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[or-cvs] Logic to implement rendezvous/introduction via unknown serv...
Update of /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or
In directory moria:/tmp/cvs-serv2828/src/or
Modified Files:
circuitbuild.c circuitlist.c circuituse.c connection_edge.c
control.c directory.c onion.c or.h relay.c rendclient.c
rendcommon.c rendservice.c test.c
Log Message:
Logic to implement rendezvous/introduction via unknown servers.
- Add a new extend_info_t datatype to hold information needed to
extend a circuit (addr,port,keyid,onion_key). Use it in cpath and
build_state. Make appropriate functions take or return it instead of
routerinfo_t or keyid.
- #if 0 needless check in circuit_get_by_edge_conn; if nobody triggers this
error in 0.1.0.10, nobody will trigger it.
- Implement new hidden service descriptor format, which contains "extend
info" for introduction points, along with protocol version list.
- Parse new format.
- Generate new format
- Cache old and new formats alongside each other.
- Directories serve "old" format if asked in old way, "newest available"
format if asked in new way.
- Use new format to find introduction points if possible; otherwise fall
back. Keep nickname lists and extendinfo lists in sync.
- Tests for new format.
- Implement new "v2" INTRODUCE cell format.
- Accept new format
- Use new format if we have a versioned service descriptor that says the
server accepts the new format.
- Add documentation for functions and data types.
Index: circuitbuild.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/circuitbuild.c,v
retrieving revision 1.120
retrieving revision 1.121
diff -u -d -r1.120 -r1.121
--- circuitbuild.c 15 Jun 2005 18:34:46 -0000 1.120
+++ circuitbuild.c 29 Jun 2005 21:46:55 -0000 1.121
@@ -21,13 +21,12 @@
static int circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ,
uint8_t cell_type, char *payload);
-static int onion_pick_cpath_exit(circuit_t *circ, routerinfo_t *exit);
+static int onion_pick_cpath_exit(circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit);
static crypt_path_t *onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath);
-static int onion_next_router_in_cpath(circuit_t *circ, routerinfo_t **router);
static int onion_extend_cpath(uint8_t purpose, crypt_path_t **head_ptr,
cpath_build_state_t *state);
static int count_acceptable_routers(smartlist_t *routers);
-static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, routerinfo_t *choice);
+static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice);
/** Iterate over values of circ_id, starting from conn-\>next_circ_id,
* and with the high bit specified by circ_id_type (see
@@ -85,31 +84,25 @@
elements = smartlist_create();
if (verbose) {
+ const char *nickname = build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state);
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, "%s%s circ (length %d, exit %s):",
circ->build_state->is_internal ? "internal" : "exit",
circ->build_state->need_uptime ? " (high-uptime)" : "",
circ->build_state->desired_path_len,
- circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
+ nickname?nickname:"unnamed");
smartlist_add(elements, tor_strdup(buf));
}
hop = circ->cpath;
do {
const char *elt;
- routerinfo_t *r;
if (!hop)
break;
if (!verbose && hop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
break;
- if ((r = router_get_by_digest(hop->identity_digest))) {
- elt = r->nickname;
- } else if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) {
- elt = "<rendezvous splice>";
- } else {
- buf[0]='$';
- base16_encode(buf+1,sizeof(buf)-1,hop->identity_digest,DIGEST_LEN);
- elt = buf;
- }
+ if (!hop->extend_info)
+ break;
+ elt = hop->extend_info->nickname;
if (verbose) {
size_t len = strlen(elt)+2+strlen(states[hop->state])+1;
char *v = tor_malloc(len);
@@ -166,7 +159,7 @@
prev_digest = me->identity_digest;
}
do {
- router = router_get_by_digest(hop->identity_digest);
+ router = router_get_by_digest(hop->extend_info->identity_digest);
if (router) {
if (prev_digest) {
if (hop->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
@@ -272,7 +265,7 @@
return circ;
}
-/** Build a new circuit for <b>purpose</b>. If <b>exit</b>
+/** Build a new circuit for <b>purpose</b>. If <b>info/b>
* is defined, then use that as your exit router, else choose a suitable
* exit node.
*
@@ -280,14 +273,14 @@
* it's not open already.
*/
circuit_t *
-circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, routerinfo_t *exit,
+circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info,
int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int internal)
{
circuit_t *circ;
circ = circuit_init(purpose, need_uptime, need_capacity, internal);
- if (onion_pick_cpath_exit(circ, exit) < 0 ||
+ if (onion_pick_cpath_exit(circ, info) < 0 ||
onion_populate_cpath(circ) < 0) {
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
return NULL;
@@ -309,26 +302,32 @@
int
circuit_handle_first_hop(circuit_t *circ)
{
- routerinfo_t *firsthop;
+ crypt_path_t *firsthop;
connection_t *n_conn;
+ char tmpbuf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN+1];
+ struct in_addr in;
- onion_next_router_in_cpath(circ, &firsthop);
+ firsthop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
tor_assert(firsthop);
/* now see if we're already connected to the first OR in 'route' */
- log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Looking for firsthop '%s:%u'",
- firsthop->address,firsthop->or_port);
+ in.s_addr = htonl(firsthop->extend_info->addr);
+ tor_inet_ntoa(&in, tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf));
+ log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Looking for firsthop '%s:%u'",tmpbuf,
+ firsthop->extend_info->port);
/* imprint the circuit with its future n_conn->id */
- memcpy(circ->n_conn_id_digest, firsthop->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
- n_conn = connection_get_by_identity_digest(firsthop->identity_digest,
- CONN_TYPE_OR);
+ memcpy(circ->n_conn_id_digest, firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN);
+ n_conn = connection_get_by_identity_digest(
+ firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest, CONN_TYPE_OR);
if (!n_conn || n_conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { /* not currently connected */
- circ->n_addr = firsthop->addr;
- circ->n_port = firsthop->or_port;
+ circ->n_addr = firsthop->extend_info->addr;
+ circ->n_port = firsthop->extend_info->port;
if (!n_conn) { /* launch the connection */
- n_conn = connection_or_connect(firsthop->addr, firsthop->or_port,
- firsthop->identity_digest);
+ n_conn = connection_or_connect(firsthop->extend_info->addr,
+ firsthop->extend_info->port,
+ firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest);
if (!n_conn) { /* connect failed, forget the whole thing */
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"connect to firsthop failed. Closing.");
return -1;
@@ -452,7 +451,6 @@
{
crypt_path_t *hop;
routerinfo_t *router;
- int r;
char payload[2+4+DIGEST_LEN+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
char *onionskin;
size_t payload_len;
@@ -465,20 +463,15 @@
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"First skin; sending create cell.");
router = router_get_by_digest(circ->n_conn->identity_digest);
- if (!router) {
- log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Couldn't find routerinfo for %s",
- circ->n_conn->nickname);
- return -1;
- }
if (1 || /* Disable this '1' once we believe CREATE_FAST works. XXXX */
- (get_options()->ORPort || !router->platform ||
+ (get_options()->ORPort || !router || !router->platform ||
!tor_version_as_new_as(router->platform, "0.1.0.6-rc"))) {
/* We are an OR, or we are connecting to an old Tor: we should
* send an old slow create cell.
*/
cell_type = CELL_CREATE;
- if (onion_skin_create(router->onion_pkey,
+ if (onion_skin_create(circ->cpath->extend_info->onion_key,
&(circ->cpath->dh_handshake_state),
payload) < 0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"onion_skin_create (first hop) failed.");
@@ -505,8 +498,8 @@
tor_assert(circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
tor_assert(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"starting to send subsequent skin.");
- r = onion_next_router_in_cpath(circ, &router);
- if (r > 0) {
+ hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
+ if (!hop) {
/* done building the circuit. whew. */
circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN;
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"circuit built!");
@@ -524,19 +517,17 @@
circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circ);
circuit_has_opened(circ); /* do other actions as necessary */
return 0;
- } else if (r < 0) {
- return -1;
}
- hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
- *(uint32_t*)payload = htonl(hop->addr);
- *(uint16_t*)(payload+4) = htons(hop->port);
+ *(uint32_t*)payload = htonl(hop->extend_info->addr);
+ *(uint16_t*)(payload+4) = htons(hop->extend_info->port);
onionskin = payload+2+4;
- memcpy(payload+2+4+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, hop->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ memcpy(payload+2+4+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, hop->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
payload_len = 2+4+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN+DIGEST_LEN;
- if (onion_skin_create(router->onion_pkey, &(hop->dh_handshake_state), onionskin) < 0) {
+ if (onion_skin_create(hop->extend_info->onion_key,
+ &(hop->dh_handshake_state), onionskin) < 0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"onion_skin_create failed.");
return -1;
}
@@ -1218,10 +1209,9 @@
* router (or use <b>exit</b> if provided). Store these in the
* cpath. Return 0 if ok, -1 if circuit should be closed. */
static int
-onion_pick_cpath_exit(circuit_t *circ, routerinfo_t *exit)
+onion_pick_cpath_exit(circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
{
cpath_build_state_t *state = circ->build_state;
-
routerlist_t *rl;
int r;
@@ -1237,16 +1227,17 @@
if (exit) { /* the circuit-builder pre-requested one */
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Using requested exit node '%s'", exit->nickname);
+ exit = extend_info_dup(exit);
} else { /* we have to decide one */
- exit = choose_good_exit_server(circ->purpose, rl,
+ routerinfo_t *router = choose_good_exit_server(circ->purpose, rl,
state->need_uptime, state->need_capacity);
- if (!exit) {
+ if (!router) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"failed to choose an exit server");
return -1;
}
+ exit = extend_info_from_router(router);
}
- memcpy(state->chosen_exit_digest, exit->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
- state->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(exit->nickname);
+ state->chosen_exit = exit;
return 0;
}
@@ -1255,30 +1246,32 @@
* the caller will do this if it wants to.
*/
int
-circuit_append_new_exit(circuit_t *circ, routerinfo_t *exit)
+circuit_append_new_exit(circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *info)
{
- tor_assert(exit);
+ cpath_build_state_t *state;
+ tor_assert(info);
tor_assert(circ && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
- tor_free(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
- circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(exit->nickname);
- memcpy(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_digest, exit->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ state = circ->build_state;
+ tor_assert(state);
+ if (state->chosen_exit)
+ extend_info_free(state->chosen_exit);
+ state->chosen_exit = extend_info_dup(info);
+
++circ->build_state->desired_path_len;
- onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, exit);
+ onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, info);
return 0;
}
-/** Take the open circ originating here, give it a new exit destination
- * to <b>exit</b>, and get it to send the next extend cell. If you can't
- * send the extend cell, mark the circuit for close and return -1, else
- * return 0. */
+/** DOCDOC */
int
-circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circuit_t *circ, routerinfo_t *exit)
+circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *info)
{
- circuit_append_new_exit(circ, exit);
+ circuit_append_new_exit(circ, info);
circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING;
if (circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't extend circuit to new point '%s'.",
- circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
+ info->nickname);
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
return -1;
}
@@ -1350,7 +1343,7 @@
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Contemplating intermediate hop: random choice.");
excluded = smartlist_create();
- if ((r = router_get_by_digest(state->chosen_exit_digest))) {
+ if ((r = build_state_get_exit_router(state))) {
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
}
@@ -1359,7 +1352,7 @@
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
}
for (i = 0, cpath = head; i < cur_len; ++i, cpath=cpath->next) {
- if ((r = router_get_by_digest(cpath->identity_digest))) {
+ if ((r = router_get_by_digest(cpath->extend_info->identity_digest))) {
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
}
@@ -1379,7 +1372,7 @@
smartlist_t *excluded = smartlist_create();
or_options_t *options = get_options();
- if ((r = router_get_by_digest(state->chosen_exit_digest))) {
+ if ((r = build_state_get_exit_router(state))) {
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
}
@@ -1424,27 +1417,6 @@
return NULL;
}
-/** Find the router corresponding to the first non-open hop in
- * circ->cpath. Make sure it's state closed. Return 1 if all
- * hops are open (the circuit is complete), 0 if we find a router
- * (and set it to *router), and -1 if we fail to lookup the router.
- */
-static int
-onion_next_router_in_cpath(circuit_t *circ, routerinfo_t **router) {
- routerinfo_t *r;
- crypt_path_t *hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
- if (!hop) /* all hops are open */
- return 1;
- tor_assert(hop->state == CPATH_STATE_CLOSED);
- r = router_get_by_digest(hop->identity_digest);
- if (!r) {
- log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Circuit intended to extend to a hop whose routerinfo we've lost. Cancelling circuit.");
- return -1;
- }
- *router = r;
- return 0;
-}
-
/** Choose a suitable next hop in the cpath <b>head_ptr</b>,
* based on <b>state</b>. Append the hop info to head_ptr.
*/
@@ -1454,7 +1426,7 @@
{
int cur_len;
crypt_path_t *cpath;
- routerinfo_t *choice;
+ extend_info_t *info = NULL;
smartlist_t *excludednodes;
tor_assert(head_ptr);
@@ -1481,23 +1453,29 @@
add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(excludednodes,get_options()->ExcludeNodes,0);
if (cur_len == state->desired_path_len - 1) { /* Picking last node */
- choice = router_get_by_digest(state->chosen_exit_digest);
+ info = extend_info_dup(state->chosen_exit);
} else if (cur_len == 0) { /* picking first node */
- choice = choose_good_entry_server(state);
+ routerinfo_t *r = choose_good_entry_server(state);
+ if (r)
+ info = extend_info_from_router(r);
} else {
- choice = choose_good_middle_server(purpose, state, *head_ptr, cur_len);
+ routerinfo_t *r =
+ choose_good_middle_server(purpose, state, *head_ptr, cur_len);
+ if (r)
+ info = extend_info_from_router(r);
}
smartlist_free(excludednodes);
- if (!choice) {
+ if (!info) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Failed to find node for hop %d of our path. Discarding this circuit.", cur_len);
return -1;
}
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Chose router %s for hop %d (exit is %s)",
- choice->nickname, cur_len+1, state->chosen_exit_name);
+ info->nickname, cur_len+1, build_state_get_exit_nickname(state));
- onion_append_hop(head_ptr, choice);
+ onion_append_hop(head_ptr, info);
+ extend_info_free(info);
return 0;
}
@@ -1505,7 +1483,7 @@
* corresponding router <b>choice</b>, and append it to the
* end of the cpath <b>head_ptr</b>. */
static int
-onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, routerinfo_t *choice)
+onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice)
{
crypt_path_t *hop = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
@@ -1515,9 +1493,7 @@
hop->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
hop->state = CPATH_STATE_CLOSED;
- hop->port = choice->or_port;
- hop->addr = choice->addr;
- memcpy(hop->identity_digest, choice->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ hop->extend_info = extend_info_dup(choice);
hop->package_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
@@ -1525,3 +1501,67 @@
return 0;
}
+/** Allocate and return a new extend_info_t that can be used to build a
+ * circuit to or through the router <b>r</b>. */
+extend_info_t *
+extend_info_from_router(routerinfo_t *r)
+{
+ extend_info_t *info;
+ tor_assert(r);
+ info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
+ strlcpy(info->nickname, r->nickname, sizeof(info->nickname));
+ memcpy(info->identity_digest, r->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ info->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(r->onion_pkey);
+ info->addr = r->addr;
+ info->port = r->or_port;
+ return info;
+}
+
+/** Release storage held by an extend_info_t struct. */
+void
+extend_info_free(extend_info_t *info)
+{
+ tor_assert(info);
+ crypto_free_pk_env(info->onion_key);
+ tor_free(info);
+}
+
+/** Allocate and return a new extend_info_t with the same contents as
+ * <b>info</b>. */
+extend_info_t *
+extend_info_dup(extend_info_t *info)
+{
+ extend_info_t *newinfo;
+ tor_assert(info);
+ newinfo = tor_malloc(sizeof(extend_info_t));
+ memcpy(newinfo, info, sizeof(extend_info_t));
+ newinfo->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(info->onion_key);
+ return newinfo;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return the routerinfo_t for the chosen exit router in <b>state</b>. If
+ * there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the routerinfo_t for the
+ * chosen exit, return NULL.
+ */
+routerinfo_t *
+build_state_get_exit_router(cpath_build_state_t *state)
+{
+ if (!state || !state->chosen_exit)
+ return NULL;
+ return router_get_by_digest(state->chosen_exit->identity_digest);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Return the nickname for the chosen exit router in <b>state</b>. If
+ * there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the routerinfo_t for the
+ * chosen exit, return NULL.
+ */
+const char *
+build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state)
+{
+ if (!state || !state->chosen_exit)
+ return NULL;
+ return state->chosen_exit->nickname;
+}
+
Index: circuitlist.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/circuitlist.c,v
retrieving revision 1.51
retrieving revision 1.52
diff -u -d -r1.51 -r1.52
--- circuitlist.c 19 Jun 2005 20:40:41 -0000 1.51
+++ circuitlist.c 29 Jun 2005 21:46:55 -0000 1.52
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@
/********* END VARIABLES ************/
-/** DOCDOC This whole section */
+/** A map from OR connection and circuit ID to circuit. (Lookup performance is
+ * very important here, since we need to do it every time a cell arrives.) */
struct orconn_circid_circuit_map_t {
RB_ENTRY(orconn_circid_circuit_map_t) node;
connection_t *or_conn;
@@ -32,7 +33,9 @@
circuit_t *circuit;
};
-/** DOCDOC */
+/** helper for RB tree: compare the OR connection and circuit ID for a and b,
+ * and return less than, equal to, or greater than zero appropriately.
+ */
static INLINE int
compare_orconn_circid_entries(struct orconn_circid_circuit_map_t *a,
struct orconn_circid_circuit_map_t *b)
@@ -49,9 +52,15 @@
RB_PROTOTYPE(orconn_circid_tree, orconn_circid_circuit_map_t, node, compare_orconn_circid_entries);
RB_GENERATE(orconn_circid_tree, orconn_circid_circuit_map_t, node, compare_orconn_circid_entries);
+/** The most recently returned entyr from circuit_get_by_circid_orconn; used
+ * to improve performance when many cells arrive in a row from the same circuit.
+ */
+/* (We tried using splay trees, but round-robin turned out to make them suck.) */
struct orconn_circid_circuit_map_t *_last_circid_orconn_ent = NULL;
-/** DOCDOC */
+/** Set the p_conn or n_conn field of a circuit <b>circ</b>, along with the
+ * corresponding circuit ID, and add the circuit as appropriate to the
+ * (orconn,id)-\>circuit map. */
void
circuit_set_circid_orconn(circuit_t *circ, uint16_t id,
connection_t *conn,
@@ -154,7 +163,7 @@
}
}
-/** DOCDOC **/
+/** Return the head of the global linked list of circuits. **/
circuit_t *
_circuit_get_global_list(void)
{
@@ -227,7 +236,8 @@
if (circ->p_digest)
crypto_free_digest_env(circ->p_digest);
if (circ->build_state) {
- tor_free(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
+ if (circ->build_state->chosen_exit)
+ extend_info_free(circ->build_state->chosen_exit);
if (circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath)
circuit_free_cpath_node(circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
}
@@ -296,6 +306,9 @@
crypto_free_digest_env(victim->b_digest);
if (victim->dh_handshake_state)
crypto_dh_free(victim->dh_handshake_state);
+ if (victim->extend_info)
+ extend_info_free(victim->extend_info);
+
victim->magic = 0xDEADBEEFu;
tor_free(victim);
}
@@ -367,7 +380,7 @@
}
-/** DOCDOC */
+/** Return the circuit that a given edge connection is using. */
circuit_t *
circuit_get_by_edge_conn(connection_t *conn)
{
@@ -385,8 +398,9 @@
}
circ = conn->on_circuit;
- /* All this stuff here is sanity-checking. */
tor_assert(circ->magic == CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
+#if 0
+ /* All this stuff here is sanity-checking. */
for (tmpconn = circ->p_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream)
if (tmpconn == conn)
return circ;
@@ -398,6 +412,8 @@
return circ;
tor_assert(0);
+#endif
+ return circ;
}
/** Return a circ such that circ is attached to <b>conn</b>, either as
@@ -592,10 +608,14 @@
}
if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
tor_assert(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
+ tor_assert(circ->build_state->chosen_exit);
/* treat this like getting a nack from it */
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Failed intro circ %s to %s (awaiting ack). Removing from descriptor.",
- safe_str(circ->rend_query), safe_str(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name));
- rend_client_remove_intro_point(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name, circ->rend_query);
+ safe_str(circ->rend_query),
+ safe_str(build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state)));
+ // XXXX NM
+ rend_client_remove_intro_point(circ->build_state->chosen_exit,
+ circ->rend_query);
}
if (circ->n_conn)
Index: circuituse.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/circuituse.c,v
retrieving revision 1.75
retrieving revision 1.76
diff -u -d -r1.75 -r1.76
--- circuituse.c 11 Jun 2005 18:52:11 -0000 1.75
+++ circuituse.c 29 Jun 2005 21:46:55 -0000 1.76
@@ -74,12 +74,7 @@
* circuit, it's the magical extra bob hop. so just check the nickname
* of the one we meant to finish at.
*/
- exitrouter = router_get_by_digest(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_digest);
-
- if (!exitrouter) {
- log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Skipping broken circ (exit router vanished)");
- return 0; /* this circuit is screwed and doesn't know it yet */
- }
+ exitrouter = build_state_get_exit_router(circ->build_state);
if (!circ->build_state->need_uptime &&
smartlist_string_num_isin(get_options()->LongLivedPorts,
@@ -87,6 +82,11 @@
return 0;
if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
+ if (!exitrouter) {
+ log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Not considering circuit with unknown router.");
+ return 0; /* this circuit is screwed and doesn't know it yet,
+ * or is a rendezvous circuit. */
+ }
if (!connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter)) {
/* can't exit from this router */
return 0;
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL &&
(!circ->timestamp_dirty ||
circ->timestamp_dirty + get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness < now)) {
- exitrouter = router_get_by_digest(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_digest);
+ exitrouter = build_state_get_exit_router(circ->build_state);
if (exitrouter &&
(!need_uptime || circ->build_state->need_uptime)) {
int ok;
@@ -682,7 +682,7 @@
/* Don't increment failure count, since Alice may have picked
* the rendezvous point maliciously */
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Couldn't connect to Alice's chosen rend point %s (%s hop failed).",
- circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name,
+ build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state),
failed_at_last_hop?"last":"non-last");
rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(circ);
break;
@@ -703,12 +703,34 @@
* success. */
#define MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES 5
-/** Launch a new circuit based on our arguments. */
+/** Launch a new circuit; see circuit_launch_by_extend_info for details on
+ * arguments. */
circuit_t *
circuit_launch_by_router(uint8_t purpose, routerinfo_t *exit,
int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int internal)
{
circuit_t *circ;
+ extend_info_t *info = NULL;
+ if (exit)
+ info = extend_info_from_router(exit);
+ circ = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(purpose, info, need_uptime, need_capacity,
+ internal);
+ if (info)
+ extend_info_free(info);
+ return circ;
+}
+
+/** Launch a new circuit with purpose <b>purpose</b> and exit node <b>info</b>
+ * (or NULL to select a random exit node). If <b>need_uptime</b> is true,
+ * choose among routers with high uptime. If <b>need_capacity</b> is true,
+ * choose among routers with high bandwidth. If <b>internal</b> is true, the
+ * last hop need not be an exit node. Return the newly allocated circuit on
+ * success, or NULL on failure. */
+circuit_t *
+circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info,
+ int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int internal)
+{
+ circuit_t *circ;
if (!has_fetched_directory) {
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Haven't fetched directory yet; canceling circuit launch.");
@@ -721,7 +743,7 @@
if ((circ = circuit_get_clean_open(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, need_uptime,
need_capacity, internal))) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Cannibalizing circ '%s' for purpose %d",
- circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name, purpose);
+ build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state), purpose);
circ->purpose = purpose;
/* reset the birth date of this circ, else expire_building
* will see it and think it's been trying to build since it
@@ -740,8 +762,8 @@
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
/* need to add a new hop */
- tor_assert(exit);
- if (circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, exit) < 0)
+ tor_assert(info);
+ if (circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, info) < 0)
return NULL;
break;
default:
@@ -762,11 +784,12 @@
}
/* try a circ. if it fails, circuit_mark_for_close will increment n_circuit_failures */
- return circuit_establish_circuit(purpose, exit,
+ return circuit_establish_circuit(purpose, info,
need_uptime, need_capacity, internal);
}
-/** Launch a new circuit and return a pointer to it. Return NULL if you failed. */
+/** Launch a new circuit; see circuit_launch_by_extend_info for details on
+ * arguments. */
circuit_t *
circuit_launch_by_nickname(uint8_t purpose, const char *exit_nickname,
int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int internal)
@@ -867,30 +890,22 @@
/* is one already on the way? */
circ = circuit_get_best(conn, 0, desired_circuit_purpose);
if (!circ) {
- char *exitname=NULL;
+ extend_info_t *extend_info=NULL;
uint8_t new_circ_purpose;
int is_internal;
if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
/* need to pick an intro point */
-try_an_intro_point:
- exitname = rend_client_get_random_intro(conn->rend_query);
- if (!exitname) {
+ extend_info = rend_client_get_random_intro(conn->rend_query);
+ if (!extend_info) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"No intro points for '%s': refetching service descriptor.",
safe_str(conn->rend_query));
rend_client_refetch_renddesc(conn->rend_query);
conn->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
return 0;
}
- if (!router_get_by_nickname(exitname)) {
- log_fn(LOG_NOTICE,"Advertised intro point '%s' is not recognized for hidserv address '%s'. Skipping over.",
- exitname, safe_str(conn->rend_query));
- rend_client_remove_intro_point(exitname, conn->rend_query);
- tor_free(exitname);
- goto try_an_intro_point;
- }
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Chose %s as intro point for %s.",
- exitname, safe_str(conn->rend_query));
+ extend_info->nickname, safe_str(conn->rend_query));
}
/* If we have specified a particular exit node for our
@@ -898,13 +913,13 @@
*/
if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
if (conn->chosen_exit_name) {
- exitname = tor_strdup(conn->chosen_exit_name);
- if (!router_get_by_nickname(exitname)) {
+ routerinfo_t *r;
+ if (!(r = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name))) {
log_fn(LOG_NOTICE,"Requested exit point '%s' is not known. Closing.",
- exitname);
- tor_free(exitname);
+ conn->chosen_exit_name);
return -1;
}
+ extend_info = extend_info_from_router(r);
}
}
@@ -916,9 +931,10 @@
new_circ_purpose = desired_circuit_purpose;
is_internal = (new_circ_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL || is_resolve);
- circ = circuit_launch_by_nickname(new_circ_purpose, exitname, need_uptime,
- 1, is_internal);
- tor_free(exitname);
+ circ = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(
+ new_circ_purpose, extend_info, need_uptime, 1, is_internal);
+ if (extend_info)
+ extend_info_free(extend_info);
if (desired_circuit_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
/* help predict this next time */
@@ -989,18 +1005,18 @@
}
});
- if (!found_needle)
+ if (!found_needle || !circ->build_state->chosen_exit)
return;
/* Add this exit/hostname pair to the addressmap. */
len = strlen(conn->socks_request->address) + 1 /* '.' */ +
- strlen(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name) + 1 /* '.' */ +
+ strlen(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname) + 1 /* '.' */ +
strlen("exit") + 1 /* '\0' */;
new_address = tor_malloc(len);
tor_snprintf(new_address, len, "%s.%s.exit",
conn->socks_request->address,
- circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
+ circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname);
addressmap_register(conn->socks_request->address, new_address,
time(NULL) + options->TrackHostExitsExpire);
Index: connection_edge.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/connection_edge.c,v
retrieving revision 1.333
retrieving revision 1.334
diff -u -d -r1.333 -r1.334
--- connection_edge.c 19 Jun 2005 20:40:41 -0000 1.333
+++ connection_edge.c 29 Jun 2005 21:46:55 -0000 1.334
@@ -1051,7 +1051,7 @@
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Got a hidden service request for ID '%s'",
safe_str(conn->rend_query));
/* see if we already have it cached */
- r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_query, &entry);
+ r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_query, -1, &entry);
if (r<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Invalid service descriptor %s",
safe_str(conn->rend_query));
Index: control.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/control.c,v
retrieving revision 1.97
retrieving revision 1.98
diff -u -d -r1.97 -r1.98
--- control.c 27 Jun 2005 23:35:04 -0000 1.97
+++ control.c 29 Jun 2005 21:46:55 -0000 1.98
@@ -1402,7 +1402,9 @@
/* now circ refers to something that is ready to be extended */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(routers, routerinfo_t *, r,
{
- circuit_append_new_exit(circ, r);
+ extend_info_t *info = extend_info_from_router(r);
+ circuit_append_new_exit(circ, info);
+ extend_info_free(info);
});
/* now that we've populated the cpath, start extending */
Index: directory.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/directory.c,v
retrieving revision 1.236
retrieving revision 1.237
diff -u -d -r1.236 -r1.237
--- directory.c 22 Jun 2005 21:59:11 -0000 1.236
+++ directory.c 29 Jun 2005 21:46:55 -0000 1.237
@@ -435,6 +435,9 @@
httpcommand = "GET";
tor_snprintf(url, sizeof(url), "/tor/rendezvous/%s", resource);
+ /* XXXX011 Once directories understand versioned descriptors, switch to this
+ * URL in order to get the most recent version */
+ // tor_snprintf(url, sizeof(url), "/tor/rendezvous1/%s", resource);
break;
case DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC:
@@ -1004,10 +1007,13 @@
return 0;
}
- if (!strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous/")) {
+ if (!strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous/") ||
+ !strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous1/")) {
/* rendezvous descriptor fetch */
const char *descp;
size_t desc_len;
+ int versioned = !strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous1/");
+ const char *query = url+strlen("/tor/rendezvous/")+(versioned?1:0);
if (!authdir_mode(get_options())) {
/* We don't hand out rend descs. In fact, it could be a security
@@ -1019,7 +1025,7 @@
tor_free(url);
return 0;
}
- switch (rend_cache_lookup_desc(url+strlen("/tor/rendezvous/"), &descp, &desc_len)) {
+ switch (rend_cache_lookup_desc(query, versioned?-1:0, &descp, &desc_len)) {
case 1: /* valid */
format_rfc1123_time(date, time(NULL));
tor_snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nDate: %s\r\nContent-Length: %d\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n\r\n",
Index: onion.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/onion.c,v
retrieving revision 1.182
retrieving revision 1.183
diff -u -d -r1.182 -r1.183
--- onion.c 13 Jun 2005 17:33:12 -0000 1.182
+++ onion.c 29 Jun 2005 21:46:55 -0000 1.183
@@ -153,6 +153,9 @@
crypto_dh_env_t *dh = NULL;
int dhbytes, pkbytes;
+ tor_assert(dest_router_key);
+ tor_assert(handshake_state_out);
+ tor_assert(onion_skin_out);
*handshake_state_out = NULL;
memset(onion_skin_out, 0, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
Index: or.h
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/or.h,v
retrieving revision 1.621
retrieving revision 1.622
diff -u -d -r1.621 -r1.622
--- or.h 27 Jun 2005 23:35:04 -0000 1.621
+++ or.h 29 Jun 2005 21:46:55 -0000 1.622
@@ -664,7 +664,8 @@
int done_receiving; /**< For half-open connections; not used currently. */
char has_sent_end; /**< For debugging: set once we've set the stream end,
and check in circuit_about_to_close_connection(). */
- struct circuit_t *on_circuit; /**< DOCDOC */
+ struct circuit_t *on_circuit; /**< The circuit (if any) that this edge
+ * connection is using. */
/* Used only by AP connections */
socks_request_t *socks_request; /**< SOCKS structure describing request (AP
@@ -766,6 +767,17 @@
char *signing_router;
} routerlist_t;
+/** Informetation on router used when extending a circuit. (We don't need a
+ * full routerinfo_t to extend: we only need addr:port:keyid to build an OR
+ * connection, and onion_key to create the onionskin.) */
+typedef struct extend_info_t {
+ char nickname[MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1]; /**< This router's nickname for display*/
+ char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /**< Hash of this router's identity key */
+ uint32_t addr; /**< IP address in host order */
+ uint16_t port; /**< OR port */
+ crypto_pk_env_t *onion_key; /**< Current onionskin key */
+} extend_info_t;
+
#define CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC 0x70127012u
/** Holds accounting information for a single step in the layered encryption
@@ -793,12 +805,8 @@
/** Negotiated key material shared with the OR at this step. */
char handshake_digest[DIGEST_LEN];/* KH in tor-spec.txt */
- /** IP4 address of the OR at this step. */
- uint32_t addr;
- /** Port of the OR at this step. */
- uint16_t port;
- /** Identity key digest of the OR at this step. */
- char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ /** Information to extend to the OR at this step. */
+ extend_info_t *extend_info;
/** Is the circuit built to this step? Must be one of:
* - CPATH_STATE_CLOSED (The circuit has not been extended to this step)
@@ -836,10 +844,8 @@
typedef struct {
/** Intended length of the final circuit. */
int desired_path_len;
- /** Nickname of planned exit node. */
- char *chosen_exit_name;
- /** Identity of planned exit node. */
- char chosen_exit_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ /** How to extend to the planned exit node. */
+ extend_info_t *chosen_exit;
/** Whether every node in the circ must have adequate uptime. */
int need_uptime;
/** Whether every node in the circ must have adequate capacity. */
@@ -1220,7 +1226,7 @@
void circuit_dump_by_conn(connection_t *conn, int severity);
circuit_t *circuit_init(uint8_t purpose, int need_uptime,
int need_capacity, int internal);
-circuit_t *circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, routerinfo_t *exit,
+circuit_t *circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit,
int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int internal);
int circuit_handle_first_hop(circuit_t *circ);
void circuit_n_conn_done(connection_t *or_conn, int status);
@@ -1234,9 +1240,14 @@
int circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled(time_t now, int *need_uptime,
int *need_capacity);
-int circuit_append_new_exit(circuit_t *circ, routerinfo_t *exit);
-int circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circuit_t *circ, routerinfo_t *exit);
+int circuit_append_new_exit(circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *info);
+int circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *info);
void onion_append_to_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, crypt_path_t *new_hop);
+extend_info_t *extend_info_from_router(routerinfo_t *r);
+extend_info_t *extend_info_dup(extend_info_t *info);
+void extend_info_free(extend_info_t *info);
+routerinfo_t *build_state_get_exit_router(cpath_build_state_t *state);
+const char *build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state);
/********************************* circuitlist.c ***********************/
@@ -1280,6 +1291,9 @@
void circuit_build_failed(circuit_t *circ);
circuit_t *circuit_launch_by_nickname(uint8_t purpose, const char *exit_nickname,
int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int is_internal);
+circuit_t *circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose,
+ extend_info_t *info,
+ int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int is_internal);
circuit_t *circuit_launch_by_router(uint8_t purpose, routerinfo_t *exit,
int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int is_internal);
void circuit_reset_failure_count(int timeout);
@@ -1707,22 +1721,34 @@
void rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(circuit_t *circ);
int rend_client_introduction_acked(circuit_t *circ, const char *request, size_t request_len);
void rend_client_refetch_renddesc(const char *query);
-int rend_client_remove_intro_point(char *failed_intro, const char *query);
+int rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro, const char *query);
int rend_client_rendezvous_acked(circuit_t *circ, const char *request, size_t request_len);
int rend_client_receive_rendezvous(circuit_t *circ, const char *request, size_t request_len);
-void rend_client_desc_here(char *query);
+void rend_client_desc_here(const char *query);
-char *rend_client_get_random_intro(char *query);
+extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro(const char *query);
int rend_client_send_introduction(circuit_t *introcirc, circuit_t *rendcirc);
/********************************* rendcommon.c ***************************/
+/** Information used to connect to a hidden service. */
typedef struct rend_service_descriptor_t {
- crypto_pk_env_t *pk;
- time_t timestamp;
- int n_intro_points;
+ crypto_pk_env_t *pk; /**< This service's public key. */
+ int version; /**< 0 or 1 */
+ time_t timestamp; /**< Time when the descriptor was generated. */
+ uint16_t protocols; /**< Bitmask: which rendezvous protocols are supporeted?
+ * (We allow bits '0', '1', and '2' to be set.) */
+ int n_intro_points; /**< Number of introduction points. */
+ /** Array of n_intro_points elements for this service's introduction points'
+ * nicknames. Elements are removed from this array if introduction attempts
+ * fail. */
char **intro_points;
+ /** Array of n_intro_points elements for this service's introduction points'
+ * extend_infos, or NULL if this descriptor is V0. Elements are removed
+ * from this array if introduction attempts fail. If this array is present,
+ * its elements correspond to the elements of intro_points. */
+ extend_info_t **intro_point_extend_info;
} rend_service_descriptor_t;
int rend_cmp_service_ids(const char *one, const char *two);
@@ -1732,6 +1758,7 @@
void rend_service_descriptor_free(rend_service_descriptor_t *desc);
int rend_encode_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t *desc,
+ int version,
crypto_pk_env_t *key,
char **str_out,
size_t *len_out);
@@ -1740,7 +1767,7 @@
typedef struct rend_cache_entry_t {
size_t len; /* Length of desc */
- time_t received; /* When did we get the descriptor? */
+ time_t received; /* When was the descriptor received? */
char *desc; /* Service descriptor */
rend_service_descriptor_t *parsed; /* Parsed value of 'desc' */
} rend_cache_entry_t;
@@ -1749,8 +1776,8 @@
void rend_cache_clean(void);
void rend_cache_free_all(void);
int rend_valid_service_id(const char *query);
-int rend_cache_lookup_desc(const char *query, const char **desc, size_t *desc_len);
-int rend_cache_lookup_entry(const char *query, rend_cache_entry_t **entry_out);
+int rend_cache_lookup_desc(const char *query, int version, const char **desc, size_t *desc_len);
+int rend_cache_lookup_entry(const char *query, int version, rend_cache_entry_t **entry_out);
int rend_cache_store(const char *desc, size_t desc_len);
/********************************* rendservice.c ***************************/
Index: relay.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/relay.c,v
retrieving revision 1.73
retrieving revision 1.74
diff -u -d -r1.73 -r1.74
--- relay.c 19 Jun 2005 08:35:16 -0000 1.73
+++ relay.c 29 Jun 2005 21:46:55 -0000 1.74
@@ -633,11 +633,8 @@
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Address '%s' refused due to '%s'. Considering retrying.",
safe_str(conn->socks_request->address),
connection_edge_end_reason_str(reason));
- exitrouter = router_get_by_digest(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_digest);
- if (!exitrouter) {
- log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Skipping broken circ (exit router vanished)");
- return 0; /* this circuit is screwed and doesn't know it yet */
- }
+ exitrouter =
+ router_get_by_digest(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest);
switch (reason) {
case END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY:
if (rh->length >= 5) {
@@ -652,15 +649,15 @@
conn->chosen_exit_name);
}
/* check if he *ought* to have allowed it */
- if (rh->length < 5 ||
- (!tor_inet_aton(conn->socks_request->address, &in) &&
- !conn->chosen_exit_name)) {
+ if (exitrouter &&
+ (rh->length < 5 ||
+ (!tor_inet_aton(conn->socks_request->address, &in) &&
+ !conn->chosen_exit_name))) {
log_fn(LOG_NOTICE,"Exitrouter '%s' seems to be more restrictive than its exit policy. Not using this router as exit for now.", exitrouter->nickname);
addr_policy_free(exitrouter->exit_policy);
exitrouter->exit_policy =
router_parse_addr_policy_from_string("reject *:*");
}
-
if (connection_ap_detach_retriable(conn, circ) >= 0)
return 0;
/* else, conn will get closed below */
@@ -683,10 +680,11 @@
break;
case END_STREAM_REASON_HIBERNATING:
case END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT:
- addr_policy_free(exitrouter->exit_policy);
- exitrouter->exit_policy =
- router_parse_addr_policy_from_string("reject *:*");
-
+ if (exitrouter) {
+ addr_policy_free(exitrouter->exit_policy);
+ exitrouter->exit_policy =
+ router_parse_addr_policy_from_string("reject *:*");
+ }
if (connection_ap_detach_retriable(conn, circ) >= 0)
return 0;
/* else, will close below */
Index: rendclient.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/rendclient.c,v
retrieving revision 1.89
retrieving revision 1.90
diff -u -d -r1.89 -r1.90
--- rendclient.c 11 Jun 2005 18:52:11 -0000 1.89
+++ rendclient.c 29 Jun 2005 21:46:55 -0000 1.90
@@ -58,15 +58,16 @@
size_t payload_len;
int r;
char payload[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
- char tmp[1+(MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1)+REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN];
+ char tmp[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
crypt_path_t *cpath;
+ off_t dh_offset;
tor_assert(introcirc->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
tor_assert(rendcirc->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
tor_assert(!rend_cmp_service_ids(introcirc->rend_query, rendcirc->rend_query));
- if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(introcirc->rend_query, &entry) < 1) {
+ if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(introcirc->rend_query, -1, &entry) < 1) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.",
safe_str(introcirc->rend_query));
goto err;
@@ -95,22 +96,28 @@
}
/* write the remaining items into tmp */
-#if 0
- tmp[0] = 1; /* version 1 of the cell format */
- /* nul pads */
- strncpy(tmp+1, rendcirc->build_state->chosen_exit_name, (MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1));
- memcpy(tmp+1+MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1, rendcirc->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
-#else
- strncpy(tmp, rendcirc->build_state->chosen_exit_name, (MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1)); /* nul pads */
- memcpy(tmp+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1, rendcirc->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
-#endif
- if (crypto_dh_get_public(cpath->dh_handshake_state,
-#if 0
- tmp+1+MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1+REND_COOKIE_LEN,
-#else
- tmp+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1+REND_COOKIE_LEN,
-#endif
+ if (entry->parsed->protocols & (1<<2)) {
+ /* version 2 format */
+ extend_info_t *extend_info = rendcirc->build_state->chosen_exit;
+ int klen;
+ tmp[0] = 2; /* version 2 of the cell format */
+ /* nul pads */
+ set_uint32(tmp+1, htonl(extend_info->addr));
+ set_uint16(tmp+5, htons(extend_info->port));
+ memcpy(tmp+7, extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ klen = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(extend_info->onion_key, tmp+7+DIGEST_LEN+2,
+ sizeof(tmp)-(7+DIGEST_LEN+2));
+ set_uint16(tmp+7+DIGEST_LEN, htons(klen));
+ memcpy(tmp+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen, rendcirc->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
+ dh_offset = 7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen+REND_COOKIE_LEN;
+ } else {
+ /* Version 0. */
+ strncpy(tmp, rendcirc->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname, (MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1)); /* nul pads */
+ memcpy(tmp+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1, rendcirc->rend_cookie, REND_COOKIE_LEN);
+ dh_offset = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1+REND_COOKIE_LEN;
+ }
+ if (crypto_dh_get_public(cpath->dh_handshake_state, tmp+dh_offset,
DH_KEY_LEN)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't extract g^x");
goto err;
@@ -119,11 +126,7 @@
/*XXX maybe give crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt a max_len arg,
* to avoid buffer overflows? */
r = crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(entry->parsed->pk, payload+DIGEST_LEN, tmp,
-#if 0
- 1+MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1+REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN,
-#else
- MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1+REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN,
-#endif
+ dh_offset+DH_KEY_LEN,
PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 0);
if (r<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"hybrid pk encrypt failed.");
@@ -174,7 +177,6 @@
rend_client_introduction_acked(circuit_t *circ,
const char *request, size_t request_len)
{
- char *nickname;
circuit_t *rendcirc;
if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
@@ -184,7 +186,8 @@
return -1;
}
- tor_assert(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
+ tor_assert(circ->build_state->chosen_exit);
+ tor_assert(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname);
if (request_len == 0) {
/* It's an ACK; the introduction point relayed our introduction request. */
@@ -209,27 +212,26 @@
* points. If any remain, extend to a new one and try again.
* If none remain, refetch the service descriptor.
*/
- if (rend_client_remove_intro_point(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name,
+ if (rend_client_remove_intro_point(circ->build_state->chosen_exit,
circ->rend_query) > 0) {
/* There are introduction points left. re-extend the circuit to
* another intro point and try again. */
- routerinfo_t *r;
- nickname = rend_client_get_random_intro(circ->rend_query);
- tor_assert(nickname);
- log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Got nack for %s from %s, extending to %s.",
- safe_str(circ->rend_query),
- circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name, nickname);
- if (!(r = router_get_by_nickname(nickname))) {
- log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Advertised intro point '%s' for %s is not known. Closing.",
- nickname, safe_str(circ->rend_query));
- tor_free(nickname);
+ extend_info_t *info;
+ int result;
+ info = rend_client_get_random_intro(circ->rend_query);
+ if (!info) {
+ log_fn(LOG_WARN, "No introduction points left for %s. Closing.",
+ safe_str(circ->rend_query));
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
return -1;
}
- log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Chose new intro point %s for %s (circ %d)",
- nickname, safe_str(circ->rend_query), circ->n_circ_id);
- tor_free(nickname);
- return circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, r);
+ log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Got nack for %s from %s, extending circ %d to %s.",
+ safe_str(circ->rend_query),
+ circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname, circ->n_circ_id,
+ info->nickname);
+ result = circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, info);
+ extend_info_free(info);
+ return result;
}
}
return 0;
@@ -257,13 +259,13 @@
* unrecognized, 1 if recognized and some intro points remain.
*/
int
-rend_client_remove_intro_point(char *failed_intro, const char *query)
+rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro, const char *query)
{
int i, r;
rend_cache_entry_t *ent;
connection_t *conn;
- r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(query, &ent);
+ r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(query, -1, &ent);
if (r<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Malformed service ID '%s'", safe_str(query));
return -1;
@@ -275,12 +277,31 @@
return 0;
}
- for (i=0; i < ent->parsed->n_intro_points; ++i) {
- if (!strcasecmp(ent->parsed->intro_points[i], failed_intro)) {
- tor_free(ent->parsed->intro_points[i]);
- ent->parsed->intro_points[i] =
- ent->parsed->intro_points[--ent->parsed->n_intro_points];
- break;
+ if (ent->parsed->intro_point_extend_info) {
+ for (i=0; i < ent->parsed->n_intro_points; ++i) {
+ if (!memcmp(failed_intro->identity_digest,
+ ent->parsed->intro_point_extend_info[i]->identity_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ tor_assert(!strcmp(ent->parsed->intro_points[i],
+ ent->parsed->intro_point_extend_info[i]->nickname));
+ tor_free(ent->parsed->intro_points[i]);
+ extend_info_free(ent->parsed->intro_point_extend_info[i]);
+ --ent->parsed->n_intro_points;
+ ent->parsed->intro_points[i] =
+ ent->parsed->intro_points[ent->parsed->n_intro_points];
+ ent->parsed->intro_point_extend_info[i] =
+ ent->parsed->intro_point_extend_info[ent->parsed->n_intro_points];
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ for (i=0; i < ent->parsed->n_intro_points; ++i) {
+ if (!strcasecmp(ent->parsed->intro_points[i], failed_intro->nickname)) {
+ tor_free(ent->parsed->intro_points[i]);
+ ent->parsed->intro_points[i] =
+ ent->parsed->intro_points[--ent->parsed->n_intro_points];
+ break;
+ }
}
}
@@ -385,7 +406,7 @@
* else fail them.
*/
void
-rend_client_desc_here(char *query)
+rend_client_desc_here(const char *query)
{
connection_t *conn;
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
@@ -393,7 +414,7 @@
while ((conn = connection_get_by_type_state_rendquery(CONN_TYPE_AP,
AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT, query))) {
- if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_query, &entry) == 1 &&
+ if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_query, -1, &entry) == 1 &&
entry->parsed->n_intro_points > 0) {
/* either this fetch worked, or it failed but there was a
* valid entry from before which we should reuse */
@@ -419,37 +440,42 @@
}
}
-/** strdup a nickname for a random introduction
- * point of query. return NULL if error.
+/** Return a newly allocated extend_info_t* for a randomly chosen introduction
+ * point for the named hidden service. Return NULL if all introduction points
+ * have been tried and failed.
*/
-char *
-rend_client_get_random_intro(char *query)
+extend_info_t *
+rend_client_get_random_intro(const char *query)
{
int i;
- smartlist_t *sl;
- char *choice;
- char *nickname;
rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
- if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(query, &entry) < 1) {
+ if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(query, -1, &entry) < 1) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.",
safe_str(query));
return NULL;
}
- sl = smartlist_create();
+ again:
+ if (!entry->parsed->n_intro_points)
+ return NULL;
- /* add the intro point nicknames */
- for (i=0;i<entry->parsed->n_intro_points;i++)
- smartlist_add(sl,entry->parsed->intro_points[i]);
+ i = crypto_pseudo_rand_int(entry->parsed->n_intro_points);
- choice = smartlist_choose(sl);
- if (!choice) {
- smartlist_free(sl);
- return NULL;
+ if (entry->parsed->intro_point_extend_info) {
+ return extend_info_dup(entry->parsed->intro_point_extend_info[i]);
+ } else {
+ /* add the intro point nicknames */
+ char *choice = entry->parsed->intro_points[i];
+ routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_nickname(choice);
+ if (!router) {
+ log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Unknown router with nickname %s; trying another.",choice);
+ tor_free(choice);
+ entry->parsed->intro_points[i] =
+ entry->parsed->intro_points[--entry->parsed->n_intro_points];
+ goto again;
+ }
+ return extend_info_from_router(router);
}
- nickname = tor_strdup(choice);
- smartlist_free(sl);
- return nickname;
}
Index: rendcommon.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/rendcommon.c,v
retrieving revision 1.50
retrieving revision 1.51
diff -u -d -r1.50 -r1.51
--- rendcommon.c 11 Jun 2005 18:52:11 -0000 1.50
+++ rendcommon.c 29 Jun 2005 21:46:55 -0000 1.51
@@ -29,6 +29,13 @@
}
tor_free(desc->intro_points);
}
+ if (desc->intro_point_extend_info) {
+ for (i=0; i < desc->n_intro_points; ++i) {
+ if (desc->intro_point_extend_info[i])
+ extend_info_free(desc->intro_point_extend_info[i]);
+ }
+ tor_free(desc->intro_point_extend_info);
+ }
tor_free(desc);
}
@@ -38,38 +45,52 @@
*/
int
rend_encode_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t *desc,
+ int version,
crypto_pk_env_t *key,
char **str_out, size_t *len_out)
{
- char *buf, *cp, *ipoint;
+ char *cp;
+ char *end;
int i;
- size_t keylen, asn1len;
- keylen = crypto_pk_keysize(desc->pk);
- buf = tor_malloc(keylen*2); /* Too long, but that's okay. */
- i = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(desc->pk, buf, keylen*2);
- if (i<0) {
- tor_free(buf);
- return -1;
- }
- asn1len = i;
- *len_out = 2 + asn1len + 4 + 2 + keylen;
- for (i = 0; i < desc->n_intro_points; ++i) {
- *len_out += strlen(desc->intro_points[i]) + 1;
+ size_t asn1len;
+ cp = *str_out = tor_malloc(PK_BYTES*2*(desc->n_intro_points+1)); /*Too long, but ok*/
+ end = cp + PK_BYTES*2*(desc->n_intro_points+1);
+ if (version) {
+ *(uint8_t*)cp = (uint8_t)0xff;
+ *(uint8_t*)(cp+1) = (uint8_t)version;
+ cp += 2;
}
- cp = *str_out = tor_malloc(*len_out);
+ asn1len = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(desc->pk, cp+2, end-(cp+2));
set_uint16(cp, htons((uint16_t)asn1len));
- cp += 2;
- memcpy(cp, buf, asn1len);
- tor_free(buf);
- cp += asn1len;
+ cp += 2+asn1len;
set_uint32(cp, htonl((uint32_t)desc->timestamp));
cp += 4;
+ if (version == 1) {
+ set_uint16(cp, htons(desc->protocols));
+ cp += 2;
+ }
set_uint16(cp, htons((uint16_t)desc->n_intro_points));
cp += 2;
- for (i=0; i < desc->n_intro_points; ++i) {
- ipoint = (char*)desc->intro_points[i];
- strlcpy(cp, ipoint, *len_out-(cp-*str_out));
- cp += strlen(ipoint)+1;
+ if (version == 0) {
+ tor_assert(desc->intro_points);
+ for (i=0; i < desc->n_intro_points; ++i) {
+ char *ipoint = (char*)desc->intro_points[i];
+ strlcpy(cp, ipoint, *len_out-(cp-*str_out));
+ cp += strlen(ipoint)+1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ tor_assert(desc->intro_point_extend_info);
+ for (i=0; i < desc->n_intro_points; ++i) {
+ extend_info_t *info = desc->intro_point_extend_info[i];
+ int klen;
+ set_uint32(cp, htonl(info->addr));
+ set_uint16(cp+4, htons(info->port));
+ memcpy(cp+6, info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ klen = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(info->onion_key, cp+6+DIGEST_LEN+2,
+ (end-(cp+6+DIGEST_LEN+2)));
+ set_uint16(cp+6+DIGEST_LEN, htons((uint16_t)klen));
+ cp += 6+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen;
+ }
}
i = crypto_pk_private_sign_digest(key, cp, *str_out, cp-*str_out);
if (i<0) {
@@ -77,7 +98,7 @@
return -1;
}
cp += i;
- tor_assert(*len_out == (size_t)(cp-*str_out));
+ *len_out = (size_t)(cp-*str_out);
return 0;
}
@@ -92,10 +113,18 @@
int i;
size_t keylen, asn1len;
const char *end, *cp, *eos;
+ int version = 0;
result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t));
cp = str;
end = str+len;
+ if (end-cp<2) goto truncated;
+ if (*(uint8_t*)cp == 0xff) {
+ result->version = version = *(uint8_t*)(cp+1);
+ cp += 2;
+ } else {
+ result->version = version = 0;
+ }
if (end-cp < 2) goto truncated;
asn1len = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
cp += 2;
@@ -106,16 +135,51 @@
if (end-cp < 4) goto truncated;
result->timestamp = (time_t) ntohl(get_uint32(cp));
cp += 4;
+ if (version == 1) {
+ if (end-cp < 2) goto truncated;
+ result->protocols = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
+ cp += 2;
+ } else {
+ result->protocols = 1;
+ }
if (end-cp < 2) goto truncated;
result->n_intro_points = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
- result->intro_points = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(char*)*result->n_intro_points);
+
cp += 2;
- for (i=0;i<result->n_intro_points;++i) {
- if (end-cp < 2) goto truncated;
- eos = (const char *)memchr(cp,'\0',end-cp);
- if (!eos) goto truncated;
- result->intro_points[i] = tor_strdup(cp);
- cp = eos+1;
+ if (version == 0) {
+ result->intro_points = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(char*)*result->n_intro_points);
+ for (i=0;i<result->n_intro_points;++i) {
+ if (end-cp < 2) goto truncated;
+ eos = (const char *)memchr(cp,'\0',end-cp);
+ if (!eos) goto truncated;
+ result->intro_points[i] = tor_strdup(cp);
+ cp = eos+1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ result->intro_point_extend_info =
+ tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t*)*result->n_intro_points);
+ result->intro_points = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(char*)*result->n_intro_points);
+ for (i=0;i<result->n_intro_points;++i) {
+ extend_info_t *info = result->intro_point_extend_info[i] =
+ tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
+ int klen;
+ if (end-cp < 8+DIGEST_LEN) goto truncated;
+ info->addr = ntohl(get_uint32(cp));
+ info->port = ntohs(get_uint16(cp+4));
+ memcpy(info->identity_digest, cp+6, DIGEST_LEN);
+ info->nickname[0] = '$';
+ base16_encode(info->nickname+1, sizeof(info->nickname)-1,
+ info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ result->intro_points[i] = tor_strdup(info->nickname);
+ klen = ntohs(get_uint16(cp+6+DIGEST_LEN));
+ cp += 8+DIGEST_LEN;
+ if (end-cp < klen) goto truncated;
+ if (!(info->onion_key = crypto_pk_asn1_decode(cp,klen))) {
+ log_fn(LOG_WARN, "error decoding onion key for intro point");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ cp += klen;
+ }
}
keylen = crypto_pk_keysize(result->pk);
tor_assert(end-cp >= 0);
@@ -227,16 +291,28 @@
return 1;
}
-/** If we have a cached rend_cache_entry_t for the service ID <b>query</b>, set
- * *<b>e</b> to that entry and return 1. Else return 0.
+/** If we have a cached rend_cache_entry_t for the service ID <b>query</b>,
+ * set *<b>e</b> to that entry and return 1. Else return 0. If
+ * <b>version</b> is nonnegative, only return an entry in that descriptor
+ * format version. Otherwise (if <b>version</b> is negative), return the most
+ * recent format we have.
*/
int
-rend_cache_lookup_entry(const char *query, rend_cache_entry_t **e)
+rend_cache_lookup_entry(const char *query, int version, rend_cache_entry_t **e)
{
+ char key[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+2];
tor_assert(rend_cache);
if (!rend_valid_service_id(query))
return -1;
- *e = strmap_get_lc(rend_cache, query);
+ *e = NULL;
+ if (version != 0) {
+ tor_snprintf(key, sizeof(key), "1%s", query);
+ *e = strmap_get_lc(rend_cache, key);
+ }
+ if (!*e && version != 1) {
+ tor_snprintf(key, sizeof(key), "0%s", query);
+ *e = strmap_get_lc(rend_cache, key);
+ }
if (!*e)
return 0;
return 1;
@@ -251,11 +327,11 @@
* *desc.
*/
int
-rend_cache_lookup_desc(const char *query, const char **desc, size_t *desc_len)
+rend_cache_lookup_desc(const char *query, int version, const char **desc, size_t *desc_len)
{
rend_cache_entry_t *e;
int r;
- r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(query,&e);
+ r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(query,version,&e);
if (r <= 0) return r;
*desc = e->desc;
*desc_len = e->len;
@@ -275,6 +351,7 @@
rend_cache_entry_t *e;
rend_service_descriptor_t *parsed;
char query[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1];
+ char key[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+2];
time_t now;
tor_assert(rend_cache);
@@ -288,6 +365,7 @@
rend_service_descriptor_free(parsed);
return -1;
}
+ tor_snprintf(key, sizeof(key), "%c%s", parsed->version?'1':'0', query);
now = time(NULL);
if (parsed->timestamp < now-REND_CACHE_MAX_AGE-REND_CACHE_MAX_SKEW) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Service descriptor %s is too old", safe_str(query));
@@ -300,9 +378,9 @@
rend_service_descriptor_free(parsed);
return -1;
}
- e = (rend_cache_entry_t*) strmap_get_lc(rend_cache, query);
+ e = (rend_cache_entry_t*) strmap_get_lc(rend_cache, key);
if (e && e->parsed->timestamp > parsed->timestamp) {
- log_fn(LOG_INFO,"We already have a newer service descriptor %s with the same ID", safe_str(query));
+ log_fn(LOG_INFO,"We already have a newer service descriptor %s with the same ID and version", safe_str(query));
rend_service_descriptor_free(parsed);
return 0;
}
@@ -314,7 +392,7 @@
}
if (!e) {
e = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_cache_entry_t));
- strmap_set_lc(rend_cache, query, e);
+ strmap_set_lc(rend_cache, key, e);
} else {
rend_service_descriptor_free(e->parsed);
tor_free(e->desc);
Index: rendservice.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/rendservice.c,v
retrieving revision 1.126
retrieving revision 1.127
diff -u -d -r1.126 -r1.127
--- rendservice.c 11 Jun 2005 18:52:11 -0000 1.126
+++ rendservice.c 29 Jun 2005 21:46:55 -0000 1.127
@@ -272,9 +272,12 @@
d = service->desc = tor_malloc(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t));
d->pk = crypto_pk_dup_key(service->private_key);
d->timestamp = time(NULL);
+ d->version = 1;
n = smartlist_len(service->intro_nodes);
d->n_intro_points = 0;
- d->intro_points = tor_malloc(sizeof(char*)*n);
+ d->intro_points = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(char*)*n);
+ d->intro_point_extend_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t*)*n);
+ d->protocols = (1<<2) | (1<<0); /* We support protocol 2 and protocol 0. */
for (i=0; i < n; ++i) {
router = router_get_by_nickname(smartlist_get(service->intro_nodes, i));
if (!router) {
@@ -285,7 +288,10 @@
circ = find_intro_circuit(router, service->pk_digest);
if (circ && circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
/* We have an entirely established intro circuit. */
- d->intro_points[d->n_intro_points++] = tor_strdup(router->nickname);
+ d->intro_points[d->n_intro_points] = tor_strdup(router->nickname);
+ d->intro_point_extend_info[d->n_intro_points] =
+ extend_info_from_router(router);
+ d->n_intro_points++;
}
}
}
@@ -379,7 +385,8 @@
int
rend_service_introduce(circuit_t *circuit, const char *request, size_t request_len)
{
- char *ptr, *rp_nickname, *r_cookie;
+ char *ptr, *r_cookie;
+ extend_info_t *extend_info = NULL;
char buf[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN]; /* Holds KH, Df, Db, Kf, Kb */
rend_service_t *service;
@@ -390,8 +397,6 @@
crypt_path_t *cpath = NULL;
char serviceid[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1];
char hexcookie[9];
- int version;
- size_t nickname_field_len;
int circ_needs_uptime;
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1,
@@ -441,34 +446,73 @@
return -1;
}
len = r;
- if (*buf == 1) {
- rp_nickname = buf+1;
- nickname_field_len = MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1;
- version = 1;
+ if (*buf == 2) {
+ /* Version 2 INTRODUCE2 cell. */
+ int klen;
+ extend_info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
+ extend_info->addr = ntohl(get_uint32(buf+1));
+ extend_info->port = ntohs(get_uint16(buf+5));
+ memcpy(extend_info->identity_digest, buf+7, DIGEST_LEN);
+ extend_info->nickname[0] = '$';
+ base16_encode(extend_info->nickname+1, sizeof(extend_info->nickname)-1,
+ extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ klen = ntohs(get_uint16(buf+7+DIGEST_LEN));
+ if (len != 7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen+20+128) {
+ log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Bad length %u for version 2 INTRODUCE2 cell.", (int)len);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ extend_info->onion_key = crypto_pk_asn1_decode(buf+7+DIGEST_LEN+2, klen);
+ if (!extend_info->onion_key) {
+ log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Error decoding onion key in version 2 INTRODUCE2 cell.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ptr = buf+7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen;
+ len -= 7+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen;
} else {
- nickname_field_len = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1;
- rp_nickname = buf;
- version = 0;
- }
- /* XXX when 0.0.9.x is obsolete, change this to reject version != 1. */
- ptr=memchr(rp_nickname,0,nickname_field_len);
- if (!ptr || ptr == rp_nickname) {
- log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't find a null-padded nickname in INTRODUCE2 cell");
- return -1;
- }
- if ((version == 0 && !is_legal_nickname(rp_nickname)) ||
- (version == 1 && !is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(rp_nickname))) {
- log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Bad nickname in INTRODUCE2 cell.");
- return -1;
+ char *rp_nickname;
+ size_t nickname_field_len;
+ routerinfo_t *router;
+ int version;
+ if (*buf == 1) {
+ rp_nickname = buf+1;
+ nickname_field_len = MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1;
+ version = 1;
+ } else {
+ nickname_field_len = MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1;
+ rp_nickname = buf;
+ version = 0;
+ }
+ /* XXX when 0.1.0.x is obsolete, change this to reject version != 2. */
+ ptr=memchr(rp_nickname,0,nickname_field_len);
+ if (!ptr || ptr == rp_nickname) {
+ log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't find a null-padded nickname in INTRODUCE2 cell");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((version == 0 && !is_legal_nickname(rp_nickname)) ||
+ (version == 1 && !is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(rp_nickname))) {
+ log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Bad nickname in INTRODUCE2 cell.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Okay, now we know that a nickname is at the start of the buffer. */
+ ptr = rp_nickname+nickname_field_len;
+ len -= nickname_field_len;
+ len -= rp_nickname - buf; /* also remove header space used by version, if any */
+ router = router_get_by_nickname(rp_nickname);
+ if (!router) {
+ log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't found router '%s' named in rendezvous cell.",
+ rp_nickname);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ extend_info = extend_info_from_router(router);
}
- /* Okay, now we know that a nickname is at the start of the buffer. */
- ptr = rp_nickname+nickname_field_len;
- len -= nickname_field_len;
- len -= rp_nickname - buf; /* also remove header space used by version, if any */
+
if (len != REND_COOKIE_LEN+DH_KEY_LEN) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Bad length %u for INTRODUCE2 cell.", (int)len);
return -1;
}
+
r_cookie = ptr;
base16_encode(hexcookie,9,r_cookie,4);
@@ -492,19 +536,20 @@
/* Launch a circuit to alice's chosen rendezvous point.
*/
for (i=0;i<MAX_REND_FAILURES;i++) {
- launched = circuit_launch_by_nickname(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND, rp_nickname,
- circ_needs_uptime, 1, 1);
+ launched = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(
+ CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND, extend_info, circ_needs_uptime, 1, 1);
+
if (launched)
break;
}
if (!launched) { /* give up */
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Giving up launching first hop of circuit to rendezvous point '%s' for service %s",
- rp_nickname, serviceid);
+ extend_info->nickname, serviceid);
goto err;
}
log_fn(LOG_INFO,
"Accepted intro; launching circuit to '%s' (cookie %s) for service %s",
- rp_nickname, hexcookie, serviceid);
+ extend_info->nickname, hexcookie, serviceid);
tor_assert(launched->build_state);
/* Fill in the circuit's state. */
memcpy(launched->rend_pk_digest, circuit->rend_pk_digest,
@@ -522,11 +567,13 @@
if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(cpath,keys+DIGEST_LEN,1)<0)
goto err;
memcpy(cpath->handshake_digest, keys, DIGEST_LEN);
+ if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info);
return 0;
err:
if (dh) crypto_dh_free(dh);
if (launched) circuit_mark_for_close(launched);
+ if (extend_info) extend_info_free(extend_info);
return -1;
}
@@ -545,7 +592,7 @@
oldcirc->build_state->failure_count > MAX_REND_FAILURES ||
oldcirc->build_state->expiry_time < time(NULL)) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Attempt to build circuit to %s for rendezvous has failed too many times or expired; giving up.",
- oldcirc->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
+ oldcirc->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname);
return;
}
@@ -558,13 +605,13 @@
}
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Reattempting rendezvous circuit to %s",
- oldstate->chosen_exit_name);
+ oldstate->chosen_exit->nickname);
- newcirc = circuit_launch_by_nickname(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND,
- oldstate->chosen_exit_name, 0, 1, 1);
+ newcirc = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND,
+ oldstate->chosen_exit, 0, 1, 1);
if (!newcirc) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Couldn't relaunch rendezvous circuit to %s",
- oldstate->chosen_exit_name);
+ oldstate->chosen_exit->nickname);
return;
}
newstate = newcirc->build_state;
@@ -783,8 +830,8 @@
while ((circ = circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(circ,pk_digest,
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO))) {
tor_assert(circ->cpath);
- if (circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name &&
- !strcasecmp(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name, router->nickname)) {
+ if (circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname &&
+ !strcasecmp(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname, router->nickname)) {
return circ;
}
}
@@ -793,8 +840,8 @@
while ((circ = circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(circ,pk_digest,
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO))) {
tor_assert(circ->cpath);
- if (circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name &&
- !strcasecmp(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name, router->nickname)) {
+ if (circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname &&
+ !strcasecmp(circ->build_state->chosen_exit->nickname, router->nickname)) {
return circ;
}
}
@@ -805,7 +852,7 @@
* and upload it to all the dirservers.
*/
static void
-upload_service_descriptor(rend_service_t *service)
+upload_service_descriptor(rend_service_t *service, int version)
{
char *desc;
size_t desc_len;
@@ -813,6 +860,7 @@
/* Update the descriptor. */
rend_service_update_descriptor(service);
if (rend_encode_service_descriptor(service->desc,
+ version,
service->private_key,
&desc, &desc_len)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't encode service descriptor; not uploading");
@@ -963,7 +1011,10 @@
/* if it's time, or if the directory servers have a wrong service
* descriptor and ours has been stable for 5 seconds, upload a
* new one. */
- upload_service_descriptor(service);
+ upload_service_descriptor(service, 0);
+ /* XXXX011 NM Once directories understand versioned descriptors, enable
+ * this. */
+ // upload_service_descriptor(service, 1);
service->next_upload_time = now + rendpostperiod;
}
}
Index: test.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/tor/src/or/test.c,v
retrieving revision 1.183
retrieving revision 1.184
diff -u -d -r1.183 -r1.184
--- test.c 27 Jun 2005 22:25:09 -0000 1.183
+++ test.c 29 Jun 2005 21:46:55 -0000 1.184
@@ -1400,30 +1400,89 @@
rend_service_descriptor_t *d1, *d2;
char *encoded;
size_t len;
- crypto_pk_env_t *pk1;
+ crypto_pk_env_t *pk1, *pk2;
time_t now;
pk1 = crypto_new_pk_env();
-
+ pk2 = crypto_new_pk_env();
test_assert(!crypto_pk_generate_key(pk1));
+ test_assert(!crypto_pk_generate_key(pk2));
+
+ /* Test unversioned descriptor */
d1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t));
- d1->pk = pk1;
+ d1->pk = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk1);
now = time(NULL);
d1->timestamp = now;
d1->n_intro_points = 3;
+ d1->version = 0;
d1->intro_points = tor_malloc(sizeof(char*)*3);
d1->intro_points[0] = tor_strdup("tom");
d1->intro_points[1] = tor_strdup("crow");
d1->intro_points[2] = tor_strdup("joel");
- test_assert(! rend_encode_service_descriptor(d1, pk1, &encoded, &len));
+ test_assert(! rend_encode_service_descriptor(d1, 0, pk1, &encoded, &len));
d2 = rend_parse_service_descriptor(encoded, len);
test_assert(d2);
test_assert(!crypto_pk_cmp_keys(d1->pk, d2->pk));
test_eq(d2->timestamp, now);
+ test_eq(d2->version, 0);
+ test_eq(d2->protocols, 1);
test_eq(d2->n_intro_points, 3);
test_streq(d2->intro_points[0], "tom");
test_streq(d2->intro_points[1], "crow");
test_streq(d2->intro_points[2], "joel");
+ test_eq(NULL, d2->intro_point_extend_info);
+
+ rend_service_descriptor_free(d1);
+ rend_service_descriptor_free(d2);
+ tor_free(encoded);
+
+ /* Test versioned descriptor. */
+ d1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t));
+ d1->pk = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk1);
+ now = time(NULL);
+ d1->timestamp = now;
+ d1->n_intro_points = 2;
+ d1->version = 1;
+ d1->protocols = 60;
+ d1->intro_points = tor_malloc(sizeof(char*)*2);
+ d1->intro_point_extend_info = tor_malloc(sizeof(extend_info_t*)*2);
+ d1->intro_points[0] = tor_strdup("tom");
+ d1->intro_points[1] = tor_strdup("crow");
+ d1->intro_point_extend_info[0] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
+ strcpy(d1->intro_point_extend_info[0]->nickname, "tom");
+ d1->intro_point_extend_info[0]->addr = 1234;
+ d1->intro_point_extend_info[0]->port = 4567;
+ d1->intro_point_extend_info[0]->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk1);
+ memset(d1->intro_point_extend_info[0]->identity_digest, 'a', DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ d1->intro_point_extend_info[1] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
+ strcpy(d1->intro_point_extend_info[1]->nickname, "crow");
+ d1->intro_point_extend_info[1]->addr = 6060842;
+ d1->intro_point_extend_info[1]->port = 8000;
+ d1->intro_point_extend_info[1]->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk2);
+ memset(d1->intro_point_extend_info[1]->identity_digest, 'b', DIGEST_LEN);
+
+ test_assert(! rend_encode_service_descriptor(d1, 1, pk1, &encoded, &len));
+ d2 = rend_parse_service_descriptor(encoded, len);
+ test_assert(d2);
+
+ test_assert(!crypto_pk_cmp_keys(d1->pk, d2->pk));
+ test_eq(d2->timestamp, now);
+ test_eq(d2->version, 1);
+ test_eq(d2->protocols, 60);
+ test_eq(d2->n_intro_points, 2);
+ test_streq(d2->intro_points[0], d2->intro_point_extend_info[0]->nickname);
+ test_streq(d2->intro_points[1], d2->intro_point_extend_info[1]->nickname);
+ test_eq(d2->intro_point_extend_info[0]->addr, 1234);
+ test_eq(d2->intro_point_extend_info[0]->port, 4567);
+ test_assert(!crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk1,d2->intro_point_extend_info[0]->onion_key));
+ test_memeq(d2->intro_point_extend_info[0]->identity_digest,
+ d1->intro_point_extend_info[0]->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ test_eq(d2->intro_point_extend_info[1]->addr, 6060842);
+ test_eq(d2->intro_point_extend_info[1]->port, 8000);
+
+ test_memeq(d2->intro_point_extend_info[1]->identity_digest,
+ d1->intro_point_extend_info[1]->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
test_eq(BAD_HOSTNAME, parse_extended_hostname(address1));
test_eq(ONION_HOSTNAME, parse_extended_hostname(address2));
@@ -1432,6 +1491,8 @@
rend_service_descriptor_free(d1);
rend_service_descriptor_free(d2);
+ crypto_free_pk_env(pk1);
+ crypto_free_pk_env(pk2);
}
int