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[tor-commits] [torspec/master] Add 241-suspicious-guard-turnover.txt
commit fb7c47262f60f1c75108512305e37c89b0418fa1
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon Feb 2 08:36:39 2015 -0500
Add 241-suspicious-guard-turnover.txt
---
proposals/000-index.txt | 2 +
proposals/241-suspicious-guard-turnover.txt | 174 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 176 insertions(+)
diff --git a/proposals/000-index.txt b/proposals/000-index.txt
index b8d4490..b6c7415 100644
--- a/proposals/000-index.txt
+++ b/proposals/000-index.txt
@@ -161,6 +161,7 @@ Proposals by number:
238 Better hidden service stats from Tor relays [DRAFT]
239 Consensus Hash Chaining [DRAFT]
240 Early signing key revocation for directory authorities [DRAFT]
+241 Resisting guard-turnover attacks [DRAFT]
Proposals by status:
@@ -186,6 +187,7 @@ Proposals by status:
238 Better hidden service stats from Tor relays
239 Consensus Hash Chaining
240 Early signing key revocation for directory authorities
+ 241 Resisting guard-turnover attacks
NEEDS-REVISION:
131 Help users to verify they are using Tor
190 Bridge Client Authorization Based on a Shared Secret
diff --git a/proposals/241-suspicious-guard-turnover.txt b/proposals/241-suspicious-guard-turnover.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a0313b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/proposals/241-suspicious-guard-turnover.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+Filename: 241-suspicious-guard-turnover.txt
+Title: Resisting guard-turnover attacks
+Author: Aaron Johnson, Nick Mathewson
+Created: 2015-01-27
+Status: Draft
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ Tor uses entry guards to prevent an attacker who controls some
+ fraction of the network from observing a fraction of every user's
+ traffic. If users chose their entries and exits uniformly at
+ random from the list of servers every time they build a circuit,
+ then an adversary who had (k/N) of the network would deanonymize
+ F=(k/N)^2 of all circuits... and after a given user had built C
+ circuits, the attacker would see them at least once with
+ probability 1-(1-F)^C. With large C, the attacker would get a
+ sample of every user's traffic with probability 1.
+
+ To prevent this from happening, Tor clients choose a small number
+ of guard nodes (currently 1: see proposal 236). These guard nodes
+ are the only nodes that the client will connect to directly. If
+ they are not compromised, the user's paths are not compromised.
+
+ But attacks remain. Consider an attacker who can run a firewall
+ between a target user and the Tor network, and make
+ many of the guards they don't control appear to be unreachable.
+ Or consider an attacker who can identify a user's guards, and mount
+ denial-of-service attacks on them until the user picks a guard
+ that the attacker controls.
+
+ In the presence of these attacks, we can't continue to connect to
+ the Tor network unconditionally. Doing so would eventually result
+ in the user chosing a hostile node as their guard, and losing
+ anonymity.
+
+
+
+
+2. Proposed behavior
+
+ Keep a record of all the guards we've tried to connect to,
+ connected to, or extended circuits through in the last PERIOD
+ days.
+
+ (We have connected to a guard if we authenticate its identity.
+ We have extended a circuit through a guard if we built a
+ multi-hop circuit with it.)
+
+ If the number of guards we have *tried* to connect to in the last
+ PERIOD days is greater than CANDIDATE_THRESHOLD, do not attempt
+ to connect to any other guards; only attempt the ones we have
+ previously *tried* to connect to.
+
+ If the number of guards we *have* connected to in the last PERIOD
+ days is greater than CONNECTED_THRESHOLD, do not attempt to
+ connect to any other guards; only attempt ones we have already
+ *successfully* connected to.
+
+ If we fail to connect to NET_THRESHOLD guards in a row, conclude
+ that the network is likely down. Stop/notify the user; retry
+ later; add no new guards for consideration.
+
+ [[ optional
+ If we notice that USE_THRESHOLD guards that we *used for
+ circuits* in the last FAST_REACT_PERIOD days are not working, but
+ some other guards are, assume that an attack is in progress, and
+ stop/notify the user.
+ ]]
+
+2.1. Suggested parameter thresholds.
+
+ PERIOD -- 60 days
+
+ FAST_REACT_PERIOD -- 10 days
+
+ CONNECTED_THRESHOLD -- 8
+
+ CANDIDATE_THRESHOLD -- 20
+
+ NET_THRESHOLD -- 10 (< CANDIDATE_THRESHOLD)
+
+ [[ optional
+ USE_THRESHOLD -- 3 (< CONNECTED_THRESHOLD)
+ ]]
+ (Each of the above should have a corresponding consensus parameter.)
+
+2.2. What do we mean by "Stop/warn"?
+
+ By default, we should probably give warnings in most of the above
+ cases for the first version that deploys them. We can have an
+ on/off/auto setting for whether we will build circuits at all if we're
+ in a "stopped" mode. Default should be auto, meaning off for now.
+
+ The warning needs to be carefully chosen, and suggest a workaround
+ better than "get a better network" or "clear your state file".
+
+2.3. What's with making USE_THRESHOLD optional?
+
+ Aaron thinks that getting rid of it might help in the fascistfirewall
+ case. I'm a little unclear whether that makes any of the attacks
+ easier.
+
+3. State storage requirements
+
+Right now, we save for each guard that we have made contact with:
+
+ ID
+ Added
+ is dircache?
+ down-since
+ last-attempted
+ bad-since
+ chosen-on-date, chosen-by-version
+ path bias info (circ_attempts, successes, close_success)
+
+To implement the above proposal, we'll need to add, for each guard
+*or guard candidate*:
+ when did we first decide to try connecting to it?
+ when did we last do one of:
+ decide to try connecting to it?
+ connect to it?
+ build a multihop circuit through it?
+ which one was it?
+
+Probably round these to the nearest day or so.
+
+4. Future work
+
+ We need to make this play nicely with mobility. When a user has
+ three guards on port 9001 and they move to a firewall that only
+ allows 80/443, we'd prefer that they not simply grind to a halt. If
+ nodes are configured to stop when too many of their guards have gone
+ away, this will confuse them.
+
+ If people need to turn FascistFirewall on and off, great. But if
+ they just clear their state file as a workaround, that's not so good.
+
+
+ If we could tie guard choice to location, that would help a great
+ deal, but we'd need to answer the question, "Where am I on the
+ network", which is not so easy to do passively if you're behind a
+ NAT.
+
+
+
+Appendix A. Scenario analysis
+
+A.1. Example attacks
+
+ * Filter Alice's connection so they can only talk to your guards.
+
+ * Whenever Alice is using a guard you don't control, DOS it.
+
+A.2. Example non-attacks
+
+ * Alice's guard goes down.
+
+ * Alice is on a laptop that is sometimes behind a firewall that
+ blocks a guard, and sometimes is not.
+
+ * Alice is on a laptop that's behind a firewall that blocks a lot
+ of the tor network, (like, everything not on 80/443).
+
+ * Alice has a network connection that sometimes turns off and turns
+ on again.
+
+ * Alice reboots her computer periodically, and tor starts a little
+ while before the network is live.
+
+Appendix B. Acknowledgements
+
+ Thanks to Rob Jansen and David Goulet for comments on earlier versions of
+ this draft.
+
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