[tor-commits] r25375: {website} import the "you should hide exits" faq (website/trunk/docs/en)

[Roger Dingledine <arma@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

Author: arma
Date: 2012-02-06 22:37:30 +0000 (Mon, 06 Feb 2012)
New Revision: 25375

Modified:
   website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml
Log:
import the "you should hide exits" faq


Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml	2012-02-06 22:33:40 UTC (rev 25374)
+++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml	2012-02-06 22:37:30 UTC (rev 25375)
@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@
     relay.</a></li>
     <li><a href="#TransportIPnotTCP">You should transport all IP packets,
     not just TCP packets.</a></li>
+    <li><a href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor relays,
+    so people can't block the exits.</a></li>
     </ul>
 
     <p>Abuse:</p>
@@ -1815,6 +1817,41 @@
 </li>
 </ol>
 
+<hr>
+
+<a id="HideExits"></a>
+<h3><a class="anchor" href="#HideExits">You should hide the list of Tor
+relays, so people can't block the exits.</a></h3>
+
+<p>
+There are a few reasons we don't:
+</p>
+
+<ol>
+<li>We can't help but make the information available, since Tor clients
+need to use it to pick their paths. So if the "blockers" want it, they
+can get it anyway. Further, even if we didn't tell clients about the
+list of relays directly, somebody could still make a lot of connections
+through Tor to a test site and build a list of the addresses they see.
+</li>
+
+<li>If people want to block us, we believe that they should be allowed to
+do so.  Obviously, we would prefer for everybody to allow Tor users to
+connect to them, but people have the right to decide who their services
+should allow connections from, and if they want to block anonymous users,
+they can.
+</li>
+
+<li>Being blockable also has tactical advantages: it may be a persuasive
+response to website maintainers who feel threatened by Tor. Giving
+them the option may inspire them to stop and think about whether they
+really want to eliminate private access to their system, and if not,
+what other options they might have. The time they might otherwise have
+spent blocking Tor, they may instead spend rethinking their overall
+approach to privacy and anonymity.
+</li>
+</ol>
+
     <hr>
 
     <a id="Criminals"></a>

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