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[tor-commits] r24503: {website} Update mailing list archive links (in website/trunk: docs/en eff/en getinvolved/en)

Author: rransom
Date: 2011-03-29 21:17:33 +0000 (Tue, 29 Mar 2011)
New Revision: 24503

Modified:
   website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml
   website/trunk/eff/en/tor-legal-faq.wml
   website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml
Log:
Update mailing list archive links

Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml	2011-03-29 21:17:16 UTC (rev 24502)
+++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml	2011-03-29 21:17:33 UTC (rev 24503)
@@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@
     <li>If you're running a fast relay, meaning you have many TLS connections
     open, you are probably losing a lot of memory to OpenSSL's internal
     buffers (38KB+ per socket). We've patched OpenSSL to <a
-    href="http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Jun-2008/msg00001.html";>release
+    href="https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2008-June/001519.html";>release
     unused buffer memory more aggressively</a>. If you update to OpenSSL
     1.0.0-beta5, Tor's build process will automatically recognize and use
     this feature.</li>

Modified: website/trunk/eff/en/tor-legal-faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/eff/en/tor-legal-faq.wml	2011-03-29 21:17:16 UTC (rev 24502)
+++ website/trunk/eff/en/tor-legal-faq.wml	2011-03-29 21:17:33 UTC (rev 24503)
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@
 and help set a clear legal precedent establishing that merely running
 a node does not create copyright liability for either node operators
 or their bandwidth providers. If you want to be the EFF's test case,
-<a href="http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/Oct-2005/msg00208.html";>read
+<a href="https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2005-October/016301.html";>read
 more here</a>.</p>
 
 <a id="ExitSnooping"></a>

Modified: website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml	2011-03-29 21:17:16 UTC (rev 24502)
+++ website/trunk/getinvolved/en/volunteer.wml	2011-03-29 21:17:33 UTC (rev 24503)
@@ -724,8 +724,8 @@
     addresses and algorithms for gathering and blocking them. See <a
     href="<blog>bridge-distribution-strategies">our
     blog post on the topic</a> as an overview, and then look at <a
-    href="http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/Dec-2009/msg00000.html";>Roger's
-    or-dev post</a> from December for more recent thoughts &mdash; lots of
+    href="https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2009-December/000666.html";>Roger's
+    or-dev post</a> from December 2009 for more recent thoughts &mdash; lots of
     design work remains.</p>
     <p>If you want to get more into the guts of Tor itself (C), a more minor problem
     we should address is that current Tors can only listen on a single

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