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[or-cvs] [tor/maint-0.2.2] Add logic in routerparse to not read overlong private keys
commit 729f404efec0795f7ed358e7b2fa08bd62cc1ae8
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon Jan 10 12:07:34 2011 -0500
Add logic in routerparse to not read overlong private keys
I am not at all sure that it is possible to trigger a bug here,
but better safe than sorry.
---
src/common/crypto.c | 14 ++++++++------
src/common/crypto.h | 2 +-
src/or/routerparse.c | 2 +-
src/or/test.c | 6 +++---
4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c
index 3343980..da4e03e 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto.c
@@ -439,21 +439,23 @@ crypto_pk_generate_key(crypto_pk_env_t *env)
return 0;
}
-/** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the string <b>s</b> into <b>env</b>.
- * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+/** Read a PEM-encoded private key from the <b>len</b>-byte string <b>s</b>
+ * into <b>env</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. If len is -1,
+ * the string is nul-terminated.
*/
/* Used here, and used for testing. */
int
crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
- const char *s)
+ const char *s, ssize_t len)
{
BIO *b;
tor_assert(env);
tor_assert(s);
+ tor_assert(len < INT_MAX && len < SIZE_T_CEILING);
- /* Create a read-only memory BIO, backed by the NUL-terminated string 's' */
- b = BIO_new_mem_buf((char*)s, -1);
+ /* Create a read-only memory BIO, backed by the string 's' */
+ b = BIO_new_mem_buf((char*)s, (int)len);
if (env->key)
RSA_free(env->key);
@@ -487,7 +489,7 @@ crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
}
/* Try to parse it. */
- r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(env, contents);
+ r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(env, contents, -1);
tor_free(contents);
if (r)
return -1; /* read_private_key_from_string already warned, so we don't.*/
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h
index 4fb06be..713a988 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.h
+++ b/src/common/crypto.h
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ int crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_string(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
int crypto_pk_read_public_key_from_string(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
const char *src, size_t len);
int crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
- const char *s);
+ const char *s, ssize_t len);
int crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(crypto_pk_env_t *env,
const char *fname);
diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c
index fc30c62..6ca2293 100644
--- a/src/or/routerparse.c
+++ b/src/or/routerparse.c
@@ -3132,7 +3132,7 @@ get_next_token(memarea_t *area,
RET_ERR("Couldn't parse public key.");
} else if (!strcmp(tok->object_type, "RSA PRIVATE KEY")) { /* private key */
tok->key = crypto_new_pk_env();
- if (crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(tok->key, obstart))
+ if (crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(tok->key, obstart, eol-obstart))
RET_ERR("Couldn't parse private key.");
} else { /* If it's something else, try to base64-decode it */
int r;
diff --git a/src/or/test.c b/src/or/test.c
index 66fa560..c4458d8 100644
--- a/src/or/test.c
+++ b/src/or/test.c
@@ -3361,11 +3361,11 @@ test_v3_networkstatus(void)
sign_skey_leg1 = pk_generate(4);
test_assert(!crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(sign_skey_1,
- AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1));
+ AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_1,-1));
test_assert(!crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(sign_skey_2,
- AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_2));
+ AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_2,-1));
test_assert(!crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(sign_skey_3,
- AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_3));
+ AUTHORITY_SIGNKEY_3,-1));
test_assert(!crypto_pk_cmp_keys(sign_skey_1, cert1->signing_key));
test_assert(!crypto_pk_cmp_keys(sign_skey_2, cert2->signing_key));