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[tor-commits] [tor/master] Fix a huge pile of -Wshadow warnings.
commit 9fe6fea1cceb39fc415ad813020bbd863121e0c9
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu Jul 28 10:22:10 2016 -0400
Fix a huge pile of -Wshadow warnings.
These appeared on some of the Jenkins platforms. Apparently some
GCCs care when you shadow globals, and some don't.
---
src/common/compat.c | 16 ++++++------
src/common/crypto.c | 6 ++---
src/common/log.c | 4 +--
src/common/torgzip.c | 14 +++++-----
src/common/util.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
src/ext/timeouts/timeout.c | 6 ++---
src/or/addressmap.c | 24 ++++++++---------
src/or/circuitbuild.c | 42 +++++++++++++++---------------
src/or/circuitstats.c | 10 +++----
src/or/config.c | 12 ++++-----
src/or/connection_edge.c | 16 +++++++-----
src/or/control.c | 6 ++---
src/or/dirvote.c | 3 ---
src/or/policies.c | 8 +++---
src/or/relay.c | 8 +++---
src/or/rendclient.c | 6 ++---
src/or/rephist.c | 19 +++++++-------
src/or/routerkeys.c | 12 ++++-----
src/or/shared_random.c | 10 +++----
src/test/test_address.c | 8 +++---
src/test/test_util.c | 6 ++---
21 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 150 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c
index 081490d..e0807e4 100644
--- a/src/common/compat.c
+++ b/src/common/compat.c
@@ -1181,10 +1181,10 @@ tor_open_socket,(int domain, int type, int protocol))
/** Mockable wrapper for connect(). */
MOCK_IMPL(tor_socket_t,
-tor_connect_socket,(tor_socket_t socket,const struct sockaddr *address,
+tor_connect_socket,(tor_socket_t sock, const struct sockaddr *address,
socklen_t address_len))
{
- return connect(socket,address,address_len);
+ return connect(sock,address,address_len);
}
/** As socket(), but creates a nonblocking socket and
@@ -1359,31 +1359,31 @@ get_n_open_sockets(void)
/** Mockable wrapper for getsockname(). */
MOCK_IMPL(int,
-tor_getsockname,(tor_socket_t socket, struct sockaddr *address,
+tor_getsockname,(tor_socket_t sock, struct sockaddr *address,
socklen_t *address_len))
{
- return getsockname(socket, address, address_len);
+ return getsockname(sock, address, address_len);
}
/** Turn <b>socket</b> into a nonblocking socket. Return 0 on success, -1
* on failure.
*/
int
-set_socket_nonblocking(tor_socket_t socket)
+set_socket_nonblocking(tor_socket_t sock)
{
#if defined(_WIN32)
unsigned long nonblocking = 1;
- ioctlsocket(socket, FIONBIO, (unsigned long*) &nonblocking);
+ ioctlsocket(sock, FIONBIO, (unsigned long*) &nonblocking);
#else
int flags;
- flags = fcntl(socket, F_GETFL, 0);
+ flags = fcntl(sock, F_GETFL, 0);
if (flags == -1) {
log_warn(LD_NET, "Couldn't get file status flags: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
- if (fcntl(socket, F_SETFL, flags) == -1) {
+ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFL, flags) == -1) {
log_warn(LD_NET, "Couldn't set file status flags: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c
index 1c5b599..b87023f 100644
--- a/src/common/crypto.c
+++ b/src/common/crypto.c
@@ -3099,8 +3099,8 @@ crypto_rand_double(void)
{
/* We just use an unsigned int here; we don't really care about getting
* more than 32 bits of resolution */
- unsigned int uint;
- crypto_rand((char*)&uint, sizeof(uint));
+ unsigned int u;
+ crypto_rand((char*)&u, sizeof(u));
#if SIZEOF_INT == 4
#define UINT_MAX_AS_DOUBLE 4294967296.0
#elif SIZEOF_INT == 8
@@ -3108,7 +3108,7 @@ crypto_rand_double(void)
#else
#error SIZEOF_INT is neither 4 nor 8
#endif
- return ((double)uint) / UINT_MAX_AS_DOUBLE;
+ return ((double)u) / UINT_MAX_AS_DOUBLE;
}
/** Generate and return a new random hostname starting with <b>prefix</b>,
diff --git a/src/common/log.c b/src/common/log.c
index 51309aa..cb62a37 100644
--- a/src/common/log.c
+++ b/src/common/log.c
@@ -1071,13 +1071,13 @@ mark_logs_temp(void)
*/
int
add_file_log(const log_severity_list_t *severity, const char *filename,
- const int truncate)
+ const int truncate_log)
{
int fd;
logfile_t *lf;
int open_flags = O_WRONLY|O_CREAT;
- open_flags |= truncate ? O_TRUNC : O_APPEND;
+ open_flags |= truncate_log ? O_TRUNC : O_APPEND;
fd = tor_open_cloexec(filename, open_flags, 0644);
if (fd<0)
diff --git a/src/common/torgzip.c b/src/common/torgzip.c
index 331bb5a..3353f0e 100644
--- a/src/common/torgzip.c
+++ b/src/common/torgzip.c
@@ -418,13 +418,13 @@ struct tor_zlib_state_t {
* <b>compress</b>, it's for compression; otherwise it's for
* decompression. */
tor_zlib_state_t *
-tor_zlib_new(int compress, compress_method_t method,
+tor_zlib_new(int compress_, compress_method_t method,
zlib_compression_level_t compression_level)
{
tor_zlib_state_t *out;
int bits, memlevel;
- if (! compress) {
+ if (! compress_) {
/* use this setting for decompression, since we might have the
* max number of window bits */
compression_level = HIGH_COMPRESSION;
@@ -434,10 +434,10 @@ tor_zlib_new(int compress, compress_method_t method,
out->stream.zalloc = Z_NULL;
out->stream.zfree = Z_NULL;
out->stream.opaque = NULL;
- out->compress = compress;
+ out->compress = compress_;
bits = method_bits(method, compression_level);
memlevel = get_memlevel(compression_level);
- if (compress) {
+ if (compress_) {
if (deflateInit2(&out->stream, Z_BEST_COMPRESSION, Z_DEFLATED,
bits, memlevel,
Z_DEFAULT_STRATEGY) != Z_OK)
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ tor_zlib_new(int compress, compress_method_t method,
if (inflateInit2(&out->stream, bits) != Z_OK)
goto err; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
- out->allocation = tor_zlib_state_size_precalc(!compress, bits, memlevel);
+ out->allocation = tor_zlib_state_size_precalc(!compress_, bits, memlevel);
total_zlib_allocation += out->allocation;
@@ -540,13 +540,13 @@ tor_zlib_free(tor_zlib_state_t *state)
/** Return an approximate number of bytes used in RAM to hold a state with
* window bits <b>windowBits</b> and compression level 'memlevel' */
static size_t
-tor_zlib_state_size_precalc(int inflate, int windowbits, int memlevel)
+tor_zlib_state_size_precalc(int inflate_, int windowbits, int memlevel)
{
windowbits &= 15;
#define A_FEW_KILOBYTES 2048
- if (inflate) {
+ if (inflate_) {
/* From zconf.h:
"The memory requirements for inflate are (in bytes) 1 << windowBits
diff --git a/src/common/util.c b/src/common/util.c
index 2369c5f..0c04eb1 100644
--- a/src/common/util.c
+++ b/src/common/util.c
@@ -305,17 +305,17 @@ tor_strdup_(const char *s DMALLOC_PARAMS)
char *
tor_strndup_(const char *s, size_t n DMALLOC_PARAMS)
{
- char *dup;
+ char *duplicate;
tor_assert(s);
tor_assert(n < SIZE_T_CEILING);
- dup = tor_malloc_((n+1) DMALLOC_FN_ARGS);
+ duplicate = tor_malloc_((n+1) DMALLOC_FN_ARGS);
/* Performance note: Ordinarily we prefer strlcpy to strncpy. But
* this function gets called a whole lot, and platform strncpy is
* much faster than strlcpy when strlen(s) is much longer than n.
*/
- strncpy(dup, s, n);
- dup[n]='\0';
- return dup;
+ strncpy(duplicate, s, n);
+ duplicate[n]='\0';
+ return duplicate;
}
/** Allocate a chunk of <b>len</b> bytes, with the same contents as the
@@ -323,12 +323,12 @@ tor_strndup_(const char *s, size_t n DMALLOC_PARAMS)
void *
tor_memdup_(const void *mem, size_t len DMALLOC_PARAMS)
{
- char *dup;
+ char *duplicate;
tor_assert(len < SIZE_T_CEILING);
tor_assert(mem);
- dup = tor_malloc_(len DMALLOC_FN_ARGS);
- memcpy(dup, mem, len);
- return dup;
+ duplicate = tor_malloc_(len DMALLOC_FN_ARGS);
+ memcpy(duplicate, mem, len);
+ return duplicate;
}
/** As tor_memdup(), but add an extra 0 byte at the end of the resulting
@@ -336,13 +336,13 @@ tor_memdup_(const void *mem, size_t len DMALLOC_PARAMS)
void *
tor_memdup_nulterm_(const void *mem, size_t len DMALLOC_PARAMS)
{
- char *dup;
+ char *duplicate;
tor_assert(len < SIZE_T_CEILING+1);
tor_assert(mem);
- dup = tor_malloc_(len+1 DMALLOC_FN_ARGS);
- memcpy(dup, mem, len);
- dup[len] = '\0';
- return dup;
+ duplicate = tor_malloc_(len+1 DMALLOC_FN_ARGS);
+ memcpy(duplicate, mem, len);
+ duplicate[len] = '\0';
+ return duplicate;
}
/** Helper for places that need to take a function pointer to the right
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ sample_laplace_distribution(double mu, double b, double p)
* The epsilon value must be between ]0.0, 1.0]. delta_f must be greater
* than 0. */
int64_t
-add_laplace_noise(int64_t signal, double random, double delta_f,
+add_laplace_noise(int64_t signal_, double random_, double delta_f,
double epsilon)
{
int64_t noise;
@@ -569,15 +569,15 @@ add_laplace_noise(int64_t signal, double random, double delta_f,
/* Just add noise, no further signal */
noise = sample_laplace_distribution(0.0,
delta_f / epsilon,
- random);
+ random_);
/* Clip (signal + noise) to [INT64_MIN, INT64_MAX] */
- if (noise > 0 && INT64_MAX - noise < signal)
+ if (noise > 0 && INT64_MAX - noise < signal_)
return INT64_MAX;
- else if (noise < 0 && INT64_MIN - noise > signal)
+ else if (noise < 0 && INT64_MIN - noise > signal_)
return INT64_MIN;
else
- return signal + noise;
+ return signal_ + noise;
}
/* Helper: return greatest common divisor of a,b */
@@ -638,12 +638,12 @@ n_bits_set_u8(uint8_t v)
void
tor_strstrip(char *s, const char *strip)
{
- char *read = s;
- while (*read) {
- if (strchr(strip, *read)) {
- ++read;
+ char *readp = s;
+ while (*readp) {
+ if (strchr(strip, *readp)) {
+ ++readp;
} else {
- *s++ = *read++;
+ *s++ = *readp++;
}
}
*s = '\0';
@@ -1559,11 +1559,12 @@ tv_to_msec(const struct timeval *tv)
#define IS_LEAPYEAR(y) (!(y % 4) && ((y % 100) || !(y % 400)))
/** Helper: Return the number of leap-days between Jan 1, y1 and Jan 1, y2. */
static int
-n_leapdays(int y1, int y2)
+n_leapdays(int year1, int year2)
{
- --y1;
- --y2;
- return (y2/4 - y1/4) - (y2/100 - y1/100) + (y2/400 - y1/400);
+ --year1;
+ --year2;
+ return (year2/4 - year1/4) - (year2/100 - year1/100)
+ + (year2/400 - year1/400);
}
/** Number of days per month in non-leap year; used by tor_timegm and
* parse_rfc1123_time. */
@@ -5688,7 +5689,7 @@ tor_weak_random_range(tor_weak_rng_t *rng, int32_t top)
int64_t
clamp_double_to_int64(double number)
{
- int exp;
+ int exponent;
/* NaN is a special case that can't be used with the logic below. */
if (isnan(number)) {
@@ -5702,14 +5703,14 @@ clamp_double_to_int64(double number)
* magnitude of number is strictly less than 2^exp.
*
* If number is infinite, the call to frexp is legal but the contents of
- * exp are unspecified. */
- frexp(number, &exp);
+ * are exponent unspecified. */
+ frexp(number, &exponent);
/* If the magnitude of number is strictly less than 2^63, the truncated
* version of number is guaranteed to be representable. The only
* representable integer for which this is not the case is INT64_MIN, but
* it is covered by the logic below. */
- if (isfinite(number) && exp <= 63) {
+ if (isfinite(number) && exponent <= 63) {
return (int64_t)number;
}
diff --git a/src/ext/timeouts/timeout.c b/src/ext/timeouts/timeout.c
index bd463a7..713ec21 100644
--- a/src/ext/timeouts/timeout.c
+++ b/src/ext/timeouts/timeout.c
@@ -299,9 +299,9 @@ TIMEOUT_PUBLIC void timeouts_del(struct timeouts *T, struct timeout *to) {
TOR_TAILQ_REMOVE(to->pending, to, tqe);
if (to->pending != &T->expired && TOR_TAILQ_EMPTY(to->pending)) {
- ptrdiff_t index = to->pending - &T->wheel[0][0];
- int wheel = (int) (index / WHEEL_LEN);
- int slot = index % WHEEL_LEN;
+ ptrdiff_t index_ = to->pending - &T->wheel[0][0];
+ int wheel = (int) (index_ / WHEEL_LEN);
+ int slot = index_ % WHEEL_LEN;
T->pending[wheel] &= ~(WHEEL_C(1) << slot);
}
diff --git a/src/or/addressmap.c b/src/or/addressmap.c
index 047a863..f7544ab 100644
--- a/src/or/addressmap.c
+++ b/src/or/addressmap.c
@@ -264,18 +264,18 @@ addressmap_clear_invalid_automaps(const or_options_t *options)
clear_all = 1; /* This should be impossible, but let's be sure. */
STRMAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(addressmap, src_address, addressmap_entry_t *, ent) {
- int remove = clear_all;
+ int remove_this = clear_all;
if (ent->source != ADDRMAPSRC_AUTOMAP)
continue; /* not an automap mapping. */
- if (!remove) {
- remove = ! addressmap_address_should_automap(src_address, options);
+ if (!remove_this) {
+ remove_this = ! addressmap_address_should_automap(src_address, options);
}
- if (!remove && ! address_is_in_virtual_range(ent->new_address))
- remove = 1;
+ if (!remove_this && ! address_is_in_virtual_range(ent->new_address))
+ remove_this = 1;
- if (remove) {
+ if (remove_this) {
addressmap_ent_remove(src_address, ent);
MAP_DEL_CURRENT(src_address);
}
@@ -896,10 +896,10 @@ addressmap_get_virtual_address(int type)
tor_assert(addressmap);
if (type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME) {
- char rand[10];
+ char rand_bytes[10];
do {
- crypto_rand(rand, sizeof(rand));
- base32_encode(buf,sizeof(buf),rand,sizeof(rand));
+ crypto_rand(rand_bytes, sizeof(rand_bytes));
+ base32_encode(buf,sizeof(buf),rand_bytes,sizeof(rand_bytes));
strlcat(buf, ".virtual", sizeof(buf));
} while (strmap_get(addressmap, buf));
return tor_strdup(buf);
@@ -1107,11 +1107,11 @@ addressmap_get_mappings(smartlist_t *sl, time_t min_expires,
smartlist_add_asprintf(sl, "%s%s %s%s NEVER",
src_wc, key, dst_wc, val->new_address);
else {
- char time[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
- format_iso_time(time, val->expires);
+ char isotime[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ format_iso_time(isotime, val->expires);
smartlist_add_asprintf(sl, "%s%s %s%s \"%s\"",
src_wc, key, dst_wc, val->new_address,
- time);
+ isotime);
}
} else {
smartlist_add_asprintf(sl, "%s%s %s%s",
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index dab378f..f3eab91 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -457,14 +457,14 @@ origin_circuit_init(uint8_t purpose, int flags)
* it's not open already.
*/
origin_circuit_t *
-circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, int flags)
+circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei, int flags)
{
origin_circuit_t *circ;
int err_reason = 0;
circ = origin_circuit_init(purpose, flags);
- if (onion_pick_cpath_exit(circ, exit) < 0 ||
+ if (onion_pick_cpath_exit(circ, exit_ei) < 0 ||
onion_populate_cpath(circ) < 0) {
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_NOPATH);
return NULL;
@@ -1433,7 +1433,7 @@ onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ,
* to handle the desired path length, return -1.
*/
static int
-new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, smartlist_t *nodes)
+new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit_ei, smartlist_t *nodes)
{
int num_acceptable_routers;
int routelen;
@@ -1441,7 +1441,7 @@ new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, smartlist_t *nodes)
tor_assert(nodes);
routelen = DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN;
- if (exit &&
+ if (exit_ei &&
purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING &&
purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO)
routelen++;
@@ -1957,7 +1957,7 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit)
* router (or use <b>exit</b> if provided). Store these in the
* cpath. Return 0 if ok, -1 if circuit should be closed. */
static int
-onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
+onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei)
{
cpath_build_state_t *state = circ->build_state;
@@ -1965,17 +1965,17 @@ onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Launching a one-hop circuit for dir tunnel.");
state->desired_path_len = 1;
} else {
- int r = new_route_len(circ->base_.purpose, exit, nodelist_get_list());
+ int r = new_route_len(circ->base_.purpose, exit_ei, nodelist_get_list());
if (r < 1) /* must be at least 1 */
return -1;
state->desired_path_len = r;
}
- if (exit) { /* the circuit-builder pre-requested one */
- warn_if_last_router_excluded(circ, exit);
+ if (exit_ei) { /* the circuit-builder pre-requested one */
+ warn_if_last_router_excluded(circ, exit_ei);
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Using requested exit node '%s'",
- extend_info_describe(exit));
- exit = extend_info_dup(exit);
+ extend_info_describe(exit_ei));
+ exit_ei = extend_info_dup(exit_ei);
} else { /* we have to decide one */
const node_t *node =
choose_good_exit_server(circ->base_.purpose, state->need_uptime,
@@ -1984,10 +1984,10 @@ onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"Failed to choose an exit server");
return -1;
}
- exit = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
- tor_assert(exit);
+ exit_ei = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
+ tor_assert(exit_ei);
}
- state->chosen_exit = exit;
+ state->chosen_exit = exit_ei;
return 0;
}
@@ -1996,19 +1996,19 @@ onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
* the caller will do this if it wants to.
*/
int
-circuit_append_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
+circuit_append_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei)
{
cpath_build_state_t *state;
- tor_assert(exit);
+ tor_assert(exit_ei);
tor_assert(circ);
state = circ->build_state;
tor_assert(state);
extend_info_free(state->chosen_exit);
- state->chosen_exit = extend_info_dup(exit);
+ state->chosen_exit = extend_info_dup(exit_ei);
++circ->build_state->desired_path_len;
- onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, exit);
+ onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, exit_ei);
return 0;
}
@@ -2017,18 +2017,18 @@ circuit_append_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
* send the next extend cell to begin connecting to that hop.
*/
int
-circuit_extend_to_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
+circuit_extend_to_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei)
{
int err_reason = 0;
- warn_if_last_router_excluded(circ, exit);
+ warn_if_last_router_excluded(circ, exit_ei);
tor_gettimeofday(&circ->base_.timestamp_began);
- circuit_append_new_exit(circ, exit);
+ circuit_append_new_exit(circ, exit_ei);
circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
if ((err_reason = circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ))<0) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Couldn't extend circuit to new point %s.",
- extend_info_describe(exit));
+ extend_info_describe(exit_ei));
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), -err_reason);
return -1;
}
diff --git a/src/or/circuitstats.c b/src/or/circuitstats.c
index 9ac2d56..f4db64e 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitstats.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitstats.c
@@ -578,18 +578,18 @@ circuit_build_times_rewind_history(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, int n)
* array is full.
*/
int
-circuit_build_times_add_time(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, build_time_t time)
+circuit_build_times_add_time(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, build_time_t btime)
{
- if (time <= 0 || time > CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX) {
+ if (btime <= 0 || btime > CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circuit build time is too large (%u)."
- "This is probably a bug.", time);
+ "This is probably a bug.", btime);
tor_fragile_assert();
return -1;
}
- log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Adding circuit build time %u", time);
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Adding circuit build time %u", btime);
- cbt->circuit_build_times[cbt->build_times_idx] = time;
+ cbt->circuit_build_times[cbt->build_times_idx] = btime;
cbt->build_times_idx = (cbt->build_times_idx + 1) % CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE;
if (cbt->total_build_times < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE)
cbt->total_build_times++;
diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c
index fb2ab5a..64c9796 100644
--- a/src/or/config.c
+++ b/src/or/config.c
@@ -5073,7 +5073,7 @@ options_init_logs(const or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
config_line_t *opt;
int ok;
smartlist_t *elts;
- int daemon =
+ int run_as_daemon =
#ifdef _WIN32
0;
#else
@@ -5134,7 +5134,7 @@ options_init_logs(const or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
int err = smartlist_len(elts) &&
!strcasecmp(smartlist_get(elts,0), "stderr");
if (!validate_only) {
- if (daemon) {
+ if (run_as_daemon) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
"Can't log to %s with RunAsDaemon set; skipping stdout",
err?"stderr":"stdout");
@@ -5163,19 +5163,19 @@ options_init_logs(const or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options,
char *fname = expand_filename(smartlist_get(elts, 1));
/* Truncate if TruncateLogFile is set and we haven't seen this option
line before. */
- int truncate = 0;
+ int truncate_log = 0;
if (options->TruncateLogFile) {
- truncate = 1;
+ truncate_log = 1;
if (old_options) {
config_line_t *opt2;
for (opt2 = old_options->Logs; opt2; opt2 = opt2->next)
if (!strcmp(opt->value, opt2->value)) {
- truncate = 0;
+ truncate_log = 0;
break;
}
}
}
- if (add_file_log(severity, fname, truncate) < 0) {
+ if (add_file_log(severity, fname, truncate_log) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Couldn't open file for 'Log %s': %s",
opt->value, strerror(errno));
ok = 0;
diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c
index cb79de6..0ef5310 100644
--- a/src/or/connection_edge.c
+++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c
@@ -3333,19 +3333,20 @@ connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_connection_t *conn)
return 0;
}
-/** Return 1 if router <b>exit</b> is likely to allow stream <b>conn</b>
+/** Return 1 if router <b>exit_node</b> is likely to allow stream <b>conn</b>
* to exit from it, or 0 if it probably will not allow it.
* (We might be uncertain if conn's destination address has not yet been
* resolved.)
*/
int
-connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit)
+connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn,
+ const node_t *exit_node)
{
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
- tor_assert(exit);
+ tor_assert(exit_node);
/* If a particular exit node has been requested for the new connection,
* make sure the exit node of the existing circuit matches exactly.
@@ -3354,7 +3355,7 @@ connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit)
const node_t *chosen_exit =
node_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
if (!chosen_exit || tor_memneq(chosen_exit->identity,
- exit->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ exit_node->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) {
/* doesn't match */
// log_debug(LD_APP,"Requested node '%s', considering node '%s'. No.",
// conn->chosen_exit_name, exit->nickname);
@@ -3379,7 +3380,8 @@ connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit)
tor_addr_make_null(&addr, AF_INET);
addrp = &addr;
}
- r = compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(addrp, conn->socks_request->port,exit);
+ r = compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(addrp, conn->socks_request->port,
+ exit_node);
if (r == ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED)
return 0; /* We know the address, and the exit policy rejects it. */
if (r == ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED && !conn->chosen_exit_name)
@@ -3388,10 +3390,10 @@ connection_ap_can_use_exit(const entry_connection_t *conn, const node_t *exit)
* this node, err on the side of caution. */
} else if (SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(conn->socks_request->command)) {
/* Don't send DNS requests to non-exit servers by default. */
- if (!conn->chosen_exit_name && node_exit_policy_rejects_all(exit))
+ if (!conn->chosen_exit_name && node_exit_policy_rejects_all(exit_node))
return 0;
}
- if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_, exit)) {
+ if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_, exit_node)) {
/* Not a suitable exit. Refuse it. */
return 0;
}
diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c
index 0c4bcbd..ec76ecf 100644
--- a/src/or/control.c
+++ b/src/or/control.c
@@ -6084,14 +6084,14 @@ control_event_buildtimeout_set(buildtimeout_set_event_t type,
/** Called when a signal has been processed from signal_callback */
int
-control_event_signal(uintptr_t signal)
+control_event_signal(uintptr_t signal_num)
{
const char *signal_string = NULL;
if (!control_event_is_interesting(EVENT_GOT_SIGNAL))
return 0;
- switch (signal) {
+ switch (signal_num) {
case SIGHUP:
signal_string = "RELOAD";
break;
@@ -6112,7 +6112,7 @@ control_event_signal(uintptr_t signal)
break;
default:
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unrecognized signal %lu in control_event_signal",
- (unsigned long)signal);
+ (unsigned long)signal_num);
return -1;
}
diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.c b/src/or/dirvote.c
index 2db8731..94a13e3 100644
--- a/src/or/dirvote.c
+++ b/src/or/dirvote.c
@@ -1431,7 +1431,6 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
/* Add the actual router entries. */
{
- int *index; /* index[j] is the current index into votes[j]. */
int *size; /* size[j] is the number of routerstatuses in votes[j]. */
int *flag_counts; /* The number of voters that list flag[j] for the
* currently considered router. */
@@ -1466,7 +1465,6 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
memset(conflict, 0, sizeof(conflict));
memset(unknown, 0xff, sizeof(conflict));
- index = tor_calloc(smartlist_len(votes), sizeof(int));
size = tor_calloc(smartlist_len(votes), sizeof(int));
n_voter_flags = tor_calloc(smartlist_len(votes), sizeof(int));
n_flag_voters = tor_calloc(smartlist_len(flags), sizeof(int));
@@ -1932,7 +1930,6 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
/* And the loop is over and we move on to the next router */
}
- tor_free(index);
tor_free(size);
tor_free(n_voter_flags);
tor_free(n_flag_voters);
diff --git a/src/or/policies.c b/src/or/policies.c
index 0b8f335..07f256f 100644
--- a/src/or/policies.c
+++ b/src/or/policies.c
@@ -2669,7 +2669,7 @@ compare_tor_addr_to_short_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
{
int i;
int found_match = 0;
- int accept;
+ int accept_;
tor_assert(port != 0);
@@ -2689,9 +2689,9 @@ compare_tor_addr_to_short_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
}
if (found_match)
- accept = policy->is_accept;
+ accept_ = policy->is_accept;
else
- accept = ! policy->is_accept;
+ accept_ = ! policy->is_accept;
/* ???? are these right? -NM */
/* We should be sure not to return ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED in the accept
@@ -2704,7 +2704,7 @@ compare_tor_addr_to_short_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
*
* Once microdescriptors can handle addresses in special cases (e.g. if
* we ever solve ticket 1774), we can provide certainty here. -RD */
- if (accept)
+ if (accept_)
return ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_ACCEPTED;
else
return ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED;
diff --git a/src/or/relay.c b/src/or/relay.c
index 51b33cc..309bb40 100644
--- a/src/or/relay.c
+++ b/src/or/relay.c
@@ -255,12 +255,12 @@ circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ,
if (! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_splice &&
cell_direction == CELL_DIRECTION_OUT) {
- or_circuit_t *splice = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_splice;
+ or_circuit_t *splice_ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->rend_splice;
tor_assert(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED);
- tor_assert(splice->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED);
- cell->circ_id = splice->p_circ_id;
+ tor_assert(splice_->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED);
+ cell->circ_id = splice_->p_circ_id;
cell->command = CELL_RELAY; /* can't be relay_early anyway */
- if ((reason = circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell, TO_CIRCUIT(splice),
+ if ((reason = circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell, TO_CIRCUIT(splice_),
CELL_DIRECTION_IN)) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Error relaying cell across rendezvous; closing "
"circuits");
diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c
index 2d47e12..3468b07 100644
--- a/src/or/rendclient.c
+++ b/src/or/rendclient.c
@@ -830,9 +830,9 @@ fetch_v2_desc_by_addr(rend_data_t *query, smartlist_t *hsdirs)
tries_left = REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS;
while (tries_left > 0) {
- int rand = crypto_rand_int(tries_left);
- int chosen_replica = replicas_left_to_try[rand];
- replicas_left_to_try[rand] = replicas_left_to_try[--tries_left];
+ int rand_val = crypto_rand_int(tries_left);
+ int chosen_replica = replicas_left_to_try[rand_val];
+ replicas_left_to_try[rand_val] = replicas_left_to_try[--tries_left];
ret = rend_compute_v2_desc_id(descriptor_id, query->onion_address,
query->auth_type == REND_STEALTH_AUTH ?
diff --git a/src/or/rephist.c b/src/or/rephist.c
index 929e95d..0eab5e0 100644
--- a/src/or/rephist.c
+++ b/src/or/rephist.c
@@ -743,14 +743,15 @@ rep_history_clean(time_t before)
orhist_it = digestmap_iter_init(history_map);
while (!digestmap_iter_done(orhist_it)) {
- int remove;
+ int should_remove;
digestmap_iter_get(orhist_it, &d1, &or_history_p);
or_history = or_history_p;
- remove = authority ? (or_history->total_run_weights < STABILITY_EPSILON &&
+ should_remove = authority ?
+ (or_history->total_run_weights < STABILITY_EPSILON &&
!or_history->start_of_run)
: (or_history->changed < before);
- if (remove) {
+ if (should_remove) {
orhist_it = digestmap_iter_next_rmv(history_map, orhist_it);
free_or_history(or_history);
continue;
@@ -2294,16 +2295,16 @@ void
rep_hist_add_buffer_stats(double mean_num_cells_in_queue,
double mean_time_cells_in_queue, uint32_t processed_cells)
{
- circ_buffer_stats_t *stat;
+ circ_buffer_stats_t *stats;
if (!start_of_buffer_stats_interval)
return; /* Not initialized. */
- stat = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circ_buffer_stats_t));
- stat->mean_num_cells_in_queue = mean_num_cells_in_queue;
- stat->mean_time_cells_in_queue = mean_time_cells_in_queue;
- stat->processed_cells = processed_cells;
+ stats = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(circ_buffer_stats_t));
+ stats->mean_num_cells_in_queue = mean_num_cells_in_queue;
+ stats->mean_time_cells_in_queue = mean_time_cells_in_queue;
+ stats->processed_cells = processed_cells;
if (!circuits_for_buffer_stats)
circuits_for_buffer_stats = smartlist_new();
- smartlist_add(circuits_for_buffer_stats, stat);
+ smartlist_add(circuits_for_buffer_stats, stats);
}
/** Remember cell statistics for circuit <b>circ</b> at time
diff --git a/src/or/routerkeys.c b/src/or/routerkeys.c
index 27a19f5..060ffd8 100644
--- a/src/or/routerkeys.c
+++ b/src/or/routerkeys.c
@@ -931,15 +931,15 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
int
generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
{
- const tor_x509_cert_t *link = NULL, *id = NULL;
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *link_ = NULL, *id = NULL;
tor_cert_t *link_cert = NULL;
- if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link, &id) < 0 || link == NULL) {
+ if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link_, &id) < 0 || link_ == NULL) {
log_warn(LD_OR, "Can't get my x509 link cert.");
return -1;
}
- const common_digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link);
+ const common_digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link_);
if (link_cert_cert &&
! EXPIRES_SOON(link_cert_cert, options->TestingLinkKeySlop) &&
@@ -979,12 +979,12 @@ should_make_new_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, const time_t now)
EXPIRES_SOON(link_cert_cert, options->TestingLinkKeySlop))
return 1;
- const tor_x509_cert_t *link = NULL, *id = NULL;
+ const tor_x509_cert_t *link_ = NULL, *id = NULL;
- if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link, &id) < 0 || link == NULL)
+ if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(1, &link_, &id) < 0 || link_ == NULL)
return 1;
- const common_digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link);
+ const common_digests_t *digests = tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(link_);
if (!fast_memeq(digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256],
link_cert_cert->signed_key.pubkey,
diff --git a/src/or/shared_random.c b/src/or/shared_random.c
index c9886d9..0a1f24a 100644
--- a/src/or/shared_random.c
+++ b/src/or/shared_random.c
@@ -115,16 +115,16 @@ static int32_t num_srv_agreements_from_vote;
STATIC sr_srv_t *
srv_dup(const sr_srv_t *orig)
{
- sr_srv_t *dup = NULL;
+ sr_srv_t *duplicate = NULL;
if (!orig) {
return NULL;
}
- dup = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(sr_srv_t));
- dup->num_reveals = orig->num_reveals;
- memcpy(dup->value, orig->value, sizeof(dup->value));
- return dup;
+ duplicate = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(sr_srv_t));
+ duplicate->num_reveals = orig->num_reveals;
+ memcpy(duplicate->value, orig->value, sizeof(duplicate->value));
+ return duplicate;
}
/* Allocate a new commit object and initializing it with <b>rsa_identity</b>
diff --git a/src/test/test_address.c b/src/test/test_address.c
index 82d6bc7..b4638f0 100644
--- a/src/test/test_address.c
+++ b/src/test/test_address.c
@@ -562,13 +562,13 @@ static int last_connected_socket_fd = 0;
static int connect_retval = 0;
static tor_socket_t
-pretend_to_connect(tor_socket_t socket, const struct sockaddr *address,
+pretend_to_connect(tor_socket_t sock, const struct sockaddr *address,
socklen_t address_len)
{
(void)address;
(void)address_len;
- last_connected_socket_fd = socket;
+ last_connected_socket_fd = sock;
return connect_retval;
}
@@ -576,11 +576,11 @@ pretend_to_connect(tor_socket_t socket, const struct sockaddr *address,
static struct sockaddr *mock_addr = NULL;
static int
-fake_getsockname(tor_socket_t socket, struct sockaddr *address,
+fake_getsockname(tor_socket_t sock, struct sockaddr *address,
socklen_t *address_len)
{
socklen_t bytes_to_copy = 0;
- (void) socket;
+ (void) sock;
if (!mock_addr)
return -1;
diff --git a/src/test/test_util.c b/src/test/test_util.c
index 843a57a..5432b2c 100644
--- a/src/test/test_util.c
+++ b/src/test/test_util.c
@@ -5240,12 +5240,12 @@ test_util_pwdb(void *arg)
tt_assert(dir != NULL);
/* Try failing cases. First find a user that doesn't exist by name */
- char rand[4];
+ char randbytes[4];
char badname[9];
int i, found=0;
for (i = 0; i < 100; ++i) {
- crypto_rand(rand, sizeof(rand));
- base16_encode(badname, sizeof(badname), rand, sizeof(rand));
+ crypto_rand(randbytes, sizeof(randbytes));
+ base16_encode(badname, sizeof(badname), randbytes, sizeof(randbytes));
if (tor_getpwnam(badname) == NULL) {
found = 1;
break;
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