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[or-cvs] r14337: Pull up items from "future versions" list, remove duplicate (in tor/trunk: . doc)
Author: nickm
Date: 2008-04-09 16:31:59 -0400 (Wed, 09 Apr 2008)
New Revision: 14337
Modified:
tor/trunk/
tor/trunk/doc/TODO
Log:
r19277@catbus: nickm | 2008-04-09 16:31:51 -0400
Pull up items from "future versions" list, remove duplicate items, etc.
Property changes on: tor/trunk
___________________________________________________________________
svk:merge ticket from /tor/trunk [r19277] on 8246c3cf-6607-4228-993b-4d95d33730f1
Modified: tor/trunk/doc/TODO
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/TODO 2008-04-09 20:31:56 UTC (rev 14336)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/TODO 2008-04-09 20:31:59 UTC (rev 14337)
@@ -285,6 +285,7 @@
- Optimize cell pool allocation.
- Support (or just always use) jemalloc
- mmap more files.
+ - Look into pulling serverdescs off buffers as they arrive.
- Use less bandwidth
- Use if-modified-since to download consensuses
- Handle multi-core cpus better
@@ -380,6 +381,10 @@
*last* use, not their *first* use.
- enforce a lower limit on MaxCircuitDirtiness and CircuitBuildTimeout.
- Make 'safelogging' extend to info-level logs too.
+ - don't do dns hijacking tests if we're reject *:* exit policy?
+ (deferred until 0.1.1.x is less common)
+ - More consistent error checking in router_parse_entry_from_string().
+ I can say "banana" as my bandwidthcapacity, and it won't even squeak.
- Interface for letting SOAT modify flags that authorities assign.
(How to keep the authority from clobbering them afterwords?
@@ -450,7 +455,7 @@
Future versions:
- - Protocol:
+ - Protocol
- Our current approach to block attempts to use Tor as a single-hop proxy
is pretty lame; we should get a better one.
- Allow small cells and large cells on the same network?
@@ -470,21 +475,22 @@
- Directory system
- BEGIN_DIR items
- X turn the received socks addr:port into a digest for setting .exit
- handle connect-dir streams that don't have a chosen_exit_name set.
- Have a "Faster" status flag that means it. Fast2, Fast4, Fast8?
- Add an option (related to AvoidDiskWrites) to disable directory
caching. (Is this actually a good idea??)
- - Add d64 and fp64 along-side d and fp so people can paste status
+ X Add d64 and fp64 along-side d and fp so people can paste status
entries into a url. since + is a valid base64 char, only allow one
at a time. Consider adding to controller as well.
+ [abandoned for lack of demand]
- Some back-out mechanism for auto-approval on authorities
- a way of rolling back approvals to before a timestamp
- Consider minion-like fingerprint file/log combination.
- - Have new people be in limbo and need to demonstrate usefulness
+ X Have new people be in limbo and need to demonstrate usefulness
before we approve them.
- Hidden services:
+ ****** Have karsten sort these.
- Standby/hotswap/redundant hidden services.
. Update the hidden service stuff for the new dir approach. (Much
of this will be superseded by 114.)
@@ -503,11 +509,6 @@
- Hidserv offerers shouldn't need to define a SocksPort
- Server operation
- X When we notice a 'Rejected: There is already a named server with
- this nickname' message... or maybe instead when we see in the
- networkstatuses that somebody else is Named with the name we
- want: warn the user, send a STATUS_SERVER message, and fall back
- to unnamed.
- If the server is spewing complaints about raising your ulimit -n,
we should add a note about this to the server descriptor so other
people can notice too.
@@ -553,7 +554,6 @@
(It's hard to support read > write, since we need better
congestion control to avoid overfull buffers there. So,
defer the whole thing.)
- - Look into pulling serverdescs off buffers as they arrive.
- Rate limit exit connections to a given destination -- this helps
us play nice with websites when Tor users want to crawl them; it
also introduces DoS opportunities.
@@ -578,8 +578,6 @@
- Security
- some better fix for bug #516?
- - don't do dns hijacking tests if we're reject *:* exit policy?
- (deferred until 0.1.1.x is less common)
- Directory guards
- Mini-SoaT:
- Servers might check certs for known-good ssl websites, and if
@@ -592,8 +590,6 @@
the BadExit flag set.
- Alternatively, authorities should be able to import opinions
from Snakes on a Tor.
- - More consistent error checking in router_parse_entry_from_string().
- I can say "banana" as my bandwidthcapacity, and it won't even squeak.
- Bind to random port when making outgoing connections to Tor servers,
to reduce remote sniping attacks.
- Audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are just as
@@ -620,8 +616,6 @@
- We need a getrlimit equivalent on Windows so we can reserve some
file descriptors for saving files, etc. Otherwise we'll trigger
asserts when we're out of file descriptors and crash.
- - Merge code from Urz into libevent
- - Make Tor use evbuffers.
- Documentation
- a way to generate the website diagrams from source, so we can
@@ -629,8 +623,6 @@
imagemagick?)
. Flesh out options_description array in src/or/config.c
. multiple sample torrc files
- . figure out how to make nt service stuff work?
- . Document it.
- Refactor tor man page to divide generally useful options from
less useful ones?
- Add a doxygen style checker to make check-spaces so nick doesn't drift
@@ -653,8 +645,6 @@
fix the https thing in the default configuration:
http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#PrivoxyWeirdSSLPort
- - Related tools
- X Patch privoxy and socks protocol to pass strings to the browser.
=======================================================================