[or-cvs] Changes throughout. Moved caching discussion to end candida...

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Update of /home/or/cvsroot/tor/doc/design-paper
In directory moria.mit.edu:/tmp/cvs-serv24036/tor/doc/design-paper

Modified Files:
	challenges.tex 
Log Message:
Changes throughout. Moved caching discussion to end candidate for cutting.


Index: challenges.tex
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RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.45
retrieving revision 1.46
diff -u -d -r1.45 -r1.46
--- challenges.tex	7 Feb 2005 07:44:06 -0000	1.45
+++ challenges.tex	7 Feb 2005 19:55:21 -0000	1.46
@@ -56,18 +56,18 @@
 anonymity, usability, and efficiency.
 
 We first publicly deployed a Tor network in October 2003; since then it has
-grown to over a hundred volunteer servers and as much as 80 megabits of
+grown to over a hundred volunteer Tor routers (TRs)
+and as much as 80 megabits of
 average traffic per second.  Tor's research strategy has focused on deploying
 a network to as many users as possible; thus, we have resisted designs that
-would compromise deployability by imposing high resource demands on server
+would compromise deployability by imposing high resource demands on TR
 operators, and designs that would compromise usability by imposing
[...1130 lines suppressed...]
+%Added some clarification -PFS
+Besides allowing any other insider attacks, caching nodes would hold a
+record of destinations and data visited by Tor users reducing forward
+anonymity. Worse, for the cache to be widely useful much beyond the
+client that caused it there would have to either be a new mechanism to
+distribute cache information around the network and a way for clients
+to make use of it or the caches themselves would need to be
+distributed widely. Either way the record of visited sites and
+downloaded information is made automatically available to an attacker
+without having to actively gather it himself.  Besides its inherent
+value, this could serve as useful data to an attacker deciding which
+locations to target for confirmation. A way to counter this
+distribution threat might be to only cache at certain semitrusted
+helper nodes.  This might help specific clients, but it would limit
+the general value of caching.
+
+
+
 \end{document}