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[tor-commits] [tor/master] Merge branch 'bug29017-033' into bug29017-master-merge
commit 361738c9649d20f0e759abed478253482836e294
Merge: 94f7e53d0 85c598cbc
Author: teor <teor@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Tue Feb 19 18:59:16 2019 +1000
Merge branch 'bug29017-033' into bug29017-master-merge
changes/bug29017 | 4 ++++
doc/tor.1.txt | 2 +-
src/feature/relay/router.c | 11 +++++------
3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --cc src/feature/relay/router.c
index e79681540,000000000..cdd032f78
mode 100644,000000..100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/router.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/router.c
@@@ -1,3222 -1,0 +1,3221 @@@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+#define ROUTER_PRIVATE
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "app/config/statefile.h"
+#include "app/main/main.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
+#include "core/mainloop/netstatus.h"
+#include "core/or/policies.h"
+#include "core/or/protover.h"
+#include "feature/client/transports.h"
+#include "feature/control/control.h"
+#include "feature/dirauth/process_descs.h"
+#include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h"
+#include "feature/dirclient/dirclient.h"
+#include "feature/dircommon/directory.h"
+#include "feature/dirparse/authcert_parse.h"
+#include "feature/dirparse/routerparse.h"
+#include "feature/dirparse/signing.h"
+#include "feature/hibernate/hibernate.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/authcert.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nickname.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodefamily.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
+#include "feature/relay/dns.h"
+#include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
+#include "feature/relay/routermode.h"
+#include "feature/relay/selftest.h"
+#include "lib/geoip/geoip.h"
+#include "feature/stats/geoip_stats.h"
+#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_init.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/encoding/confline.h"
+#include "lib/osinfo/uname.h"
+#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
+#include "lib/version/torversion.h"
+
+#include "feature/dirauth/authmode.h"
+
+#include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
+#include "core/or/port_cfg_st.h"
+#include "feature/dirclient/dir_server_st.h"
+#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/authority_cert_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/extrainfo_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h"
+
+/**
+ * \file router.c
+ * \brief Miscellaneous relay functionality, including RSA key maintenance,
+ * generating and uploading server descriptors, picking an address to
+ * advertise, and so on.
+ *
+ * This module handles the job of deciding whether we are a Tor relay, and if
+ * so what kind. (Mostly through functions like server_mode() that inspect an
+ * or_options_t, but in some cases based on our own capabilities, such as when
+ * we are deciding whether to be a directory cache in
+ * router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver().)
+ *
+ * Also in this module are the functions to generate our own routerinfo_t and
+ * extrainfo_t, and to encode those to signed strings for upload to the
+ * directory authorities.
+ *
+ * This module also handles key maintenance for RSA and Curve25519-ntor keys,
+ * and for our TLS context. (These functions should eventually move to
+ * routerkeys.c along with the code that handles Ed25519 keys now.)
+ **/
+
+/************************************************************/
+
+/*****
+ * Key management: ORs only.
+ *****/
+
+/** Private keys for this OR. There is also an SSL key managed by tortls.c.
+ */
+static tor_mutex_t *key_lock=NULL;
+static time_t onionkey_set_at=0; /**< When was onionkey last changed? */
+/** Current private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells. */
+static crypto_pk_t *onionkey=NULL;
+/** Previous private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells
+ * generated by clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */
+static crypto_pk_t *lastonionkey=NULL;
+/** Current private ntor secret key: used to perform the ntor handshake. */
+static curve25519_keypair_t curve25519_onion_key;
+/** Previous private ntor secret key: used to perform the ntor handshake
+ * with clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */
+static curve25519_keypair_t last_curve25519_onion_key;
+/** Private server "identity key": used to sign directory info and TLS
+ * certificates. Never changes. */
+static crypto_pk_t *server_identitykey=NULL;
+/** Digest of server_identitykey. */
+static char server_identitykey_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+/** Private client "identity key": used to sign bridges' and clients'
+ * outbound TLS certificates. Regenerated on startup and on IP address
+ * change. */
+static crypto_pk_t *client_identitykey=NULL;
+/** Signing key used for v3 directory material; only set for authorities. */
+static crypto_pk_t *authority_signing_key = NULL;
+/** Key certificate to authenticate v3 directory material; only set for
+ * authorities. */
+static authority_cert_t *authority_key_certificate = NULL;
+
+/** For emergency V3 authority key migration: An extra signing key that we use
+ * with our old (obsolete) identity key for a while. */
+static crypto_pk_t *legacy_signing_key = NULL;
+/** For emergency V3 authority key migration: An extra certificate to
+ * authenticate legacy_signing_key with our obsolete identity key.*/
+static authority_cert_t *legacy_key_certificate = NULL;
+
+/* (Note that v3 authorities also have a separate "authority identity key",
+ * but this key is never actually loaded by the Tor process. Instead, it's
+ * used by tor-gencert to sign new signing keys and make new key
+ * certificates. */
+
+/** Return a readonly string with human readable description
+ * of <b>err</b>.
+ */
+const char *
+routerinfo_err_to_string(int err)
+{
+ switch (err) {
+ case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NO_EXT_ADDR:
+ return "No known exit address yet";
+ case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_PARSE:
+ return "Cannot parse descriptor";
+ case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER:
+ return "Not running in server mode";
+ case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED:
+ return "Key digest failed";
+ case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_GENERATE:
+ return "Cannot generate descriptor";
+ case TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING:
+ return "Descriptor still rebuilding - not ready yet";
+ }
+
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "unknown routerinfo error %d - shouldn't happen", err);
+ tor_assert_unreached();
+
+ return "Unknown error";
+}
+
+/** Return true if we expect given error to be transient.
+ * Return false otherwise.
+ */
+int
+routerinfo_err_is_transient(int err)
+{
+ /**
+ * For simplicity, we consider all errors other than
+ * "not a server" transient - see discussion on
+ * https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/27034
+ */
+ return err != TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER;
+}
+
+/** Replace the current onion key with <b>k</b>. Does not affect
+ * lastonionkey; to update lastonionkey correctly, call rotate_onion_key().
+ */
+static void
+set_onion_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
+{
+ if (onionkey && crypto_pk_eq_keys(onionkey, k)) {
+ /* k is already our onion key; free it and return */
+ crypto_pk_free(k);
+ return;
+ }
+ tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
+ crypto_pk_free(onionkey);
+ onionkey = k;
+ tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
+ mark_my_descriptor_dirty("set onion key");
+}
+
+/** Return the current onion key. Requires that the onion key has been
+ * loaded or generated. */
+crypto_pk_t *
+get_onion_key(void)
+{
+ tor_assert(onionkey);
+ return onionkey;
+}
+
+/** Store a full copy of the current onion key into *<b>key</b>, and a full
+ * copy of the most recent onion key into *<b>last</b>. Store NULL into
+ * a pointer if the corresponding key does not exist.
+ */
+void
+dup_onion_keys(crypto_pk_t **key, crypto_pk_t **last)
+{
+ tor_assert(key);
+ tor_assert(last);
+ tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
+ if (onionkey)
+ *key = crypto_pk_copy_full(onionkey);
+ else
+ *key = NULL;
+ if (lastonionkey)
+ *last = crypto_pk_copy_full(lastonionkey);
+ else
+ *last = NULL;
+ tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
+}
+
+/** Expire our old set of onion keys. This is done by setting
+ * last_curve25519_onion_key and lastonionkey to all zero's and NULL
+ * respectively.
+ *
+ * This function does not perform any grace period checks for the old onion
+ * keys.
+ */
+void
+expire_old_onion_keys(void)
+{
+ char *fname = NULL;
+
+ tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
+
+ /* Free lastonionkey and set it to NULL. */
+ if (lastonionkey) {
+ crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey);
+ lastonionkey = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* We zero out the keypair. See the tor_mem_is_zero() check made in
+ * construct_ntor_key_map() below. */
+ memset(&last_curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(last_curve25519_onion_key));
+
+ tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
+
+ fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old");
+ if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
+ if (tor_unlink(fname) != 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_FS, "Couldn't unlink old onion key file %s: %s",
+ fname, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+ tor_free(fname);
+
+ fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old");
+ if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
+ if (tor_unlink(fname) != 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_FS, "Couldn't unlink old ntor onion key file %s: %s",
+ fname, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+ tor_free(fname);
+}
+
+/** Return the current secret onion key for the ntor handshake. Must only
+ * be called from the main thread. */
+static const curve25519_keypair_t *
+get_current_curve25519_keypair(void)
+{
+ return &curve25519_onion_key;
+}
+/** Return a map from KEYID (the key itself) to keypairs for use in the ntor
+ * handshake. Must only be called from the main thread. */
+di_digest256_map_t *
+construct_ntor_key_map(void)
+{
+ di_digest256_map_t *m = NULL;
+
+ if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)
+ curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+ dimap_add_entry(&m,
+ curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
+ tor_memdup(&curve25519_onion_key,
+ sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t)));
+ }
+ if (!tor_mem_is_zero((const char*)
+ last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+ dimap_add_entry(&m,
+ last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
+ tor_memdup(&last_curve25519_onion_key,
+ sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t)));
+ }
+
+ return m;
+}
+/** Helper used to deallocate a di_digest256_map_t returned by
+ * construct_ntor_key_map. */
+static void
+ntor_key_map_free_helper(void *arg)
+{
+ curve25519_keypair_t *k = arg;
+ memwipe(k, 0, sizeof(*k));
+ tor_free(k);
+}
+/** Release all storage from a keymap returned by construct_ntor_key_map. */
+void
+ntor_key_map_free_(di_digest256_map_t *map)
+{
+ if (!map)
+ return;
+ dimap_free(map, ntor_key_map_free_helper);
+}
+
+/** Return the time when the onion key was last set. This is either the time
+ * when the process launched, or the time of the most recent key rotation since
+ * the process launched.
+ */
+time_t
+get_onion_key_set_at(void)
+{
+ return onionkey_set_at;
+}
+
+/** Set the current server identity key to <b>k</b>.
+ */
+void
+set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
+{
+ crypto_pk_free(server_identitykey);
+ server_identitykey = k;
+ if (crypto_pk_get_digest(server_identitykey,
+ server_identitykey_digest) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute our own identity key digest.");
+ tor_assert(0);
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
+/** Testing only -- set the server's RSA identity digest to
+ * be <b>digest</b> */
+void
+set_server_identity_key_digest_testing(const uint8_t *digest)
+{
+ memcpy(server_identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+}
+#endif
+
+/** Make sure that we have set up our identity keys to match or not match as
+ * appropriate, and die with an assertion if we have not. */
+static void
+assert_identity_keys_ok(void)
+{
+ if (1)
+ return;
+ tor_assert(client_identitykey);
+ if (public_server_mode(get_options())) {
+ /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be equal */
+ tor_assert(server_identitykey);
+ tor_assert(crypto_pk_eq_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey));
+ } else {
+ /* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be unequal */
+ if (server_identitykey)
+ tor_assert(!crypto_pk_eq_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey));
+ }
+}
+
+/** Returns the current server identity key; requires that the key has
+ * been set, and that we are running as a Tor server.
+ */
+crypto_pk_t *
+get_server_identity_key(void)
+{
+ tor_assert(server_identitykey);
+ tor_assert(server_mode(get_options()));
+ assert_identity_keys_ok();
+ return server_identitykey;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff we are a server and the server identity key
+ * has been set. */
+int
+server_identity_key_is_set(void)
+{
+ return server_mode(get_options()) && server_identitykey != NULL;
+}
+
+/** Set the current client identity key to <b>k</b>.
+ */
+void
+set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_t *k)
+{
+ crypto_pk_free(client_identitykey);
+ client_identitykey = k;
+}
+
+/** Returns the current client identity key for use on outgoing TLS
+ * connections; requires that the key has been set.
+ */
+crypto_pk_t *
+get_tlsclient_identity_key(void)
+{
+ tor_assert(client_identitykey);
+ assert_identity_keys_ok();
+ return client_identitykey;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the client identity key has been set. */
+int
+client_identity_key_is_set(void)
+{
+ return client_identitykey != NULL;
+}
+
+/** Return the key certificate for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL
+ * if we have no such certificate. */
+MOCK_IMPL(authority_cert_t *,
+get_my_v3_authority_cert, (void))
+{
+ return authority_key_certificate;
+}
+
+/** Return the v3 signing key for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL
+ * if we have no such key. */
+crypto_pk_t *
+get_my_v3_authority_signing_key(void)
+{
+ return authority_signing_key;
+}
+
+/** If we're an authority, and we're using a legacy authority identity key for
+ * emergency migration purposes, return the certificate associated with that
+ * key. */
+authority_cert_t *
+get_my_v3_legacy_cert(void)
+{
+ return legacy_key_certificate;
+}
+
+/** If we're an authority, and we're using a legacy authority identity key for
+ * emergency migration purposes, return that key. */
+crypto_pk_t *
+get_my_v3_legacy_signing_key(void)
+{
+ return legacy_signing_key;
+}
+
+/** Replace the previous onion key with the current onion key, and generate
+ * a new previous onion key. Immediately after calling this function,
+ * the OR should:
+ * - schedule all previous cpuworkers to shut down _after_ processing
+ * pending work. (This will cause fresh cpuworkers to be generated.)
+ * - generate and upload a fresh routerinfo.
+ */
+void
+rotate_onion_key(void)
+{
+ char *fname, *fname_prev;
+ crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
+ or_state_t *state = get_or_state();
+ curve25519_keypair_t new_curve25519_keypair;
+ time_t now;
+ fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key");
+ fname_prev = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old");
+ /* There isn't much point replacing an old key with an empty file */
+ if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
+ if (replace_file(fname, fname_prev))
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing rotated onion key");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG,"Error generating onion key");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
+ log_err(LD_FS,"Couldn't write generated onion key to \"%s\".", fname);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ tor_free(fname);
+ tor_free(fname_prev);
+ fname = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor");
+ fname_prev = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old");
+ if (curve25519_keypair_generate(&new_curve25519_keypair, 1) < 0)
+ goto error;
+ /* There isn't much point replacing an old key with an empty file */
+ if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
+ if (replace_file(fname, fname_prev))
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(&new_curve25519_keypair, fname,
+ "onion") < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_FS,"Couldn't write curve25519 onion key to \"%s\".",fname);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Rotating onion key");
+ tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
+ crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey);
+ lastonionkey = onionkey;
+ onionkey = prkey;
+ memcpy(&last_curve25519_onion_key, &curve25519_onion_key,
+ sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t));
+ memcpy(&curve25519_onion_key, &new_curve25519_keypair,
+ sizeof(curve25519_keypair_t));
+ now = time(NULL);
+ state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now;
+ tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
+ mark_my_descriptor_dirty("rotated onion key");
+ or_state_mark_dirty(state, get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites ? now+3600 : 0);
+ goto done;
+ error:
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't rotate onion key.");
+ if (prkey)
+ crypto_pk_free(prkey);
+ done:
+ memwipe(&new_curve25519_keypair, 0, sizeof(new_curve25519_keypair));
+ tor_free(fname);
+ tor_free(fname_prev);
+}
+
+/** Log greeting message that points to new relay lifecycle document the
+ * first time this function has been called.
+ */
+static void
+log_new_relay_greeting(void)
+{
+ static int already_logged = 0;
+
+ if (already_logged)
+ return;
+
+ tor_log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_GENERAL, "You are running a new relay. "
+ "Thanks for helping the Tor network! If you wish to know "
+ "what will happen in the upcoming weeks regarding its usage, "
+ "have a look at https://blog.torproject.org/blog/lifecycle-of";
+ "-a-new-relay");
+
+ already_logged = 1;
+}
+
+/** Load a curve25519 keypair from the file <b>fname</b>, writing it into
+ * <b>keys_out</b>. If the file isn't found, or is empty, and <b>generate</b>
+ * is true, create a new keypair and write it into the file. If there are
+ * errors, log them at level <b>severity</b>. Generate files using <b>tag</b>
+ * in their ASCII wrapper. */
+static int
+init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(curve25519_keypair_t *keys_out,
+ const char *fname,
+ int generate,
+ int severity,
+ const char *tag)
+{
+ switch (file_status(fname)) {
+ case FN_DIR:
+ case FN_ERROR:
+ tor_log(severity, LD_FS,"Can't read key from \"%s\"", fname);
+ goto error;
+ /* treat empty key files as if the file doesn't exist, and, if generate
+ * is set, replace the empty file in curve25519_keypair_write_to_file() */
+ case FN_NOENT:
+ case FN_EMPTY:
+ if (generate) {
+ if (!have_lockfile()) {
+ if (try_locking(get_options(), 0)<0) {
+ /* Make sure that --list-fingerprint only creates new keys
+ * if there is no possibility for a deadlock. */
+ tor_log(severity, LD_FS, "Another Tor process has locked \"%s\". "
+ "Not writing any new keys.", fname);
+ /*XXXX The 'other process' might make a key in a second or two;
+ * maybe we should wait for it. */
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"; generating fresh key.",
+ fname);
+ if (curve25519_keypair_generate(keys_out, 1) < 0)
+ goto error;
+ if (curve25519_keypair_write_to_file(keys_out, fname, tag)<0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_FS,
+ "Couldn't write generated key to \"%s\".", fname);
+ memwipe(keys_out, 0, sizeof(*keys_out));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"", fname);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ case FN_FILE:
+ {
+ char *tag_in=NULL;
+ if (curve25519_keypair_read_from_file(keys_out, &tag_in, fname) < 0) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error loading private key.");
+ tor_free(tag_in);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (!tag_in || strcmp(tag_in, tag)) {
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Unexpected tag %s on private key.",
+ escaped(tag_in));
+ tor_free(tag_in);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ tor_free(tag_in);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ default:
+ tor_assert(0);
+ }
+
+ error:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/** Try to load the vote-signing private key and certificate for being a v3
+ * directory authority, and make sure they match. If <b>legacy</b>, load a
+ * legacy key/cert set for emergency key migration; otherwise load the regular
+ * key/cert set. On success, store them into *<b>key_out</b> and
+ * *<b>cert_out</b> respectively, and return 0. On failure, return -1. */
+static int
+load_authority_keyset(int legacy, crypto_pk_t **key_out,
+ authority_cert_t **cert_out)
+{
+ int r = -1;
+ char *fname = NULL, *cert = NULL;
+ const char *eos = NULL;
+ crypto_pk_t *signing_key = NULL;
+ authority_cert_t *parsed = NULL;
+
+ fname = get_keydir_fname(
+ legacy ? "legacy_signing_key" : "authority_signing_key");
+ signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_ERR, NULL);
+ if (!signing_key) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "No version 3 directory key found in %s", fname);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ tor_free(fname);
+ fname = get_keydir_fname(
+ legacy ? "legacy_certificate" : "authority_certificate");
+ cert = read_file_to_str(fname, 0, NULL);
+ if (!cert) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Signing key found, but no certificate found in %s",
+ fname);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ parsed = authority_cert_parse_from_string(cert, strlen(cert), &eos);
+ if (!parsed) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse certificate in %s", fname);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (!crypto_pk_eq_keys(signing_key, parsed->signing_key)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Stored signing key does not match signing key in "
+ "certificate");
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ crypto_pk_free(*key_out);
+ authority_cert_free(*cert_out);
+
+ *key_out = signing_key;
+ *cert_out = parsed;
+ r = 0;
+ signing_key = NULL;
+ parsed = NULL;
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(fname);
+ tor_free(cert);
+ crypto_pk_free(signing_key);
+ authority_cert_free(parsed);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Load the v3 (voting) authority signing key and certificate, if they are
+ * present. Return -1 if anything is missing, mismatched, or unloadable;
+ * return 0 on success. */
+static int
+init_v3_authority_keys(void)
+{
+ if (load_authority_keyset(0, &authority_signing_key,
+ &authority_key_certificate)<0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (get_options()->V3AuthUseLegacyKey &&
+ load_authority_keyset(1, &legacy_signing_key,
+ &legacy_key_certificate)<0)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** If we're a v3 authority, check whether we have a certificate that's
+ * likely to expire soon. Warn if we do, but not too often. */
+void
+v3_authority_check_key_expiry(void)
+{
+ time_t now, expires;
+ static time_t last_warned = 0;
+ int badness, time_left, warn_interval;
+ if (!authdir_mode_v3(get_options()) || !authority_key_certificate)
+ return;
+
+ now = time(NULL);
+ expires = authority_key_certificate->expires;
+ time_left = (int)( expires - now );
+ if (time_left <= 0) {
+ badness = LOG_ERR;
+ warn_interval = 60*60;
+ } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60) {
+ badness = LOG_WARN;
+ warn_interval = 60*60;
+ } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60*7) {
+ badness = LOG_WARN;
+ warn_interval = 24*60*60;
+ } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60*30) {
+ badness = LOG_WARN;
+ warn_interval = 24*60*60*5;
+ } else {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (last_warned + warn_interval > now)
+ return;
+
+ if (time_left <= 0) {
+ tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate has expired."
+ " Generate a new one NOW.");
+ } else if (time_left <= 24*60*60) {
+ tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate expires in %d "
+ "hours; Generate a new one NOW.", time_left/(60*60));
+ } else {
+ tor_log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate expires in %d "
+ "days; Generate a new one soon.", time_left/(24*60*60));
+ }
+ last_warned = now;
+}
+
+/** Get the lifetime of an onion key in days. This value is defined by the
+ * network consesus parameter "onion-key-rotation-days". Always returns a value
+ * between <b>MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS</b> and
+ * <b>MAX_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS</b>.
+ */
+static int
+get_onion_key_rotation_days_(void)
+{
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
+ "onion-key-rotation-days",
+ DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS,
+ MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS,
+ MAX_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS);
+}
+
+/** Get the current lifetime of an onion key in seconds. This value is defined
+ * by the network consesus parameter "onion-key-rotation-days", but the value
+ * is converted to seconds.
+ */
+int
+get_onion_key_lifetime(void)
+{
+ return get_onion_key_rotation_days_()*24*60*60;
+}
+
+/** Get the grace period of an onion key in seconds. This value is defined by
+ * the network consesus parameter "onion-key-grace-period-days", but the value
+ * is converted to seconds.
+ */
+int
+get_onion_key_grace_period(void)
+{
+ int grace_period;
+ grace_period = networkstatus_get_param(NULL,
+ "onion-key-grace-period-days",
+ DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS,
+ MIN_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS,
+ get_onion_key_rotation_days_());
+ return grace_period*24*60*60;
+}
+
+/** Set up Tor's TLS contexts, based on our configuration and keys. Return 0
+ * on success, and -1 on failure. */
+int
+router_initialize_tls_context(void)
+{
+ unsigned int flags = 0;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ int lifetime = options->SSLKeyLifetime;
+ if (public_server_mode(options))
+ flags |= TOR_TLS_CTX_IS_PUBLIC_SERVER;
+ if (!lifetime) { /* we should guess a good ssl cert lifetime */
+
+ /* choose between 5 and 365 days, and round to the day */
+ unsigned int five_days = 5*24*3600;
+ unsigned int one_year = 365*24*3600;
+ lifetime = crypto_rand_int_range(five_days, one_year);
+ lifetime -= lifetime % (24*3600);
+
+ if (crypto_rand_int(2)) {
+ /* Half the time we expire at midnight, and half the time we expire
+ * one second before midnight. (Some CAs wobble their expiry times a
+ * bit in practice, perhaps to reduce collision attacks; see ticket
+ * 8443 for details about observed certs in the wild.) */
+ lifetime--;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* It's ok to pass lifetime in as an unsigned int, since
+ * config_parse_interval() checked it. */
+ return tor_tls_context_init(flags,
+ get_tlsclient_identity_key(),
+ server_mode(options) ?
+ get_server_identity_key() : NULL,
+ (unsigned int)lifetime);
+}
+
+/** Compute fingerprint (or hashed fingerprint if hashed is 1) and write
+ * it to 'fingerprint' (or 'hashed-fingerprint'). Return 0 on success, or
+ * -1 if Tor should die,
+ */
+STATIC int
+router_write_fingerprint(int hashed)
+{
+ char *keydir = NULL, *cp = NULL;
+ const char *fname = hashed ? "hashed-fingerprint" :
+ "fingerprint";
+ char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ char *fingerprint_line = NULL;
+ int result = -1;
+
+ keydir = get_datadir_fname(fname);
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Dumping %sfingerprint to \"%s\"...",
+ hashed ? "hashed " : "", keydir);
+ if (!hashed) {
+ if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(),
+ fingerprint, 0) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing fingerprint");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (crypto_pk_get_hashed_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(),
+ fingerprint) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing hashed fingerprint");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ tor_asprintf(&fingerprint_line, "%s %s\n", options->Nickname, fingerprint);
+
+ /* Check whether we need to write the (hashed-)fingerprint file. */
+
+ cp = read_file_to_str(keydir, RFTS_IGNORE_MISSING, NULL);
+ if (!cp || strcmp(cp, fingerprint_line)) {
+ if (write_str_to_file(keydir, fingerprint_line, 0)) {
+ log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing %sfingerprint line to file",
+ hashed ? "hashed " : "");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Your Tor %s identity key fingerprint is '%s %s'",
+ hashed ? "bridge's hashed" : "server's", options->Nickname,
+ fingerprint);
+
+ result = 0;
+ done:
+ tor_free(cp);
+ tor_free(keydir);
+ tor_free(fingerprint_line);
+ return result;
+}
+
+static int
+init_keys_common(void)
+{
+ if (!key_lock)
+ key_lock = tor_mutex_new();
+
+ /* There are a couple of paths that put us here before we've asked
+ * openssl to initialize itself. */
+ if (crypto_global_init(get_options()->HardwareAccel,
+ get_options()->AccelName,
+ get_options()->AccelDir)) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "Unable to initialize OpenSSL. Exiting.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+init_keys_client(void)
+{
+ crypto_pk_t *prkey;
+ if (init_keys_common() < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new()))
+ return -1;
+ if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
+ crypto_pk_free(prkey);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ set_client_identity_key(prkey);
+ /* Create a TLS context. */
+ if (router_initialize_tls_context() < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Initialize all OR private keys, and the TLS context, as necessary.
+ * On OPs, this only initializes the tls context. Return 0 on success,
+ * or -1 if Tor should die.
+ */
+int
+init_keys(void)
+{
+ char *keydir;
+ const char *mydesc;
+ crypto_pk_t *prkey;
+ char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ char v3_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ dirinfo_type_t type;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ dir_server_t *ds;
+ int v3_digest_set = 0;
+ authority_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+
+ /* OP's don't need persistent keys; just make up an identity and
+ * initialize the TLS context. */
+ if (!server_mode(options)) {
+ return init_keys_client();
+ }
+ if (init_keys_common() < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (create_keys_directory(options) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* 1a. Read v3 directory authority key/cert information. */
+ memset(v3_digest, 0, sizeof(v3_digest));
+ if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) {
+ if (init_v3_authority_keys()<0) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL, "We're configured as a V3 authority, but we "
+ "were unable to load our v3 authority keys and certificate! "
+ "Use tor-gencert to generate them. Dying.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ cert = get_my_v3_authority_cert();
+ if (cert) {
+ if (crypto_pk_get_digest(get_my_v3_authority_cert()->identity_key,
+ v3_digest) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute my v3 authority identity key "
+ "digest.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ v3_digest_set = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* 1b. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */
+ keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_id_key");
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making identity key \"%s\"...",keydir);
+ bool created = false;
+ prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created);
+ tor_free(keydir);
+ if (!prkey) return -1;
+ if (created)
+ log_new_relay_greeting();
+ set_server_identity_key(prkey);
+
+ /* 1c. If we are configured as a bridge, generate a client key;
+ * otherwise, set the server identity key as our client identity
+ * key. */
+ if (public_server_mode(options)) {
+ set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_dup_key(prkey)); /* set above */
+ } else {
+ if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new()))
+ return -1;
+ if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
+ crypto_pk_free(prkey);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ set_client_identity_key(prkey);
+ }
+
+ /* 1d. Load all ed25519 keys */
+ const int new_signing_key = load_ed_keys(options,now);
+ if (new_signing_key < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* 2. Read onion key. Make it if none is found. */
+ keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key");
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making onion key \"%s\"...",keydir);
+ prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created);
+ if (created)
+ log_new_relay_greeting();
+ tor_free(keydir);
+ if (!prkey) return -1;
+ set_onion_key(prkey);
+ if (options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR) {
+ /* only mess with the state file if we're actually running Tor */
+ or_state_t *state = get_or_state();
+ if (state->LastRotatedOnionKey > 100 && state->LastRotatedOnionKey < now) {
+ /* We allow for some parsing slop, but we don't want to risk accepting
+ * values in the distant future. If we did, we might never rotate the
+ * onion key. */
+ onionkey_set_at = state->LastRotatedOnionKey;
+ } else {
+ /* We have no LastRotatedOnionKey set; either we just created the key
+ * or it's a holdover from 0.1.2.4-alpha-dev or earlier. In either case,
+ * start the clock ticking now so that we will eventually rotate it even
+ * if we don't stay up for the full lifetime of an onion key. */
+ state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now;
+ or_state_mark_dirty(state, options->AvoidDiskWrites ?
+ time(NULL)+3600 : 0);
+ }
+ }
+
+ keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key.old");
+ if (!lastonionkey && file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE) {
+ /* Load keys from non-empty files only.
+ * Missing old keys won't be replaced with freshly generated keys. */
+ prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 0, LOG_ERR, 0);
+ if (prkey)
+ lastonionkey = prkey;
+ }
+ tor_free(keydir);
+
+ {
+ /* 2b. Load curve25519 onion keys. */
+ int r;
+ keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor");
+ r = init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(&curve25519_onion_key,
+ keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, "onion");
+ tor_free(keydir);
+ if (r<0)
+ return -1;
+
+ keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key_ntor.old");
+ if (tor_mem_is_zero((const char *)
+ last_curve25519_onion_key.pubkey.public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) &&
+ file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE) {
+ /* Load keys from non-empty files only.
+ * Missing old keys won't be replaced with freshly generated keys. */
+ init_curve25519_keypair_from_file(&last_curve25519_onion_key,
+ keydir, 0, LOG_ERR, "onion");
+ }
+ tor_free(keydir);
+ }
+
+ /* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */
+ if (router_initialize_tls_context() < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* 3b. Get an ed25519 link certificate. Note that we need to do this
+ * after we set up the TLS context */
+ if (generate_ed_link_cert(options, now, new_signing_key > 0) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Couldn't make link cert");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* 4. Build our router descriptor. */
+ /* Must be called after keys are initialized. */
+ mydesc = router_get_my_descriptor();
+ if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) {
+ const char *m = NULL;
+ routerinfo_t *ri;
+ /* We need to add our own fingerprint so it gets recognized. */
+ if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key())) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error adding own fingerprint to set of relays");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (mydesc) {
+ was_router_added_t added;
+ ri = router_parse_entry_from_string(mydesc, NULL, 1, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!ri) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Generated a routerinfo we couldn't parse.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ added = dirserv_add_descriptor(ri, &m, "self");
+ if (!WRA_WAS_ADDED(added)) {
+ if (!WRA_WAS_OUTDATED(added)) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL, "Unable to add own descriptor to directory: %s",
+ m?m:"<unknown error>");
+ return -1;
+ } else {
+ /* If the descriptor was outdated, that's ok. This can happen
+ * when some config options are toggled that affect workers, but
+ * we don't really need new keys yet so the descriptor doesn't
+ * change and the old one is still fresh. */
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't add own descriptor to directory "
+ "after key init: %s This is usually not a problem.",
+ m?m:"<unknown error>");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* 5. Dump fingerprint and possibly hashed fingerprint to files. */
+ if (router_write_fingerprint(0)) {
+ log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing fingerprint to file");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!public_server_mode(options) && router_write_fingerprint(1)) {
+ log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing hashed fingerprint to file");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!authdir_mode(options))
+ return 0;
+ /* 6. [authdirserver only] load approved-routers file */
+ if (dirserv_load_fingerprint_file() < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error loading fingerprints");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* 6b. [authdirserver only] add own key to approved directories. */
+ crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest);
+ type = ((options->V3AuthoritativeDir ?
+ (V3_DIRINFO|MICRODESC_DIRINFO|EXTRAINFO_DIRINFO) : NO_DIRINFO) |
+ (options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir ? BRIDGE_DIRINFO : NO_DIRINFO));
+
+ ds = router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(digest);
+ if (!ds) {
+ ds = trusted_dir_server_new(options->Nickname, NULL,
+ router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, 0),
+ router_get_advertised_or_port(options),
+ NULL,
+ digest,
+ v3_digest,
+ type, 0.0);
+ if (!ds) {
+ log_err(LD_GENERAL,"We want to be a directory authority, but we "
+ "couldn't add ourselves to the authority list. Failing.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ dir_server_add(ds);
+ }
+ if (ds->type != type) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Configured authority type does not match authority "
+ "type in DirAuthority list. Adjusting. (%d v %d)",
+ type, ds->type);
+ ds->type = type;
+ }
+ if (v3_digest_set && (ds->type & V3_DIRINFO) &&
+ tor_memneq(v3_digest, ds->v3_identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "V3 identity key does not match identity declared in "
+ "DirAuthority line. Adjusting.");
+ memcpy(ds->v3_identity_digest, v3_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ }
+
+ if (cert) { /* add my own cert to the list of known certs */
+ log_info(LD_DIR, "adding my own v3 cert");
+ if (trusted_dirs_load_certs_from_string(
+ cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
+ TRUSTED_DIRS_CERTS_SRC_SELF, 0,
+ NULL)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse my own v3 cert! Failing.");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0; /* success */
+}
+
+/** The lower threshold of remaining bandwidth required to advertise (or
+ * automatically provide) directory services */
+/* XXX Should this be increased? */
+#define MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER 51200
+
+/** Return true iff we have enough configured bandwidth to advertise or
+ * automatically provide directory services from cache directory
+ * information. */
+int
+router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (options->BandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (options->RelayBandwidthRate > 0 &&
+ options->RelayBandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/** Helper: Return 1 if we have sufficient resources for serving directory
+ * requests, return 0 otherwise.
+ * dir_port is either 0 or the configured DirPort number.
+ * If AccountingMax is set less than our advertised bandwidth, then don't
+ * serve requests. Likewise, if our advertised bandwidth is less than
+ * MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRSERVER, don't bother trying to serve requests.
+ */
+static int
+router_should_be_dirserver(const or_options_t *options, int dir_port)
+{
+ static int advertising=1; /* start out assuming we will advertise */
+ int new_choice=1;
+ const char *reason = NULL;
+
+ if (accounting_is_enabled(options) &&
+ get_options()->AccountingRule != ACCT_IN) {
+ /* Don't spend bytes for directory traffic if we could end up hibernating,
+ * but allow DirPort otherwise. Some relay operators set AccountingMax
+ * because they're confused or to get statistics. Directory traffic has a
+ * much larger effect on output than input so there is no reason to turn it
+ * off if using AccountingRule in. */
+ int interval_length = accounting_get_interval_length();
+ uint32_t effective_bw = get_effective_bwrate(options);
+ uint64_t acc_bytes;
+ if (!interval_length) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "An accounting interval is not allowed to be zero "
+ "seconds long. Raising to 1.");
+ interval_length = 1;
+ }
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Calculating whether to advertise %s: effective "
+ "bwrate: %u, AccountingMax: %"PRIu64", "
+ "accounting interval length %d",
+ dir_port ? "dirport" : "begindir",
+ effective_bw, (options->AccountingMax),
+ interval_length);
+
+ acc_bytes = options->AccountingMax;
+ if (get_options()->AccountingRule == ACCT_SUM)
+ acc_bytes /= 2;
+ if (effective_bw >=
+ acc_bytes / interval_length) {
+ new_choice = 0;
+ reason = "AccountingMax enabled";
+ }
+ } else if (! router_has_bandwidth_to_be_dirserver(options)) {
+ /* if we're advertising a small amount */
+ new_choice = 0;
+ reason = "BandwidthRate under 50KB";
+ }
+
+ if (advertising != new_choice) {
+ if (new_choice == 1) {
+ if (dir_port > 0)
+ log_notice(LD_DIR, "Advertising DirPort as %d", dir_port);
+ else
+ log_notice(LD_DIR, "Advertising directory service support");
+ } else {
+ tor_assert(reason);
+ log_notice(LD_DIR, "Not advertising Dir%s (Reason: %s)",
+ dir_port ? "Port" : "ectory Service support", reason);
+ }
+ advertising = new_choice;
+ }
+
+ return advertising;
+}
+
+/** Look at a variety of factors, and return 0 if we don't want to
+ * advertise the fact that we have a DirPort open or begindir support, else
+ * return 1.
+ *
+ * Where dir_port or supports_tunnelled_dir_requests are not relevant, they
+ * must be 0.
+ *
+ * Log a helpful message if we change our mind about whether to publish.
+ */
+static int
+decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(const or_options_t *options,
+ uint16_t dir_port,
+ int supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)
+{
+ /* Part one: reasons to publish or not publish that aren't
+ * worth mentioning to the user, either because they're obvious
+ * or because they're normal behavior. */
+
+ /* short circuit the rest of the function */
+ if (!dir_port && !supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)
+ return 0;
+ if (authdir_mode(options)) /* always publish */
+ return 1;
+ if (net_is_disabled())
+ return 0;
+ if (dir_port && !router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, dir_port))
+ return 0;
+ if (supports_tunnelled_dir_requests &&
+ !router_get_advertised_or_port(options))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Part two: consider config options that could make us choose to
+ * publish or not publish that the user might find surprising. */
+ return router_should_be_dirserver(options, dir_port);
+}
+
+/** Front-end to decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(): return 0 if we don't want to
+ * advertise the fact that we have a DirPort open, else return the
+ * DirPort we want to advertise.
+ */
+int
+router_should_advertise_dirport(const or_options_t *options, uint16_t dir_port)
+{
+ /* supports_tunnelled_dir_requests is not relevant, pass 0 */
+ return decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(options, dir_port, 0) ? dir_port : 0;
+}
+
+/** Front-end to decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(): return 0 if we don't want to
+ * advertise the fact that we support begindir requests, else return 1.
+ */
+static int
+router_should_advertise_begindir(const or_options_t *options,
+ int supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)
+{
+ /* dir_port is not relevant, pass 0 */
+ return decide_to_advertise_dir_impl(options, 0,
+ supports_tunnelled_dir_requests);
+}
+
+/** Return true iff the combination of options in <b>options</b> and parameters
+ * in the consensus mean that we don't want to allow exits from circuits
+ * we got from addresses not known to be servers. */
+int
+should_refuse_unknown_exits(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (options->RefuseUnknownExits != -1) {
+ return options->RefuseUnknownExits;
+ } else {
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "refuseunknownexits", 1, 0, 1);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Decide if we're a publishable server. We are a publishable server if:
+ * - We don't have the ClientOnly option set
+ * and
+ * - We have the PublishServerDescriptor option set to non-empty
+ * and
+ * - We have ORPort set
+ * and
+ * - We believe our ORPort and DirPort (if present) are reachable from
+ * the outside; or
+ * - We believe our ORPort is reachable from the outside, and we can't
+ * check our DirPort because the consensus has no exits; or
+ * - We are an authoritative directory server.
+ */
+static int
+decide_if_publishable_server(void)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ if (options->ClientOnly)
+ return 0;
+ if (options->PublishServerDescriptor_ == NO_DIRINFO)
+ return 0;
+ if (!server_mode(options))
+ return 0;
+ if (authdir_mode(options))
+ return 1;
+ if (!router_get_advertised_or_port(options))
+ return 0;
+ if (!check_whether_orport_reachable(options))
+ return 0;
+ if (router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL) {
+ /* All set: there are no exits in the consensus (maybe this is a tiny
+ * test network), so we can't check our DirPort reachability. */
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ return check_whether_dirport_reachable(options);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Initiate server descriptor upload as reasonable (if server is publishable,
+ * etc). <b>force</b> is as for router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers.
+ *
+ * We need to rebuild the descriptor if it's dirty even if we're not
+ * uploading, because our reachability testing *uses* our descriptor to
+ * determine what IP address and ports to test.
+ */
+void
+consider_publishable_server(int force)
+{
+ int rebuilt;
+
+ if (!server_mode(get_options()))
+ return;
+
+ rebuilt = router_rebuild_descriptor(0);
+ if (decide_if_publishable_server()) {
+ set_server_advertised(1);
+ if (rebuilt == 0)
+ router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(force);
+ } else {
+ set_server_advertised(0);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Return the port of the first active listener of type
+ * <b>listener_type</b>. */
+/** XXX not a very good interface. it's not reliable when there are
+ multiple listeners. */
+uint16_t
+router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(int listener_type,
+ sa_family_t family)
+{
+ /* Iterate all connections, find one of the right kind and return
+ the port. Not very sophisticated or fast, but effective. */
+ smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
+ if (conn->type == listener_type && !conn->marked_for_close &&
+ conn->socket_family == family) {
+ return conn->port;
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** Return the port that we should advertise as our ORPort; this is either
+ * the one configured in the ORPort option, or the one we actually bound to
+ * if ORPort is "auto".
+ */
+uint16_t
+router_get_advertised_or_port(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ return router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(options, AF_INET);
+}
+
+/** As router_get_advertised_or_port(), but allows an address family argument.
+ */
+uint16_t
+router_get_advertised_or_port_by_af(const or_options_t *options,
+ sa_family_t family)
+{
+ int port = get_first_advertised_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER,
+ family);
+ (void)options;
+
+ /* If the port is in 'auto' mode, we have to use
+ router_get_listener_port_by_type(). */
+ if (port == CFG_AUTO_PORT)
+ return router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER,
+ family);
+
+ return port;
+}
+
+/** Return the port that we should advertise as our DirPort;
+ * this is one of three possibilities:
+ * The one that is passed as <b>dirport</b> if the DirPort option is 0, or
+ * the one configured in the DirPort option,
+ * or the one we actually bound to if DirPort is "auto". */
+uint16_t
+router_get_advertised_dir_port(const or_options_t *options, uint16_t dirport)
+{
+ int dirport_configured = get_primary_dir_port();
+ (void)options;
+
+ if (!dirport_configured)
+ return dirport;
+
+ if (dirport_configured == CFG_AUTO_PORT)
+ return router_get_active_listener_port_by_type_af(CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER,
+ AF_INET);
+
+ return dirport_configured;
+}
+
+/*
+ * OR descriptor generation.
+ */
+
+/** My routerinfo. */
+static routerinfo_t *desc_routerinfo = NULL;
+/** My extrainfo */
+static extrainfo_t *desc_extrainfo = NULL;
+/** Why did we most recently decide to regenerate our descriptor? Used to
+ * tell the authorities why we're sending it to them. */
+static const char *desc_gen_reason = "uninitialized reason";
+/** Since when has our descriptor been "clean"? 0 if we need to regenerate it
+ * now. */
+STATIC time_t desc_clean_since = 0;
+/** Why did we mark the descriptor dirty? */
+STATIC const char *desc_dirty_reason = "Tor just started";
+/** Boolean: do we need to regenerate the above? */
+static int desc_needs_upload = 0;
+
+/** OR only: If <b>force</b> is true, or we haven't uploaded this
+ * descriptor successfully yet, try to upload our signed descriptor to
+ * all the directory servers we know about.
+ */
+void
+router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(int force)
+{
+ const routerinfo_t *ri;
+ extrainfo_t *ei;
+ char *msg;
+ size_t desc_len, extra_len = 0, total_len;
+ dirinfo_type_t auth = get_options()->PublishServerDescriptor_;
+
+ ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+ if (!ri) {
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No descriptor; skipping upload");
+ return;
+ }
+ ei = router_get_my_extrainfo();
+ if (auth == NO_DIRINFO)
+ return;
+ if (!force && !desc_needs_upload)
+ return;
+
+ log_info(LD_OR, "Uploading relay descriptor to directory authorities%s",
+ force ? " (forced)" : "");
+
+ desc_needs_upload = 0;
+
+ desc_len = ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len;
+ extra_len = ei ? ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len : 0;
+ total_len = desc_len + extra_len + 1;
+ msg = tor_malloc(total_len);
+ memcpy(msg, ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, desc_len);
+ if (ei) {
+ memcpy(msg+desc_len, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, extra_len);
+ }
+ msg[desc_len+extra_len] = 0;
+
+ directory_post_to_dirservers(DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR,
+ (auth & BRIDGE_DIRINFO) ?
+ ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE :
+ ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL,
+ auth, msg, desc_len, extra_len);
+ tor_free(msg);
+}
+
+/** OR only: Check whether my exit policy says to allow connection to
+ * conn. Return 0 if we accept; non-0 if we reject.
+ */
+int
+router_compare_to_my_exit_policy(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port)
+{
+ const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+ if (!me) /* make sure routerinfo exists */
+ return -1;
+
+ /* make sure it's resolved to something. this way we can't get a
+ 'maybe' below. */
+ if (tor_addr_is_null(addr))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* look at router_get_my_routerinfo()->exit_policy for both the v4 and the
+ * v6 policies. The exit_policy field in router_get_my_routerinfo() is a
+ * bit unusual, in that it contains IPv6 and IPv6 entries. We don't want to
+ * look at router_get_my_routerinfo()->ipv6_exit_policy, since that's a port
+ * summary. */
+ if ((tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET ||
+ tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6)) {
+ return compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(addr, port,
+ me->exit_policy) != ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED;
+#if 0
+ } else if (tor_addr_family(addr) == AF_INET6) {
+ return get_options()->IPv6Exit &&
+ desc_routerinfo->ipv6_exit_policy &&
+ compare_tor_addr_to_short_policy(addr, port,
+ me->ipv6_exit_policy) != ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED;
+#endif /* 0 */
+ } else {
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/** Return true iff my exit policy is reject *:*. Return -1 if we don't
+ * have a descriptor */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star,(void))
+{
+ const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+ if (!me) /* make sure routerinfo exists */
+ return -1;
+
+ return me->policy_is_reject_star;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff I'm a server and <b>digest</b> is equal to
+ * my server identity key digest. */
+int
+router_digest_is_me(const char *digest)
+{
+ return (server_identitykey &&
+ tor_memeq(server_identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN));
+}
+
+/** Return my identity digest. */
+const uint8_t *
+router_get_my_id_digest(void)
+{
+ return (const uint8_t *)server_identitykey_digest;
+}
+
+/** Return true iff I'm a server and <b>digest</b> is equal to
+ * my identity digest. */
+int
+router_extrainfo_digest_is_me(const char *digest)
+{
+ extrainfo_t *ei = router_get_my_extrainfo();
+ if (!ei)
+ return 0;
+
+ return tor_memeq(digest,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN);
+}
+
+/** A wrapper around router_digest_is_me(). */
+int
+router_is_me(const routerinfo_t *router)
+{
+ return router_digest_is_me(router->cache_info.identity_digest);
+}
+
+/** Return a routerinfo for this OR, rebuilding a fresh one if
+ * necessary. Return NULL on error, or if called on an OP. */
+MOCK_IMPL(const routerinfo_t *,
+router_get_my_routerinfo,(void))
+{
+ return router_get_my_routerinfo_with_err(NULL);
+}
+
+/** Return routerinfo of this OR. Rebuild it from
+ * scratch if needed. Set <b>*err</b> to 0 on success or to
+ * appropriate TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_* value on failure.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(const routerinfo_t *,
+router_get_my_routerinfo_with_err,(int *err))
+{
+ if (!server_mode(get_options())) {
+ if (err)
+ *err = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NOT_A_SERVER;
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (!desc_clean_since) {
+ int rebuild_err = router_rebuild_descriptor(0);
+ if (rebuild_err < 0) {
+ if (err)
+ *err = rebuild_err;
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!desc_routerinfo) {
+ if (err)
+ *err = TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING;
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (err)
+ *err = 0;
+
+ return desc_routerinfo;
+}
+
+/** OR only: Return a signed server descriptor for this OR, rebuilding a fresh
+ * one if necessary. Return NULL on error.
+ */
+const char *
+router_get_my_descriptor(void)
+{
+ const char *body;
+ const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+ if (! me)
+ return NULL;
+ tor_assert(me->cache_info.saved_location == SAVED_NOWHERE);
+ body = signed_descriptor_get_body(&me->cache_info);
+ /* Make sure this is nul-terminated. */
+ tor_assert(!body[me->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len]);
+ log_debug(LD_GENERAL,"my desc is '%s'", body);
+ return body;
+}
+
+/** Return the extrainfo document for this OR, or NULL if we have none.
+ * Rebuilt it (and the server descriptor) if necessary. */
+extrainfo_t *
+router_get_my_extrainfo(void)
+{
+ if (!server_mode(get_options()))
+ return NULL;
+ if (router_rebuild_descriptor(0))
+ return NULL;
+ return desc_extrainfo;
+}
+
+/** Return a human-readable string describing what triggered us to generate
+ * our current descriptor, or NULL if we don't know. */
+const char *
+router_get_descriptor_gen_reason(void)
+{
+ return desc_gen_reason;
+}
+
+static int router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess);
+
+/** Make a current best guess at our address, either because
+ * it's configured in torrc, or because we've learned it from
+ * dirserver headers. Place the answer in *<b>addr</b> and return
+ * 0 on success, else return -1 if we have no guess.
+ *
+ * If <b>cache_only</b> is true, just return any cached answers, and
+ * don't try to get any new answers.
+ */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+router_pick_published_address,(const or_options_t *options, uint32_t *addr,
+ int cache_only))
+{
+ /* First, check the cached output from resolve_my_address(). */
+ *addr = get_last_resolved_addr();
+ if (*addr)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Second, consider doing a resolve attempt right here. */
+ if (!cache_only) {
+ if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, addr, NULL, NULL) >= 0) {
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG,"Success: chose address '%s'.", fmt_addr32(*addr));
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Third, check the cached output from router_new_address_suggestion(). */
+ if (router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(addr) >= 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* We have no useful cached answers. Return failure. */
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Like router_check_descriptor_address_consistency, but specifically for the
+ * ORPort or DirPort.
+ * listener_type is either CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER or CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER. */
+static void
+router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(uint32_t ipv4h_desc_addr,
+ int listener_type)
+{
+ tor_assert(listener_type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER ||
+ listener_type == CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER);
+
+ /* The first advertised Port may be the magic constant CFG_AUTO_PORT.
+ */
+ int port_v4_cfg = get_first_advertised_port_by_type_af(listener_type,
+ AF_INET);
+ if (port_v4_cfg != 0 &&
+ !port_exists_by_type_addr32h_port(listener_type,
+ ipv4h_desc_addr, port_v4_cfg, 1)) {
+ const tor_addr_t *port_addr = get_first_advertised_addr_by_type_af(
+ listener_type,
+ AF_INET);
+ /* If we're building a descriptor with no advertised address,
+ * something is terribly wrong. */
+ tor_assert(port_addr);
+
+ tor_addr_t desc_addr;
+ char port_addr_str[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
+ char desc_addr_str[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
+
+ tor_addr_to_str(port_addr_str, port_addr, TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN, 0);
+
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&desc_addr, ipv4h_desc_addr);
+ tor_addr_to_str(desc_addr_str, &desc_addr, TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN, 0);
+
+ const char *listener_str = (listener_type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER ?
+ "OR" : "Dir");
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "The IPv4 %sPort address %s does not match the "
+ "descriptor address %s. If you have a static public IPv4 "
+ "address, use 'Address <IPv4>' and 'OutboundBindAddress "
+ "<IPv4>'. If you are behind a NAT, use two %sPort lines: "
+ "'%sPort <PublicPort> NoListen' and '%sPort <InternalPort> "
+ "NoAdvertise'.",
+ listener_str, port_addr_str, desc_addr_str, listener_str,
+ listener_str, listener_str);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Tor relays only have one IPv4 address in the descriptor, which is derived
+ * from the Address torrc option, or guessed using various methods in
+ * router_pick_published_address().
+ * Warn the operator if there is no ORPort on the descriptor address
+ * ipv4h_desc_addr.
+ * Warn the operator if there is no DirPort on the descriptor address.
+ * This catches a few common config errors:
+ * - operators who expect ORPorts and DirPorts to be advertised on the
+ * ports' listen addresses, rather than the torrc Address (or guessed
+ * addresses in the absence of an Address config). This includes
+ * operators who attempt to put their ORPort and DirPort on different
+ * addresses;
+ * - discrepancies between guessed addresses and configured listen
+ * addresses (when the Address option isn't set).
+ * If a listener is listening on all IPv4 addresses, it is assumed that it
+ * is listening on the configured Address, and no messages are logged.
+ * If an operators has specified NoAdvertise ORPorts in a NAT setting,
+ * no messages are logged, unless they have specified other advertised
+ * addresses.
+ * The message tells operators to configure an ORPort and DirPort that match
+ * the Address (using NoListen if needed).
+ */
+static void
+router_check_descriptor_address_consistency(uint32_t ipv4h_desc_addr)
+{
+ router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(ipv4h_desc_addr,
+ CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER);
+ router_check_descriptor_address_port_consistency(ipv4h_desc_addr,
+ CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER);
+}
+
+/** A list of nicknames that we've warned about including in our family,
+ * for one reason or another. */
+static smartlist_t *warned_family = NULL;
+
+/**
+ * Return a new smartlist containing the family members configured in
+ * <b>options</b>. Warn about invalid or missing entries. Return NULL
+ * if this relay should not declare a family.
+ **/
+STATIC smartlist_t *
+get_my_declared_family(const or_options_t *options)
+{
+ if (!options->MyFamily)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (options->BridgeRelay)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!warned_family)
+ warned_family = smartlist_new();
+
+ smartlist_t *declared_family = smartlist_new();
+ config_line_t *family;
+
+ /* First we try to get the whole family in the form of hexdigests. */
+ for (family = options->MyFamily; family; family = family->next) {
+ char *name = family->value;
+ const node_t *member;
+ if (options->Nickname && !strcasecmp(name, options->Nickname))
+ continue; /* Don't list ourself by nickname, that's redundant */
+ else
+ member = node_get_by_nickname(name, 0);
+
+ if (!member) {
+ /* This node doesn't seem to exist, so warn about it if it is not
+ * a hexdigest. */
+ int is_legal = is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(name);
+ if (!smartlist_contains_string(warned_family, name) &&
+ !is_legal_hexdigest(name)) {
+ if (is_legal)
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "There is a router named %s in my declared family, but "
+ "I have no descriptor for it. I'll use the nickname "
+ "as is, but this may confuse clients. Please list it "
+ "by identity digest instead.", escaped(name));
+ else
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named %s in my declared "
+ "family, but that isn't a legal digest or nickname. "
+ "Skipping it.", escaped(name));
+ smartlist_add_strdup(warned_family, name);
+ }
+ if (is_legal) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(declared_family, name);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* List the node by digest. */
+ char *fp = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
+ fp[0] = '$';
+ base16_encode(fp+1,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
+ member->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
+ smartlist_add(declared_family, fp);
+
+ if (! is_legal_hexdigest(name) &&
+ !smartlist_contains_string(warned_family, name)) {
+ /* Warn if this node was not specified by hexdigest. */
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named %s in my declared "
+ "family, but it wasn't listed by digest. Please consider "
+ "saying %s instead, if that's what you meant.",
+ escaped(name), fp);
+ smartlist_add_strdup(warned_family, name);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Now declared_family should have the closest we can come to the
+ * identities that the user wanted.
+ *
+ * Unlike older versions of Tor, we _do_ include our own identity: this
+ * helps microdescriptor compression, and helps in-memory compression
+ * on clients. */
+ nodefamily_t *nf = nodefamily_from_members(declared_family,
+ router_get_my_id_digest(),
+ NF_WARN_MALFORMED,
+ NULL);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(declared_family, char *, s, tor_free(s));
+ smartlist_free(declared_family);
+ if (!nf) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ char *s = nodefamily_format(nf);
+ nodefamily_free(nf);
+
+ smartlist_t *result = smartlist_new();
+ smartlist_split_string(result, s, NULL,
+ SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
+ tor_free(s);
+
+ if (smartlist_len(result) == 1) {
+ /* This is a one-element list containing only ourself; instead return
+ * nothing */
+ const char *singleton = smartlist_get(result, 0);
+ bool is_me = false;
+ if (singleton[0] == '$') {
+ char d[DIGEST_LEN];
+ int n = base16_decode(d, sizeof(d), singleton+1, strlen(singleton+1));
+ if (n == DIGEST_LEN &&
+ fast_memeq(d, router_get_my_id_digest(), DIGEST_LEN)) {
+ is_me = true;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!is_me) {
+ // LCOV_EXCL_START
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Found a singleton family list with an element "
+ "that wasn't us! Element was %s", escaped(singleton));
+ // LCOV_EXCL_STOP
+ } else {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(result, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(result);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** Build a fresh routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and extra-info document
+ * for this OR. Set r to the generated routerinfo, e to the generated
+ * extra-info document. Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error. Failure to
+ * generate an extra-info document is not an error and is indicated by setting
+ * e to NULL. Caller is responsible for freeing generated documents if 0 is
+ * returned.
+ */
+int
+router_build_fresh_descriptor(routerinfo_t **r, extrainfo_t **e)
+{
+ routerinfo_t *ri;
+ extrainfo_t *ei;
+ uint32_t addr;
+ char platform[256];
+ int hibernating = we_are_hibernating();
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ if (router_pick_published_address(options, &addr, 0) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Don't know my address while generating descriptor");
+ return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_NO_EXT_ADDR;
+ }
+
+ /* Log a message if the address in the descriptor doesn't match the ORPort
+ * and DirPort addresses configured by the operator. */
+ router_check_descriptor_address_consistency(addr);
+
+ ri = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t));
+ ri->cache_info.routerlist_index = -1;
+ ri->nickname = tor_strdup(options->Nickname);
+ ri->addr = addr;
+ ri->or_port = router_get_advertised_or_port(options);
+ ri->dir_port = router_get_advertised_dir_port(options, 0);
+ ri->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests =
+ directory_permits_begindir_requests(options);
+ ri->cache_info.published_on = time(NULL);
+ /* get_onion_key() must invoke from main thread */
+ router_set_rsa_onion_pkey(get_onion_key(), &ri->onion_pkey,
+ &ri->onion_pkey_len);
+
+ ri->onion_curve25519_pkey =
+ tor_memdup(&get_current_curve25519_keypair()->pubkey,
+ sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
+
+ /* For now, at most one IPv6 or-address is being advertised. */
+ {
+ const port_cfg_t *ipv6_orport = NULL;
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(get_configured_ports(), const port_cfg_t *, p) {
+ if (p->type == CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER &&
+ ! p->server_cfg.no_advertise &&
+ ! p->server_cfg.bind_ipv4_only &&
+ tor_addr_family(&p->addr) == AF_INET6) {
+ /* Like IPv4, if the relay is configured using the default
+ * authorities, disallow internal IPs. Otherwise, allow them. */
+ const int default_auth = using_default_dir_authorities(options);
+ if (! tor_addr_is_internal(&p->addr, 0) || ! default_auth) {
+ ipv6_orport = p;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ char addrbuf[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
+ log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
+ "Unable to use configured IPv6 address \"%s\" in a "
+ "descriptor. Skipping it. "
+ "Try specifying a globally reachable address explicitly.",
+ tor_addr_to_str(addrbuf, &p->addr, sizeof(addrbuf), 1));
+ }
+ }
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(p);
+ if (ipv6_orport) {
+ tor_addr_copy(&ri->ipv6_addr, &ipv6_orport->addr);
+ ri->ipv6_orport = ipv6_orport->port;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_server_identity_key());
+ if (BUG(crypto_pk_get_digest(ri->identity_pkey,
+ ri->cache_info.identity_digest) < 0)) {
+ routerinfo_free(ri);
+ return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DIGEST_FAILED;
+ }
+ ri->cache_info.signing_key_cert =
+ tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
+
+ get_platform_str(platform, sizeof(platform));
+ ri->platform = tor_strdup(platform);
+
+ ri->protocol_list = tor_strdup(protover_get_supported_protocols());
+
+ /* compute ri->bandwidthrate as the min of various options */
+ ri->bandwidthrate = get_effective_bwrate(options);
+
+ /* and compute ri->bandwidthburst similarly */
+ ri->bandwidthburst = get_effective_bwburst(options);
+
+ /* Report bandwidth, unless we're hibernating or shutting down */
+ ri->bandwidthcapacity = hibernating ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess();
+
+ if (dns_seems_to_be_broken() || has_dns_init_failed()) {
+ /* DNS is screwed up; don't claim to be an exit. */
+ policies_exit_policy_append_reject_star(&ri->exit_policy);
+ } else {
+ policies_parse_exit_policy_from_options(options,ri->addr,&ri->ipv6_addr,
+ &ri->exit_policy);
+ }
+ ri->policy_is_reject_star =
+ policy_is_reject_star(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET, 1) &&
+ policy_is_reject_star(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET6, 1);
+
+ if (options->IPv6Exit) {
+ char *p_tmp = policy_summarize(ri->exit_policy, AF_INET6);
+ if (p_tmp)
+ ri->ipv6_exit_policy = parse_short_policy(p_tmp);
+ tor_free(p_tmp);
+ }
+
+ ri->declared_family = get_my_declared_family(options);
+
+ /* Now generate the extrainfo. */
+ ei = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extrainfo_t));
+ ei->cache_info.is_extrainfo = 1;
+ strlcpy(ei->nickname, get_options()->Nickname, sizeof(ei->nickname));
+ ei->cache_info.published_on = ri->cache_info.published_on;
+ ei->cache_info.signing_key_cert =
+ tor_cert_dup(get_master_signing_key_cert());
+
+ memcpy(ei->cache_info.identity_digest, ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN);
+ if (extrainfo_dump_to_string(&ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
+ ei, get_server_identity_key(),
+ get_master_signing_keypair()) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate extra-info descriptor.");
+ extrainfo_free(ei);
+ ei = NULL;
+ } else {
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
+ strlen(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
+ router_get_extrainfo_hash(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
+ crypto_digest256((char*) ei->digest256,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len,
+ DIGEST_SHA256);
+ }
+
+ /* Now finish the router descriptor. */
+ if (ei) {
+ memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest,
+ ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
+ DIGEST_LEN);
+ memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest256,
+ ei->digest256,
+ DIGEST256_LEN);
+ } else {
+ /* ri was allocated with tor_malloc_zero, so there is no need to
+ * zero ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest here. */
+ }
+ if (! (ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body =
+ router_dump_router_to_string(ri, get_server_identity_key(),
+ get_onion_key(),
+ get_current_curve25519_keypair(),
+ get_master_signing_keypair())) ) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate router descriptor.");
+ routerinfo_free(ri);
+ extrainfo_free(ei);
+ return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_CANNOT_GENERATE;
+ }
+ ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
+ strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
+
+ ri->purpose =
+ options->BridgeRelay ? ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE : ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL;
+ if (options->BridgeRelay) {
+ /* Bridges shouldn't be able to send their descriptors unencrypted,
+ anyway, since they don't have a DirPort, and always connect to the
+ bridge authority anonymously. But just in case they somehow think of
+ sending them on an unencrypted connection, don't allow them to try. */
+ ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 0;
+ if (ei)
+ ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 0;
+ } else {
+ ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
+ if (ei)
+ ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
+ }
+
+ router_get_router_hash(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
+ strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body),
+ ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
+
+ if (ei) {
+ tor_assert(!
+ routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri->identity_pkey, ei,
+ &ri->cache_info, NULL));
+ }
+
+ *r = ri;
+ *e = ei;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** If <b>force</b> is true, or our descriptor is out-of-date, rebuild a fresh
+ * routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and extra-info document for this OR.
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error.
+ */
+int
+router_rebuild_descriptor(int force)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ routerinfo_t *ri;
+ extrainfo_t *ei;
+ uint32_t addr;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ if (desc_clean_since && !force)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (router_pick_published_address(options, &addr, 0) < 0 ||
+ router_get_advertised_or_port(options) == 0) {
+ /* Stop trying to rebuild our descriptor every second. We'll
+ * learn that it's time to try again when ip_address_changed()
+ * marks it dirty. */
+ desc_clean_since = time(NULL);
+ return TOR_ROUTERINFO_ERROR_DESC_REBUILDING;
+ }
+
+ log_info(LD_OR, "Rebuilding relay descriptor%s", force ? " (forced)" : "");
+
+ err = router_build_fresh_descriptor(&ri, &ei);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo);
+ desc_routerinfo = ri;
+ extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo);
+ desc_extrainfo = ei;
+
+ desc_clean_since = time(NULL);
+ desc_needs_upload = 1;
+ desc_gen_reason = desc_dirty_reason;
+ if (BUG(desc_gen_reason == NULL)) {
+ desc_gen_reason = "descriptor was marked dirty earlier, for no reason.";
+ }
+ desc_dirty_reason = NULL;
+ control_event_my_descriptor_changed();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/** If our router descriptor ever goes this long without being regenerated
+ * because something changed, we force an immediate regenerate-and-upload. */
+#define FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL (18*60*60)
+
+/** If our router descriptor seems to be missing or unacceptable according
+ * to the authorities, regenerate and reupload it _this_ often. */
+#define FAST_RETRY_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL (90*60)
+
+/** Mark descriptor out of date if it's been "too long" since we last tried
+ * to upload one. */
+void
+mark_my_descriptor_dirty_if_too_old(time_t now)
+{
+ networkstatus_t *ns;
+ const routerstatus_t *rs;
+ const char *retry_fast_reason = NULL; /* Set if we should retry frequently */
+ const time_t slow_cutoff = now - FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL;
+ const time_t fast_cutoff = now - FAST_RETRY_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL;
+
+ /* If it's already dirty, don't mark it. */
+ if (! desc_clean_since)
+ return;
+
+ /* If it's older than FORCE_REGENERATE_DESCRIPTOR_INTERVAL, it's always
+ * time to rebuild it. */
+ if (desc_clean_since < slow_cutoff) {
+ mark_my_descriptor_dirty("time for new descriptor");
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Now we see whether we want to be retrying frequently or no. The
+ * rule here is that we'll retry frequently if we aren't listed in the
+ * live consensus we have, or if the publication time of the
+ * descriptor listed for us in the consensus is very old, or if the
+ * consensus lists us as "stale" and we haven't regenerated since the
+ * consensus was published. */
+ ns = networkstatus_get_live_consensus(now);
+ if (ns) {
+ rs = networkstatus_vote_find_entry(ns, server_identitykey_digest);
+ if (rs == NULL)
+ retry_fast_reason = "not listed in consensus";
+ else if (rs->published_on < slow_cutoff)
+ retry_fast_reason = "version listed in consensus is quite old";
+ else if (rs->is_staledesc && ns->valid_after > desc_clean_since)
+ retry_fast_reason = "listed as stale in consensus";
+ }
+
+ if (retry_fast_reason && desc_clean_since < fast_cutoff)
+ mark_my_descriptor_dirty(retry_fast_reason);
+}
+
+/** Call when the current descriptor is out of date. */
+void
+mark_my_descriptor_dirty(const char *reason)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ if (BUG(reason == NULL)) {
+ reason = "marked descriptor dirty for unspecified reason";
+ }
+ if (server_mode(options) && options->PublishServerDescriptor_)
+ log_info(LD_OR, "Decided to publish new relay descriptor: %s", reason);
+ desc_clean_since = 0;
+ if (!desc_dirty_reason)
+ desc_dirty_reason = reason;
+}
+
+/** How frequently will we republish our descriptor because of large (factor
+ * of 2) shifts in estimated bandwidth? Note: We don't use this constant
+ * if our previous bandwidth estimate was exactly 0. */
+#define MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ (3*60*60)
+
+/** Maximum uptime to republish our descriptor because of large shifts in
+ * estimated bandwidth. */
+#define MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE (24*60*60)
+
+/** By which factor bandwidth shifts have to change to be considered large. */
+#define BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR 2
+
+/** Check whether bandwidth has changed a lot since the last time we announced
+ * bandwidth while the uptime is smaller than MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE.
+ * If so, mark our descriptor dirty. */
+void
+check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time_t now)
+{
+ static time_t last_changed = 0;
+ uint64_t prev, cur;
+ const int hibernating = we_are_hibernating();
+
+ /* If the relay uptime is bigger than MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE,
+ * the next regularly scheduled descriptor update (18h) will be enough */
+ if (get_uptime() > MAX_UPTIME_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE && !hibernating)
+ return;
+
+ const routerinfo_t *my_ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+
+ if (!my_ri)
+ return;
+
+ prev = my_ri->bandwidthcapacity;
+
+ /* Consider ourselves to have zero bandwidth if we're hibernating or
+ * shutting down. */
+ cur = hibernating ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess();
+
+ if ((prev != cur && (!prev || !cur)) ||
+ cur > (prev * BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR) ||
+ cur < (prev / BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FACTOR) ) {
+ if (last_changed+MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ < now || !prev) {
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL,
+ "Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor.");
+ mark_my_descriptor_dirty("bandwidth has changed");
+ last_changed = now;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/** Note at log level severity that our best guess of address has changed from
+ * <b>prev</b> to <b>cur</b>. */
+static void
+log_addr_has_changed(int severity,
+ const tor_addr_t *prev,
+ const tor_addr_t *cur,
+ const char *source)
+{
+ char addrbuf_prev[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
+ char addrbuf_cur[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
+
+ if (BUG(!server_mode(get_options())))
+ return;
+
+ if (tor_addr_to_str(addrbuf_prev, prev, sizeof(addrbuf_prev), 1) == NULL)
+ strlcpy(addrbuf_prev, "???", TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN);
+ if (tor_addr_to_str(addrbuf_cur, cur, sizeof(addrbuf_cur), 1) == NULL)
+ strlcpy(addrbuf_cur, "???", TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN);
+
+ if (!tor_addr_is_null(prev))
+ log_fn(severity, LD_GENERAL,
+ "Our IP Address has changed from %s to %s; "
+ "rebuilding descriptor (source: %s).",
+ addrbuf_prev, addrbuf_cur, source);
+ else
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL,
+ "Guessed our IP address as %s (source: %s).",
+ addrbuf_cur, source);
+}
+
+/** Check whether our own address as defined by the Address configuration
+ * has changed. This is for routers that get their address from a service
+ * like dyndns. If our address has changed, mark our descriptor dirty. */
+void
+check_descriptor_ipaddress_changed(time_t now)
+{
+ uint32_t prev, cur;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ const char *method = NULL;
+ char *hostname = NULL;
+ const routerinfo_t *my_ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
+
+ (void) now;
+
+ if (my_ri == NULL) /* make sure routerinfo exists */
+ return;
+
+ /* XXXX ipv6 */
+ prev = my_ri->addr;
+ if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, &method, &hostname) < 0) {
+ log_info(LD_CONFIG,"options->Address didn't resolve into an IP.");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (prev != cur) {
+ char *source;
+ tor_addr_t tmp_prev, tmp_cur;
+
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&tmp_prev, prev);
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&tmp_cur, cur);
+
+ tor_asprintf(&source, "METHOD=%s%s%s", method,
+ hostname ? " HOSTNAME=" : "",
+ hostname ? hostname : "");
+
+ log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, &tmp_prev, &tmp_cur, source);
+ tor_free(source);
+
+ ip_address_changed(0);
+ }
+
+ tor_free(hostname);
+}
+
+/** The most recently guessed value of our IP address, based on directory
+ * headers. */
+static tor_addr_t last_guessed_ip = TOR_ADDR_NULL;
+
+/** A directory server <b>d_conn</b> told us our IP address is
+ * <b>suggestion</b>.
+ * If this address is different from the one we think we are now, and
+ * if our computer doesn't actually know its IP address, then switch. */
+void
+router_new_address_suggestion(const char *suggestion,
+ const dir_connection_t *d_conn)
+{
+ tor_addr_t addr;
+ uint32_t cur = 0; /* Current IPv4 address. */
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+
+ /* first, learn what the IP address actually is */
+ if (tor_addr_parse(&addr, suggestion) == -1) {
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "Malformed X-Your-Address-Is header %s. Ignoring.",
+ escaped(suggestion));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "Got X-Your-Address-Is: %s.", suggestion);
+
+ if (!server_mode(options)) {
+ tor_addr_copy(&last_guessed_ip, &addr);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* XXXX ipv6 */
+ cur = get_last_resolved_addr();
+ if (cur ||
+ resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, NULL, NULL) >= 0) {
+ /* We're all set -- we already know our address. Great. */
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&last_guessed_ip, cur); /* store it in case we
+ need it later */
+ return;
+ }
+ if (tor_addr_is_internal(&addr, 0)) {
+ /* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is, say, 127.0.0.1. */
+ return;
+ }
+ if (tor_addr_eq(&d_conn->base_.addr, &addr)) {
+ /* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is their IP. */
+ log_debug(LD_DIR, "A directory server told us our IP address is %s, "
+ "but they are just reporting their own IP address. Ignoring.",
+ suggestion);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Okay. We can't resolve our own address, and X-Your-Address-Is is giving
+ * us an answer different from what we had the last time we managed to
+ * resolve it. */
+ if (!tor_addr_eq(&last_guessed_ip, &addr)) {
+ control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
+ "EXTERNAL_ADDRESS ADDRESS=%s METHOD=DIRSERV",
+ suggestion);
+ log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, &last_guessed_ip, &addr,
+ d_conn->base_.address);
+ ip_address_changed(0);
+ tor_addr_copy(&last_guessed_ip, &addr); /* router_rebuild_descriptor()
+ will fetch it */
+ }
+}
+
+/** We failed to resolve our address locally, but we'd like to build
+ * a descriptor and publish / test reachability. If we have a guess
+ * about our address based on directory headers, answer it and return
+ * 0; else return -1. */
+static int
+router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess)
+{
+ if (!tor_addr_is_null(&last_guessed_ip)) {
+ *guess = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&last_guessed_ip);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/** Set <b>platform</b> (max length <b>len</b>) to a NUL-terminated short
+ * string describing the version of Tor and the operating system we're
+ * currently running on.
+ */
+STATIC void
+get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len)
+{
+ tor_snprintf(platform, len, "Tor %s on %s",
+ get_short_version(), get_uname());
+}
+
+/* XXX need to audit this thing and count fenceposts. maybe
+ * refactor so we don't have to keep asking if we're
+ * near the end of maxlen?
+ */
+#define DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
+
+/** OR only: Given a routerinfo for this router, and an identity key to sign
+ * with, encode the routerinfo as a signed server descriptor and return a new
+ * string encoding the result, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+char *
+router_dump_router_to_string(routerinfo_t *router,
+ const crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
+ const crypto_pk_t *tap_key,
+ const curve25519_keypair_t *ntor_keypair,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair)
+{
+ char *address = NULL;
+ char *onion_pkey = NULL; /* Onion key, PEM-encoded. */
+ crypto_pk_t *rsa_pubkey = NULL;
+ char *identity_pkey = NULL; /* Identity key, PEM-encoded. */
+ char digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
+ char *extra_info_line = NULL;
+ size_t onion_pkeylen, identity_pkeylen;
+ char *family_line = NULL;
+ char *extra_or_address = NULL;
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ smartlist_t *chunks = NULL;
+ char *output = NULL;
+ const int emit_ed_sigs = signing_keypair &&
+ router->cache_info.signing_key_cert;
+ char *ed_cert_line = NULL;
+ char *rsa_tap_cc_line = NULL;
+ char *ntor_cc_line = NULL;
+ char *proto_line = NULL;
+
+ /* Make sure the identity key matches the one in the routerinfo. */
+ if (!crypto_pk_eq_keys(ident_key, router->identity_pkey)) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Tried to sign a router with a private key that didn't "
+ "match router's public key!");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (emit_ed_sigs) {
+ if (!router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included ||
+ !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signed_key,
+ &signing_keypair->pubkey)) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to sign a router descriptor with a mismatched "
+ "ed25519 key chain %d",
+ router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* record our fingerprint, so we can include it in the descriptor */
+ if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(router->identity_pkey, fingerprint, 1)<0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG,"Error computing fingerprint");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (emit_ed_sigs) {
+ /* Encode ed25519 signing cert */
+ char ed_cert_base64[256];
+ char ed_fp_base64[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
+ if (base64_encode(ed_cert_base64, sizeof(ed_cert_base64),
+ (const char*)router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded,
+ router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
+ BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode signing key certificate!");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (ed25519_public_to_base64(ed_fp_base64,
+ &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key)<0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode identity key\n");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_asprintf(&ed_cert_line, "identity-ed25519\n"
+ "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+ "%s"
+ "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+ "master-key-ed25519 %s\n",
+ ed_cert_base64, ed_fp_base64);
+ }
+
+ /* PEM-encode the onion key */
+ rsa_pubkey = router_get_rsa_onion_pkey(router->onion_pkey,
+ router->onion_pkey_len);
+ if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(rsa_pubkey,
+ &onion_pkey,&onion_pkeylen)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"write onion_pkey to string failed!");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* PEM-encode the identity key */
+ if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(router->identity_pkey,
+ &identity_pkey,&identity_pkeylen)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"write identity_pkey to string failed!");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Cross-certify with RSA key */
+ if (tap_key && router->cache_info.signing_key_cert &&
+ router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included) {
+ char buf[256];
+ int tap_cc_len = 0;
+ uint8_t *tap_cc =
+ make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(tap_key,
+ &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key,
+ router->identity_pkey,
+ &tap_cc_len);
+ if (!tap_cc) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"make_tap_onion_key_crosscert failed!");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), (const char*)tap_cc, tap_cc_len,
+ BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"base64_encode(rsa_crosscert) failed!");
+ tor_free(tap_cc);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_free(tap_cc);
+
+ tor_asprintf(&rsa_tap_cc_line,
+ "onion-key-crosscert\n"
+ "-----BEGIN CROSSCERT-----\n"
+ "%s"
+ "-----END CROSSCERT-----\n", buf);
+ }
+
+ /* Cross-certify with onion keys */
+ if (ntor_keypair && router->cache_info.signing_key_cert &&
+ router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included) {
+ int sign = 0;
+ char buf[256];
+ /* XXXX Base the expiration date on the actual onion key expiration time?*/
+ tor_cert_t *cert =
+ make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert(ntor_keypair,
+ &router->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key,
+ router->cache_info.published_on,
+ get_onion_key_lifetime(), &sign);
+ if (!cert) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"make_ntor_onion_key_crosscert failed!");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_assert(sign == 0 || sign == 1);
+
+ if (base64_encode(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ (const char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len,
+ BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE)<0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"base64_encode(ntor_crosscert) failed!");
+ tor_cert_free(cert);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_cert_free(cert);
+
+ tor_asprintf(&ntor_cc_line,
+ "ntor-onion-key-crosscert %d\n"
+ "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+ "%s"
+ "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", sign, buf);
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the publication time. */
+ format_iso_time(published, router->cache_info.published_on);
+
+ if (router->declared_family && smartlist_len(router->declared_family)) {
+ char *family = smartlist_join_strings(router->declared_family,
+ " ", 0, NULL);
+ tor_asprintf(&family_line, "family %s\n", family);
+ tor_free(family);
+ } else {
+ family_line = tor_strdup("");
+ }
+
+ if (!tor_digest_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest)) {
+ char extra_info_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ base16_encode(extra_info_digest, sizeof(extra_info_digest),
+ router->cache_info.extra_info_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ if (!tor_digest256_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256)) {
+ char d256_64[BASE64_DIGEST256_LEN+1];
+ digest256_to_base64(d256_64, router->cache_info.extra_info_digest256);
+ tor_asprintf(&extra_info_line, "extra-info-digest %s %s\n",
+ extra_info_digest, d256_64);
+ } else {
+ tor_asprintf(&extra_info_line, "extra-info-digest %s\n",
+ extra_info_digest);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (router->ipv6_orport &&
+ tor_addr_family(&router->ipv6_addr) == AF_INET6) {
+ char addr[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN];
+ const char *a;
+ a = tor_addr_to_str(addr, &router->ipv6_addr, sizeof(addr), 1);
+ if (a) {
+ tor_asprintf(&extra_or_address,
+ "or-address %s:%d\n", a, router->ipv6_orport);
+ log_debug(LD_OR, "My or-address line is <%s>", extra_or_address);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (router->protocol_list) {
+ tor_asprintf(&proto_line, "proto %s\n", router->protocol_list);
+ } else {
+ proto_line = tor_strdup("");
+ }
+
+ address = tor_dup_ip(router->addr);
+ chunks = smartlist_new();
+
+ /* Generate the easy portion of the router descriptor. */
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks,
+ "router %s %s %d 0 %d\n"
+ "%s"
+ "%s"
+ "platform %s\n"
+ "%s"
+ "published %s\n"
+ "fingerprint %s\n"
+ "uptime %ld\n"
+ "bandwidth %d %d %d\n"
+ "%s%s"
+ "onion-key\n%s"
+ "signing-key\n%s"
+ "%s%s"
+ "%s%s%s",
+ router->nickname,
+ address,
+ router->or_port,
+ router_should_advertise_dirport(options, router->dir_port),
+ ed_cert_line ? ed_cert_line : "",
+ extra_or_address ? extra_or_address : "",
+ router->platform,
+ proto_line,
+ published,
+ fingerprint,
+ get_uptime(),
+ (int) router->bandwidthrate,
+ (int) router->bandwidthburst,
+ (int) router->bandwidthcapacity,
+ extra_info_line ? extra_info_line : "",
+ (options->DownloadExtraInfo || options->V3AuthoritativeDir) ?
+ "caches-extra-info\n" : "",
+ onion_pkey, identity_pkey,
+ rsa_tap_cc_line ? rsa_tap_cc_line : "",
+ ntor_cc_line ? ntor_cc_line : "",
+ family_line,
+ we_are_hibernating() ? "hibernating 1\n" : "",
+ "hidden-service-dir\n");
+
+ if (options->ContactInfo && strlen(options->ContactInfo)) {
+ const char *ci = options->ContactInfo;
+ if (strchr(ci, '\n') || strchr(ci, '\r'))
+ ci = escaped(ci);
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "contact %s\n", ci);
+ }
+
+ if (options->BridgeRelay) {
+ const char *bd;
+ if (options->BridgeDistribution && strlen(options->BridgeDistribution)) {
+ bd = options->BridgeDistribution;
+ } else {
+ bd = "any";
+ }
+ if (strchr(bd, '\n') || strchr(bd, '\r'))
+ bd = escaped(bd);
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "bridge-distribution-request %s\n", bd);
+ }
+
+ if (router->onion_curve25519_pkey) {
+ char kbuf[128];
+ base64_encode(kbuf, sizeof(kbuf),
+ (const char *)router->onion_curve25519_pkey->public_key,
+ CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE);
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "ntor-onion-key %s", kbuf);
+ } else {
+ /* Authorities will start rejecting relays without ntor keys in 0.2.9 */
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "A relay must have an ntor onion key");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Write the exit policy to the end of 's'. */
+ if (!router->exit_policy || !smartlist_len(router->exit_policy)) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "reject *:*\n");
+ } else if (router->exit_policy) {
+ char *exit_policy = router_dump_exit_policy_to_string(router,1,0);
+
+ if (!exit_policy)
+ goto err;
+
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", exit_policy);
+ tor_free(exit_policy);
+ }
+
+ if (router->ipv6_exit_policy) {
+ char *p6 = write_short_policy(router->ipv6_exit_policy);
+ if (p6 && strcmp(p6, "reject 1-65535")) {
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks,
+ "ipv6-policy %s\n", p6);
+ }
+ tor_free(p6);
+ }
+
+ if (router_should_advertise_begindir(options,
+ router->supports_tunnelled_dir_requests)) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "tunnelled-dir-server\n");
+ }
+
+ /* Sign the descriptor with Ed25519 */
+ if (emit_ed_sigs) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-sig-ed25519 ");
+ crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
+ ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
+ chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA256);
+ ed25519_signature_t sig;
+ char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1];
+ if (ed25519_sign(&sig, (const uint8_t*)digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
+ signing_keypair) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &sig) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf);
+ }
+
+ /* Sign the descriptor with RSA */
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-signature\n");
+
+ crypto_digest_smartlist(digest, DIGEST_LEN, chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA1);
+
+ {
+ char *sig;
+ if (!(sig = router_get_dirobj_signature(digest, DIGEST_LEN, ident_key))) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't sign router descriptor");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ smartlist_add(chunks, sig);
+ }
+
+ /* include a last '\n' */
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "\n");
+
+ output = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
+ {
+ char *s_dup;
+ const char *cp;
+ routerinfo_t *ri_tmp;
+ cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(output);
+ ri_tmp = router_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, 0, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!ri_tmp) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG,
+ "We just generated a router descriptor we can't parse.");
+ log_err(LD_BUG, "Descriptor was: <<%s>>", output);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_free(s_dup);
+ routerinfo_free(ri_tmp);
+ }
+#endif /* defined(DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING) */
+
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ tor_free(output); /* sets output to NULL */
+ done:
+ if (chunks) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(chunks);
+ }
+ crypto_pk_free(rsa_pubkey);
+ tor_free(address);
+ tor_free(family_line);
+ tor_free(onion_pkey);
+ tor_free(identity_pkey);
+ tor_free(extra_or_address);
+ tor_free(ed_cert_line);
+ tor_free(rsa_tap_cc_line);
+ tor_free(ntor_cc_line);
+ tor_free(extra_info_line);
+ tor_free(proto_line);
+
+ return output;
+}
+
+/**
+ * OR only: Given <b>router</b>, produce a string with its exit policy.
+ * If <b>include_ipv4</b> is true, include IPv4 entries.
+ * If <b>include_ipv6</b> is true, include IPv6 entries.
+ */
+char *
+router_dump_exit_policy_to_string(const routerinfo_t *router,
+ int include_ipv4,
+ int include_ipv6)
+{
+ if ((!router->exit_policy) || (router->policy_is_reject_star)) {
+ return tor_strdup("reject *:*");
+ }
+
+ return policy_dump_to_string(router->exit_policy,
+ include_ipv4,
+ include_ipv6);
+}
+
+/** Load the contents of <b>filename</b>, find the last line starting with
+ * <b>end_line</b>, ensure that its timestamp is not more than 25 hours in
+ * the past or more than 1 hour in the future with respect to <b>now</b>,
+ * and write the file contents starting with that line to *<b>out</b>.
+ * Return 1 for success, 0 if the file does not exist or is empty, or -1
+ * if the file does not contain a line matching these criteria or other
+ * failure. */
+static int
+load_stats_file(const char *filename, const char *end_line, time_t now,
+ char **out)
+{
+ int r = -1;
+ char *fname = get_datadir_fname(filename);
+ char *contents, *start = NULL, *tmp, timestr[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ time_t written;
+ switch (file_status(fname)) {
+ case FN_FILE:
+ /* X022 Find an alternative to reading the whole file to memory. */
+ if ((contents = read_file_to_str(fname, 0, NULL))) {
+ tmp = strstr(contents, end_line);
+ /* Find last block starting with end_line */
+ while (tmp) {
+ start = tmp;
+ tmp = strstr(tmp + 1, end_line);
+ }
+ if (!start)
+ goto notfound;
+ if (strlen(start) < strlen(end_line) + 1 + sizeof(timestr))
+ goto notfound;
+ strlcpy(timestr, start + 1 + strlen(end_line), sizeof(timestr));
+ if (parse_iso_time(timestr, &written) < 0)
+ goto notfound;
+ if (written < now - (25*60*60) || written > now + (1*60*60))
+ goto notfound;
+ *out = tor_strdup(start);
+ r = 1;
+ }
+ notfound:
+ tor_free(contents);
+ break;
+ /* treat empty stats files as if the file doesn't exist */
+ case FN_NOENT:
+ case FN_EMPTY:
+ r = 0;
+ break;
+ case FN_ERROR:
+ case FN_DIR:
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ tor_free(fname);
+ return r;
+}
+
+/** Write the contents of <b>extrainfo</b> and aggregated statistics to
+ * *<b>s_out</b>, signing them with <b>ident_key</b>. Return 0 on
+ * success, negative on failure. */
+int
+extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
+ crypto_pk_t *ident_key,
+ const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_keypair)
+{
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
+ char identity[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
+ char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
+ char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
+ char *bandwidth_usage;
+ int result;
+ static int write_stats_to_extrainfo = 1;
+ char sig[DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN+1];
+ char *s = NULL, *pre, *contents, *cp, *s_dup = NULL;
+ time_t now = time(NULL);
+ smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new();
+ extrainfo_t *ei_tmp = NULL;
+ const int emit_ed_sigs = signing_keypair &&
+ extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert;
+ char *ed_cert_line = NULL;
+
+ base16_encode(identity, sizeof(identity),
+ extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
+ format_iso_time(published, extrainfo->cache_info.published_on);
+ bandwidth_usage = rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines();
+ if (emit_ed_sigs) {
+ if (!extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included ||
+ !ed25519_pubkey_eq(&extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signed_key,
+ &signing_keypair->pubkey)) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to sign a extrainfo descriptor with a "
+ "mismatched ed25519 key chain %d",
+ extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->signing_key_included);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ char ed_cert_base64[256];
+ if (base64_encode(ed_cert_base64, sizeof(ed_cert_base64),
+ (const char*)extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded,
+ extrainfo->cache_info.signing_key_cert->encoded_len,
+ BASE64_ENCODE_MULTILINE) < 0) {
+ log_err(LD_BUG,"Couldn't base64-encode signing key certificate!");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ tor_asprintf(&ed_cert_line, "identity-ed25519\n"
+ "-----BEGIN ED25519 CERT-----\n"
+ "%s"
+ "-----END ED25519 CERT-----\n", ed_cert_base64);
+ } else {
+ ed_cert_line = tor_strdup("");
+ }
+
+ tor_asprintf(&pre, "extra-info %s %s\n%spublished %s\n%s",
+ extrainfo->nickname, identity,
+ ed_cert_line,
+ published, bandwidth_usage);
+ smartlist_add(chunks, pre);
+
+ if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET))
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "geoip-db-digest %s\n",
+ geoip_db_digest(AF_INET));
+ if (geoip_is_loaded(AF_INET6))
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "geoip6-db-digest %s\n",
+ geoip_db_digest(AF_INET6));
+
+ if (options->ExtraInfoStatistics && write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
+ log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Adding stats to extra-info descriptor.");
+ if (options->DirReqStatistics &&
+ load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"dirreq-stats",
+ "dirreq-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
+ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
+ }
+ if (options->HiddenServiceStatistics &&
+ load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"hidserv-stats",
+ "hidserv-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
+ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
+ }
+ if (options->EntryStatistics &&
+ load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"entry-stats",
+ "entry-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
+ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
+ }
+ if (options->CellStatistics &&
+ load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"buffer-stats",
+ "cell-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
+ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
+ }
+ if (options->ExitPortStatistics &&
+ load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"exit-stats",
+ "exit-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
+ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
+ }
+ if (options->ConnDirectionStatistics &&
+ load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"conn-stats",
+ "conn-bi-direct", now, &contents) > 0) {
+ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
+ }
- }
-
- if (options->PaddingStatistics) {
- contents = rep_hist_get_padding_count_lines();
- if (contents)
- smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
++ if (options->PaddingStatistics) {
++ contents = rep_hist_get_padding_count_lines();
++ if (contents)
++ smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
++ }
+ }
+
+ /* Add information about the pluggable transports we support. */
+ if (options->ServerTransportPlugin) {
+ char *pluggable_transports = pt_get_extra_info_descriptor_string();
+ if (pluggable_transports)
+ smartlist_add(chunks, pluggable_transports);
+ }
+
+ if (should_record_bridge_info(options) && write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
+ const char *bridge_stats = geoip_get_bridge_stats_extrainfo(now);
+ if (bridge_stats) {
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, bridge_stats);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (emit_ed_sigs) {
+ char sha256_digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-sig-ed25519 ");
+ crypto_digest_smartlist_prefix(sha256_digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
+ ED_DESC_SIGNATURE_PREFIX,
+ chunks, "", DIGEST_SHA256);
+ ed25519_signature_t ed_sig;
+ char buf[ED25519_SIG_BASE64_LEN+1];
+ if (ed25519_sign(&ed_sig, (const uint8_t*)sha256_digest, DIGEST256_LEN,
+ signing_keypair) < 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (ed25519_signature_to_base64(buf, &ed_sig) < 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ smartlist_add_asprintf(chunks, "%s\n", buf);
+ }
+
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, "router-signature\n");
+ s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
+
+ while (strlen(s) > MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE - DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN) {
+ /* So long as there are at least two chunks (one for the initial
+ * extra-info line and one for the router-signature), we can keep removing
+ * things. */
+ if (smartlist_len(chunks) > 2) {
+ /* We remove the next-to-last element (remember, len-1 is the last
+ element), since we need to keep the router-signature element. */
+ int idx = smartlist_len(chunks) - 2;
+ char *e = smartlist_get(chunks, idx);
+ smartlist_del_keeporder(chunks, idx);
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor "
+ "with statistics that exceeds the 50 KB "
+ "upload limit. Removing last added "
+ "statistics.");
+ tor_free(e);
+ tor_free(s);
+ s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extra-info descriptors that "
+ "exceeds the 50 KB upload limit.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig));
+ if (router_get_extrainfo_hash(s, strlen(s), digest) < 0 ||
+ router_append_dirobj_signature(sig, sizeof(sig), digest, DIGEST_LEN,
+ ident_key) < 0) {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not append signature to extra-info "
+ "descriptor.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ smartlist_add_strdup(chunks, sig);
+ tor_free(s);
+ s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
+
+ cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(s);
+ ei_tmp = extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, NULL, NULL);
+ if (!ei_tmp) {
+ if (write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
+ log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor "
+ "with statistics that we can't parse. Not "
+ "adding statistics to this or any future "
+ "extra-info descriptors.");
+ write_stats_to_extrainfo = 0;
+ result = extrainfo_dump_to_string(s_out, extrainfo, ident_key,
+ signing_keypair);
+ goto done;
+ } else {
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extrainfo descriptor we "
+ "can't parse.");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *s_out = s;
+ s = NULL; /* prevent free */
+ result = 0;
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ result = -1;
+
+ done:
+ tor_free(s);
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, chunk, tor_free(chunk));
+ smartlist_free(chunks);
+ tor_free(s_dup);
+ tor_free(ed_cert_line);
+ extrainfo_free(ei_tmp);
+ tor_free(bandwidth_usage);
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/** Forget that we have issued any router-related warnings, so that we'll
+ * warn again if we see the same errors. */
+void
+router_reset_warnings(void)
+{
+ if (warned_family) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_clear(warned_family);
+ }
+}
+
+/** Release all static resources held in router.c */
+void
+router_free_all(void)
+{
+ crypto_pk_free(onionkey);
+ crypto_pk_free(lastonionkey);
+ crypto_pk_free(server_identitykey);
+ crypto_pk_free(client_identitykey);
+
+ tor_mutex_free(key_lock);
+ routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo);
+ extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo);
+ crypto_pk_free(authority_signing_key);
+ authority_cert_free(authority_key_certificate);
+ crypto_pk_free(legacy_signing_key);
+ authority_cert_free(legacy_key_certificate);
+
+ memwipe(&curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(curve25519_onion_key));
+ memwipe(&last_curve25519_onion_key, 0, sizeof(last_curve25519_onion_key));
+
+ if (warned_family) {
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
+ smartlist_free(warned_family);
+ }
+}
+
+/* From the given RSA key object, convert it to ASN-1 encoded format and set
+ * the newly allocated object in onion_pkey_out. The length of the key is set
+ * in onion_pkey_len_out. */
+void
+router_set_rsa_onion_pkey(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char **onion_pkey_out,
+ size_t *onion_pkey_len_out)
+{
+ int len;
+ char buf[1024];
+
+ tor_assert(pk);
+ tor_assert(onion_pkey_out);
+ tor_assert(onion_pkey_len_out);
+
+ len = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(pk, buf, sizeof(buf));
+ if (BUG(len < 0)) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ *onion_pkey_out = tor_memdup(buf, len);
+ *onion_pkey_len_out = len;
+
+ done:
+ return;
+}
+
+/* From an ASN-1 encoded onion pkey, return a newly allocated RSA key object.
+ * It is the caller responsability to free the returned object.
+ *
+ * Return NULL if the pkey is NULL, malformed or if the length is 0. */
+crypto_pk_t *
+router_get_rsa_onion_pkey(const char *pkey, size_t pkey_len)
+{
+ if (!pkey || pkey_len == 0) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return crypto_pk_asn1_decode(pkey, pkey_len);
+}
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