_public &&
- !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK)) {
- if (have_encrypted_secret_file) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We needed to load a secret key from %s, "
- "but it was encrypted. Try 'tor --keygen' instead, so you "
- "can enter the passphrase.",
- secret_fname);
- } else if (offline_secret) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We wanted to load a secret key from %s, "
- "but you're keeping it offline. (OfflineMasterKey is set.)",
- secret_fname);
- } else {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We needed to load a secret key from %s, "
- "but couldn't find it. %s", secret_fname,
- (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN) ?
- "If you're keeping your master secret key offline, you will "
- "need to run 'tor --keygen' to generate new signing keys." :
- "Did you forget to copy it over when you copied the rest of the "
- "signing key material?");
- }
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* If it's absent, and we're not supposed to make a new keypair, fail. */
- if (!have_secret && !found_public && !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE)) {
- if (split) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "No key found in %s or %s.",
- secret_fname, public_fname);
- } else {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "No key found in %s.", secret_fname);
- }
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* If the secret key is absent, but the encrypted key would be present,
- * that's an error */
- if (!have_secret && !found_public && have_encrypted_secret_file) {
- tor_assert(!encrypt_key);
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Found an encrypted secret key, "
- "but not public key file %s!", public_fname);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* if it's absent, make a new keypair... */
- if (!have_secret && !found_public) {
- tor_free(keypair);
- keypair = ed_key_new(signing_key, flags, now, lifetime,
- cert_type, &cert);
- if (!keypair) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create keypair");
- goto err;
- }
- created_pk = created_sk = created_cert = 1;
- }
-
- /* Write it to disk if we're supposed to do with a new passphrase, or if
- * we just created it. */
- if (created_sk || (have_secret && options != NULL &&
- options->change_key_passphrase)) {
- if (write_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
- encrypt_key,
- secret_fname, tag, encrypted_secret_fname) < 0
- ||
- (split &&
- ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag) < 0)
- ||
- (cert &&
- crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
- tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0)) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write keys or cert to file.");
- goto err;
- }
- goto done;
- }
-
- /* If we're not supposed to get a cert, we're done. */
- if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
- goto done;
-
- /* Read a cert. */
- tor_free(got_tag);
- uint8_t certbuf[256];
- ssize_t cert_body_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(
- cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
- &got_tag, certbuf, sizeof(certbuf));
- if (cert_body_len >= 0 && !strcmp(got_tag, tag))
- cert = tor_cert_parse(certbuf, cert_body_len);
-
- /* If we got it, check it to the extent we can. */
- int bad_cert = 0;
-
- if (! cert) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was unparseable");
- bad_cert = 1;
- } else if (!tor_memeq(cert->signed_key.pubkey, keypair->pubkey.pubkey,
- ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was for wrong key");
- bad_cert = 1;
- } else if (signing_key &&
- tor_cert_checksig(cert, &signing_key->pubkey, now) < 0) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Can't check certificate: %s",
- tor_cert_describe_signature_status(cert));
- bad_cert = 1;
- } else if (cert->cert_expired) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate is expired");
- bad_cert = 1;
- } else if (signing_key && cert->signing_key_included &&
- ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&signing_key->pubkey, &cert->signing_key)) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate signed by unexpectd key!");
- bad_cert = 1;
- }
-
- if (bad_cert) {
- tor_cert_free(cert);
- cert = NULL;
- }
-
- /* If we got a cert, we're done. */
- if (cert)
- goto done;
-
- /* If we didn't get a cert, and we're not supposed to make one, fail. */
- if (!signing_key || !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE)) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Without signing key, can't create certificate");
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* We have keys but not a certificate, so make one. */
- uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
- if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
- cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
- cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
- &keypair->pubkey,
- now, lifetime,
- cert_flags);
-
- if (! cert) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create certificate");
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* Write it to disk. */
- created_cert = 1;
- if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
- tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0) {
- tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write cert to disk.");
- goto err;
- }
-
- done:
- if (cert_out)
- *cert_out = cert;
- else
- tor_cert_free(cert);
-
- goto cleanup;
-
- err:
- if (keypair)
- memwipe(keypair, 0, sizeof(*keypair));
- tor_free(keypair);
- tor_cert_free(cert);
- if (cert_out)
- *cert_out = NULL;
- if (created_sk)
- unlink(secret_fname);
- if (created_pk)
- unlink(public_fname);
- if (created_cert)
- unlink(cert_fname);
-
- cleanup:
- tor_free(encrypted_secret_fname);
- tor_free(secret_fname);
- tor_free(public_fname);
- tor_free(cert_fname);
- tor_free(got_tag);
-
- return keypair;
-}
-
-/**
- * Create a new signing key and (optionally) certficiate; do not read or write
- * from disk. See ed_key_init_from_file() for more information.
- */
-ed25519_keypair_t *
-ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
- uint32_t flags,
- time_t now,
- time_t lifetime,
- uint8_t cert_type,
- struct tor_cert_st **cert_out)
-{
- if (cert_out)
- *cert_out = NULL;
-
- const int extra_strong = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG);
- ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
- if (ed25519_keypair_generate(keypair, extra_strong) < 0)
- goto err;
-
- if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
- return keypair;
-
- tor_assert(signing_key);
- tor_assert(cert_out);
- uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
- if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
- cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
- tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
- &keypair->pubkey,
- now, lifetime,
- cert_flags);
- if (! cert)
- goto err;
-
- *cert_out = cert;
- return keypair;
-
- err:
- tor_free(keypair);
- return NULL;
-}
-
static ed25519_keypair_t *master_identity_key = NULL;
static ed25519_keypair_t *master_signing_key = NULL;
static ed25519_keypair_t *current_auth_key = NULL;
@@ -1363,43 +720,6 @@ make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
return tor_memdup(signature, r);
}
-/** Check whether an RSA-TAP cross-certification is correct. Return 0 if it
- * is, -1 if it isn't. */
-MOCK_IMPL(int,
-check_tap_onion_key_crosscert,(const uint8_t *crosscert,
- int crosscert_len,
- const crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey,
- const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_pkey,
- const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest))
-{
- uint8_t *cc = tor_malloc(crypto_pk_keysize(onion_pkey));
- int cc_len =
- crypto_pk_public_checksig(onion_pkey,
- (char*)cc,
- crypto_pk_keysize(onion_pkey),
- (const char*)crosscert,
- crosscert_len);
- if (cc_len < 0) {
- goto err;
- }
- if (cc_len < DIGEST_LEN + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN) {
- log_warn(LD_DIR, "Short signature on cross-certification with TAP key");
- goto err;
- }
- if (tor_memneq(cc, rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN) ||
- tor_memneq(cc + DIGEST_LEN, master_id_pkey->pubkey,
- ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
- log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect cross-certification with TAP key");
- goto err;
- }
-
- tor_free(cc);
- return 0;
- err:
- tor_free(cc);
- return -1;
-}
-
void
routerkeys_free_all(void)
{
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h
index f52ed0f30..c5a58e553 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h
+++ b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h
@@ -6,35 +6,6 @@
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE (1u<<0)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE (1u<<1)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT (1u<<2)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK (1u<<3)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT (1u<<4)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG (1u<<5)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT (1u<<6)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET (1u<<7)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED (1u<<8)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR (1u<<9)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN (1u<<10)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET (1u<<11)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME (1u<<12)
-
-struct tor_cert_st;
-ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
- int severity,
- const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
- time_t now,
- time_t lifetime,
- uint8_t cert_type,
- struct tor_cert_st **cert_out,
- const or_options_t *options);
-ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
- uint32_t flags,
- time_t now,
- time_t lifetime,
- uint8_t cert_type,
- struct tor_cert_st **cert_out);
const ed25519_public_key_t *get_master_identity_key(void);
const ed25519_keypair_t *get_master_signing_keypair(void);
const struct tor_cert_st *get_master_signing_key_cert(void);
@@ -58,23 +29,12 @@ uint8_t *make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
const crypto_pk_t *rsa_id_key,
int *len_out);
-MOCK_DECL(int, check_tap_onion_key_crosscert,(const uint8_t *crosscert,
- int crosscert_len,
- const crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey,
- const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_pkey,
- const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest));
-
int log_cert_expiration(void);
int load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now);
int should_make_new_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, const time_t now);
int generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now, int force);
-int read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
- const char *fname);
-int write_encrypted_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
- const char *fname);
-
void routerkeys_free_all(void);
#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
@@ -83,4 +43,3 @@ void init_mock_ed_keys(const crypto_pk_t *rsa_identity_key);
#endif
#endif /* !defined(TOR_ROUTERKEYS_H) */
-
diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendservice.c b/src/feature/rend/rendservice.c
index 7966ab846..b16574003 100644
--- a/src/feature/rend/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/feature/rend/rendservice.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include "feature/rend/rendcommon.h"
#include "feature/rend/rendservice.h"
#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
#include "core/or/relay.h"
#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
#include "feature/hs_common/replaycache.h"
@@ -1363,7 +1364,7 @@ rend_service_key_on_disk(const char *directory_path)
/* Load key */
fname = hs_path_from_filename(directory_path, private_key_fname);
- pk = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_DEBUG, 0);
+ pk = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_DEBUG, NULL);
if (pk) {
ret = 1;
}
@@ -1535,7 +1536,7 @@ rend_service_load_keys(rend_service_t *s)
/* Load key */
fname = rend_service_path(s, private_key_fname);
- s->private_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 1, LOG_ERR, 0);
+ s->private_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 1, LOG_ERR, NULL);
if (!s->private_key)
goto err;
diff --git a/src/test/fuzz/fuzz_descriptor.c b/src/test/fuzz/fuzz_descriptor.c
index 5a56f4081..2babdce4b 100644
--- a/src/test/fuzz/fuzz_descriptor.c
+++ b/src/test/fuzz/fuzz_descriptor.c
@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
#include "core/or/or.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerparse.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
-#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
#include "test/fuzz/fuzzing.h"
static int
@@ -76,4 +77,3 @@ fuzz_main(const uint8_t *data, size_t sz)
}
return 0;
}
-
diff --git a/src/test/test_routerkeys.c b/src/test/test_routerkeys.c
index b62aea113..f05401ba0 100644
--- a/src/test/test_routerkeys.c
+++ b/src/test/test_routerkeys.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h"
#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
#include "test/test.h"
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