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[tor-commits] [torspec/master] Convert prop299 to unix line-endings
commit 87bc2f172d87fff042dc493e16419687518c3866
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue Feb 5 07:10:23 2019 -0500
Convert prop299 to unix line-endings
---
proposals/299-ip-failure-count.txt | 234 ++++++++++++++++++-------------------
1 file changed, 117 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)
diff --git a/proposals/299-ip-failure-count.txt b/proposals/299-ip-failure-count.txt
index 99d2534..60d35d4 100644
--- a/proposals/299-ip-failure-count.txt
+++ b/proposals/299-ip-failure-count.txt
@@ -1,117 +1,117 @@
-Filename: 299-ip-failure-count.txt
-Title: Preferring IPv4 or IPv6 based on IP Version Failure Count
-Author: Neel Chauhan
-Created: 25-Jan-2019
-Status: Open
-Ticket: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27491
-
-1. Introduction
-
- As IPv4 address space becomes scarce, ISPs and organizations will deploy
- IPv6 in their networks. Right now, Tor clients connect to guards using
- IPv4 connectivity by default.
-
- When networks first transition to IPv6, both IPv4 and IPv6 will be enabled
- on most networks in a so-called "dual-stack" configuration. This is to not
- break existing IPv4-only applications while enabling IPv6 connectivity.
- However, IPv6 connectivity may be unreliable and clients should be able
- to connect to the guard using the most reliable technology, whether IPv4
- or IPv6.
-
- In ticket #27490, we introduced the option ClientAutoIPv6ORPort which adds
- preliminary "happy eyeballs" support. If set, this lets a client randomly
- choose between IPv4 or IPv6. However, this random decision does not take
- into account unreliable connectivity or network failures of an IP family.
- A successful Tor implementation of the happy eyeballs algorithm requires
- that unreliable connectivity on IPv4 and IPv6 are taken into consideration.
-
- This proposal describes an algorithm to take into account network failures
- in the random decision used for choosing an IP family and the data fields
- used by the algorithm.
-
-2. Failure Counter Design
-
- I propose that the failure counter uses the following fields:
-
- * IPv4 failure count
-
- * IPv4 failure count from no route (autofail)
-
- * IPv6 failure count
-
- * IPv6 failure count from no route (autofail)
-
- These entries will exist as internal counters for the current session, and
- as a list of the previous counts of these counters from previous sessions in
- the state file.
-
- These values will be stored as 32-bit unsigned integers for the current
- session, and as comma seperated values in the statefile.
-
- The list capacity will be the 4 most recent sessions for each field above
- stored in the state file with the least recent first. This is for the
- following reasons:
-
- * We can forget about the oldest sessions without having to keep the
- exact timestamp when a client failed. This prevents an attacker from
- getting detailed failure information from the state file.
-
- * Some clients (mobile phones, laptops) may switch between networks of
- which may be more or less reliable than the previous in terms of IPv4
- or IPv6. In this case, it makes less sense to remember old failures
- caused on a different network from the current one.
-
- When Tor is being closed, and there are less than four entries for each
- field, we will append the current session at the end. If there are four
- entries, we will remove the oldest entry and then add the current session's
- values at Tor's shutdown.
-
-3. Failure Probability Calculation
-
- The failure count of one IP version will increase the probability of the
- other IP version. For instance, a failure of IPv4 will increase the IPv6
- probability, and vice versa.
-
- When the IP version is being chosen, I propose that these values will be
- included in the guard selection code:
-
- * IPv4 failure points
-
- * IPv6 failure points
-
- * Total failure points
-
- These values will be stored as 32-bit unsigned integers.
-
- A generic failure of an IP version will add one point to the failure point
- count values of the particular IP version which failed.
-
- A failure of an IP version from a "no route" error which happens when
- connections automatically fail will be counted as two failure points
- for the automatically failed version.
-
- The failure points for both IPv4 and IPv6 is sum of the values in the state
- file plus the current session's failure values. The total failure points is
- a sum of the IPv4 and IPv6 failure points.
-
- The probability of a particular IP version is the failure points of the
- other version divided by the total number of failure points, multiplied
- by 8 and stored as an integer. We will call this value the summarized
- failure point value (SFPV). The reason for this summarization is to
- emulate a probability in 1/8 intervals by the random number generator.
-
- In the random number generator, we will choose a random number between 0
- and 8. If the random number is less than the IPv6 SFPV, we will choose
- IPv4. If it is equal or greater, we will choose IPv6.
-
- If the probability is 0/8 with a SFPV value of 0, it will be rounded to
- 1/8 with a SFPV of 1. Also, if the probability is 8/8 with a SFPV of 8,
- it will be rounded to 7/8 with a SFPV of 7. The reason for this is to
- accomodate mobile clients which could change networks at any time (e.g.
- WiFi to cellular) which may be more or less reliable in terms of a
- particular IP family when compared to the previous network of the client.
-
-4. Acknowledgements
-
- Thank you teor for aiding me with the implementation of Happy Eyeballs in
- Tor. This would not have been possible if it weren't for you.
+Filename: 299-ip-failure-count.txt
+Title: Preferring IPv4 or IPv6 based on IP Version Failure Count
+Author: Neel Chauhan
+Created: 25-Jan-2019
+Status: Open
+Ticket: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27491
+
+1. Introduction
+
+ As IPv4 address space becomes scarce, ISPs and organizations will deploy
+ IPv6 in their networks. Right now, Tor clients connect to guards using
+ IPv4 connectivity by default.
+
+ When networks first transition to IPv6, both IPv4 and IPv6 will be enabled
+ on most networks in a so-called "dual-stack" configuration. This is to not
+ break existing IPv4-only applications while enabling IPv6 connectivity.
+ However, IPv6 connectivity may be unreliable and clients should be able
+ to connect to the guard using the most reliable technology, whether IPv4
+ or IPv6.
+
+ In ticket #27490, we introduced the option ClientAutoIPv6ORPort which adds
+ preliminary "happy eyeballs" support. If set, this lets a client randomly
+ choose between IPv4 or IPv6. However, this random decision does not take
+ into account unreliable connectivity or network failures of an IP family.
+ A successful Tor implementation of the happy eyeballs algorithm requires
+ that unreliable connectivity on IPv4 and IPv6 are taken into consideration.
+
+ This proposal describes an algorithm to take into account network failures
+ in the random decision used for choosing an IP family and the data fields
+ used by the algorithm.
+
+2. Failure Counter Design
+
+ I propose that the failure counter uses the following fields:
+
+ * IPv4 failure count
+
+ * IPv4 failure count from no route (autofail)
+
+ * IPv6 failure count
+
+ * IPv6 failure count from no route (autofail)
+
+ These entries will exist as internal counters for the current session, and
+ as a list of the previous counts of these counters from previous sessions in
+ the state file.
+
+ These values will be stored as 32-bit unsigned integers for the current
+ session, and as comma seperated values in the statefile.
+
+ The list capacity will be the 4 most recent sessions for each field above
+ stored in the state file with the least recent first. This is for the
+ following reasons:
+
+ * We can forget about the oldest sessions without having to keep the
+ exact timestamp when a client failed. This prevents an attacker from
+ getting detailed failure information from the state file.
+
+ * Some clients (mobile phones, laptops) may switch between networks of
+ which may be more or less reliable than the previous in terms of IPv4
+ or IPv6. In this case, it makes less sense to remember old failures
+ caused on a different network from the current one.
+
+ When Tor is being closed, and there are less than four entries for each
+ field, we will append the current session at the end. If there are four
+ entries, we will remove the oldest entry and then add the current session's
+ values at Tor's shutdown.
+
+3. Failure Probability Calculation
+
+ The failure count of one IP version will increase the probability of the
+ other IP version. For instance, a failure of IPv4 will increase the IPv6
+ probability, and vice versa.
+
+ When the IP version is being chosen, I propose that these values will be
+ included in the guard selection code:
+
+ * IPv4 failure points
+
+ * IPv6 failure points
+
+ * Total failure points
+
+ These values will be stored as 32-bit unsigned integers.
+
+ A generic failure of an IP version will add one point to the failure point
+ count values of the particular IP version which failed.
+
+ A failure of an IP version from a "no route" error which happens when
+ connections automatically fail will be counted as two failure points
+ for the automatically failed version.
+
+ The failure points for both IPv4 and IPv6 is sum of the values in the state
+ file plus the current session's failure values. The total failure points is
+ a sum of the IPv4 and IPv6 failure points.
+
+ The probability of a particular IP version is the failure points of the
+ other version divided by the total number of failure points, multiplied
+ by 8 and stored as an integer. We will call this value the summarized
+ failure point value (SFPV). The reason for this summarization is to
+ emulate a probability in 1/8 intervals by the random number generator.
+
+ In the random number generator, we will choose a random number between 0
+ and 8. If the random number is less than the IPv6 SFPV, we will choose
+ IPv4. If it is equal or greater, we will choose IPv6.
+
+ If the probability is 0/8 with a SFPV value of 0, it will be rounded to
+ 1/8 with a SFPV of 1. Also, if the probability is 8/8 with a SFPV of 8,
+ it will be rounded to 7/8 with a SFPV of 7. The reason for this is to
+ accomodate mobile clients which could change networks at any time (e.g.
+ WiFi to cellular) which may be more or less reliable in terms of a
+ particular IP family when compared to the previous network of the client.
+
+4. Acknowledgements
+
+ Thank you teor for aiding me with the implementation of Happy Eyeballs in
+ Tor. This would not have been possible if it weren't for you.
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