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[or-cvs] some minor cleanups before i move a bnuch of sections

Update of /home2/or/cvsroot/tor/doc/design-paper
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home2/arma/work/onion/cvs/tor/doc/design-paper

Modified Files:
Log Message:
some minor cleanups before i move a bnuch of sections

Index: challenges.tex
RCS file: /home2/or/cvsroot/tor/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.51
retrieving revision 1.52
diff -u -d -r1.51 -r1.52
--- challenges.tex	8 Feb 2005 06:54:47 -0000	1.51
+++ challenges.tex	8 Feb 2005 07:37:30 -0000	1.52
@@ -423,8 +423,7 @@
 % this para should probably move to the scalability / directory system. -RD
 % Nope. Cut for space, except for small comment added above -PFS
-\section{Crossroads: Policy issues}
+\section{Policy issues}
 Many of the issues the Tor project needs to address extend beyond
 system design and technology development. In particular, the
@@ -802,8 +801,7 @@
 %[XXX Mention correct DNS-RBL implementation. -NM]
-\section{Crossroads: Design choices}
+\section{Design choices}
 In addition to social issues, Tor also faces some design challenges that must
 be addressed as the network develops.
@@ -969,15 +967,15 @@
 It has been thought for some time that the best anonymity protection
-comes from running your own node~\cite{or-pet00,tor-design}.
-(In fact, in Onion Routing's first design, this was the only option
-possible~\cite{or-ih96}.)  While the first implementation
+comes from running your own node~\cite{tor-design,or-pet00}.
+(In fact, this was the only option in the earliest Onion Routing
+design~\cite{or-ih96}.)  While the first implementation
 had a fixed path length of five nodes, first generation
-Onion Routing design included random length routes chosen 
+Onion Routing design included random length routes chosen
 to simultaneously maximize efficiency and unpredictability in routes.
 If one followed Tor's three node default
 path length, an enclave-to-enclave communication (in which the entry and
-exit nodes were run by enclaves themselves) 
+exit nodes were run by enclaves themselves)
 would be completely compromised by the
 middle node. Thus for enclave-to-enclave communication, four is the fewest
 number of nodes that preserves the $\frac{c^2}{n^2}$ degree of protection
@@ -1188,8 +1186,7 @@
 %RIAA; less so if threat is to application data or individuals or...
-%P2P + anonymity issues:
 Tor is running today with hundreds of nodes and tens of thousands of
 users, but it will certainly not scale to millions.
@@ -1486,16 +1483,16 @@
 an unexpected boon from the fact that we're a general-purpose overlay
 network: as Tor grows more popular, other groups who need an overlay
 network on the Internet are starting to adapt Tor to their needs.
 Second, Tor is only one of many components that preserve privacy online.
 To keep identifying information out of application traffic, we must build
 more and better protocol-aware proxies that are usable by ordinary people.
 Third, we need to gain a reputation for social good, and learn how to
 coexist with the variety of Internet services and their established
 authentication mechanisms. We can't just keep escalating the blacklist
 standoff forever.
 Fourth, as described in Section~\ref{sec:scaling}, the current Tor
 architecture does not scale even to handle current user demand. We must
 find designs and incentives to let clients relay traffic too, without