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[tor-commits] [tor/master] test: Add ESTABLISH_INTRO unit tests
commit c0a0c197257c6909ea46dbb18e3b84f7caa8f7e9
Author: David Goulet <dgoulet@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue Jan 10 09:24:21 2017 -0500
test: Add ESTABLISH_INTRO unit tests
This commit adds 3 unit tests which validates a wrong signature length, a
wrong authentication key length and a wrong MAC in the cell.
Closes #20992
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c | 168 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 168 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c b/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c
index 608988b..b4a81ea 100644
--- a/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c
+++ b/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c
@@ -12,12 +12,14 @@
#define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE
#include "test.h"
+#include "log_test_helpers.h"
#include "crypto.h"
#include "or.h"
#include "ht.h"
#include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h"
+#include "hs_common.h"
#include "hs_service.h"
#include "hs_circuitmap.h"
#include "hs_intropoint.h"
@@ -143,6 +145,163 @@ test_establish_intro_wrong_keytype2(void *arg)
circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
}
+/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but with a wrong MAC. Should fail. */
+static void
+test_establish_intro_wrong_mac(void *arg)
+{
+ int retval;
+ hs_cell_establish_intro_t *establish_intro_cell = NULL;
+ or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);;
+ uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
+ ssize_t cell_len = 0;
+ uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
+
+ (void)arg;
+
+ /* Get the auth key of the intro point */
+ crypto_rand((char *) circuit_key_material, sizeof(circuit_key_material));
+ helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circuit_key_material);
+
+ /* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
+ attempt to parse it. */
+ establish_intro_cell = generate_establish_intro_cell(circuit_key_material,
+ sizeof(circuit_key_material));
+ tt_assert(establish_intro_cell);
+ /* Mangle one byte of the MAC. */
+ uint8_t *handshake_ptr =
+ hs_cell_establish_intro_getarray_handshake_mac(establish_intro_cell);
+ handshake_ptr[TRUNNEL_SHA3_256_LEN - 1]++;
+ /* We need to resign the payload with that change. */
+ {
+ ed25519_signature_t sig;
+ ed25519_keypair_t key_struct;
+ /* New keypair for the signature since we don't have access to the private
+ * key material generated earlier when creating the cell. */
+ retval = ed25519_keypair_generate(&key_struct, 0);
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
+ uint8_t *auth_key_ptr =
+ hs_cell_establish_intro_getarray_auth_key(establish_intro_cell);
+ memcpy(auth_key_ptr, key_struct.pubkey.pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+ /* Encode payload so we can sign it. */
+ cell_len = get_establish_intro_payload(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
+ establish_intro_cell);
+ tt_int_op(cell_len, >, 0);
+
+ retval = ed25519_sign_prefixed(&sig, cell_body,
+ cell_len -
+ (ED25519_SIG_LEN +
+ sizeof(establish_intro_cell->sig_len)),
+ ESTABLISH_INTRO_SIG_PREFIX, &key_struct);
+ tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
+ /* And write the signature to the cell */
+ uint8_t *sig_ptr =
+ hs_cell_establish_intro_getarray_sig(establish_intro_cell);
+ memcpy(sig_ptr, sig.sig, establish_intro_cell->sig_len);
+ /* Re-encode with the new signature. */
+ cell_len = get_establish_intro_payload(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
+ establish_intro_cell);
+ }
+
+ /* Receive the cell. Should fail because our MAC is wrong. */
+ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
+ retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len);
+ expect_log_msg_containing("ESTABLISH_INTRO handshake_auth not as expected");
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ tt_int_op(retval, ==, -1);
+
+ done:
+ hs_cell_establish_intro_free(establish_intro_cell);
+ circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
+}
+
+/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but with a wrong auth key length. Should
+ * fail. */
+static void
+test_establish_intro_wrong_auth_key_len(void *arg)
+{
+ int retval;
+ hs_cell_establish_intro_t *establish_intro_cell = NULL;
+ or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);;
+ uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
+ ssize_t cell_len = 0;
+ size_t bad_auth_key_len = ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN - 1;
+ uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
+
+ (void)arg;
+
+ /* Get the auth key of the intro point */
+ crypto_rand((char *) circuit_key_material, sizeof(circuit_key_material));
+ helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circuit_key_material);
+
+ /* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
+ attempt to parse it. */
+ establish_intro_cell = generate_establish_intro_cell(circuit_key_material,
+ sizeof(circuit_key_material));
+ tt_assert(establish_intro_cell);
+ /* Mangle the auth key length. */
+ hs_cell_establish_intro_set_auth_key_len(establish_intro_cell,
+ bad_auth_key_len);
+ hs_cell_establish_intro_setlen_auth_key(establish_intro_cell,
+ bad_auth_key_len);
+ cell_len = get_establish_intro_payload(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
+ establish_intro_cell);
+ tt_int_op(cell_len, >, 0);
+
+ /* Receive the cell. Should fail. */
+ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
+ retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len);
+ expect_log_msg_containing("ESTABLISH_INTRO auth key length is invalid");
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ tt_int_op(retval, ==, -1);
+
+ done:
+ hs_cell_establish_intro_free(establish_intro_cell);
+ circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
+}
+
+/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but with a wrong sig length. Should
+ * fail. */
+static void
+test_establish_intro_wrong_sig_len(void *arg)
+{
+ int retval;
+ hs_cell_establish_intro_t *establish_intro_cell = NULL;
+ or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);;
+ uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
+ ssize_t cell_len = 0;
+ size_t bad_sig_len = ED25519_SIG_LEN - 1;
+ uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
+
+ (void)arg;
+
+ /* Get the auth key of the intro point */
+ crypto_rand((char *) circuit_key_material, sizeof(circuit_key_material));
+ helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circuit_key_material);
+
+ /* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
+ attempt to parse it. */
+ establish_intro_cell = generate_establish_intro_cell(circuit_key_material,
+ sizeof(circuit_key_material));
+ tt_assert(establish_intro_cell);
+ /* Mangle the signature length. */
+ hs_cell_establish_intro_set_sig_len(establish_intro_cell, bad_sig_len);
+ hs_cell_establish_intro_setlen_sig(establish_intro_cell, bad_sig_len);
+ cell_len = get_establish_intro_payload(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
+ establish_intro_cell);
+ tt_int_op(cell_len, >, 0);
+
+ /* Receive the cell. Should fail. */
+ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_INFO);
+ retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len);
+ expect_log_msg_containing("ESTABLISH_INTRO sig len is invalid");
+ teardown_capture_of_logs();
+ tt_int_op(retval, ==, -1);
+
+ done:
+ hs_cell_establish_intro_free(establish_intro_cell);
+ circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
+}
+
/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but slightly change the signature. Should
* fail. */
static void
@@ -356,6 +515,15 @@ struct testcase_t hs_intropoint_tests[] = {
{ "receive_establish_intro_wrong_sig",
test_establish_intro_wrong_sig, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
+ { "receive_establish_intro_wrong_sig_len",
+ test_establish_intro_wrong_sig_len, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
+
+ { "receive_establish_intro_wrong_auth_key_len",
+ test_establish_intro_wrong_auth_key_len, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
+
+ { "receive_establish_intro_wrong_mac",
+ test_establish_intro_wrong_mac, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
+
END_OF_TESTCASES
};
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