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[or-cvs] r16336: Fix the verbage on the attacks page a little, add a couple l (torbutton/trunk/website/design)
Author: mikeperry
Date: 2008-08-01 16:07:42 -0400 (Fri, 01 Aug 2008)
New Revision: 16336
Modified:
torbutton/trunk/website/design/design.xml
torbutton/trunk/website/design/index.html.en
Log:
Fix the verbage on the attacks page a little, add a couple
links.
Modified: torbutton/trunk/website/design/design.xml
===================================================================
--- torbutton/trunk/website/design/design.xml 2008-08-01 18:49:00 UTC (rev 16335)
+++ torbutton/trunk/website/design/design.xml 2008-08-01 20:07:42 UTC (rev 16336)
@@ -133,19 +133,29 @@
<sect3 id="attacks">
<title>Adversary Capabilities - Attacks</title>
<para>
+
The adversary can perform the following attacks from a number of different
-positions to accomplish various aspects of their goals.
+positions to accomplish various aspects of their goals. It should be noted
+that many of these attacks (especially those involving IP address leakage) are
+often performed by accident by websites that simply have Javascript, dynamic
+CSS elements, and plugins. Others are performed by adservers seeking to
+correlate users' activity across different IP addresses, and still others are
+performed by malicious agents on the Tor network and at national firewalls.
+
</para>
<orderedlist>
<listitem><command>Inserting Javascript</command>
<para>
-Javascript allows the adversary the opportunity to accomplish a number of
-their goals. If not properly disabled, Javascript event handlers and timers
+If not properly disabled, Javascript event handlers and timers
can cause the browser to perform network activity after Tor has been disabled,
-thus allowing the adversary to correlate Tor and Non-Tor activity. Javascript
+thus allowing the adversary to correlate Tor and Non-Tor activity and reveal
+a user's non-Tor IP address. Javascript
also allows the adversary to execute <ulink
url="http://gemal.dk/browserspy/css.html";>history disclosure attacks</ulink>:
-to query the history via the different attributes of 'visited' links. Finally,
+to query the history via the different attributes of 'visited' links to search
+for particular google queries, sites, or even to <ulink
+url="http://www.mikeonads.com/2008/07/13/using-your-browser-url-history-estimate-gender/";>profile
+users based on gender and other classifications</ulink>. Finally,
Javascript can be used to query the user's timezone via the
<function>Date()</function> object, and to reduce the anonymity set by querying
the <function>navigator</function> object for operating system, CPU, locale,
@@ -160,7 +170,11 @@
capable of performing network activity that the author has
investigated is also capable of performing network activity independent of
browser proxy settings - and often independent of its own proxy settings.
-In addition, plugins can be used to store unique identifiers that are more
+Sites that have plugin content don't even have to be malicious to obtain a
+user's
+Non-Tor IP (it usually leaks by itself), though <ulink
+url="http://www.metasploit.com/research/projects/decloak/";>plenty of active
+exploits</ulink> are possible as well. In addition, plugins can be used to store unique identifiers that are more
difficult to clear than standard cookies.
<ulink url="http://epic.org/privacy/cookies/flash.html";>Flash-based
cookies</ulink> fall into this category, but there are likely numerous other
@@ -171,7 +185,8 @@
<listitem><command>Inserting CSS</command>
<para>
-CSS can also be used to correlate Tor and Non-Tor activity, via the usage of
+CSS can also be used to correlate Tor and Non-Tor activity and reveal a user's
+Non-Tor IP address, via the usage of
<ulink url="http://www.tjkdesign.com/articles/css%20pop%20ups/";>CSS
popups</ulink> - essentially CSS-based event handlers that fetch content via
CSS's onmouseover attribute. If these popups are allowed to perform network
@@ -2228,7 +2243,8 @@
url="http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/api/java/net/class-use/NetworkInterface.html";>can query</ulink> the <ulink
url="http://www.rgagnon.com/javadetails/java-0095.html";>local IP
address</ulink> and report it back to the
-remote site. They can also <ulink url="http://metasploit.com/research/misc/decloak/index.htm";>bypass proxy settings</ulink> and directly connect to a
+remote site. They can also <ulink
+url="http://www.metasploit.com/research/projects/decloak/";>bypass proxy settings</ulink> and directly connect to a
remote site without Tor. Every browser plugin we have tested with Firefox has
some form of network capability, and every one ignores proxy settings or worse - only
partially obeys them. This includes but is not limited to:
Modified: torbutton/trunk/website/design/index.html.en
===================================================================
--- torbutton/trunk/website/design/index.html.en 2008-08-01 18:49:00 UTC (rev 16335)
+++ torbutton/trunk/website/design/index.html.en 2008-08-01 20:07:42 UTC (rev 16336)
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd";>
-<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml";><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>Torbutton Design Documentation</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.73.2" /></head><body><div class="article" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a id="design"></a>Torbutton Design Documentation</h2></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Mike</span> <span class="surname">Perry</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email" href="mailto:mikeperry.fscked/org";>mikeperry.fscked/org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">July 31 2008</p></div></div><hr /></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Table of Contents</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2752504">1. Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversary">1.1. Adversary Model</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#requirements">1.2. Torbutton Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#layout">1.3. Extension Layout</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2757898">2. Components</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2761688">2.1. Hooked Components</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2775653">2.2. New Components</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2764876">3. Chrome</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#browseroverlay">3.1. Browser Overlay - torbutton.xul</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2772338">3.2. Preferences Window - preferences.xul</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2771283">3.3. Other Windows</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2770647">4. Toggle Code Path</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2766848">4.1. Button Click</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2777304">4.2. Proxy Update</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2762535">4.3. Settings Update</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id2781968">5. Description of Options</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2768188">5.1. Test Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#plugins">5.2. Disable plugins on Tor Usage (crucial)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2749229">5.3. Isolate Dynamic Content to Tor State (crucial)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#jshooks">5.4. Hook Dangerous Javascript (crucial)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2780094">5.5. Resize windows to multiples of 50px during Tor usage (recommended)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2780885">5.6. Disable Updates During Tor</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2768382">5.7. Disable Search Suggestions during Tor (recommended)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2781664">5.8. Block Tor/Non-Tor access to network from file:// urls (recommended)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2764098">5.9. Close all Tor/Non-Tor tabs and windows on toggle (optional)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2762895">5.10. Isolate Access to History navigation to Tor state (crucial)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2753454">5.11. History Access Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2746752">5.12. Clear History During Tor Toggle (optional)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2746797">5.13. Block Password+Form saving during Tor/Non-Tor</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2746863">5.14. Block Tor disk cache and clear all cache on Tor Toggle</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2746918">5.15. Block disk and memory cache during Tor</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2746976">5.16. Clear Cookies on Tor Toggle</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2747030">5.17. Store Non-Tor cookies in a protected jar</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2747089">5.18. Store both Non-Tor and Tor cookies in a protected jar (dangerous)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2747128">5.19. Manage My Own Cookies (dangerous)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2747144">5.20. Disable DOM Storage during Tor usage (crucial)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2788964">5.21. Clear HTTP Auth on Tor Toggle (recommended)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2789001">5.22. Clear cookies on Tor/Non-Tor shutdown</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2789055">5.23. Reload cookie jar/clear cookies on Firefox crash</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2789131">5.24. On crash recovery or session restored startup, restore via: Tor, Non-Tor</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2789203">5.25. On normal startup, set state to: Tor, Non-Tor, Shutdown State</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2789262">5.26. Prevent session store from saving Non-Tor/Tor-loaded tabs</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2789326">5.27. Set user agent during Tor usage (crucial)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2789514">5.28. Spoof US English Browser</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2789607">5.29. Don't send referrer during Tor Usage</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2789647">5.30. Store SSL/CA Certs in separate jars for Tor/Non-Tor (recommended)</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#FirefoxBugs">6. Relevant Firefox Bugs</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#FirefoxSecurity">6.1. Bugs impacting security</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#FirefoxWishlist">6.2. Bugs blocking functionality</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#FirefoxMiscBugs">6.3. Low Priority Bugs</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#TestPlan">7. Testing</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#Categories">7.1. Single state testing</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2790768">7.2. Multi-state testing</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2790844">7.3. Active testing (aka How to Hack Torbutton)</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="sect1" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2752504"></a>1. Introduction</h2></div></div></div><p>
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml";><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>Torbutton Design Documentation</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.73.2" /></head><body><div class="article" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a id="design"></a>Torbutton Design Documentation</h2></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Mike</span> <span class="surname">Perry</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email"><<a class="email" href="mailto:mikeperry.fscked/org";>mikeperry.fscked/org</a>></code></p></div></div></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">July 31 2008</p></div></div><hr /></div><div class="toc"><p><b>Table of Contents</b></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id3003794">1. Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversary">1.1. Adversary Model</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#requirements">1.2. Torbutton Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#layout">1.3. Extension Layout</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id3013108">2. Components</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3036294">2.1. Hooked Components</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3026957">2.2. New Components</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id3017231">3. Chrome</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#browseroverlay">3.1. Browser Overlay - torbutton.xul</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3030186">3.2. Preferences Window - preferences.xul</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3038907">3.3. Other Windows</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id3027471">4. Toggle Code Path</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3034877">4.1. Button Click</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3012015">4.2. Proxy Update</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3031243">4.3. Settings Update</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#id3038096">5. Description of Options</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3040114">5.1. Test Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#plugins">5.2. Disable plugins on Tor Usage (crucial)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3023634">5.3. Isolate Dynamic Content to Tor State (crucial)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#jshooks">5.4. Hook Dangerous Javascript (crucial)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3016866">5.5. Resize windows to multiples of 50px during Tor usage (recommended)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3009112">5.6. Disable Updates During Tor</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3015999">5.7. Disable Search Suggestions during Tor (recommended)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3021562">5.8. Block Tor/Non-Tor access to network from file:// urls (recommended)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3005056">5.9. Close all Tor/Non-Tor tabs and windows on toggle (optional)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3005596">5.10. Isolate Access to History navigation to Tor state (crucial)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3013147">5.11. History Access Settings</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2998046">5.12. Clear History During Tor Toggle (optional)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2998091">5.13. Block Password+Form saving during Tor/Non-Tor</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2998158">5.14. Block Tor disk cache and clear all cache on Tor Toggle</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2998213">5.15. Block disk and memory cache during Tor</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2998270">5.16. Clear Cookies on Tor Toggle</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2998324">5.17. Store Non-Tor cookies in a protected jar</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2998384">5.18. Store both Non-Tor and Tor cookies in a protected jar (dangerous)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2998423">5.19. Manage My Own Cookies (dangerous)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id2998439">5.20. Disable DOM Storage during Tor usage (crucial)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3040260">5.21. Clear HTTP Auth on Tor Toggle (recommended)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3040298">5.22. Clear cookies on Tor/Non-Tor shutdown</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3040352">5.23. Reload cookie jar/clear cookies on Firefox crash</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3040427">5.24. On crash recovery or session restored startup, restore via: Tor, Non-Tor</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3040500">5.25. On normal startup, set state to: Tor, Non-Tor, Shutdown State</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3040558">5.26. Prevent session store from saving Non-Tor/Tor-loaded tabs</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3040623">5.27. Set user agent during Tor usage (crucial)</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3040811">5.28. Spoof US English Browser</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3040904">5.29. Don't send referrer during Tor Usage</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3040944">5.30. Store SSL/CA Certs in separate jars for Tor/Non-Tor (recommended)</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#FirefoxBugs">6. Relevant Firefox Bugs</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#FirefoxSecurity">6.1. Bugs impacting security</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#FirefoxWishlist">6.2. Bugs blocking functionality</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#FirefoxMiscBugs">6.3. Low Priority Bugs</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#TestPlan">7. Testing</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#Categories">7.1. Single state testing</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3042058">7.2. Multi-state testing</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#id3042129">7.3. Active testing (aka How to Hack Torbutton)</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="sect1" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id3003794"></a>1. Introduction</h2></div></div></div><p>
This document describes the goals, operation, and testing procedures of the
Torbutton Firefox extension. It is current as of Torbutton 1.2.0.
@@ -64,15 +64,24 @@
confiscation of their computer equipment for excessive Tor usage or just
general suspicion.
</p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="attacks"></a>Adversary Capabilities - Attacks</h4></div></div></div><p>
+
The adversary can perform the following attacks from a number of different
-positions to accomplish various aspects of their goals.
+positions to accomplish various aspects of their goals. It should be noted
+that many of these attacks (especially those involving IP address leakage) are
+often performed by accident by websites that simply have Javascript, dynamic
+CSS elements, and plugins. Others are performed by adservers seeking to
+correlate users' activity across different IP addresses, and still others are
+performed by malicious agents on the Tor network and at national firewalls.
+
</p><div class="orderedlist"><ol type="1"><li><span class="command"><strong>Inserting Javascript</strong></span><p>
-Javascript allows the adversary the opportunity to accomplish a number of
-their goals. If not properly disabled, Javascript event handlers and timers
+If not properly disabled, Javascript event handlers and timers
can cause the browser to perform network activity after Tor has been disabled,
-thus allowing the adversary to correlate Tor and Non-Tor activity. Javascript
+thus allowing the adversary to correlate Tor and Non-Tor activity and reveal
+a user's non-Tor IP address. Javascript
also allows the adversary to execute <a class="ulink" href="http://gemal.dk/browserspy/css.html"; target="_top">history disclosure attacks</a>:
-to query the history via the different attributes of 'visited' links. Finally,
+to query the history via the different attributes of 'visited' links to search
+for particular google queries, sites, or even to <a class="ulink" href="http://www.mikeonads.com/2008/07/13/using-your-browser-url-history-estimate-gender/"; target="_top">profile
+users based on gender and other classifications</a>. Finally,
Javascript can be used to query the user's timezone via the
<code class="function">Date()</code> object, and to reduce the anonymity set by querying
the <code class="function">navigator</code> object for operating system, CPU, locale,
@@ -83,7 +92,10 @@
capable of performing network activity that the author has
investigated is also capable of performing network activity independent of
browser proxy settings - and often independent of its own proxy settings.
-In addition, plugins can be used to store unique identifiers that are more
+Sites that have plugin content don't even have to be malicious to obtain a
+user's
+Non-Tor IP (it usually leaks by itself), though <a class="ulink" href="http://www.metasploit.com/research/projects/decloak/"; target="_top">plenty of active
+exploits</a> are possible as well. In addition, plugins can be used to store unique identifiers that are more
difficult to clear than standard cookies.
<a class="ulink" href="http://epic.org/privacy/cookies/flash.html"; target="_top">Flash-based
cookies</a> fall into this category, but there are likely numerous other
@@ -91,7 +103,8 @@
</p></li><li><span class="command"><strong>Inserting CSS</strong></span><p>
-CSS can also be used to correlate Tor and Non-Tor activity, via the usage of
+CSS can also be used to correlate Tor and Non-Tor activity and reveal a user's
+Non-Tor IP address, via the usage of
<a class="ulink" href="http://www.tjkdesign.com/articles/css%20pop%20ups/"; target="_top">CSS
popups</a> - essentially CSS-based event handlers that fetch content via
CSS's onmouseover attribute. If these popups are allowed to perform network
@@ -217,13 +230,13 @@
stable.</p><p>'Chrome' is a combination of XML and Javascript used to describe a window.
Extensions are allowed to create 'overlays' that are 'bound' to existing XML
window definitions, or they can create their own windows. The DTD for this XML
-is called <a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/XUL_Reference"; target="_top">XUL</a>.</p></div></div><div class="sect1" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2757898"></a>2. Components</h2></div></div></div><p>
+is called <a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/XUL_Reference"; target="_top">XUL</a>.</p></div></div><div class="sect1" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id3013108"></a>2. Components</h2></div></div></div><p>
Torbutton installs components for two purposes: hooking existing components to
reimplement their interfaces; and creating new components that provide
services to other pieces of the extension.
- </p><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2761688"></a>2.1. Hooked Components</h3></div></div></div><p>Torbutton makes extensive use of Contract ID hooking, and implements some
+ </p><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3036294"></a>2.1. Hooked Components</h3></div></div></div><p>Torbutton makes extensive use of Contract ID hooking, and implements some
of its own standalone components as well. Let's discuss the hooked components
first.</p><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="sessionstore"></a><a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/nsISessionStore"; target="_top">@mozilla.org/browser/sessionstore;1</a> -
<a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/nsSessionStore2.js"; target="_top">components/nsSessionStore2.js</a>
@@ -241,7 +254,7 @@
with a couple of modifications to prevent tabs that were loaded with Tor
enabled from being written to disk, and some version detection code to
determine which component to load. The <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/nsSessionStore3.diff"; target="_top">diff against the original session
-store</a> is included in the SVN repository.</p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2787785"></a><a class="ulink" href="http://lxr.mozilla.org/seamonkey/source/browser/components/sessionstore/src/nsSessionStartup.js"; target="_top">@mozilla.org/browser/sessionstartup;1</a> -
+store</a> is included in the SVN repository.</p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id3032598"></a><a class="ulink" href="http://lxr.mozilla.org/seamonkey/source/browser/components/sessionstore/src/nsSessionStartup.js"; target="_top">@mozilla.org/browser/sessionstartup;1</a> -
<a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/crash-observer.js"; target="_top">components/crash-observer.js</a></h4></div></div></div><p>This component wraps the Firefox Session Startup component that is in
charge of <a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/Session_store_API"; target="_top">restoring saved
sessions</a>. The wrapper's only job is to intercept the
@@ -255,7 +268,7 @@
in the preferences window (<span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.restore_tor</strong></span>), and
restoring cookies for the corresponding cookie jar, if it exists.</p><p>By performing this notification, this component assists in the
<a class="link" href="#proxy">Proxy Obedience</a>, and <a class="link" href="#isolation">Network Isolation</a> requirements.
-</p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2771969"></a><a class="ulink" href="http://www.xulplanet.com/references/xpcomref/comps/c_browserglobalhistory2.html"; target="_top">@mozilla.org/browser/global-history;2</a>
+</p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id3039706"></a><a class="ulink" href="http://www.xulplanet.com/references/xpcomref/comps/c_browserglobalhistory2.html"; target="_top">@mozilla.org/browser/global-history;2</a>
- <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/ignore-history.js"; target="_top">components/ignore-history.js</a></h4></div></div></div><p>This component was contributed by <a class="ulink" href="http://www.collinjackson.com/"; target="_top">Collin Jackson</a> as a method for defeating
CSS and Javascript-based methods of history disclosure. The global-history
component is what is used by Firefox to determine if a link was visited or not
@@ -267,9 +280,9 @@
</p><p>
This component helps satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a>
and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements of Torbutton.
-</p></div></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2775653"></a>2.2. New Components</h3></div></div></div><p>Torbutton creates four new components that are used throughout the
+</p></div></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3026957"></a>2.2. New Components</h3></div></div></div><p>Torbutton creates four new components that are used throughout the
extension. These components do not hook any interfaces, nor are they used
-anywhere besides Torbutton itself.</p><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2773972"></a><a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/cookie-jar-selector.js"; target="_top">@stanford.edu/cookie-jar-selector;2
+anywhere besides Torbutton itself.</p><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id3037450"></a><a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/cookie-jar-selector.js"; target="_top">@stanford.edu/cookie-jar-selector;2
- components/cookie-jar-selector.js</a></h4></div></div></div><p>The cookie jar selector (also based on code from <a class="ulink" href="http://www.collinjackson.com/"; target="_top">Collin
Jackson</a>) is used by the Torbutton chrome to switch between
Tor and Non-Tor cookies. Its operations are simple: sync cookies to disk, then
@@ -278,7 +291,7 @@
into place.</p><p>
This component helps to address the <a class="link" href="#state">State
Isolation</a> requirement of Torbutton.
-</p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2787286"></a><a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/torbutton-logger.js"; target="_top">@torproject.org/torbutton-logger;1
+</p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id3031428"></a><a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/torbutton-logger.js"; target="_top">@torproject.org/torbutton-logger;1
- components/torbutton-logger.js</a></h4></div></div></div><p>The torbutton logger component allows on-the-fly redirection of torbutton
logging messages to either Firefox stderr
(<span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.logmethod=0</strong></span>), the Javascript error console
@@ -330,7 +343,7 @@
</p><p>
This helps to fulfill both the <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> and the <a class="link" href="#undiscoverability">Tor Undiscoverability</a> requirements of
-Torbutton.</p></div></div></div><div class="sect1" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2764876"></a>3. Chrome</h2></div></div></div><p>The chrome is where all the torbutton graphical elements and windows are
+Torbutton.</p></div></div></div><div class="sect1" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id3017231"></a>3. Chrome</h2></div></div></div><p>The chrome is where all the torbutton graphical elements and windows are
located. Each window is described as an <a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/XUL_Reference"; target="_top">XML file</a>, with zero or more Javascript
files attached. The scope of these Javascript files is their containing
window.</p><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="browseroverlay"></a>3.1. Browser Overlay - <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/chrome/content/torbutton.xul"; target="_top">torbutton.xul</a></h3></div></div></div><p>The browser overlay, torbutton.xul, defines the toolbar button, the status
@@ -395,9 +408,9 @@
Plugins During Tor Usage" preference. This helps fulfill the <a class="link" href="#proxy">Proxy Obedience</a> requirement, by preventing external
applications from accessing network resources at the command of Tor-fetched
pages.
- </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2772338"></a>3.2. Preferences Window - <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/chrome/content/preferences.xul"; target="_top">preferences.xul</a></h3></div></div></div><p>The preferences window of course lays out the Torbutton preferences, with
-handlers located in <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/chrome/content/preferences.js"; target="_top">chrome/content/preferences.js</a>.</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2771283"></a>3.3. Other Windows</h3></div></div></div><p>There are additional windows that describe popups for right clicking on
-the status bar, the toolbutton, and the about page.</p></div></div><div class="sect1" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2770647"></a>4. Toggle Code Path</h2></div></div></div><p>
+ </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3030186"></a>3.2. Preferences Window - <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/chrome/content/preferences.xul"; target="_top">preferences.xul</a></h3></div></div></div><p>The preferences window of course lays out the Torbutton preferences, with
+handlers located in <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/chrome/content/preferences.js"; target="_top">chrome/content/preferences.js</a>.</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3038907"></a>3.3. Other Windows</h3></div></div></div><p>There are additional windows that describe popups for right clicking on
+the status bar, the toolbutton, and the about page.</p></div></div><div class="sect1" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id3027471"></a>4. Toggle Code Path</h2></div></div></div><p>
The act of toggling is connected to <code class="function">torbutton_toggle()</code>
via the <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/chrome/content/torbutton.xul"; target="_top">torbutton.xul</a>
@@ -418,7 +431,7 @@
409737</a> unfixed. The content policy does not allow any network activity
whatsoever during this three stage transition.
- </p><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2766848"></a>4.1. Button Click</h3></div></div></div><p>
+ </p><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3034877"></a>4.1. Button Click</h3></div></div></div><p>
This is the first step in the toggling process. When the user clicks the
toggle button or the toolbar, <code class="function">torbutton_toggle()</code> is
@@ -431,7 +444,7 @@
<span class="command"><strong>torbutton_unique_pref_observer</strong></span> to perform the rest of the
toggle.
- </p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2777304"></a>4.2. Proxy Update</h3></div></div></div><p>
+ </p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3012015"></a>4.2. Proxy Update</h3></div></div></div><p>
When Torbutton receives any proxy change notifications via its
<span class="command"><strong>torbutton_unique_pref_observer</strong></span>, it calls
@@ -446,7 +459,7 @@
observer so that other addons (such as SwitchProxy) can switch the proxy
settings between multiple proxies.
- </p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2762535"></a>4.3. Settings Update</h3></div></div></div><p>
+ </p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3031243"></a>4.3. Settings Update</h3></div></div></div><p>
The next stage is also handled by
<code class="function">torbutton_update_status()</code>. This function sets scores of
@@ -457,10 +470,10 @@
<span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.settings_applied</strong></span>, which signifies the
completion of the toggle operation to the <a class="link" href="#contentpolicy" title="@torproject.org/cssblocker;1 - components/cssblocker.js">content policy</a>.
- </p></div></div><div class="sect1" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id2781968"></a>5. Description of Options</h2></div></div></div><p>This section provides a detailed description of Torbutton's options. Each
+ </p></div></div><div class="sect1" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="id3038096"></a>5. Description of Options</h2></div></div></div><p>This section provides a detailed description of Torbutton's options. Each
option is presented as the string from the preferences window, a summary, the
preferences it touches, and the effect this has on the components, chrome, and
-browser properties.</p><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2768188"></a>5.1. Test Settings</h3></div></div></div><p>
+browser properties.</p><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3040114"></a>5.1. Test Settings</h3></div></div></div><p>
This button under the Proxy Settings tab provides a way to verify that the
proxy settings are correct, and actually do route through the Tor network. It
performs this check by issuing an <a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/XMLHttpRequest"; target="_top">XMLHTTPRequest</a>
@@ -511,7 +524,7 @@
Since most plugins completely ignore browser proxy settings, the actions
performed by this setting are crucial to satisfying the <a class="link" href="#proxy">Proxy Obedience</a> requirement.
- </p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2749229"></a>5.3. Isolate Dynamic Content to Tor State (crucial)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.isolate_content</strong></span></p><p>Enabling this preference is what enables the <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/cssblocker.js"; target="_top">@torproject.org/cssblocker;1</a> content policy
+ </p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3023634"></a>5.3. Isolate Dynamic Content to Tor State (crucial)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.isolate_content</strong></span></p><p>Enabling this preference is what enables the <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/cssblocker.js"; target="_top">@torproject.org/cssblocker;1</a> content policy
mentioned above, and causes it to block content load attempts in pages an
opposite Tor state from the current state. Freshly loaded <a class="ulink" href="http://www.xulplanet.com/references/elemref/ref_tabbrowser.html"; target="_top">browser
tabs</a> are tagged
@@ -562,7 +575,7 @@
meet the <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a>
requirements.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2780094"></a>5.5. Resize windows to multiples of 50px during Tor usage (recommended)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.resize_windows</strong></span></p><p>
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3016866"></a>5.5. Resize windows to multiples of 50px during Tor usage (recommended)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.resize_windows</strong></span></p><p>
This option drastically cuts down on the number of distinct anonymity sets
that divide the Tor web userbase. Without this setting, the dimensions for a
@@ -597,7 +610,7 @@
</p><p>
This setting helps to meet the <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirements.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2780885"></a>5.6. Disable Updates During Tor</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_updates</strong></span></p><p>This setting causes Torbutton to disable the four <a class="ulink" href="http://wiki.mozilla.org/Update:Users/Checking_For_Updates#Preference_Controls_and_State"; target="_top">Firefox
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3009112"></a>5.6. Disable Updates During Tor</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_updates</strong></span></p><p>This setting causes Torbutton to disable the four <a class="ulink" href="http://wiki.mozilla.org/Update:Users/Checking_For_Updates#Preference_Controls_and_State"; target="_top">Firefox
update settings</a> during Tor
usage: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.update.enabled</strong></span>,
<span class="command"><strong>app.update.enabled</strong></span>,
@@ -607,7 +620,7 @@
checking for search plugin updates while Tor is enabled.
</p><p>
This setting satisfies the <a class="link" href="#updates">Update Safety</a> requirement.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2768382"></a>5.7. Disable Search Suggestions during Tor (recommended)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_search</strong></span></p><p>
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3015999"></a>5.7. Disable Search Suggestions during Tor (recommended)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.no_search</strong></span></p><p>
This setting causes Torbutton to disable <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Browser.search.suggest.enabled"; target="_top"><span class="command"><strong>browser.search.suggest.enabled</strong></span></a>
during Tor usage.
This governs if you get Google search suggestions during Tor
@@ -618,7 +631,7 @@
While this setting doesn't satisfy any Torbutton requirements, the fact that
cookies are transmitted for partially typed queries does not seem desirable
for Tor usage.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2781664"></a>5.8. Block Tor/Non-Tor access to network from file:// urls (recommended)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option:
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3021562"></a>5.8. Block Tor/Non-Tor access to network from file:// urls (recommended)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option:
</p><table class="simplelist" border="0" summary="Simple list"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_tor_file_net</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_nontor_file_net</strong></span></td></tr></table><p>
</p><p>
@@ -638,7 +651,7 @@
operations in opposite Tor states. Also, allowing pages to submit arbitrary
files to arbitrary sites just generally seems like a bad idea.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2764098"></a>5.9. Close all Tor/Non-Tor tabs and windows on toggle (optional)</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3005056"></a>5.9. Close all Tor/Non-Tor tabs and windows on toggle (optional)</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
</p><table class="simplelist" border="0" summary="Simple list"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.close_nontor</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.close_tor</strong></span></td></tr></table><p>
</p><p>
@@ -662,7 +675,7 @@
While this setting doesn't satisfy any Torbutton requirements, the fact that
cookies are transmitted for partially typed queries does not seem desirable
for Tor usage.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2762895"></a>5.10. Isolate Access to History navigation to Tor state (crucial)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_js_history</strong></span></p><p>
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3005596"></a>5.10. Isolate Access to History navigation to Tor state (crucial)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_js_history</strong></span></p><p>
This setting determines if Torbutton installs an <a class="ulink" href="http://www.xulplanet.com/references/xpcomref/ifaces/nsISHistoryListener.html"; target="_top">nsISHistoryListener</a>
attached to the <a class="ulink" href="http://www.xulplanet.com/references/xpcomref/ifaces/nsISHistory.html"; target="_top">sessionHistory</a> of
of each browser's <a class="ulink" href="http://www.xulplanet.com/references/xpcomref/comps/c_webshell1.html"; target="_top">webNavigatator</a>.
@@ -690,7 +703,7 @@
Separation</a> and (until Bug 409737 is fixed) <a class="link" href="#isolation">Network Isolation</a>
requirements.
- </p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2753454"></a>5.11. History Access Settings</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
+ </p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3013147"></a>5.11. History Access Settings</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
</p><table class="simplelist" border="0" summary="Simple list"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_thread</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_nthread</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_thwrite</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_nthwrite</strong></span></td></tr></table><p>
</p><p>These four settings govern the behavior of the <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/ignore-history.js"; target="_top">components/ignore-history.js</a>
history blocker component mentioned above. By hooking the browser's view of
@@ -705,12 +718,12 @@
</p><p>
This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2746752"></a>5.12. Clear History During Tor Toggle (optional)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_history</strong></span></p><p>This setting governs if Torbutton calls
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2998046"></a>5.12. Clear History During Tor Toggle (optional)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_history</strong></span></p><p>This setting governs if Torbutton calls
<a class="ulink" href="http://www.xulplanet.com/references/xpcomref/ifaces/nsIBrowserHistory.html#method_removeAllPages"; target="_top">nsIBrowserHistory.removeAllPages</a>
and <a class="ulink" href="http://www.xulplanet.com/references/xpcomref/ifaces/nsISHistory.html#method_PurgeHistory"; target="_top">nsISHistory.PurgeHistory</a>
for each tab on Tor toggle.</p><p>
This setting is an optional way to help satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2746797"></a>5.13. Block Password+Form saving during Tor/Non-Tor</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2998091"></a>5.13. Block Password+Form saving during Tor/Non-Tor</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
</p><table class="simplelist" border="0" summary="Simple list"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_tforms</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_ntforms</strong></span></td></tr></table><p>
</p><p>These settings govern if Torbutton disables
<span class="command"><strong>browser.formfill.enable</strong></span>
@@ -719,19 +732,19 @@
more important than it seems.
</p><p>
This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2746863"></a>5.14. Block Tor disk cache and clear all cache on Tor Toggle</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_cache</strong></span>
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2998158"></a>5.14. Block Tor disk cache and clear all cache on Tor Toggle</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_cache</strong></span>
</p><p>This option causes Torbutton to call <a class="ulink" href="http://www.xulplanet.com/references/xpcomref/ifaces/nsICacheService.html#method_evictEntries"; target="_top">nsICacheService.evictEntries(0)</a>
on Tor toggle to remove all entries from the cache. In addition, this setting
causes Torbutton to set <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Browser.cache.disk.enable"; target="_top">browser.cache.disk.enable</a> to false.
</p><p>
This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2746918"></a>5.15. Block disk and memory cache during Tor</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_cache</strong></span></p><p>This setting
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2998213"></a>5.15. Block disk and memory cache during Tor</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.block_cache</strong></span></p><p>This setting
causes Torbutton to set <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Browser.cache.memory.enable"; target="_top">browser.cache.memory.enable</a>,
<a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Browser.cache.disk.enable"; target="_top">browser.cache.disk.enable</a> and
<a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Network.http.use-cache"; target="_top">network.http.use-cache</a> to false during tor usage.
</p><p>
This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2746976"></a>5.16. Clear Cookies on Tor Toggle</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_cookies</strong></span>
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2998270"></a>5.16. Clear Cookies on Tor Toggle</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_cookies</strong></span>
</p><p>
This setting causes Torbutton to call <a class="ulink" href="http://www.xulplanet.com/references/xpcomref/ifaces/nsICookieManager.html#method_removeAll"; target="_top">nsICookieManager.removeAll()</a> on
@@ -741,7 +754,7 @@
</p><p>
This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2747030"></a>5.17. Store Non-Tor cookies in a protected jar</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.cookie_jars</strong></span>
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2998324"></a>5.17. Store Non-Tor cookies in a protected jar</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.cookie_jars</strong></span>
</p><p>
This setting causes Torbutton to use <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/cookie-jar-selector.js"; target="_top">@stanford.edu/cookie-jar-selector;2</a> to store
@@ -754,15 +767,15 @@
</p><p>
This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> and <a class="link" href="#disk">Disk Avoidance</a> requirements.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2747089"></a>5.18. Store both Non-Tor and Tor cookies in a protected jar (dangerous)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.dual_cookie_jars</strong></span>
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2998384"></a>5.18. Store both Non-Tor and Tor cookies in a protected jar (dangerous)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.dual_cookie_jars</strong></span>
</p><p>
This setting causes Torbutton to use <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/cookie-jar-selector.js"; target="_top">@stanford.edu/cookie-jar-selector;2</a> to store
both Tor and Non-Tor cookies into protected jars.
</p><p>
This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2747128"></a>5.19. Manage My Own Cookies (dangerous)</h3></div></div></div><p>Options: None</p><p>This setting disables all Torbutton cookie handling by setting the above
-cookie prefs all to false.</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2747144"></a>5.20. Disable DOM Storage during Tor usage (crucial)</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2747146"></a>5.20.1. Do not write Tor/Non-Tor cookies to disk</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2998423"></a>5.19. Manage My Own Cookies (dangerous)</h3></div></div></div><p>Options: None</p><p>This setting disables all Torbutton cookie handling by setting the above
+cookie prefs all to false.</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2998439"></a>5.20. Disable DOM Storage during Tor usage (crucial)</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2998441"></a>5.20.1. Do not write Tor/Non-Tor cookies to disk</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
</p><table class="simplelist" border="0" summary="Simple list"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.tor_memory_jar</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.nontor_memory_jar</strong></span></td></tr></table><p>
</p><p>
These settings (contributed by arno) cause Torbutton to set <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Network.cookie.lifetimePolicy"; target="_top">network.cookie.lifetimePolicy</a>
@@ -782,13 +795,13 @@
<a class="ulink" href="http://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/DOM:Storage"; target="_top">DOM Storage</a> from
being used to store persistent information across Tor states.</p><p>
This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2788964"></a>5.21. Clear HTTP Auth on Tor Toggle (recommended)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_http_auth</strong></span>
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3040260"></a>5.21. Clear HTTP Auth on Tor Toggle (recommended)</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.clear_http_auth</strong></span>
</p><p>
This setting causes Torbutton to call <a class="ulink" href="http://www.xulplanet.com/references/xpcomref/ifaces/nsIHttpAuthManager.html#method_clearAll"; target="_top">nsIHttpAuthManager.clearAll()</a>
every time Tor is toggled.
</p><p>
This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2789001"></a>5.22. Clear cookies on Tor/Non-Tor shutdown</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.shutdown_method</strong></span>
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3040298"></a>5.22. Clear cookies on Tor/Non-Tor shutdown</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.shutdown_method</strong></span>
</p><p> This option variable can actually take 3 values: 0, 1, and 2. 0 means no
cookie clearing, 1 means clear only during Tor-enabled shutdown, and 2 means
clear for both Tor and Non-Tor shutdown. When set to 1 or 2, Torbutton listens
@@ -796,7 +809,7 @@
<code class="function">torbutton_uninstall_observer()</code> and use <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/cookie-jar-selector.js"; target="_top">@stanford.edu/cookie-jar-selector;2</a>
to clear out all cookies and all cookie jars upon shutdown. </p><p>
This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2789055"></a>5.23. Reload cookie jar/clear cookies on Firefox crash</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3040352"></a>5.23. Reload cookie jar/clear cookies on Firefox crash</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
</p><table class="simplelist" border="0" summary="Simple list"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.reload_crashed_jar</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.crashed</strong></span></td></tr></table><p>
</p><p>This is no longer a user visible option, and is enabled by default. In
the event of a crash, the Torbutton <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/crash-observer.js"; target="_top">components/crash-observer.js</a>
@@ -808,7 +821,7 @@
component.</p><p>
This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement in the event of Firefox
crashes.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2789131"></a>5.24. On crash recovery or session restored startup, restore via: Tor, Non-Tor</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3040427"></a>5.24. On crash recovery or session restored startup, restore via: Tor, Non-Tor</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
</p><table class="simplelist" border="0" summary="Simple list"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.restore_tor</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.crashed</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.normal_exit</strong></span></td></tr></table><p>
</p><p>This option works with the Torbutton <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/crash-observer.js"; target="_top">crash-observer.js</a>
to set the Tor state after a crash is detected (via the
@@ -824,7 +837,7 @@
requirement in the event of Firefox crashes by ensuring all cookies,
settings and saved sessions are reloaded from a fixed Tor state.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2789203"></a>5.25. On normal startup, set state to: Tor, Non-Tor, Shutdown State</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3040500"></a>5.25. On normal startup, set state to: Tor, Non-Tor, Shutdown State</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
</p><table class="simplelist" border="0" summary="Simple list"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.startup_state</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.noncrashed</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.normal_exit</strong></span></td></tr></table><p>
</p><p>This option also works with the Torbutton <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/crash-observer.js"; target="_top">crash-observer.js</a>
to set the Tor state after a normal startup is detected (via the
@@ -834,7 +847,7 @@
extensions.torbutton.normal_exit in torbutton_uninstall_observer() during
Firefox exit and checks this value as well during startup.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2789262"></a>5.26. Prevent session store from saving Non-Tor/Tor-loaded tabs</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3040558"></a>5.26. Prevent session store from saving Non-Tor/Tor-loaded tabs</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
</p><table class="simplelist" border="0" summary="Simple list"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.nonontor_sessionstore</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.notor_sessionstore</strong></span></td></tr></table><p>
</p><p>If these options are enabled, the <a class="ulink" href="https://tor-svn.freehaven.net/svn/torbutton/trunk/src/components/nsSessionStore3.js"; target="_top">replacement nsSessionStore.js</a>
component checks the <span class="command"><strong>__tb_tor_fetched</strong></span> tag of tabs before writing them
@@ -844,7 +857,7 @@
requirement, and also helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#state">State Separation</a> requirement in the event of Firefox
crashes.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2789326"></a>5.27. Set user agent during Tor usage (crucial)</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3040623"></a>5.27. Set user agent during Tor usage (crucial)</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
</p><table class="simplelist" border="0" summary="Simple list"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.set_uagent</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.oscpu_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.platform_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.productsub_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.appname_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.appversion_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.useragent_override</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.useragent_vendor</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.useragent_vendorSub</strong></span></td></tr></table><p>
</p><p>On face, user agent switching appears to be straight-forward in Firefox.
It provides several options for controlling the browser user agent string:
@@ -870,7 +883,7 @@
</p><p>
This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> requirement.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2789514"></a>5.28. Spoof US English Browser</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3040811"></a>5.28. Spoof US English Browser</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
</p><table class="simplelist" border="0" summary="Simple list"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.spoof_english</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.spoof_charset</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.spoof_language</strong></span></td></tr></table><p>
</p><p> This option causes Torbutton to set
<span class="command"><strong>general.useragent.locale</strong></span>
@@ -881,13 +894,13 @@
well as hooking <span class="command"><strong>navigator.language</strong></span> via its <a class="link" href="#jshooks" title="5.4. Hook Dangerous Javascript (crucial)">javascript hooks</a>.
</p><p>
This setting helps to satisfy the <a class="link" href="#setpreservation">Anonymity Set Preservation</a> and <a class="link" href="#location">Location Neutrality</a> requirements.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2789607"></a>5.29. Don't send referrer during Tor Usage</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.disable_referer</strong></span>
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3040904"></a>5.29. Don't send referrer during Tor Usage</h3></div></div></div><p>Option: <span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.disable_referer</strong></span>
</p><p>
This option causes Torbutton to set <a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Network.http.sendSecureXSiteReferrer"; target="_top">network.http.sendSecureXSiteReferrer</a> and
<a class="ulink" href="http://kb.mozillazine.org/Network.http.sendRefererHeader"; target="_top">network.http.sendRefererHeader</a> during Tor usage.</p><p>
This setting also does not directly satisfy any Torbutton requirement, but
some may desire to mask their referrer for general privacy concerns.
-</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2789647"></a>5.30. Store SSL/CA Certs in separate jars for Tor/Non-Tor (recommended)</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
+</p></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3040944"></a>5.30. Store SSL/CA Certs in separate jars for Tor/Non-Tor (recommended)</h3></div></div></div><p>Options:
</p><table class="simplelist" border="0" summary="Simple list"><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.jar_certs</strong></span></td></tr><tr><td><span class="command"><strong>extensions.torbutton.jar_ca_certs</strong></span></td></tr></table><p>
</p><p>
@@ -1229,10 +1242,10 @@
comprehensive test pages would make it much easier to fix other issues as they
present themselves without introducing regressions.
- </p><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2790621"></a>Java and Plugin Decloaking</h4></div></div></div><p>
+ </p><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id3041910"></a>Java and Plugin Decloaking</h4></div></div></div><p>
As <a class="link" href="#plugins" title="5.2. Disable plugins on Tor Usage (crucial)">mentioned above</a>, Java and plugins <a class="ulink" href="http://java.sun.com/j2se/1.5.0/docs/api/java/net/class-use/NetworkInterface.html"; target="_top">can query</a> the <a class="ulink" href="http://www.rgagnon.com/javadetails/java-0095.html"; target="_top">local IP
address</a> and report it back to the
-remote site. They can also <a class="ulink" href="http://metasploit.com/research/misc/decloak/index.htm"; target="_top">bypass proxy settings</a> and directly connect to a
+remote site. They can also <a class="ulink" href="http://www.metasploit.com/research/projects/decloak/"; target="_top">bypass proxy settings</a> and directly connect to a
remote site without Tor. Every browser plugin we have tested with Firefox has
some form of network capability, and every one ignores proxy settings or worse - only
partially obeys them. This includes but is not limited to:
@@ -1245,14 +1258,14 @@
worse, <a class="ulink" href="http://www.janusvm.com/goldy/side-channels/side-channels.html"; target="_top">externally
handled mime types and urls</a> can also cause direct non-Tor connections
as well.
- </p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2790685"></a>History Disclosure attacks</h4></div></div></div><p>
+ </p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id3041974"></a>History Disclosure attacks</h4></div></div></div><p>
The browser's history can also be queried by a remote site to inspect for
Google queries, visits to sites that contain usernames in the URLs, or
other anonymity set reducing information. This can be done by either
<a class="ulink" href="http://gemal.dk/browserspy/css.html"; target="_top">Javascript</a>, or by
<a class="ulink" href="http://ha.ckers.org/weird/CSS-history.cgi"; target="_top">CSS</a> without any scripting involved.
- </p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2790711"></a>User agent, extension, resolution and OS information</h4></div></div></div><p>
+ </p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id3042000"></a>User agent, extension, resolution and OS information</h4></div></div></div><p>
As mentioned above, these properties can be combined to greatly reduce
anonymity set and even build a potentially <a class="link" href="#fingerprinting">globally unique identifier</a> for
@@ -1261,17 +1274,17 @@
information</a> as well as <a class="ulink" href="http://pseudo-flaw.net/content/tor/torbutton/"; target="_top">chrome disclosure
information</a>.
- </p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2790749"></a>Timezone and Location Information</h4></div></div></div><p>
+ </p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id3042038"></a>Timezone and Location Information</h4></div></div></div><p>
<a class="ulink" href="http://gemal.dk/browserspy/date.html"; target="_top">Time and Timezone</a>
should be obscured to be GMT-only, and by the browser should present itself
with an US English locale.
- </p></div></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2790768"></a>7.2. Multi-state testing</h3></div></div></div><p>
+ </p></div></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3042058"></a>7.2. Multi-state testing</h3></div></div></div><p>
The tests in this section are geared towards a page that would instruct the
user to toggle their Tor state after the fetch and perform some operations:
mouseovers, stray clicks, and potentially reloads.
- </p><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2790780"></a>Cookies and Cache Correlation</h4></div></div></div><p>
+ </p><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id3042070"></a>Cookies and Cache Correlation</h4></div></div></div><p>
The most obvious test is to set a cookie, ask the user to toggle tor, and then
have them reload the page. The cookie should no longer be set if they are
using the default Torbutton settings. In addition, it is possible to leverage
@@ -1279,11 +1292,11 @@
identifiers</a>. The default settings of Torbutton should also protect
against these from persisting across Tor Toggle.
- </p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2790803"></a>Javascript timers and event handlers</h4></div></div></div><p>
+ </p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id3042093"></a>Javascript timers and event handlers</h4></div></div></div><p>
Javascript can set timers and register event handlers in the hopes of fetching
URLs after the user has toggled Torbutton.
- </p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2790816"></a>CSS Popups and non-script Dynamic Content</h4></div></div></div><p>
+ </p></div><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id3042105"></a>CSS Popups and non-script Dynamic Content</h4></div></div></div><p>
Even if Javascript is disabled, CSS is still able to
<a class="ulink" href="http://www.tjkdesign.com/articles/css%20pop%20ups/"; target="_top">create popup-like
@@ -1293,7 +1306,7 @@
possible for meta-refresh tags to set timers long enough to make it likely
that the user has toggled Tor before fetching content.
- </p></div></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id2790844"></a>7.3. Active testing (aka How to Hack Torbutton)</h3></div></div></div><p>
+ </p></div></div><div class="sect2" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="id3042129"></a>7.3. Active testing (aka How to Hack Torbutton)</h3></div></div></div><p>
The idea behind active testing is to discover vulnerabilities in Torbutton to
bypass proxy settings, run script in an opposite Tor state, store unique
@@ -1308,7 +1321,7 @@
submitting the test cases back to be run in the standard batch of Torbutton
tests.
- </p><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id2790873"></a>Some suggested vectors to investigate</h4></div></div></div><p>
+ </p><div class="sect3" lang="en" xml:lang="en"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="id3042158"></a>Some suggested vectors to investigate</h4></div></div></div><p>
</p><div class="itemizedlist"><ul type="disc"><li>Strange ways to register Javascript <a class="ulink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DOM_Events"; target="_top">events</a> and <a class="ulink" href="http://www.devshed.com/c/a/JavaScript/Using-Timers-in-JavaScript/"; target="_top">timeouts</a> should
be verified to actually be ineffective after Tor has been toggled.</li><li>Other ways to cause Javascript to be executed after
<span class="command"><strong>javascript.enabled</strong></span> has been toggled off.</li><li>Odd ways to attempt to load plugins. Kyle Williams has had