[tor-commits] [tech-reports/master] Reply to dgoulet's comments.

[karsten@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

commit 4baae27cec328db369acdfb0180a6943ba9dbf95
Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing@xxxxxxx>
Date:   Sat Nov 29 09:38:06 2014 +0100

    Reply to dgoulet's comments.
---
 2015/hidden-service-stats/hidden-service-stats.tex |   14 +++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/2015/hidden-service-stats/hidden-service-stats.tex b/2015/hidden-service-stats/hidden-service-stats.tex
index ef8f46c..75ce789 100644
--- a/2015/hidden-service-stats/hidden-service-stats.tex
+++ b/2015/hidden-service-stats/hidden-service-stats.tex
@@ -150,7 +150,11 @@ the introduction point.
 % it is that there is probably a noticable time difference between using
 % an already created circuit for which we simply extend one hop versus
 % establishing a new one of 4 hops.
-
+% [karsten]: That's right, but we have no data from the client, but only
+% from the relay that happens to be the last hop in the circuit.  That
+% relay only sees that the circuit gets extended to it, but it has no
+% information how long the client had the circuit lying around before
+% extending it.
 
 % Newly established circuit.
 % Benefits: Performance reason, this can be useful to know the real cost
@@ -497,8 +501,12 @@ There is no obvious risk related to this statistic.
 % and report a tiny number of actual user cells?  but I added an item to
 % the section start where we can discuss whether this is a good safeguard
 % in general.
-% Right well that's a time statistic and not an amount so if an attacker
-% would establish 100 RP I guess he/she indeed poisoning the stat?...
+% [dgoulet]: Right well that's a time statistic and not an amount so if an
+% attacker would establish 100 RP I guess he/she indeed poisoning the
+% stat?...
+% [karsten]: Maybe.  In theory, the stat is not poisoned for the attacker
+% if she knows what values she's contributed to it.  But I agree that this
+% is not the best example.
 
 \subparagraph{Recommendation}
 



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