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[tor-commits] r26091: {website} TBB design doc: Make section anchors more uniform. (website/trunk/projects/torbrowser/design)

Author: mikeperry
Date: 2013-03-08 09:58:38 +0000 (Fri, 08 Mar 2013)
New Revision: 26091

Modified:
   website/trunk/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en
Log:
TBB design doc: Make section anchors more uniform.



Modified: website/trunk/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en	2013-03-08 08:55:13 UTC (rev 26090)
+++ website/trunk/projects/torbrowser/design/index.html.en	2013-03-08 09:58:38 UTC (rev 26091)
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
 <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-transitional.dtd";>
-<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml";><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.76.1" /></head><body><div class="article" title="The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a id="design"></a>The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</h2></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Mike</span> <span class="surname">Perry</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email">&lt;<a class="email" href="mailto:mikeperry#torproject org">mikeperry#torprojectÂorg</a>&gt;</code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Erinn</span> <span class="surname">Clark</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class=
 "email">&lt;<a class="email" href="mailto:erinn#torproject org">erinn#torprojectÂorg</a>&gt;</code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Steven</span> <span class="surname">Murdoch</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email">&lt;<a class="email" href="mailto:sjmurdoch#torproject org">sjmurdoch#torprojectÂorg</a>&gt;</code></p></div></div></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">March 8 2013</p></div></div><hr /></div><div class="toc"><p><strong>Table of Contents</strong></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#idp2245200">1. Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#components">1.1. Browser Component Overview</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#DesignRequirements">2. Design Requirements and Philosophy</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#security">2.1. Security Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
  href="#privacy">2.2. Privacy Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#philosophy">2.3. Philosophy</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#adversary">3. Adversary Model</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversarygoals">3.1. Adversary Goals</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversarypositioning">3.2. Adversary Capabilities - Positioning</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#attacks">3.3. Adversary Capabilities - Attacks</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#Implementation">4. Implementation</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#proxy-obedience">4.1. Proxy Obedience</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#state-separation">4.2. State Separation</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#disk-avoidance">4.3. Disk Avoidance</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#app-data-isolation">4.4. Application Data Isolation</a></span></dt
 ><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#identifier-linkability">4.5. Cross-Origin Identifier Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#fingerprinting-linkability">4.6. Cross-Origin Fingerprinting Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#new-identity">4.7. Long-Term Unlinkability via "New Identity" button</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#OtherSecurity">4.8. Other Security Measures</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#firefox-patches">4.9. Description of Firefox Patches</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="appendix"><a href="#Transparency">A. Towards Transparency in Navigation Tracking</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#deprecate">A.1. Deprecation Wishlist</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#idp5795728">A.2. Promising Standards</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="sect1" title="1.ÂIntroduction"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: bo
 th"><a id="idp2245200"></a>1.ÂIntroduction</h2></div></div></div><p>
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml";><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8" /><title>The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</title><meta name="generator" content="DocBook XSL Stylesheets V1.76.1" /></head><body><div class="article" title="The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title"><a id="design"></a>The Design and Implementation of the Tor Browser [DRAFT]</h2></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Mike</span> <span class="surname">Perry</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email">&lt;<a class="email" href="mailto:mikeperry#torproject org">mikeperry#torprojectÂorg</a>&gt;</code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Erinn</span> <span class="surname">Clark</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class=
 "email">&lt;<a class="email" href="mailto:erinn#torproject org">erinn#torprojectÂorg</a>&gt;</code></p></div></div></div></div><div><div class="author"><h3 class="author"><span class="firstname">Steven</span> <span class="surname">Murdoch</span></h3><div class="affiliation"><div class="address"><p><code class="email">&lt;<a class="email" href="mailto:sjmurdoch#torproject org">sjmurdoch#torprojectÂorg</a>&gt;</code></p></div></div></div></div><div><p class="pubdate">March 8 2013</p></div></div><hr /></div><div class="toc"><p><strong>Table of Contents</strong></p><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#idp4695088">1. Introduction</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#components">1.1. Browser Component Overview</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#DesignRequirements">2. Design Requirements and Philosophy</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#security">2.1. Security Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a
  href="#privacy">2.2. Privacy Requirements</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#philosophy">2.3. Philosophy</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#adversary">3. Adversary Model</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversary-goals">3.1. Adversary Goals</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#adversary-positioning">3.2. Adversary Capabilities - Positioning</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#attacks">3.3. Adversary Capabilities - Attacks</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#Implementation">4. Implementation</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#proxy-obedience">4.1. Proxy Obedience</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#state-separation">4.2. State Separation</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#disk-avoidance">4.3. Disk Avoidance</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#app-data-isolation">4.4. Application Data Isolation</a></span></
 dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#identifier-linkability">4.5. Cross-Origin Identifier Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#fingerprinting-linkability">4.6. Cross-Origin Fingerprinting Unlinkability</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#new-identity">4.7. Long-Term Unlinkability via "New Identity" button</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#other-security">4.8. Other Security Measures</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect2"><a href="#firefox-patches">4.9. Description of Firefox Patches</a></span></dt></dl></dd><dt><span class="appendix"><a href="#Transparency">A. Towards Transparency in Navigation Tracking</a></span></dt><dd><dl><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#deprecate">A.1. Deprecation Wishlist</a></span></dt><dt><span class="sect1"><a href="#idp5836112">A.2. Promising Standards</a></span></dt></dl></dd></dl></div><div class="sect1" title="1.ÂIntroduction"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear:
  both"><a id="idp4695088"></a>1.ÂIntroduction</h2></div></div></div><p>
 
 This document describes the <a class="link" href="#adversary" title="3.ÂAdversary Model">adversary model</a>,
 <a class="link" href="#DesignRequirements" title="2.ÂDesign Requirements and Philosophy">design requirements</a>, and <a class="link" href="#Implementation" title="4.ÂImplementation">implementation</a>  of the Tor Browser. It is current as of Tor Browser 2.3.25-4
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@
 types that can be used to illustrate the design requirements for the
 Tor Browser. Let's start with the goals.
 
-   </p><div class="sect2" title="3.1.ÂAdversary Goals"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="adversarygoals"></a>3.1.ÂAdversary Goals</h3></div></div></div><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><span class="command"><strong>Bypassing proxy settings</strong></span><p>The adversary's primary goal is direct compromise and bypass of 
+   </p><div class="sect2" title="3.1.ÂAdversary Goals"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="adversary-goals"></a>3.1.ÂAdversary Goals</h3></div></div></div><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><span class="command"><strong>Bypassing proxy settings</strong></span><p>The adversary's primary goal is direct compromise and bypass of 
 Tor, causing the user to directly connect to an IP of the adversary's
 choosing.</p></li><li class="listitem"><span class="command"><strong>Correlation of Tor vs Non-Tor Activity</strong></span><p>If direct proxy bypass is not possible, the adversary will likely
 happily settle for the ability to correlate something a user did via Tor with
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@
 seizing the computers of all Tor users in an area (especially after narrowing
 the field by the above two pieces of information). History records and cache
 data are the primary goals here.
-     </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect2" title="3.2.ÂAdversary Capabilities - Positioning"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="adversarypositioning"></a>3.2.ÂAdversary Capabilities - Positioning</h3></div></div></div><p>
+     </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect2" title="3.2.ÂAdversary Capabilities - Positioning"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="adversary-positioning"></a>3.2.ÂAdversary Capabilities - Positioning</h3></div></div></div><p>
 The adversary can position themselves at a number of different locations in
 order to execute their attacks.
     </p><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><span class="command"><strong>Exit Node or Upstream Router</strong></span><p>
@@ -606,13 +606,13 @@
 Tor Browser State is separated from existing browser state through use of a
 custom Firefox profile. Furthermore, plugins are disabled, which prevents
 Flash cookies from leaking from a pre-existing Flash directory.
-   </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.3.ÂDisk Avoidance"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="disk-avoidance"></a>4.3.ÂDisk Avoidance</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5537536"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
+   </p></div><div class="sect2" title="4.3.ÂDisk Avoidance"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="disk-avoidance"></a>4.3.ÂDisk Avoidance</h3></div></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5577776"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
 
 The User Agent MUST (at user option) prevent all disk records of browser activity.
 The user should be able to optionally enable URL history and other history
 features if they so desire. 
 
-    </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5538896"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
+    </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5579136"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
 
 We achieve this goal through several mechanisms. First, we set the Firefox
 Private Browsing preference
@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@
 context-menu option to drill down into specific types of state or permissions.
 An example of this simplification can be seen in Figure 1.
 
-   </p><div class="figure"><a id="idp5562896"></a><p class="title"><strong>FigureÂ1.ÂImproving the Privacy UI</strong></p><div class="figure-contents"><div class="mediaobject" align="center"><img src="NewCookieManager.png" align="middle" alt="Improving the Privacy UI" /></div><div class="caption"><p></p>
+   </p><div class="figure"><a id="idp5603216"></a><p class="title"><strong>FigureÂ1.ÂImproving the Privacy UI</strong></p><div class="figure-contents"><div class="mediaobject" align="center"><img src="NewCookieManager.png" align="middle" alt="Improving the Privacy UI" /></div><div class="caption"><p></p>
 
 This example UI is a mock-up of how isolating identifiers to the URL bar
 origin can simplify the privacy UI for all data - not just cookies. Once
@@ -1178,11 +1178,11 @@
 menu option in Torbutton. This context menu option is active if Torbutton can
 read the environment variables $TOR_CONTROL_PASSWD and $TOR_CONTROL_PORT.
 
-   </p><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5680880"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
+   </p><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5721200"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
 
 All linkable identifiers and browser state MUST be cleared by this feature.
 
-    </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5682128"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
+    </blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5722448"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 
 First, Torbutton disables Javascript in all open tabs and windows by using
 both the <a class="ulink" href="https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/XPCOM_Interface_Reference/nsIDocShell#Attributes"; target="_top">browser.docShell.allowJavascript</a>
@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@
      </p></blockquote></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote">
 If the user chose to "protect" any cookies by using the Torbutton Cookie
 Protections UI, those cookies are not cleared as part of the above.
-    </blockquote></div></div></div><div class="sect2" title="4.8.ÂOther Security Measures"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="OtherSecurity"></a>4.8.ÂOther Security Measures</h3></div></div></div><p>
+    </blockquote></div></div></div><div class="sect2" title="4.8.ÂOther Security Measures"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h3 class="title"><a id="other-security"></a>4.8.ÂOther Security Measures</h3></div></div></div><p>
 
 In addition to the above mechanisms that are devoted to preserving privacy
 while browsing, we also have a number of technical mechanisms to address other
@@ -1223,7 +1223,7 @@
 Fingerprinting</a> is a statistical attack to attempt to recognize specific
 encrypted website activity.
 
-     </p><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5694768"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
+     </p><div class="sect3" title="Design Goal:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5734960"></a>Design Goal:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 
 We want to deploy a mechanism that reduces the accuracy of features available
 for classification. This mechanism would either impact the true and false
@@ -1244,7 +1244,7 @@
 defenses</a> such that they only use existing spare Guard bandwidth capacity in the Tor
 network.
 
-     </p></blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5700896"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
+     </p></blockquote></div></div><div class="sect3" title="Implementation Status:"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h4 class="title"><a id="idp5741184"></a>Implementation Status:</h4></div></div></div><div class="blockquote"><blockquote class="blockquote"><p>
 Currently, we patch Firefox to <a class="ulink" href="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-patches/firefox/0017-Randomize-HTTP-request-order-and-pipeline-depth.patch"; target="_top">randomize
 pipeline order and depth</a>. Unfortunately, pipelining is very fragile.
 Many sites do not support it, and even sites that advertise support for
@@ -1575,7 +1575,7 @@
 ourselves</a>, as they are comparatively rare and can be handled with site
 permissions.
 
-   </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect1" title="A.2.ÂPromising Standards"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="idp5795728"></a>A.2.ÂPromising Standards</h2></div></div></div><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="http://web-send.org"; target="_top">Web-Send Introducer</a><p>
+   </p></li></ol></div></div><div class="sect1" title="A.2.ÂPromising Standards"><div class="titlepage"><div><div><h2 class="title" style="clear: both"><a id="idp5836112"></a>A.2.ÂPromising Standards</h2></div></div></div><div class="orderedlist"><ol class="orderedlist" type="1"><li class="listitem"><a class="ulink" href="http://web-send.org"; target="_top">Web-Send Introducer</a><p>
 
 Web-Send is a browser-based link sharing and federated login widget that is
 designed to operate without relying on third-party tracking or abusing other

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