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[or-cvs] [tor/master] Merge remote branch 'origin/maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2
commit a7790d48af73760a2ae10fcff70b319914316b90
Merge: 1393985 ef6fa07
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Sat Jan 15 14:15:19 2011 -0500
Merge remote branch 'origin/maint-0.2.1' into maint-0.2.2
changes/bug2384 | 6 ++++++
src/common/crypto.c | 12 +++++++++---
src/or/rendclient.c | 2 ++
src/or/rendservice.c | 2 ++
4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --combined src/common/crypto.c
index 1d12a9d,29137a8..e847d8c
--- a/src/common/crypto.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto.c
@@@ -27,7 -27,6 +27,7 @@@
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
@@@ -50,9 -49,9 +50,9 @@@
#define CRYPTO_PRIVATE
#include "crypto.h"
-#include "log.h"
+#include "../common/torlog.h"
#include "aes.h"
-#include "util.h"
+#include "../common/util.h"
#include "container.h"
#include "compat.h"
@@@ -62,33 -61,6 +62,33 @@@
#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#ifdef ANDROID
+/* Android's OpenSSL seems to have removed all of its Engine support. */
+#define DISABLE_ENGINES
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00908000l
+/* On OpenSSL versions before 0.9.8, there is no working SHA256
+ * implementation, so we use Tom St Denis's nice speedy one, slightly adapted
+ * to our needs */
+#define SHA256_CTX sha256_state
+#define SHA256_Init sha256_init
+#define SHA256_Update sha256_process
+#define LTC_ARGCHK(x) tor_assert(x)
+#include "sha256.c"
+#define SHA256_Final(a,b) sha256_done(b,a)
+
+static unsigned char *
+SHA256(const unsigned char *m, size_t len, unsigned char *d)
+{
+ SHA256_CTX ctx;
+ SHA256_Init(&ctx);
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, m, len);
+ SHA256_Final(d, &ctx);
+ return d;
+}
+#endif
+
/** Macro: is k a valid RSA public or private key? */
#define PUBLIC_KEY_OK(k) ((k) && (k)->key && (k)->key->n)
/** Macro: is k a valid RSA private key? */
@@@ -122,7 -94,7 +122,7 @@@ struct crypto_dh_env_t
};
static int setup_openssl_threading(void);
-static int tor_check_dh_key(BIGNUM *bn);
+static int tor_check_dh_key(int severity, BIGNUM *bn);
/** Return the number of bytes added by padding method <b>padding</b>.
*/
@@@ -179,7 -151,6 +179,7 @@@ crypto_log_errors(int severity, const c
}
}
+#ifndef DISABLE_ENGINES
/** Log any OpenSSL engines we're using at NOTICE. */
static void
log_engine(const char *fn, ENGINE *e)
@@@ -194,82 -165,37 +194,82 @@@
log(LOG_INFO, LD_CRYPTO, "Using default implementation for %s", fn);
}
}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef DISABLE_ENGINES
+/** Try to load an engine in a shared library via fully qualified path.
+ */
+static ENGINE *
+try_load_engine(const char *path, const char *engine)
+{
+ ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic");
+ if (e) {
+ if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "ID", engine, 0) ||
+ !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "DIR_LOAD", "2", 0) ||
+ !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "DIR_ADD", path, 0) ||
+ !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "LOAD", NULL, 0)) {
+ ENGINE_free(e);
+ e = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ return e;
+}
+#endif
/** Initialize the crypto library. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
int
-crypto_global_init(int useAccel)
+crypto_global_init(int useAccel, const char *accelName, const char *accelDir)
{
if (!_crypto_global_initialized) {
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
_crypto_global_initialized = 1;
setup_openssl_threading();
- /* XXX the below is a bug, since we can't know if we're supposed
- * to be using hardware acceleration or not. we should arrange
- * for this function to be called before init_keys. But make it
- * not complain loudly, at least until we make acceleration work. */
- if (useAccel < 0) {
- log_info(LD_CRYPTO, "Initializing OpenSSL via tor_tls_init().");
- }
if (useAccel > 0) {
+#ifdef DISABLE_ENGINES
+ (void)accelName;
+ (void)accelDir;
+ log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "No OpenSSL hardware acceleration support enabled.");
+#else
+ ENGINE *e = NULL;
+
log_info(LD_CRYPTO, "Initializing OpenSSL engine support.");
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
- if (!ENGINE_register_all_complete())
- return -1;
-
- /* XXXX make sure this isn't leaking. */
+ ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+
+ if (accelName) {
+ if (accelDir) {
+ log_info(LD_CRYPTO, "Trying to load dynamic OpenSSL engine \"%s\""
+ " via path \"%s\".", accelName, accelDir);
+ e = try_load_engine(accelName, accelDir);
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_CRYPTO, "Initializing dynamic OpenSSL engine \"%s\""
+ " acceleration support.", accelName);
+ e = ENGINE_by_id(accelName);
+ }
+ if (!e) {
+ log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Unable to load dynamic OpenSSL engine \"%s\".",
+ accelName);
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_CRYPTO, "Loaded dynamic OpenSSL engine \"%s\".",
+ accelName);
+ }
+ }
+ if (e) {
+ log_info(LD_CRYPTO, "Loaded OpenSSL hardware acceleration engine,"
+ " setting default ciphers.");
+ ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL);
+ }
log_engine("RSA", ENGINE_get_default_RSA());
log_engine("DH", ENGINE_get_default_DH());
log_engine("RAND", ENGINE_get_default_RAND());
log_engine("SHA1", ENGINE_get_digest_engine(NID_sha1));
log_engine("3DES", ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(NID_des_ede3_ecb));
log_engine("AES", ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(NID_aes_128_ecb));
+#endif
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_CRYPTO, "NOT using OpenSSL engine support.");
}
return crypto_seed_rng(1);
}
@@@ -291,11 -217,7 +291,11 @@@ crypto_global_cleanup(void
EVP_cleanup();
ERR_remove_state(0);
ERR_free_strings();
+
+#ifndef DISABLE_ENGINES
ENGINE_cleanup();
+#endif
+
CONF_modules_unload(1);
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
#ifdef TOR_IS_MULTITHREADED
@@@ -337,8 -259,7 +337,8 @@@ _crypto_new_pk_env_evp_pkey(EVP_PKEY *p
return _crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(rsa);
}
-/** Helper, used by tor-checkkey.c. Return the RSA from a crypto_pk_env_t. */
+/** Helper, used by tor-checkkey.c and tor-gencert.c. Return the RSA from a
+ * crypto_pk_env_t. */
RSA *
_crypto_pk_env_get_rsa(crypto_pk_env_t *env)
{
@@@ -400,12 -321,10 +400,12 @@@ crypto_new_pk_env(void
void
crypto_free_pk_env(crypto_pk_env_t *env)
{
- tor_assert(env);
+ if (!env)
+ return;
if (--env->refs > 0)
return;
+ tor_assert(env->refs == 0);
if (env->key)
RSA_free(env->key);
@@@ -428,7 -347,10 +428,7 @@@ crypto_create_init_cipher(const char *k
return NULL;
}
- if (crypto_cipher_set_key(crypto, key)) {
- crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "setting symmetric key");
- goto error;
- }
+ crypto_cipher_set_key(crypto, key);
if (encrypt_mode)
r = crypto_cipher_encrypt_init_cipher(crypto);
@@@ -462,8 -384,7 +462,8 @@@ crypto_new_cipher_env(void
void
crypto_free_cipher_env(crypto_cipher_env_t *env)
{
- tor_assert(env);
+ if (!env)
+ return;
tor_assert(env->cipher);
aes_free_cipher(env->cipher);
@@@ -473,11 -394,11 +473,11 @@@
/* public key crypto */
-/** Generate a new public/private keypair in <b>env</b>. Return 0 on
- * success, -1 on failure.
+/** Generate a <b>bits</b>-bit new public/private keypair in <b>env</b>.
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
int
-crypto_pk_generate_key(crypto_pk_env_t *env)
+crypto_pk_generate_key_with_bits(crypto_pk_env_t *env, int bits)
{
tor_assert(env);
@@@ -485,7 -406,7 +485,7 @@@
RSA_free(env->key);
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00908000l
/* In OpenSSL 0.9.7, RSA_generate_key is all we have. */
- env->key = RSA_generate_key(PK_BYTES*8,65537, NULL, NULL);
+ env->key = RSA_generate_key(bits, 65537, NULL, NULL);
#else
/* In OpenSSL 0.9.8, RSA_generate_key is deprecated. */
{
@@@ -498,7 -419,7 +498,7 @@@
r = RSA_new();
if (!r)
goto done;
- if (RSA_generate_key_ex(r, PK_BYTES*8, e, NULL) == -1)
+ if (RSA_generate_key_ex(r, bits, e, NULL) == -1)
goto done;
env->key = r;
@@@ -569,6 -490,7 +569,7 @@@ crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filenam
/* Try to parse it. */
r = crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_string(env, contents, -1);
+ memset(contents, 0, strlen(contents));
tor_free(contents);
if (r)
return -1; /* read_private_key_from_string already warned, so we don't.*/
@@@ -706,6 -628,7 +707,7 @@@ crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename
s[len]='\0';
r = write_str_to_file(fname, s, 0);
BIO_free(bio);
+ memset(s, 0, strlen(s));
tor_free(s);
return r;
}
@@@ -782,25 -705,14 +784,25 @@@ crypto_pk_env_t
crypto_pk_copy_full(crypto_pk_env_t *env)
{
RSA *new_key;
+ int privatekey = 0;
tor_assert(env);
tor_assert(env->key);
if (PRIVATE_KEY_OK(env)) {
new_key = RSAPrivateKey_dup(env->key);
+ privatekey = 1;
} else {
new_key = RSAPublicKey_dup(env->key);
}
+ if (!new_key) {
+ log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Unable to duplicate a %s key: openssl failed.",
+ privatekey?"private":"public");
+ crypto_log_errors(LOG_ERR,
+ privatekey ? "Duplicating a private key" :
+ "Duplicating a public key");
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ return NULL;
+ }
return _crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(new_key);
}
@@@ -1301,14 -1213,19 +1303,14 @@@ crypto_cipher_generate_key(crypto_ciphe
/** Set the symmetric key for the cipher in <b>env</b> to the first
* CIPHER_KEY_LEN bytes of <b>key</b>. Does not initialize the cipher.
- * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
-int
+void
crypto_cipher_set_key(crypto_cipher_env_t *env, const char *key)
{
tor_assert(env);
tor_assert(key);
- if (!env->key)
- return -1;
-
memcpy(env->key, key, CIPHER_KEY_LEN);
- return 0;
}
/** Generate an initialization vector for our AES-CTR cipher; store it
@@@ -1485,69 -1402,9 +1487,69 @@@ crypto_digest(char *digest, const char
return (SHA1((const unsigned char*)m,len,(unsigned char*)digest) == NULL);
}
+int
+crypto_digest256(char *digest, const char *m, size_t len,
+ digest_algorithm_t algorithm)
+{
+ tor_assert(m);
+ tor_assert(digest);
+ tor_assert(algorithm == DIGEST_SHA256);
+ return (SHA256((const unsigned char*)m,len,(unsigned char*)digest) == NULL);
+}
+
+/** Set the digests_t in <b>ds_out</b> to contain every digest on the
+ * <b>len</b> bytes in <b>m</b> that we know how to compute. Return 0 on
+ * success, -1 on failure. */
+int
+crypto_digest_all(digests_t *ds_out, const char *m, size_t len)
+{
+ digest_algorithm_t i;
+ tor_assert(ds_out);
+ memset(ds_out, 0, sizeof(*ds_out));
+ if (crypto_digest(ds_out->d[DIGEST_SHA1], m, len) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ for (i = DIGEST_SHA256; i < N_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS; ++i) {
+ if (crypto_digest256(ds_out->d[i], m, len, i) < 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return the name of an algorithm, as used in directory documents. */
+const char *
+crypto_digest_algorithm_get_name(digest_algorithm_t alg)
+{
+ switch (alg) {
+ case DIGEST_SHA1:
+ return "sha1";
+ case DIGEST_SHA256:
+ return "sha256";
+ default:
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ return "??unknown_digest??";
+ }
+}
+
+/** Given the name of a digest algorithm, return its integer value, or -1 if
+ * the name is not recognized. */
+int
+crypto_digest_algorithm_parse_name(const char *name)
+{
+ if (!strcmp(name, "sha1"))
+ return DIGEST_SHA1;
+ else if (!strcmp(name, "sha256"))
+ return DIGEST_SHA256;
+ else
+ return -1;
+}
+
/** Intermediate information about the digest of a stream of data. */
struct crypto_digest_env_t {
- SHA_CTX d;
+ union {
+ SHA_CTX sha1;
+ SHA256_CTX sha2;
+ } d;
+ digest_algorithm_t algorithm : 8;
};
/** Allocate and return a new digest object.
@@@ -1557,19 -1414,7 +1559,19 @@@ crypto_new_digest_env(void
{
crypto_digest_env_t *r;
r = tor_malloc(sizeof(crypto_digest_env_t));
- SHA1_Init(&r->d);
+ SHA1_Init(&r->d.sha1);
+ r->algorithm = DIGEST_SHA1;
+ return r;
+}
+
+crypto_digest_env_t *
+crypto_new_digest256_env(digest_algorithm_t algorithm)
+{
+ crypto_digest_env_t *r;
+ tor_assert(algorithm == DIGEST_SHA256);
+ r = tor_malloc(sizeof(crypto_digest_env_t));
+ SHA256_Init(&r->d.sha2);
+ r->algorithm = algorithm;
return r;
}
@@@ -1578,8 -1423,6 +1580,8 @@@
void
crypto_free_digest_env(crypto_digest_env_t *digest)
{
+ if (!digest)
+ return;
memset(digest, 0, sizeof(crypto_digest_env_t));
tor_free(digest);
}
@@@ -1592,51 -1435,30 +1594,51 @@@ crypto_digest_add_bytes(crypto_digest_e
{
tor_assert(digest);
tor_assert(data);
- /* Using the SHA1_*() calls directly means we don't support doing
- * SHA1 in hardware. But so far the delay of getting the question
+ /* Using the SHA*_*() calls directly means we don't support doing
+ * SHA in hardware. But so far the delay of getting the question
* to the hardware, and hearing the answer, is likely higher than
* just doing it ourselves. Hashes are fast.
*/
- SHA1_Update(&digest->d, (void*)data, len);
+ switch (digest->algorithm) {
+ case DIGEST_SHA1:
+ SHA1_Update(&digest->d.sha1, (void*)data, len);
+ break;
+ case DIGEST_SHA256:
+ SHA256_Update(&digest->d.sha2, (void*)data, len);
+ break;
+ default:
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ break;
+ }
}
/** Compute the hash of the data that has been passed to the digest
* object; write the first out_len bytes of the result to <b>out</b>.
- * <b>out_len</b> must be \<= DIGEST_LEN.
+ * <b>out_len</b> must be \<= DIGEST256_LEN.
*/
void
crypto_digest_get_digest(crypto_digest_env_t *digest,
char *out, size_t out_len)
{
- unsigned char r[DIGEST_LEN];
- SHA_CTX tmpctx;
+ unsigned char r[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ crypto_digest_env_t tmpenv;
tor_assert(digest);
tor_assert(out);
- tor_assert(out_len <= DIGEST_LEN);
- /* memcpy into a temporary ctx, since SHA1_Final clears the context */
- memcpy(&tmpctx, &digest->d, sizeof(SHA_CTX));
- SHA1_Final(r, &tmpctx);
+ /* memcpy into a temporary ctx, since SHA*_Final clears the context */
+ memcpy(&tmpenv, digest, sizeof(crypto_digest_env_t));
+ switch (digest->algorithm) {
+ case DIGEST_SHA1:
+ tor_assert(out_len <= DIGEST_LEN);
+ SHA1_Final(r, &tmpenv.d.sha1);
+ break;
+ case DIGEST_SHA256:
+ tor_assert(out_len <= DIGEST256_LEN);
+ SHA256_Final(r, &tmpenv.d.sha2);
+ break;
+ default:
+ tor_fragile_assert();
+ break;
+ }
memcpy(out, r, out_len);
memset(r, 0, sizeof(r));
}
@@@ -1772,7 -1594,7 +1774,7 @@@ crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_env
crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "generating DH key");
return -1;
}
- if (tor_check_dh_key(dh->dh->pub_key)<0) {
+ if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, dh->dh->pub_key)<0) {
log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-"
"the-universe chances really do happen. Trying again.");
/* Free and clear the keys, so OpenSSL will actually try again. */
@@@ -1819,7 -1641,7 +1821,7 @@@ crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_env_t *d
* See http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/psandqs.ps.gz for some tips.
*/
static int
-tor_check_dh_key(BIGNUM *bn)
+tor_check_dh_key(int severity, BIGNUM *bn)
{
BIGNUM *x;
char *s;
@@@ -1830,13 -1652,13 +1832,13 @@@
init_dh_param();
BN_set_word(x, 1);
if (BN_cmp(bn,x)<=0) {
- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at least 2.");
+ log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at least 2.");
goto err;
}
BN_copy(x,dh_param_p);
BN_sub_word(x, 1);
if (BN_cmp(bn,x)>=0) {
- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at most p-2.");
+ log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at most p-2.");
goto err;
}
BN_free(x);
@@@ -1844,7 -1666,7 +1846,7 @@@
err:
BN_free(x);
s = BN_bn2hex(bn);
- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Rejecting insecure DH key [%s]", s);
+ log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "Rejecting insecure DH key [%s]", s);
OPENSSL_free(s);
return -1;
}
@@@ -1862,13 -1684,13 +1864,13 @@@
* where || is concatenation.)
*/
ssize_t
-crypto_dh_compute_secret(crypto_dh_env_t *dh,
+crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_env_t *dh,
const char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len,
char *secret_out, size_t secret_bytes_out)
{
char *secret_tmp = NULL;
BIGNUM *pubkey_bn = NULL;
- size_t secret_len=0;
+ size_t secret_len=0, secret_tmp_len=0;
int result=0;
tor_assert(dh);
tor_assert(secret_bytes_out/DIGEST_LEN <= 255);
@@@ -1877,12 -1699,13 +1879,13 @@@
if (!(pubkey_bn = BN_bin2bn((const unsigned char*)pubkey,
(int)pubkey_len, NULL)))
goto error;
- if (tor_check_dh_key(pubkey_bn)<0) {
+ if (tor_check_dh_key(severity, pubkey_bn)<0) {
/* Check for invalid public keys. */
- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO,"Rejected invalid g^x");
+ log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO,"Rejected invalid g^x");
goto error;
}
- secret_tmp = tor_malloc(crypto_dh_get_bytes(dh));
+ secret_tmp_len = crypto_dh_get_bytes(dh);
+ secret_tmp = tor_malloc(secret_tmp_len);
result = DH_compute_key((unsigned char*)secret_tmp, pubkey_bn, dh->dh);
if (result < 0) {
log_warn(LD_CRYPTO,"DH_compute_key() failed.");
@@@ -1901,7 -1724,10 +1904,10 @@@
crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "completing DH handshake");
if (pubkey_bn)
BN_free(pubkey_bn);
- tor_free(secret_tmp);
+ if (secret_tmp) {
+ memset(secret_tmp, 0, secret_tmp_len);
+ tor_free(secret_tmp);
+ }
if (result < 0)
return result;
else
@@@ -1951,8 -1777,7 +1957,8 @@@ crypto_expand_key_material(const char *
void
crypto_dh_free(crypto_dh_env_t *dh)
{
- tor_assert(dh);
+ if (!dh)
+ return;
tor_assert(dh->dh);
DH_free(dh->dh);
tor_free(dh);
@@@ -1977,14 -1802,6 +1983,14 @@@
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x00907fffl) || \
(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090803fl))
+static void
+seed_weak_rng(void)
+{
+ unsigned seed;
+ crypto_rand((void*)&seed, sizeof(seed));
+ tor_init_weak_random(seed);
+}
+
/** Seed OpenSSL's random number generator with bytes from the operating
* system. <b>startup</b> should be true iff we have just started Tor and
* have not yet allocated a bunch of fds. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
@@@ -1992,15 -1809,14 +1998,15 @@@
int
crypto_seed_rng(int startup)
{
- char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
int rand_poll_status = 0;
/* local variables */
#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
+ unsigned char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
static int provider_set = 0;
static HCRYPTPROV provider;
#else
+ char buf[ADD_ENTROPY];
static const char *filenames[] = {
"/dev/srandom", "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", NULL
};
@@@ -2036,7 -1852,6 +2042,7 @@@
}
RAND_seed(buf, sizeof(buf));
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ seed_weak_rng();
return 0;
#else
for (i = 0; filenames[i]; ++i) {
@@@ -2053,7 -1868,6 +2059,7 @@@
}
RAND_seed(buf, (int)sizeof(buf));
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+ seed_weak_rng();
return 0;
}
@@@ -2121,26 -1935,6 +2127,26 @@@ crypto_rand_uint64(uint64_t max
}
}
+/** Return a pseudorandom double d, chosen uniformly from the range
+ * 0.0 <= d < 1.0.
+ */
+double
+crypto_rand_double(void)
+{
+ /* We just use an unsigned int here; we don't really care about getting
+ * more than 32 bits of resolution */
+ unsigned int uint;
+ crypto_rand((char*)&uint, sizeof(uint));
+#if SIZEOF_INT == 4
+#define UINT_MAX_AS_DOUBLE 4294967296.0
+#elif SIZEOF_INT == 8
+#define UINT_MAX_AS_DOUBLE 1.8446744073709552e+19
+#else
+#error SIZEOF_INT is neither 4 nor 8
+#endif
+ return ((double)uint) / UINT_MAX_AS_DOUBLE;
+}
+
/** Generate and return a new random hostname starting with <b>prefix</b>,
* ending with <b>suffix</b>, and containing no less than
* <b>min_rand_len</b> and no more than <b>max_rand_len</b> random base32
@@@ -2401,54 -2195,15 +2407,54 @@@ digest_from_base64(char *digest, const
#endif
}
+/** Base-64 encode DIGEST256_LINE bytes from <b>digest</b>, remove the
+ * trailing = and newline characters, and store the nul-terminated result in
+ * the first BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+1 bytes of <b>d64</b>. */
+int
+digest256_to_base64(char *d64, const char *digest)
+{
+ char buf[256];
+ base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), digest, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ buf[BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN] = '\0';
+ memcpy(d64, buf, BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Given a base-64 encoded, nul-terminated digest in <b>d64</b> (without
+ * trailing newline or = characters), decode it and store the result in the
+ * first DIGEST256_LEN bytes at <b>digest</b>. */
+int
+digest256_from_base64(char *digest, const char *d64)
+{
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_BASE64
+ char buf_in[BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+3];
+ char buf[256];
+ if (strlen(d64) != BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(buf_in, d64, BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN);
+ memcpy(buf_in+BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN, "=\n\0", 3);
+ if (base64_decode(buf, sizeof(buf), buf_in, strlen(buf_in)) != DIGEST256_LEN)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(digest, buf, DIGEST256_LEN);
+ return 0;
+#else
+ if (base64_decode(digest, DIGEST256_LEN, d64, strlen(d64)) == DIGEST256_LEN)
+ return 0;
+ else
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
/** Implements base32 encoding as in rfc3548. Limitation: Requires
* that srclen*8 is a multiple of 5.
*/
void
base32_encode(char *dest, size_t destlen, const char *src, size_t srclen)
{
- unsigned int i, bit, v, u;
- size_t nbits = srclen * 8;
+ unsigned int i, v, u;
+ size_t nbits = srclen * 8, bit;
+ tor_assert(srclen < SIZE_T_CEILING/8);
tor_assert((nbits%5) == 0); /* We need an even multiple of 5 bits. */
tor_assert((nbits/5)+1 <= destlen); /* We need enough space. */
tor_assert(destlen < SIZE_T_CEILING);
@@@ -2472,12 -2227,11 +2478,12 @@@ base32_decode(char *dest, size_t destle
{
/* XXXX we might want to rewrite this along the lines of base64_decode, if
* it ever shows up in the profile. */
- unsigned int i, j, bit;
- size_t nbits;
+ unsigned int i;
+ size_t nbits, j, bit;
char *tmp;
nbits = srclen * 5;
+ tor_assert(srclen < SIZE_T_CEILING / 5);
tor_assert((nbits%8) == 0); /* We need an even multiple of 8 bits. */
tor_assert((nbits/8) <= destlen); /* We need enough space. */
tor_assert(destlen < SIZE_T_CEILING);
diff --combined src/or/rendclient.c
index b8526b6,9587546..1306fe0
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@@ -8,19 -8,6 +8,19 @@@
**/
#include "or.h"
+#include "circuitbuild.h"
+#include "circuitlist.h"
+#include "circuituse.h"
+#include "config.h"
+#include "connection.h"
+#include "connection_edge.h"
+#include "directory.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "relay.h"
+#include "rendclient.h"
+#include "rendcommon.h"
+#include "rephist.h"
+#include "routerlist.h"
/** Called when we've established a circuit to an introduction point:
* send the introduction request. */
@@@ -76,7 -63,7 +76,7 @@@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_ci
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
crypt_path_t *cpath;
off_t dh_offset;
- crypto_pk_env_t *intro_key; /* either Bob's public key or an intro key. */
+ crypto_pk_env_t *intro_key = NULL;
tor_assert(introcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
tor_assert(rendcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
@@@ -89,26 -76,48 +89,26 @@@
&entry) < 1) {
log_warn(LD_REND,
"query %s didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.",
- escaped_safe_str(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address));
+ escaped_safe_str_client(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address));
goto err;
}
- /* first 20 bytes of payload are the hash of Bob's pk */
- if (entry->parsed->version == 0) { /* un-versioned descriptor */
- intro_key = entry->parsed->pk;
- } else { /* versioned descriptor */
- intro_key = NULL;
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *,
- intro, {
- if (!memcmp(introcirc->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
- intro->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
- intro_key = intro->intro_key;
- break;
- }
- });
- if (!intro_key) {
- /** XXX This case probably means that the intro point vanished while
- * we were building a circuit to it. In the future, we should find
- * out how that happened and whether we should kill the circuits to
- * removed intro points immediately. See task 1073. */
- int num_intro_points = smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes);
- if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address,
- 0, &entry) > 0) {
- log_info(LD_REND, "We have both a v0 and a v2 rend desc for this "
- "service. The v2 desc doesn't contain the introduction "
- "point (and key) to send an INTRODUCE1/2 cell to this "
- "introduction point. Assuming the introduction point "
- "is for v0 rend clients and using the service key "
- "from the v0 desc instead. (This is probably a bug, "
- "because we shouldn't even have both a v0 and a v2 "
- "descriptor for the same service.)");
- /* See flyspray task 1024. */
- intro_key = entry->parsed->pk;
- } else {
- log_info(LD_REND, "Internal error: could not find intro key; we "
- "only have a v2 rend desc with %d intro points.",
- num_intro_points);
- goto err;
- }
+ /* first 20 bytes of payload are the hash of the intro key */
+ intro_key = NULL;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *,
+ intro, {
+ if (!memcmp(introcirc->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
+ intro->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ intro_key = intro->intro_key;
+ break;
}
+ });
+ if (!intro_key) {
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Our introduction point knowledge changed in "
+ "mid-connect! Could not find intro key; we only have a "
+ "v2 rend desc with %d intro points. Giving up.",
+ smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes));
+ goto err;
}
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(intro_key, payload)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't hash public key.");
@@@ -210,7 -219,7 +210,7 @@@
introcirc->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT;
return 0;
-err:
+ err:
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return -1;
@@@ -283,7 -292,7 +283,7 @@@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_c
extend_info = rend_client_get_random_intro(circ->rend_data);
if (!extend_info) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "No introduction points left for %s. Closing.",
- escaped_safe_str(circ->rend_data->onion_address));
+ escaped_safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address));
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return -1;
}
@@@ -291,7 -300,7 +291,7 @@@
log_info(LD_REND,
"Got nack for %s from %s. Re-extending circ %d, "
"this time to %s.",
- escaped_safe_str(circ->rend_data->onion_address),
+ escaped_safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address),
circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname,
circ->_base.n_circ_id, extend_info->nickname);
result = circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, extend_info);
@@@ -299,7 -308,7 +299,7 @@@
log_info(LD_REND,
"Got nack for %s from %s. Building a new introduction "
"circuit, this time to %s.",
- escaped_safe_str(circ->rend_data->onion_address),
+ escaped_safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address),
circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname,
extend_info->nickname);
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
@@@ -462,21 -471,45 +462,21 @@@ directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *d
rend_query->onion_address, desc_id_base32,
rend_query->auth_type,
(rend_query->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH ? "[none]" :
- escaped_safe_str(descriptor_cookie_base64)),
+ escaped_safe_str_client(descriptor_cookie_base64)),
hs_dir->nickname, hs_dir->dir_port);
return 1;
}
-/** If we are not currently fetching a rendezvous service descriptor
- * for the service ID <b>query</b>, start a directory connection to fetch a
- * new one.
- */
-void
-rend_client_refetch_renddesc(const char *query)
-{
- if (!get_options()->FetchHidServDescriptors)
- return;
- log_info(LD_REND, "Fetching rendezvous descriptor for service %s",
- escaped_safe_str(query));
- if (connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(CONN_TYPE_DIR, 0, query, 0)) {
- log_info(LD_REND,"Would fetch a new renddesc here (for %s), but one is "
- "already in progress.", escaped_safe_str(query));
- } else {
- /* not one already; initiate a dir rend desc lookup */
- directory_get_from_dirserver(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC,
- ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL, query,
- PDS_RETRY_IF_NO_SERVERS);
- }
-}
-
-/** Start a connection to a hidden service directory to fetch a v2
- * rendezvous service descriptor for the base32-encoded service ID
- * <b>query</b>.
- */
+/** Unless we already have a descriptor for <b>rend_query</b> with at least
+ * one (possibly) working introduction point in it, start a connection to a
+ * hidden service directory to fetch a v2 rendezvous service descriptor. */
void
rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query)
{
char descriptor_id[DIGEST_LEN];
int replicas_left_to_try[REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS];
- int i, tries_left, r;
+ int i, tries_left;
rend_cache_entry_t *e = NULL;
- time_t now = time(NULL);
tor_assert(rend_query);
/* Are we configured to fetch descriptors? */
if (!get_options()->FetchHidServDescriptors) {
@@@ -485,13 -518,15 +485,13 @@@
return;
}
/* Before fetching, check if we already have the descriptor here. */
- r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &e);
- if (r > 0 && now - e->received < NUM_SECONDS_BEFORE_HS_REFETCH) {
+ if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &e) > 0) {
log_info(LD_REND, "We would fetch a v2 rendezvous descriptor, but we "
- "already have a fresh copy of that descriptor here. "
- "Not fetching.");
+ "already have that descriptor here. Not fetching.");
return;
}
log_debug(LD_REND, "Fetching v2 rendezvous descriptor for service %s",
- safe_str(rend_query->onion_address));
+ safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address));
/* Randomly iterate over the replicas until a descriptor can be fetched
* from one of the consecutive nodes, or no options are left. */
tries_left = REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS;
@@@ -517,8 -552,8 +517,8 @@@
log_info(LD_REND, "Could not pick one of the responsible hidden "
"service directories to fetch descriptors, because "
"we already tried them all unsuccessfully.");
- /* Close pending connections (unless a v0 request is still going on). */
- rend_client_desc_trynow(rend_query->onion_address, 2);
+ /* Close pending connections. */
+ rend_client_desc_trynow(rend_query->onion_address);
return;
}
@@@ -539,13 -574,18 +539,13 @@@ rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_i
r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &ent);
if (r<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Malformed service ID %s.",
- escaped_safe_str(rend_query->onion_address));
+ escaped_safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address));
return -1;
}
if (r==0) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown service %s. Re-fetching descriptor.",
- escaped_safe_str(rend_query->onion_address));
- /* Fetch both, v0 and v2 rend descriptors in parallel. Use whichever
- * arrives first. Exception: When using client authorization, only
- * fetch v2 descriptors.*/
+ escaped_safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address));
rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_query);
- if (rend_query->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH)
- rend_client_refetch_renddesc(rend_query->onion_address);
return 0;
}
@@@ -562,13 -602,18 +562,13 @@@
if (smartlist_len(ent->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0) {
log_info(LD_REND,
"No more intro points remain for %s. Re-fetching descriptor.",
- escaped_safe_str(rend_query->onion_address));
- /* Fetch both, v0 and v2 rend descriptors in parallel. Use whichever
- * arrives first. Exception: When using client authorization, only
- * fetch v2 descriptors.*/
+ escaped_safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address));
rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(rend_query);
- if (rend_query->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH)
- rend_client_refetch_renddesc(rend_query->onion_address);
/* move all pending streams back to renddesc_wait */
while ((conn = connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(CONN_TYPE_AP,
AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT,
- rend_query->onion_address, -1))) {
+ rend_query->onion_address))) {
conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
}
@@@ -576,7 -621,7 +576,7 @@@
}
log_info(LD_REND,"%d options left for %s.",
smartlist_len(ent->parsed->intro_nodes),
- escaped_safe_str(rend_query->onion_address));
+ escaped_safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address));
return 1;
}
@@@ -638,8 -683,7 +638,8 @@@ rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_c
tor_assert(circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
hop = circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath;
tor_assert(hop->dh_handshake_state);
- if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(hop->dh_handshake_state, (char*)request,
+ if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,
+ hop->dh_handshake_state, (char*)request,
DH_KEY_LEN,
keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't complete DH handshake.");
@@@ -673,24 -717,32 +673,26 @@@
* attach only the connections that are waiting on this circuit, rather
* than trying to attach them all. See comments bug 743. */
connection_ap_attach_pending();
+ memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
return 0;
err:
+ memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return -1;
}
-/** Find all the apconns in state AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT that
- * are waiting on query. If there's a working cache entry here
- * with at least one intro point, move them to the next state. If
- * <b>rend_version</b> is non-negative, fail connections that have
- * requested <b>query</b> unless there are still descriptor fetch
- * requests in progress for other descriptor versions than
- * <b>rend_version</b>.
- */
+/** Find all the apconns in state AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT that are
+ * waiting on <b>query</b>. If there's a working cache entry here with at
+ * least one intro point, move them to the next state. */
void
-rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query, int rend_version)
+rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query)
{
edge_connection_t *conn;
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
time_t now = time(NULL);
smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, _conn,
- {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, _conn) {
if (_conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP ||
_conn->state != AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT ||
_conn->marked_for_close)
@@@ -722,12 -774,17 +724,12 @@@
connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH);
}
} else { /* 404, or fetch didn't get that far */
- /* Unless there are requests for another descriptor version pending,
- * close the connection. */
- if (rend_version >= 0 &&
- !connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(CONN_TYPE_DIR, 0, query,
- rend_version == 0 ? 2 : 0)) {
- log_notice(LD_REND,"Closing stream for '%s.onion': hidden service is "
- "unavailable (try again later).", safe_str(query));
- connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED);
- }
+ log_notice(LD_REND,"Closing stream for '%s.onion': hidden service is "
+ "unavailable (try again later).",
+ safe_str_client(query));
+ connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED);
}
- });
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(_conn);
}
/** Return a newly allocated extend_info_t* for a randomly chosen introduction
@@@ -745,7 -802,7 +747,7 @@@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend
if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) {
log_warn(LD_REND,
"Query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.",
- safe_str(rend_query->onion_address));
+ safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address));
return NULL;
}
@@@ -757,10 -814,7 +759,10 @@@
intro = smartlist_get(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i);
/* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */
if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) {
- router = router_get_by_nickname(intro->extend_info->nickname, 0);
+ if (tor_digest_is_zero(intro->extend_info->identity_digest))
+ router = router_get_by_hexdigest(intro->extend_info->nickname);
+ else
+ router = router_get_by_digest(intro->extend_info->identity_digest);
if (!router) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.",
intro->extend_info->nickname);
@@@ -898,7 -952,8 +900,7 @@@ rend_parse_service_authorization(or_opt
err:
res = -1;
done:
- if (auth)
- rend_service_authorization_free(auth);
+ rend_service_authorization_free(auth);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c););
smartlist_free(sl);
if (!validate_only && res == 0) {
diff --combined src/or/rendservice.c
index 1d64cf4,a650eda..f1480e0
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@@ -8,23 -8,10 +8,23 @@@
**/
#include "or.h"
+#include "circuitbuild.h"
+#include "circuitlist.h"
+#include "circuituse.h"
+#include "config.h"
+#include "directory.h"
+#include "networkstatus.h"
+#include "rendclient.h"
+#include "rendcommon.h"
+#include "rendservice.h"
+#include "router.h"
+#include "relay.h"
+#include "rephist.h"
+#include "routerlist.h"
+#include "routerparse.h"
static origin_circuit_t *find_intro_circuit(rend_intro_point_t *intro,
- const char *pk_digest,
- int desc_version);
+ const char *pk_digest);
/** Represents the mapping from a virtual port of a rendezvous service to
* a real port on some IP.
@@@ -55,6 -42,8 +55,6 @@@ typedef struct rend_service_t
/* Fields specified in config file */
char *directory; /**< where in the filesystem it stores it */
smartlist_t *ports; /**< List of rend_service_port_config_t */
- int descriptor_version; /**< Rendezvous descriptor version that will be
- * published. */
rend_auth_type_t auth_type; /**< Client authorization type or 0 if no client
* authorization is performed. */
smartlist_t *clients; /**< List of rend_authorized_client_t's of
@@@ -69,7 -58,7 +69,7 @@@
* or are trying to establish. */
time_t intro_period_started; /**< Start of the current period to build
* introduction points. */
- int n_intro_circuits_launched; /**< count of intro circuits we have
+ int n_intro_circuits_launched; /**< Count of intro circuits we have
* established in this period. */
rend_service_descriptor_t *desc; /**< Current hidden service descriptor. */
time_t desc_is_dirty; /**< Time at which changes to the hidden service
@@@ -101,8 -90,7 +101,8 @@@ num_rend_services(void
static void
rend_authorized_client_free(rend_authorized_client_t *client)
{
- if (!client) return;
+ if (!client)
+ return;
if (client->client_key)
crypto_free_pk_env(client->client_key);
tor_free(client->client_name);
@@@ -121,9 -109,7 +121,9 @@@ rend_authorized_client_strmap_item_free
static void
rend_service_free(rend_service_t *service)
{
- if (!service) return;
+ if (!service)
+ return;
+
tor_free(service->directory);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->ports, void*, p, tor_free(p));
smartlist_free(service->ports);
@@@ -134,14 -120,15 +134,14 @@@
rend_intro_point_free(intro););
smartlist_free(service->intro_nodes);
}
- if (service->desc)
- rend_service_descriptor_free(service->desc);
+
+ rend_service_descriptor_free(service->desc);
if (service->clients) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->clients, rend_authorized_client_t *, c,
rend_authorized_client_free(c););
smartlist_free(service->clients);
}
- if (service->accepted_intros)
- digestmap_free(service->accepted_intros, _tor_free);
+ digestmap_free(service->accepted_intros, _tor_free);
tor_free(service);
}
@@@ -150,9 -137,9 +150,9 @@@
void
rend_service_free_all(void)
{
- if (!rend_service_list) {
+ if (!rend_service_list)
return;
- }
+
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t*, ptr,
rend_service_free(ptr));
smartlist_free(rend_service_list);
@@@ -169,6 -156,36 +169,6 @@@ rend_add_service(rend_service_t *servic
service->intro_nodes = smartlist_create();
- /* If the service is configured to publish unversioned (v0) and versioned
- * descriptors (v2 or higher), split it up into two separate services
- * (unless it is configured to perform client authorization). */
- if (service->descriptor_version == -1) {
- if (service->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH) {
- rend_service_t *v0_service = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_t));
- v0_service->directory = tor_strdup(service->directory);
- v0_service->ports = smartlist_create();
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->ports, rend_service_port_config_t *, p, {
- rend_service_port_config_t *copy =
- tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_port_config_t));
- memcpy(copy, p, sizeof(rend_service_port_config_t));
- smartlist_add(v0_service->ports, copy);
- });
- v0_service->intro_period_started = service->intro_period_started;
- v0_service->descriptor_version = 0; /* Unversioned descriptor. */
- v0_service->auth_type = REND_NO_AUTH;
- rend_add_service(v0_service);
- }
-
- service->descriptor_version = 2; /* Versioned descriptor. */
- }
-
- if (service->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH && !service->descriptor_version) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service with client authorization and "
- "version 0 descriptors configured; ignoring.");
- rend_service_free(service);
- return;
- }
-
if (service->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH &&
smartlist_len(service->clients) == 0) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service with client authorization but no "
@@@ -280,7 -297,7 +280,7 @@@ rend_config_services(or_options_t *opti
for (line = options->RendConfigLines; line; line = line->next) {
if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceDir")) {
- if (service) {
+ if (service) { /* register the one we just finished parsing */
if (validate_only)
rend_service_free(service);
else
@@@ -290,6 -307,7 +290,6 @@@
service->directory = tor_strdup(line->value);
service->ports = smartlist_create();
service->intro_period_started = time(NULL);
- service->descriptor_version = -1; /**< All descriptor versions. */
continue;
}
if (!service) {
@@@ -415,13 -433,35 +415,13 @@@
return -1;
}
} else {
- smartlist_t *versions;
- char *version_str;
- int i, version, ver_ok=1, versions_bitmask = 0;
tor_assert(!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceVersion"));
- versions = smartlist_create();
- smartlist_split_string(versions, line->value, ",",
- SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
- for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(versions); i++) {
- version_str = smartlist_get(versions, i);
- if (strlen(version_str) != 1 || strspn(version_str, "02") != 1) {
- log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
- "HiddenServiceVersion can only be 0 and/or 2.");
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(versions, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
- smartlist_free(versions);
- rend_service_free(service);
- return -1;
- }
- version = (int)tor_parse_long(version_str, 10, 0, INT_MAX, &ver_ok,
- NULL);
- if (!ver_ok)
- continue;
- versions_bitmask |= 1 << version;
+ if (strcmp(line->value, "2")) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "The only supported HiddenServiceVersion is 2.");
+ rend_service_free(service);
+ return -1;
}
- /* If exactly one version is set, change descriptor_version to that
- * value; otherwise leave it at -1. */
- if (versions_bitmask == 1 << 0) service->descriptor_version = 0;
- if (versions_bitmask == 1 << 2) service->descriptor_version = 2;
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(versions, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
- smartlist_free(versions);
}
}
if (service) {
@@@ -443,7 -483,8 +443,7 @@@
* probably ok? */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t *, new, {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_service_list, rend_service_t *, old, {
- if (!strcmp(old->directory, new->directory) &&
- old->descriptor_version == new->descriptor_version) {
+ if (!strcmp(old->directory, new->directory)) {
smartlist_add_all(new->intro_nodes, old->intro_nodes);
smartlist_clear(old->intro_nodes);
smartlist_add(surviving_services, old);
@@@ -466,16 -507,18 +466,16 @@@
tor_assert(oc->rend_data);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(surviving_services, rend_service_t *, ptr, {
if (!memcmp(ptr->pk_digest, oc->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
- DIGEST_LEN) &&
- ptr->descriptor_version == oc->rend_data->rend_desc_version) {
+ DIGEST_LEN)) {
keep_it = 1;
break;
}
});
if (keep_it)
continue;
- log_info(LD_REND, "Closing intro point %s for service %s version %d.",
- safe_str(oc->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname),
- oc->rend_data->onion_address,
- oc->rend_data->rend_desc_version);
+ log_info(LD_REND, "Closing intro point %s for service %s.",
+ safe_str_client(oc->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname),
+ oc->rend_data->onion_address);
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
/* XXXX Is there another reason we should use here? */
}
@@@ -498,13 -541,14 +498,13 @@@ rend_service_update_descriptor(rend_ser
rend_service_descriptor_t *d;
origin_circuit_t *circ;
int i;
- if (service->desc) {
- rend_service_descriptor_free(service->desc);
- service->desc = NULL;
- }
+
+ rend_service_descriptor_free(service->desc);
+ service->desc = NULL;
+
d = service->desc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t));
d->pk = crypto_pk_dup_key(service->private_key);
d->timestamp = time(NULL);
- d->version = service->descriptor_version;
d->intro_nodes = smartlist_create();
/* Support intro protocols 2 and 3. */
d->protocols = (1 << 2) + (1 << 3);
@@@ -512,7 -556,7 +512,7 @@@
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes); ++i) {
rend_intro_point_t *intro_svc = smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, i);
rend_intro_point_t *intro_desc;
- circ = find_intro_circuit(intro_svc, service->pk_digest, d->version);
+ circ = find_intro_circuit(intro_svc, service->pk_digest);
if (!circ || circ->_base.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO)
continue;
@@@ -753,15 -797,17 +753,15 @@@ rend_service_load_keys(void
return r;
}
-/** Return the service whose public key has a digest of <b>digest</b> and
- * which publishes the given descriptor <b>version</b>. Return NULL if no
- * such service exists.
+/** Return the service whose public key has a digest of <b>digest</b>, or
+ * NULL if no such service exists.
*/
static rend_service_t *
-rend_service_get_by_pk_digest_and_version(const char* digest,
- uint8_t version)
+rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(const char* digest)
{
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t*, s,
- if (!memcmp(s->pk_digest,digest,DIGEST_LEN) &&
- s->descriptor_version == version) return s);
+ if (!memcmp(s->pk_digest,digest,DIGEST_LEN))
+ return s);
return NULL;
}
@@@ -898,16 -944,21 +898,16 @@@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_
}
/* look up service depending on circuit. */
- service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest_and_version(
- circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
- circuit->rend_data->rend_desc_version);
+ service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest);
if (!service) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Got an INTRODUCE2 cell for an unrecognized service %s.",
escaped(serviceid));
return -1;
}
- /* if descriptor version is 2, use intro key instead of service key. */
- if (circuit->rend_data->rend_desc_version == 0) {
- intro_key = service->private_key;
- } else {
- intro_key = circuit->intro_key;
- }
+ /* use intro key instead of service key. */
+ intro_key = circuit->intro_key;
/* first DIGEST_LEN bytes of request is intro or service pk digest */
crypto_pk_get_digest(intro_key, intro_key_digest);
@@@ -938,7 -989,7 +938,7 @@@
len = r;
if (*buf == 3) {
/* Version 3 INTRODUCE2 cell. */
- time_t ts = 0, now = time(NULL);
+ time_t ts = 0;
v3_shift = 1;
auth_type = buf[1];
switch (auth_type) {
@@@ -1032,7 -1083,7 +1032,7 @@@
router = router_get_by_nickname(rp_nickname, 0);
if (!router) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Couldn't find router %s named in introduce2 cell.",
- escaped_safe_str(rp_nickname));
+ escaped_safe_str_client(rp_nickname));
/* XXXX Add a no-such-router reason? */
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
goto err;
@@@ -1107,8 -1158,7 +1107,8 @@@
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
goto err;
}
- if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(dh, ptr+REND_COOKIE_LEN, DH_KEY_LEN, keys,
+ if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh, ptr+REND_COOKIE_LEN,
+ DH_KEY_LEN, keys,
DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't complete DH handshake");
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
@@@ -1118,7 -1168,7 +1118,7 @@@
circ_needs_uptime = rend_service_requires_uptime(service);
/* help predict this next time */
- rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), circ_needs_uptime, 1);
+ rep_hist_note_used_internal(now, circ_needs_uptime, 1);
/* Launch a circuit to alice's chosen rendezvous point.
*/
@@@ -1134,16 -1184,14 +1134,16 @@@
if (!launched) { /* give up */
log_warn(LD_REND, "Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous "
"point %s for service %s.",
- escaped_safe_str(extend_info->nickname), serviceid);
+ escaped_safe_str_client(extend_info->nickname),
+ serviceid);
reason = END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED;
goto err;
}
log_info(LD_REND,
"Accepted intro; launching circuit to %s "
"(cookie %s) for service %s.",
- escaped_safe_str(extend_info->nickname), hexcookie, serviceid);
+ escaped_safe_str_client(extend_info->nickname),
+ hexcookie, serviceid);
tor_assert(launched->build_state);
/* Fill in the circuit's state. */
launched->rend_data = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_data_t));
@@@ -1153,10 -1201,11 +1153,10 @@@
memcpy(launched->rend_data->rend_cookie, r_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
strlcpy(launched->rend_data->onion_address, service->service_id,
sizeof(launched->rend_data->onion_address));
launched->build_state->pending_final_cpath = cpath =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
- launched->build_state->expiry_time = time(NULL) + MAX_REND_TIMEOUT;
+ launched->build_state->expiry_time = now + MAX_REND_TIMEOUT;
cpath->dh_handshake_state = dh;
dh = NULL;
@@@ -1165,8 -1214,10 +1165,10 @@@
memcpy(cpath->handshake_digest, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info);
+ memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
return 0;
err:
+ memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh);
if (launched)
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(launched), reason);
@@@ -1238,7 -1289,7 +1240,7 @@@ rend_service_launch_establish_intro(ren
log_info(LD_REND,
"Launching circuit to introduction point %s for service %s",
- escaped_safe_str(intro->extend_info->nickname),
+ escaped_safe_str_client(intro->extend_info->nickname),
service->service_id);
rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), 1, 0);
@@@ -1251,7 -1302,7 +1253,7 @@@
if (!launched) {
log_info(LD_REND,
"Can't launch circuit to establish introduction at %s.",
- escaped_safe_str(intro->extend_info->nickname));
+ escaped_safe_str_client(intro->extend_info->nickname));
return -1;
}
@@@ -1274,16 -1325,18 +1276,16 @@@
strlcpy(launched->rend_data->onion_address, service->service_id,
sizeof(launched->rend_data->onion_address));
memcpy(launched->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, service->pk_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
- launched->rend_data->rend_desc_version = service->descriptor_version;
- if (service->descriptor_version == 2)
- launched->intro_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(intro->intro_key);
+ launched->intro_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(intro->intro_key);
if (launched->_base.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
rend_service_intro_has_opened(launched);
return 0;
}
/** Return the number of introduction points that are or have been
- * established for the given service address and rendezvous version. */
+ * established for the given service address in <b>query</b>. */
static int
-count_established_intro_points(const char *query, int rend_version)
+count_established_intro_points(const char *query)
{
int num_ipos = 0;
circuit_t *circ;
@@@ -1294,6 -1347,7 +1296,6 @@@
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO)) {
origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
if (oc->rend_data &&
- oc->rend_data->rend_desc_version == rend_version &&
!rend_cmp_service_ids(query, oc->rend_data->onion_address))
num_ipos++;
}
@@@ -1323,8 -1377,9 +1325,8 @@@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_ci
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
- service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest_and_version(
- circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
- circuit->rend_data->rend_desc_version);
+ service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest);
if (!service) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unrecognized service ID %s on introduction circuit %d.",
serviceid, circuit->_base.n_circ_id);
@@@ -1334,7 -1389,8 +1336,7 @@@
/* If we already have enough introduction circuits for this service,
* redefine this one as a general circuit. */
- if (count_established_intro_points(serviceid,
- circuit->rend_data->rend_desc_version) > NUM_INTRO_POINTS) {
+ if (count_established_intro_points(serviceid) > NUM_INTRO_POINTS) {
log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction "
"circuit, but we already have enough. Redefining purpose to "
"general.");
@@@ -1347,8 -1403,13 +1349,8 @@@
"Established circuit %d as introduction point for service %s",
circuit->_base.n_circ_id, serviceid);
- /* If the introduction point will not be used in an unversioned
- * descriptor, use the intro key instead of the service key in
- * ESTABLISH_INTRO. */
- if (service->descriptor_version == 0)
- intro_key = service->private_key;
- else
- intro_key = circuit->intro_key;
+ /* Use the intro key instead of the service key in ESTABLISH_INTRO. */
+ intro_key = circuit->intro_key;
/* Build the payload for a RELAY_ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. */
r = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(intro_key, buf+2,
RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE-2);
@@@ -1409,8 -1470,9 +1411,8 @@@ rend_service_intro_established(origin_c
goto err;
}
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
- service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest_and_version(
- circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
- circuit->rend_data->rend_desc_version);
+ service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest);
if (!service) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service on introduction circuit %d.",
circuit->_base.n_circ_id);
@@@ -1460,8 -1522,9 +1462,8 @@@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(orig
"cookie %s for service %s",
circuit->_base.n_circ_id, hexcookie, serviceid);
- service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest_and_version(
- circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
- circuit->rend_data->rend_desc_version);
+ service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(
+ circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest);
if (!service) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Internal error: unrecognized service ID on "
"introduction circuit.");
@@@ -1517,12 -1580,13 +1519,12 @@@
*/
/** Return the (possibly non-open) introduction circuit ending at
- * <b>intro</b> for the service whose public key is <b>pk_digest</b> and
- * which publishes descriptor of version <b>desc_version</b>. Return
- * NULL if no such service is found.
+ * <b>intro</b> for the service whose public key is <b>pk_digest</b>.
+ * (<b>desc_version</b> is ignored). Return NULL if no such service is
+ * found.
*/
static origin_circuit_t *
-find_intro_circuit(rend_intro_point_t *intro, const char *pk_digest,
- int desc_version)
+find_intro_circuit(rend_intro_point_t *intro, const char *pk_digest)
{
origin_circuit_t *circ = NULL;
@@@ -1531,7 -1595,8 +1533,7 @@@
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO))) {
if (!memcmp(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
intro->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) &&
- circ->rend_data &&
- circ->rend_data->rend_desc_version == desc_version) {
+ circ->rend_data) {
return circ;
}
}
@@@ -1541,7 -1606,8 +1543,7 @@@
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO))) {
if (!memcmp(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
intro->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) &&
- circ->rend_data &&
- circ->rend_data->rend_desc_version == desc_version) {
+ circ->rend_data) {
return circ;
}
}
@@@ -1574,7 -1640,6 +1576,7 @@@ directory_post_to_hs_dir(rend_service_d
}
for (j = 0; j < smartlist_len(responsible_dirs); j++) {
char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1];
+ char *hs_dir_ip;
hs_dir = smartlist_get(responsible_dirs, j);
if (smartlist_digest_isin(renddesc->successful_uploads,
hs_dir->identity_digest))
@@@ -1596,18 -1661,15 +1598,18 @@@
strlen(desc->desc_str), 0);
base32_encode(desc_id_base32, sizeof(desc_id_base32),
desc->desc_id, DIGEST_LEN);
+ hs_dir_ip = tor_dup_ip(hs_dir->addr);
log_info(LD_REND, "Sending publish request for v2 descriptor for "
"service '%s' with descriptor ID '%s' with validity "
"of %d seconds to hidden service directory '%s' on "
- "port %d.",
- safe_str(service_id),
- safe_str(desc_id_base32),
+ "%s:%d.",
+ safe_str_client(service_id),
+ safe_str_client(desc_id_base32),
seconds_valid,
hs_dir->nickname,
- hs_dir->dir_port);
+ hs_dir_ip,
+ hs_dir->or_port);
+ tor_free(hs_dir_ip);
/* Remember successful upload to this router for next time. */
if (!smartlist_digest_isin(successful_uploads, hs_dir->identity_digest))
smartlist_add(successful_uploads, hs_dir->identity_digest);
@@@ -1637,8 -1699,9 +1639,8 @@@
smartlist_free(successful_uploads);
}
-/** Encode and sign up-to-date v0 and/or v2 service descriptors for
- * <b>service</b>, and upload it/them to all the dirservers/to the
- * responsible hidden service directories.
+/** Encode and sign an up-to-date service descriptor for <b>service</b>,
+ * and upload it/them to the responsible hidden service directories.
*/
static void
upload_service_descriptor(rend_service_t *service)
@@@ -1650,8 -1713,35 +1652,8 @@@
rendpostperiod = get_options()->RendPostPeriod;
- /* Upload unversioned (v0) descriptor? */
- if (service->descriptor_version == 0 &&
- get_options()->PublishHidServDescriptors) {
- char *desc;
- size_t desc_len;
- /* Encode the descriptor. */
- if (rend_encode_service_descriptor(service->desc,
- service->private_key,
- &desc, &desc_len)<0) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service descriptor; "
- "not uploading.");
- return;
- }
-
- /* Post it to the dirservers */
- rend_get_service_id(service->desc->pk, serviceid);
- log_info(LD_REND, "Sending publish request for hidden service %s",
- serviceid);
- directory_post_to_dirservers(DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC,
- ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL,
- HIDSERV_AUTHORITY, desc, desc_len, 0);
- tor_free(desc);
- service->next_upload_time = now + rendpostperiod;
- uploaded = 1;
- }
-
- /* Upload v2 descriptor? */
- if (service->descriptor_version == 2 &&
- get_options()->PublishHidServDescriptors) {
+ /* Upload descriptor? */
+ if (get_options()->PublishHidServDescriptors) {
networkstatus_t *c = networkstatus_get_latest_consensus();
if (c && smartlist_len(c->routerstatus_list) > 0) {
int seconds_valid, i, j, num_descs;
@@@ -1790,7 -1880,8 +1792,7 @@@ rend_services_introduce(void
for (j=0; j < smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes); ++j) {
intro = smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, j);
router = router_get_by_digest(intro->extend_info->identity_digest);
- if (!router || !find_intro_circuit(intro, service->pk_digest,
- service->descriptor_version)) {
+ if (!router || !find_intro_circuit(intro, service->pk_digest)) {
log_info(LD_REND,"Giving up on %s as intro point for %s.",
intro->extend_info->nickname, service->service_id);
if (service->desc) {
@@@ -1842,7 -1933,7 +1844,7 @@@
router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_UPTIME;
if (get_options()->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_INTRODUCTION)
flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID;
- router = router_choose_random_node(NULL, intro_routers,
+ router = router_choose_random_node(intro_routers,
options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
if (!router) {
log_warn(LD_REND,
@@@ -1854,8 -1945,10 +1856,8 @@@
smartlist_add(intro_routers, router);
intro = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_intro_point_t));
intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_router(router);
- if (service->descriptor_version == 2) {
- intro->intro_key = crypto_new_pk_env();
- tor_assert(!crypto_pk_generate_key(intro->intro_key));
- }
+ intro->intro_key = crypto_new_pk_env();
+ tor_assert(!crypto_pk_generate_key(intro->intro_key));
smartlist_add(service->intro_nodes, intro);
log_info(LD_REND, "Picked router %s as an intro point for %s.",
router->nickname, service->service_id);
@@@ -1948,7 -2041,8 +1950,7 @@@ rend_consider_descriptor_republication(
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rend_service_list); ++i) {
service = smartlist_get(rend_service_list, i);
- if (service->descriptor_version && service->desc &&
- !service->desc->all_uploads_performed) {
+ if (service->desc && !service->desc->all_uploads_performed) {
/* If we failed in uploading a descriptor last time, try again *without*
* updating the descriptor's contents. */
upload_service_descriptor(service);
@@@ -1974,9 -2068,10 +1976,9 @@@ rend_service_dump_stats(int severity
service->directory);
for (j=0; j < smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes); ++j) {
intro = smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, j);
- safe_name = safe_str(intro->extend_info->nickname);
+ safe_name = safe_str_client(intro->extend_info->nickname);
- circ = find_intro_circuit(intro, service->pk_digest,
- service->descriptor_version);
+ circ = find_intro_circuit(intro, service->pk_digest);
if (!circ) {
log(severity, LD_GENERAL, " Intro point %d at %s: no circuit",
j, safe_name);
@@@ -2007,8 -2102,9 +2009,8 @@@ rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(e
log_debug(LD_REND,"beginning to hunt for addr/port");
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
circ->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN);
- service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest_and_version(
- circ->rend_data->rend_pk_digest,
- circ->rend_data->rend_desc_version);
+ service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(
+ circ->rend_data->rend_pk_digest);
if (!service) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Couldn't find any service associated with pk %s on "
"rendezvous circuit %d; closing.",