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[tor-commits] r26674: {website} make the faq work better on website mirrors too (website/trunk/docs/en)
Author: arma
Date: 2014-03-24 07:00:12 +0000 (Mon, 24 Mar 2014)
New Revision: 26674
Modified:
website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml
Log:
make the faq work better on website mirrors too
Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml
===================================================================
--- website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2014-03-24 06:57:32 UTC (rev 26673)
+++ website/trunk/docs/en/faq.wml 2014-03-24 07:00:12 UTC (rev 26674)
@@ -981,7 +981,7 @@
it sends. The Tor Browser Bundle tries to keep application-level data,
like the user-agent string, uniform for all users. The Tor Browser can't
do anything about text that you type into forms, though. <a
- href="https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html.en#warning";>Be
+ href="<page download/download-easy>#warning">Be
careful and be smart.</a>
</p>
@@ -1517,7 +1517,7 @@
You can set Proxy IP address, port, and authentication information in
Tor Browser's Network Settings. If you're using Tor another way, check
out the HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy config options in the <a
-href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html.en";>man page</a>,
+href="<page docs/tor-manual>">man page</a>,
and modify your torrc file accordingly. You will need an HTTP proxy for
doing GET requests to fetch the Tor directory, and you will need an
HTTPS proxy for doing CONNECT requests to get to Tor relays. (It's fine
@@ -1642,7 +1642,7 @@
<p>You can still verify your Tor Browser download by downloading the
signature file (.asc) along with your package and <a
- href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/verifying-signatures.html.en";>
+ href="<page docs/verifying-signatures>">
checking the GPG signature</a> as before. We now have an additional
verification method that allows you to verify the build as well as
the download.</p>
@@ -1658,7 +1658,7 @@
<pre>gpg --keyserver keys.mozilla.org --recv-keys 0x29846B3C683686CC</pre>
(This will bring you developer Mike Perry's public key. Other
developers' key IDs can be found on
- <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/signing-keys.html.en";>this
+ <a href="<page docs/signing-keys>">this
page</a>.)</li>
<li>Verify the sha256sums.txt file by executing this command:
<pre>gpg --verify <NAME OF THE SIGNATURE FILE>.asc sha256sums.txt</pre></li>
@@ -1794,7 +1794,7 @@
</pre>
<p>
If you've installed <a
- href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/obfsproxy-debian-instructions.html.en#instructions";>Obfsproxy</a>,
+ href="<page projects/obfsproxy-debian-instructions>#instructions">Obfsproxy</a>,
you'll need to add one more line:
</p>
<pre>
@@ -2845,7 +2845,7 @@
for most flaggings are documented on the <a
href="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/badRelays";>bad
relays wiki</a>. Please <a
- href="https://torproject.org/about/contact.html.en";>contact us</a> so
+ href="<page about/contact>">contact us</a> so
we can sort out the issue.</p>
<hr>
@@ -3400,7 +3400,7 @@
<p><a href="https://exonerator.torproject.org/";>
Exonerator</a> is a web service that can check if an IP address was a
relay at a given time. We can also <a
- href="https://torproject.org/about/contact.html.en";>provide a signed
+ href="<page about/contact>">provide a signed
letter</a> if needed.</p>
<hr>
@@ -3510,7 +3510,7 @@
hidden service?</a></h3>
<p>
- See the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en";>
+ See the <a href="<page docs/tor-hidden-service>">
official hidden service configuration instructions</a>.
</p>
@@ -3838,7 +3838,7 @@
</p>
<p>
That's where the <a
- href="https://torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en";>Tor Browser
+ href="<page projects/torbrowser>">Tor Browser
Bundle</a> comes in. We produce a web browser that is preconfigured to
help you control the risks to your privacy and anonymity while browsing
the Internet. Not only are the above technologies disabled to prevent
@@ -4123,7 +4123,7 @@
But since we want to do a lot of work on quality-of-service and better
queuing approaches first, you shouldn't expect this change anytime soon
(if ever). However if you are keen, there are a couple of
-<a href="https://www.torproject.org/getinvolved/volunteer.html.en#Research";>
+<a href="<page getinvolved/volunteer>#Research">
research ideas</a> that may involve changing the cell size.
</p>
@@ -4158,7 +4158,7 @@
</p>
<p>
We've made quite a bit of progress on this problem lately. You can read more
-details on the <a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/pluggable-transports.html.en";>
+details on the <a href="<page docs/pluggable-transports>">
pluggable transports page</a>. You may also be interested in
<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GwMr8Xl7JMQ";>Roger and Jake's talk at
28C3</a>, or <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZg1nqs793M";>Runa's
@@ -4224,10 +4224,10 @@
minutes, and often more frequently than that. This makes it extremely
dificult for websites to create any sort of persistent profile of Tor
users (assuming you did not <a
- href="https://torproject.org/download/download.html.en#warning";>identify
+ href="<page download/download>#warning">identify
yourself in other ways</a>). No one Tor relay can know enough
information to compromise any Tor user because of Tor's <a
- href="https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#thesolution";>encrypted
+ href="<page about/overview>#thesolution">encrypted
three-hop circuit</a> design.
</p>
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