[or-cvs] r14481: another paper i want somebody to write (website/trunk/en)

[arma@xxxxxxxx]

Author: arma
Date: 2008-04-26 15:38:42 -0400 (Sat, 26 Apr 2008)
New Revision: 14481

Modified:
   website/trunk/en/volunteer.wml
Log:
another paper i want somebody to write


Modified: website/trunk/en/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/en/volunteer.wml	2008-04-26 18:55:46 UTC (rev 14480)
+++ website/trunk/en/volunteer.wml	2008-04-26 19:38:42 UTC (rev 14481)
@@ -1050,6 +1050,21 @@
 asymmetric links, is it actually possible to differentiate client traffic from
 natural bursts due to their asymmetric capacity? Or is it easier than
 symmetric links for some other reason?</li>
+<li>Repeat Murdoch and Danezis's <a
+href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/projects/anon/#torta";>attack from
+Oakland 05</a> on the current Tor network. See if you can learn why it
+works well on some nodes and not well on others. (My theory is that the
+fast nodes with spare capacity resist the attack better.) If that's true,
+then experiment with the RelayBandwidthRate and RelayBandwidthBurst
+options to run a relay that is used as a client while relaying the
+attacker's traffic: as we crank down the RelayBandwidthRate, does the
+attack get harder? What's the right ratio of RelayBandwidthRate to
+actually capacity? Or is it a ratio at all? While we're at it, does a
+much larger set of candidate relays increase the false positive rate
+or other complexity for the attack? (The Tor network is now almost two
+orders of magnitude larger than it was when they wrote their paper.) Be
+sure to read <a href="http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#clog-the-queue";>Don't
+Clog the Queue</a> too.</li>
 <li>The "routing zones attack": most of the literature thinks of
 the network path between Alice and her entry node (and between the
 exit node and Bob) as a single link on some graph. In practice,