[tor-commits] [webwml/staging] Drop 'IP hijacking detection for the Tor Network' project idea

[hiro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

commit c8aff65216c074c10edbc97f33c740a4b00e3185
Author: Damian Johnson <atagar@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Sat Feb 4 16:07:06 2017 -0800

    Drop 'IP hijacking detection for the Tor Network' project idea
    
    Didn't hear back if it was still relevant.
---
 getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml | 40 ----------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 40 deletions(-)

diff --git a/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml b/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml
index bf13aec..90f0500 100644
--- a/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml
+++ b/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml
@@ -1104,46 +1104,6 @@ ideas.
     </ul>
     </li>
 
-    <a id="ipHijacking"></a>
-    <li>
-    <b>IP hijacking detection for the Tor Network</b>
-    <br>
-    Likely Mentors: <i>Aaron Gibson (aagbsn)</i>
-    <br><br>
-    <p>
-    <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IP_hijacking";>IP hijacking</a>
-    occurs when a bad actor creates false routing information to redirect
-    Internet traffic to or through themselves. This activity is straightforward
-    to detect, because the Internet routing tables are public information, but
-    currently there are no public services that monitor the Tor network. The
-    Tor Network is a dynamic set of relays, so monitoring must be Tor-aware in
-    order to keep the set of monitored relays accurate. Additionally, consensus
-    archives and historical Internet routing table snapshots are publicly
-    available, and this analysis can be performed retroactively.
-    </p>
-
-    <p>
-    The implications of IP hijacking are that Tor traffic can be redirected
-    through a network that an attacker controls, even if the attacker does not
-    normally have this capability - i.e. they are not in the network path. For
-    example, an adversary could hijack the prefix of a Tor Guard relay, in
-    order to learn who its clients are, or hijack a Tor Exit relay to tamper
-    with requests or name resolution.
-    </p>
-
-    <p>
-    This project comprises building a service that compares network prefixes of
-    relays in the consensus with present and historic routing table snapshots
-    from looking glass services such as <a
-    href="http://routeviews.org";>Routeviews</a>, or aggregators such as <a
-    href="https://bgpstream.caida.org";>Caida BGPStream</a> and then issues
-    email alerts to the contact-info in the relay descriptor and a mailing
-    list. Network operators are responsive to route injections, and these
-    alerts can be used to notify network operators to take immediate action, as
-    well as collect information about the occurrence of these type of attacks.
-    </p>
-    </li>
-
     <a id="ahmiaSearch"></a>
     <li>
     <b>Ahmia - Hidden Service Search</b>



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