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[tor-commits] [tor/maint-0.4.3] Fix out-of-bound memory read in `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` for NSS.
commit b46984e97ec4064ac8178ea9b3bf6985a4f2f632
Author: Alexander Færøy <ahf@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue Mar 31 02:33:54 2020 +0000
Fix out-of-bound memory read in `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` for NSS.
This patch fixes an out-of-bound memory read in
`tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` when Tor is compiled to use Mozilla's NSS
instead of OpenSSL.
The NSS library stores some length fields in bits instead of bytes, but
the comparison function found in `SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual()` needs the
length to be encoded in bytes. This means that for a 140-byte,
DER-encoded, SubjectPublicKeyInfo struct (with a 1024-bit RSA public key
in it), we would ask `SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual()` to compare the first 1120
bytes instead of 140 (140bytes * 8bits = 1120bits).
This patch fixes the issue by converting from bits to bytes before
calling `SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual()` and convert the `len`-fields back to
bits before we leave the function.
This patch is part of the fix for TROVE-2020-001.
See: https://bugs.torproject.org/33119
---
changes/bug33119 | 4 ++++
src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/bug33119 b/changes/bug33119
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c976654b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/bug33119
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+ o Major bugfixes (NSS):
+ - Fix out-of-bound memory access in `tor_tls_cert_matches_key()` when Tor is
+ compiled with NSS support. Fixes bug 33119; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. This
+ issue is also tracked as TROVE-2020-001.
diff --git a/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c
index 3c62e98df..f7792e07a 100644
--- a/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c
+++ b/src/lib/tls/tortls_nss.c
@@ -713,23 +713,49 @@ MOCK_IMPL(int,
tor_tls_cert_matches_key,(const tor_tls_t *tls,
const struct tor_x509_cert_t *cert))
{
- tor_assert(tls);
tor_assert(cert);
+ tor_assert(cert->cert);
+
int rv = 0;
- CERTCertificate *peercert = SSL_PeerCertificate(tls->ssl);
- if (!peercert)
+ tor_x509_cert_t *peercert = tor_tls_get_peer_cert((tor_tls_t *)tls);
+
+ if (!peercert || !peercert->cert)
goto done;
- CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *peer_info = &peercert->subjectPublicKeyInfo;
+
+ CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *peer_info = &peercert->cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo;
CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *cert_info = &cert->cert->subjectPublicKeyInfo;
+
+ /* NSS stores the `len` field in bits, instead of bytes, for the
+ * `subjectPublicKey` field in CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo, but
+ * `SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual()` compares the two bitstrings using a length field
+ * defined in bytes.
+ *
+ * We convert the `len` field from bits to bytes, do our comparison with
+ * `SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual()`, and reset the length field from bytes to bits
+ * again.
+ *
+ * See also NSS's own implementation of `SECKEY_CopySubjectPublicKeyInfo()`
+ * in seckey.c in the NSS source tree. This function also does the conversion
+ * between bits and bytes.
+ */
+ unsigned int peer_info_orig_len = peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len;
+ unsigned int cert_info_orig_len = cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len;
+
+ peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len = (peer_info_orig_len >> 3);
+ cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len = (cert_info_orig_len >> 3);
+
rv = SECOID_CompareAlgorithmID(&peer_info->algorithm,
&cert_info->algorithm) == 0 &&
SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&peer_info->subjectPublicKey,
&cert_info->subjectPublicKey);
+ peer_info->subjectPublicKey.len = peer_info_orig_len;
+ cert_info->subjectPublicKey.len = cert_info_orig_len;
+
done:
- if (peercert)
- CERT_DestroyCertificate(peercert);
+ tor_x509_cert_free(peercert);
+
return rv;
}
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