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[or-cvs] r22307: {} update the presentation, rename it to be more accurate to th (projects/presentations)
Author: phobos
Date: 2010-05-09 21:28:12 +0000 (Sun, 09 May 2010)
New Revision: 22307
Added:
projects/presentations/technical-solutions-to-internet-surveillance.tex
Removed:
projects/presentations/technical-solutions-to-internet-censorship.tex
Log:
update the presentation, rename it to be more accurate to the topic
Deleted: projects/presentations/technical-solutions-to-internet-censorship.tex
===================================================================
--- projects/presentations/technical-solutions-to-internet-censorship.tex 2010-05-09 21:10:26 UTC (rev 22306)
+++ projects/presentations/technical-solutions-to-internet-censorship.tex 2010-05-09 21:28:12 UTC (rev 22307)
@@ -1,560 +0,0 @@
-\documentclass{beamer}
-\mode<presentation>
-\usetheme{Pittsburgh}
-\usecolortheme{beaver}
-\title{Technical Solutions to Internet Surveillance \& Censorship}
-\author{Andrew Lewman \\ andrew@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx \\ https://torproject.org}
-\date{\today}
-\begin{document}
-
-\begin{frame}
- \maketitle
- \begin{center}
- \includegraphics[height=3cm]{./images/2009-tor-logo}
- \hspace{1cm}
- \includegraphics[height=3cm]{./images/chacha}
- \end{center}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Universal Declaration of Human Rights}
-\textbf{Article 19}
-\medskip
- \begin{quotation}
- \noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
-seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
-regardless of frontiers.
- \end{quotation}
-
-\bigskip
-\textbf{Article 20}
-\medskip
- \begin{quotation}
- \noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad Everyone has the
-right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
- \end{quotation}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{George Orwell was an optimist}
-\begin{quotation}
-\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad Who controls the past, controls the future: who controls the present controls the past
-\end{quotation}
-\flushright --- George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty Four, 1949
-
-\flushleft
-The re-writing of history is now much more efficient than when George
-Orwell imagined armies of Winston Smiths cutting holes in newspaper
-archives
-
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Online archives are easily censored}
-\begin{center}
-\includegraphics<1>[height=7.5cm]{./images/observer}
-\includegraphics<2>[height=6.5cm]{./images/guardian-crop}
-\end{center}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{The Internet facilitates centralization}
-
- \begin{columns}[t]
- \column{7cm}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item Centralized systems work better: cheaper, more versatile, and more efficient
-\item By eliminating distance, the Internet allows greater centralization
-\item Centralized archiving of physical newspapers is awkward, but online archiving works well
-\item This makes life easier for readers, and censors too
-\item Many libraries are now dropping archiving of paper in favor of electronic subscriptions
-\end{itemize}
- \column{5cm}
- \vbox{}
- \parbox{5cm}{\includegraphics[width=4.5cm]{./images/observer}}
- \bigskip
-
- \parbox{5cm}{\includegraphics[width=4.5cm]{./images/guardian-crop}}
- \end{columns}
-
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{The Internet eases publication too}
- \begin{columns}[t]
- \column{7.5cm}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item "The Catholic Orangemen of Togo", by Craig Murray, was dropped by its publisher due to libel threats
-\item Even the Cambridge University Press pulped a book, "Alms for Jihad" by J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, following legal action
-\item The lack of support from a publisher and network of book shops would previously be devastating
-\item However, the Internet facilitates self-publishing and marketing
-\end{itemize}
- \column{6cm}
- \vbox{}
- \begin{overlayarea}{6cm}{6cm}
- \parbox{6cm}{\includegraphics<1>[width=5cm]{./images/orangemen}
- \includegraphics<2>[width=5cm]{./images/murray}}
- \end{overlayarea}
- \end{columns}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Internet architecture allows censorship}
-\includegraphics[width=10cm]{./images/cnmap}
-\flushright
-\tiny Diagram: China Internet Network Information Center
-\end{frame}
-
- \begin{frame}
- \frametitle{What is being blocked, and why}
- \begin{columns}[t]
- \column{7cm}
- \setbeamercovered{transparent}
-
- \begin{itemize}
- \item According to the Open Net Initiative, at least 70 countries filter the Internet in some way; from Asia, to Europe, to the Americas.
- \item The types of material censored varied depending on country, e.g.:
- \begin{itemize}
- \item<1-> Human Rights (blocked in China)
- \item<2-> Religion (blocked in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Bahrain)
- \item<3-> Pornography (blocked in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Bahrain, Singapore, Burma, \ldots)
- \end{itemize}
- \item Other issues censored include: military and militant websites; sex education, alcohol/drugs, music; gay and lesbian websites; news
- \end{itemize}
- \setbeamercovered{invisible}
- \column{5cm}
- \vbox{}
- \begin{overlayarea}{5cm}{10.5cm}
- \only<1>{\resizebox{5cm}{!}{\includegraphics{./images/hrichina}}}
- \only<2>{\resizebox{5cm}{!}{\includegraphics{./images/islameyat}}}
- \only<3>{\resizebox{5cm}{!}{\includegraphics{./images/playboy}}}
- \end{overlayarea}
- \end{columns}
- \end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Search Engine results are censored}
-\includegraphics[width=11cm]{./images/tiananmen}
-\begin{center}
-Searching for "Tiananmen Square" on Google.com and Google.cn
-\end{center}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Chilling effects: self-censorship through fear, intimidation, and punishment}
-People can be intimidated into not testing rules through fear of detection and retribution
-\begin{columns}[t]
-\column{5.5cm}
-\vbox{}
-%% http://farm1.static.flickr.com/150/347760599_fedfd250cb.jpg
-
-\includegraphics[width=5.5cm]{./images/kareem}
-\column{5.5cm}
-\vbox{}
-
-\textit{"I call on Egyptian government officials to take the necessary procedures to protect the Egyptian youth from the spread of subversive religious ideologies among them by permanently shutting down religious institutions in this country."}
-\flushright --- Kareem Amer (sentenced to four years of prison in Egypt)
-\end{columns}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Sweden's iPRED experience}
-\includegraphics[scale=1]{./images/netnodnov}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Incentives}
-\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad Our analysis shows that consumers increasingly want to decide for themselves when to watch and from which screen. Unfortunately, many have become adept at circumventing the IPRED legislation.
-\flushright --- Jens Heron, Mediavision
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Resisting Internet censorship}
-
-\begin{quotation}
-\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.
-\end{quotation}
-\flushright --- John Gilmore, 1993
-
-\flushleft
-
-No longer true on a technical level: censorship is in the routers.
-\medskip
-
-Remains true on a social level: when material is censored, people distribute copies and draw attention to them
-\medskip
-
-But what if people are too afraid to do this?
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Freedom of speech and anonymity}
-
-\textbf{United States Constitution: 1st Amendment}
-
-\begin{quotation}
-\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
-\end{quotation}
-
-\textbf{McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission}
-
-\begin{quotation}
-\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad Protections for anonymous speech are vital to democratic discourse. Allowing dissenters to shield their identities frees them to express critical, minority views \ldots Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority \ldots It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular
-\end{quotation}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Twitter in Iran: Good.}
-\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{./images/twitter-iran-protests-time}
-\flushright{\tiny From http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Twitter in USA: Bad.}
-\includegraphics[scale=0.45]{./images/twitter-g20-pittsburgh-gothamist}
-\flushright{\tiny from http://gothamist.com/2009/10/05/fbi\_raids\_queens\_home\_in\_g20\_protes.php}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Internet surveillance is pervasive}
-
- \begin{columns}[t]
- \column{7cm}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item Conventional surveillance methods had to be targeted
-\item Internet censorship is capable of monitoring everyone, all of the time
-\item Governments are increasing monitoring: SORM (Russia), Golden Shield (China), Data Retention Directive (EU), and Interception Modernisation Programme (UK), Warrantless Wiretapping (USA)
-\item 1 in 7 East German citizens worked for the Stasi. Today we can achieve the same results with a fraction of the cost
-\end{itemize}
-
- \column{5cm}
- \vbox{}
- \parbox{5cm}{\includegraphics[width=4.5cm]{./images/nsa-room}}
- \end{columns}
-
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Traffic data surveillance}
-
-\begin{itemize}
-\item Traffic data (who talks to whom, how often and for how long) is the core of intelligence capabilities
-\item This information is cheaper to record and store, compared to full content
-\item Because it can be easily processed by computer, data mining techniques can be used to understand social structures
-\end{itemize}
-
-\begin{quotation}
-\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad No government of any colour is to be trusted with such a roadmap to our souls
-\end{quotation}
-\flushright --- Sir Ken Macdonald, former director of public prosecutions, on the UK Interception Modernisation Program
-
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
- \frametitle{Importantly, information on social networks can be derived}
- \begin{columns}[t]
- \column{4.5cm}
- \vspace{0cm}
-
- {\color{red}$\bullet$} Communities\newline
- {\color{blue}$\bullet$} People
- \column{7cm}
- \vbox{}
-
- \includegraphics[clip, trim=5cm 12cm 2cm 5cm,width=7cm]{./images/network}
- \end{columns}
- \flushright{\tiny From "The Economics of Mass Surveillance" by George Danezis and Bettina Wittneben}
- \end{frame}
-
- \begin{frame}
- \frametitle{The Transparent Society}
-
- \begin{columns}[t]
- \column{7cm}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item David Brin proposed that in a world of pervasive surveillance, balance could be maintained by allowing everyone to monitor everyone else
-\item Bruce Schneier retorted that surveillance amplifies existing powers
-\item Many countries restrict anonymous speech (e.g.\ Germany and China)
-\item It is easy for those in power to call on the weak to link their names to opinions
-\end{itemize}
-
- \column{5cm}
- \vbox{}
- \parbox{5cm}{\includegraphics[width=4.5cm]{./images/namesheet}}
-
-\flushright{\tiny Photo: Manos Simonides}
- \end{columns}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Censorship resistance systems}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item Software to resist censorship should
-\begin{itemize}
- \item have a diverse set of users
- \item work where you are without special steps
- \item be sustainable (what if the company goes broke?)
- \item be decentralized (swapping censors doesn't help you)
- \item protect you by default
- \item have accessible standards and published designs (black box vs. glass box)
- \item be fast enough that you'll use it daily
- \item doesn't promise perfect everything including a fully encrypted Internet
-\end{itemize}
-\item<1-> These properties should be maintained even if the censorship resistance system is partially compromised
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Blocking with technology}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item When a country's government controls international connectivity, they can block requests for banned websites and destinations
-\item There are a number of different approaches (DNS blocking, IP address blocking, etc.)
-\item Software may be produced in-country, but often is an adapted commercial product
-\item These companies not only make the software, but provide a continuously updated list of websites to be blocked
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
- \begin{frame}
- \frametitle{Normal web browsing}
-
- \begin{centering}
- \vbox{}
-
- \includegraphics[clip, trim=1cm 4cm 1cm 2.2cm, width=10cm]{./images/no-proxy}
- \end{centering}
-
-\vspace{-1cm}
-
- \flushright
-
- \tiny Diagram: Jane Gowan
-
- \end{frame}
-
- \begin{frame}
- \frametitle{DNS tampering}
-
- \begin{centering}
- \vbox{}
-
- \includegraphics[clip, trim=1cm 4cm 1cm 2.2cm, width=10cm]{./images/dns}
- \end{centering}
-
-\vspace{-1cm}
-
- \flushright
-
- \tiny Diagram: Jane Gowan
-
- \end{frame}
-
- \begin{frame}
- \frametitle{IP blocking}
-
- \begin{centering}
- \vbox{}
-
- \includegraphics[clip, trim=1cm 4cm 1cm 2.2cm, width=10cm]{./images/ip}
- \end{centering}
-
-\vspace{-1cm}
-
- \flushright
-
- \tiny Diagram: Jane Gowan
-
- \end{frame}
-
- \begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Trade-offs in blocking systems}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item<1-> DNS blocking
-\begin{itemize}
-\item Easy and cheap to implement
-\item Blocks at domain name granularity -- over blocks protocols, web pages
-\item Trivial to bypass
-\end{itemize}
-\item<2-> IP blocking
-\begin{itemize}
-\item Easy and cheap to implement
-\item Blocks at IP address (perhaps port) -- over-blocks virtual hosting
-\end{itemize}
-\item<3-> Proxy blocking
-\begin{itemize}
-\item Expensive to implement
-\item Blocks at webpage level -- low over-blocking
-\end{itemize}
-\item<4-> Hybrid blocking -- IP based redirection to proxy
-\begin{itemize}
-\item Tricky to get right, but cheap
-\item Has some vulnerabilities
-\item Blocks at webpage level -- low over-blocking
-\end{itemize}
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Who wants online privacy?}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item<1-> Ordinary people
-\begin{itemize}
-\item To avoid personal information being sold to marketers
-\item Protect themselves when researching sensitive topics
-\end{itemize}
-\item<2-> Military and Law Enforcement
-\begin{itemize}
-\item To carry out intelligence gathering
-\item Protect undercover field agents
-\item Offer anonymous tip lines
-\end{itemize}
-\item<3-> Journalists
-\begin{itemize}
-\item To protect sources, such as whistle blowers
-\end{itemize}
-\item<4-> Human rights workers
-\begin{itemize}
-\item To publicize abuses and protect themselves from surveillance
-\item Blogging about controversial subjects
-\end{itemize}
-\item<5-> Businesses
-\begin{itemize}
-\item To observe their competition and build anonymous collaborations
-\end{itemize}
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Anonymous communication}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item People have to hide in a crowd of other people ("anonymity loves company")
-\item The goal of the system is to make all users look as similar as possible, to give a bigger crowd
-\item Hide who is communicating with whom
-\item Layered encryption and random delays hide correlation between input traffic and output traffic
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Tor is a low-latency anonymity system}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item<1-> Based on technology developed in the Onion Routing project
-\item<2-> Privacy by design, not by policy (no data collected)
-\item<3-> Commonly used for web browsing and instant messaging (works for any TCP traffic)
-\item<4-> Originally built as a pure anonymity system (hides who is talking to whom)
-\item<5-> Now designed to resist censorship too (hides whether someone is using the system at all)
-\item<6-> Centralized directory authorities publish a list of all servers; client doesn't trust the network by design
-\end{itemize}
-
-\begin{center}
-\includegraphics[height=3cm]{./images/2009-tor-logo}
-\end{center}
-
-\end{frame}
-
- \begin{frame}
- \frametitle{Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers}
- \begin{center}
- \begin{overlayarea}{9cm}{6cm}
- \only<1>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-network}}
- \only<2>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-safe-selection}}
- \only<3>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-safe-path}}
- \end{overlayarea}
- \flushright
-
- \tiny Diagram: Robert Watson
- \end{center}
- \end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Tor hidden services allow censorship resistant services}
-\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{./images/wikileaks}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{How is Tor different from other systems?}
-\\[1cm]
-\begin{center}
-\only<1>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/single_hop_relay}}
-\only<2>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/evil_single_hop_relay}}
-\only<3>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/data_snooping_single_hop_relay}}
-\end{center}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Limitations of censorship resistance}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item Censorship resistance is thought controversial -- especially by the censors
-\item There is something for everyone to like, and something for everyone to dislike, going on with censorship resistance systems
-\item Bad people do use them to do bad things (for many different definitions of bad people)
-\item It is impossible to block bad uses, even if we could come up with a common definition of bad content
-\item The systems are not perfect, so it is possible some people will be caught
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Conclusions}
- \begin{columns}[t]
- \column{7cm}
- \begin{itemize}
- \item The Internet and centralisation can both improve and harm freedom of speech
- \item Slogans regarding the borderless nature and inherent freedoms of the Internet are frequently wrong
- \item Technical details matter: how a system is implemented can make a radical difference
- \item Technologies can be used to resist censorship and improve privacy
- \item However, policies must be changed too and pressure is needed on legislators
- \end{itemize}
- \column{5cm}
- \vbox{}
- \begin{overlayarea}{5cm}{10cm}
- \resizebox{5cm}{!}{\includegraphics{./images/collage}}
- \end{overlayarea}
- \end{columns}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{One Version of the Future}
-\begin{quotation}
-\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad I'd like to change the design of the Internet by introducing
-regulation--Internet passports, Internet police and international
-agreement--about following Internet standards. And if some countries
-don't agree with or don't pay attention to the agreement, just cut
-them off.
-\end{quotation}
-\flushright --- Eugene Kaspersky, Co-Founder \& CEO of Kaspersky Labs
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{A better version of the future}
-\textbf{Internet Access as a Human Right}
-\medskip
-\begin{quotation}
-\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad
-We think it's something you cannot live without in modern society. Like banking services or water or electricity, you need an Internet connection
-\end{quotation}
-\flushright --- Laura Vilkkonen, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Finland
-
-\bigskip
-\textbf{Tor Project's Mission}
-\medskip
-\begin{quotation}
-\noinent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad We remain committed to defending online privacy and anonymity as a human right.
-\end{quotation}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{How to get there}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item Increased funding of research and development for privacy, circumvention, and anti-censorship technologies
-\item Policy and Legal frameworks for free access, free speech, and anonymity
-%\item Mobile devices and telco innovation
-%\item Ambient connectivity
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\begin{frame}
-\frametitle{Credits}
-\begin{itemize}
-\item Thank you to Steven J. Murdoch, \url{http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/sjm217/}, for the research and basis for this presentation. \\
-\item Photographer and Diagram credits as listed throughout the presentation.
-\end{itemize}
-\end{frame}
-
-\end{document}
Copied: projects/presentations/technical-solutions-to-internet-surveillance.tex (from rev 22306, projects/presentations/technical-solutions-to-internet-censorship.tex)
===================================================================
--- projects/presentations/technical-solutions-to-internet-surveillance.tex (rev 0)
+++ projects/presentations/technical-solutions-to-internet-surveillance.tex 2010-05-09 21:28:12 UTC (rev 22307)
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
+\documentclass{beamer}
+\mode<presentation>
+\usetheme{Pittsburgh}
+\usecolortheme{beaver}
+\title{Technical Solutions to Internet Surveillance}
+\author{Andrew Lewman \\ andrew@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx \\ https://torproject.org}
+\date{\today}
+\begin{document}
+
+% General flow:
+% internet is becoming centralized; good: cheaper to deploy, easier to manage; bad: control points, surveillance points
+% govt wants data, see total info awareness (wow, look at that logo or how to freak out your population) (give credit to moxie)
+% wiretapping the internet: mention some countries with programs about wiretapping, show nsa-room in AT&T San Fran
+% here's a better way to collect vast amounts of data about your population: show facebook logo
+% want more than just social interactions? show google logo, look at all of this data, email, instant messaging, topics of interest (search queries, results clicked, ads shown/clicked)
+% is absence of signal enough to arouse suspicion? cell phone location data, google services, facebook accounts?
+% how do you hide in a crowd without arousing suspicion? show tor headed liberty bell pic, don't be this guy
+%
+
+\begin{frame}
+ \maketitle
+ \begin{center}
+ \includegraphics[height=3cm]{./images/2009-tor-logo}
+ \hspace{1cm}
+ \includegraphics[height=3cm]{./images/TIA-logo}
+ \end{center}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Internet architecture is becoming centralized}
+\includegraphics[width=10cm]{./images/cnmap}
+\flushright
+\tiny Diagram: China Internet Network Information Center
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Internet surveillance is pervasive}
+
+ \begin{columns}[t]
+ \column{7cm}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Conventional surveillance methods had to be targeted
+\item Internet censorship is capable of monitoring everyone, all of the time
+\item Governments are increasing monitoring: SORM (Russia), Golden Shield (China), Data Retention Directive (EU), and Interception Modernisation Programme (UK), Warrantless Wiretapping (USA)
+\item 1 in 7 East German citizens worked for the Stasi. Today we can achieve the same results with a fraction of the cost
+\end{itemize}
+
+ \column{5cm}
+ \vbox{}
+ \parbox{5cm}{\includegraphics[width=4.5cm]{./images/nsa-room}}
+ \end{columns}
+
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Traffic data surveillance}
+
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Traffic data (who talks to whom, how often and for how long) is the core of intelligence capabilities
+\item This information is cheaper to record and store, compared to full content
+\item Because it can be easily processed by computer, data mining techniques can be used to understand social structures
+\end{itemize}
+
+\begin{quotation}
+\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad No government of any colour is to be trusted with such a roadmap to our souls
+\end{quotation}
+\flushright --- Sir Ken Macdonald, former director of public prosecutions, on the UK Interception Modernisation Program
+
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+ \frametitle{Importantly, information on social networks can be derived}
+ \begin{columns}[t]
+ \column{4.5cm}
+ \vspace{0cm}
+
+ {\color{red}$\bullet$} Communities\newline
+ {\color{blue}$\bullet$} People
+ \column{7cm}
+ \vbox{}
+
+ \includegraphics[clip, trim=5cm 12cm 2cm 5cm,width=7cm]{./images/network}
+ \end{columns}
+ \flushright{\tiny From "The Economics of Mass Surveillance" by George Danezis and Bettina Wittneben}
+ \end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Search Engine results are censored}
+\includegraphics[width=11cm]{./images/tiananmen}
+\begin{center}
+Searching for "Tiananmen Square" on Google.com and Google.cn
+\end{center}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Sweden's iPRED experience}
+\includegraphics[scale=1]{./images/netnodnov}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Incentives}
+\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad Our analysis shows that consumers increasingly want to decide for themselves when to watch and from which screen. Unfortunately, many have become adept at circumventing the IPRED legislation.
+\flushright --- Jens Heron, Mediavision
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Resisting Internet censorship}
+
+\begin{quotation}
+\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.
+\end{quotation}
+\flushright --- John Gilmore, 1993
+
+\flushleft
+
+No longer true on a technical level: censorship is in the routers.
+\medskip
+
+Remains true on a social level: when material is censored, people distribute copies and draw attention to them
+\medskip
+
+But what if people are too afraid to do this?
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Twitter in Iran: Good.}
+\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{./images/twitter-iran-protests-time}
+\flushright{\tiny From http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Twitter in USA: Bad.}
+\includegraphics[scale=0.45]{./images/twitter-g20-pittsburgh-gothamist}
+\flushright{\tiny from http://gothamist.com/2009/10/05/fbi\_raids\_queens\_home\_in\_g20\_protes.php}
+\end{frame}
+
+ \begin{frame}
+ \frametitle{The Transparent Society}
+
+ \begin{columns}[t]
+ \column{7cm}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item David Brin proposed that in a world of pervasive surveillance, balance could be maintained by allowing everyone to monitor everyone else
+\item Bruce Schneier retorted that surveillance amplifies existing powers
+\item Many countries restrict anonymous speech (e.g.\ Germany and China)
+\item It is easy for those in power to call on the weak to link their names to opinions
+\end{itemize}
+
+ \column{5cm}
+ \vbox{}
+ \parbox{5cm}{\includegraphics[width=4.5cm]{./images/namesheet}}
+
+\flushright{\tiny Photo: Manos Simonides}
+ \end{columns}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Censorship resistance systems}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Software to resist censorship should
+\begin{itemize}
+ \item have a diverse set of users
+ \item work where you are without special steps
+ \item be sustainable (what if the company goes broke?)
+ \item be decentralized (swapping censors doesn't help you)
+ \item protect you by default
+ \item have accessible standards and published designs (black box vs. glass box)
+ \item be fast enough that you'll use it daily
+ \item doesn't promise perfect everything including a fully encrypted Internet
+\end{itemize}
+\item<1-> These properties should be maintained even if the censorship resistance system is partially compromised
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Blocking with technology}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item When a country's government controls international connectivity, they can block requests for banned websites and destinations
+\item There are a number of different approaches (DNS blocking, IP address blocking, etc.)
+\item Software may be produced in-country, but often is an adapted commercial product
+\item These companies not only make the software, but provide a continuously updated list of websites to be blocked
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+ \begin{frame}
+ \frametitle{Normal web browsing}
+
+ \begin{centering}
+ \vbox{}
+
+ \includegraphics[clip, trim=1cm 4cm 1cm 2.2cm, width=10cm]{./images/no-proxy}
+ \end{centering}
+
+\vspace{-1cm}
+
+ \flushright
+
+ \tiny Diagram: Jane Gowan
+
+ \end{frame}
+
+ \begin{frame}
+ \frametitle{DNS tampering}
+
+ \begin{centering}
+ \vbox{}
+
+ \includegraphics[clip, trim=1cm 4cm 1cm 2.2cm, width=10cm]{./images/dns}
+ \end{centering}
+
+\vspace{-1cm}
+
+ \flushright
+
+ \tiny Diagram: Jane Gowan
+
+ \end{frame}
+
+ \begin{frame}
+ \frametitle{IP blocking}
+
+ \begin{centering}
+ \vbox{}
+
+ \includegraphics[clip, trim=1cm 4cm 1cm 2.2cm, width=10cm]{./images/ip}
+ \end{centering}
+
+\vspace{-1cm}
+
+ \flushright
+
+ \tiny Diagram: Jane Gowan
+
+ \end{frame}
+
+ \begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Trade-offs in blocking systems}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item<1-> DNS blocking
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Easy and cheap to implement
+\item Blocks at domain name granularity -- over blocks protocols, web pages
+\item Trivial to bypass
+\end{itemize}
+\item<2-> IP blocking
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Easy and cheap to implement
+\item Blocks at IP address (perhaps port) -- over-blocks virtual hosting
+\end{itemize}
+\item<3-> Proxy blocking
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Expensive to implement
+\item Blocks at webpage level -- low over-blocking
+\end{itemize}
+\item<4-> Hybrid blocking -- IP based redirection to proxy
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Tricky to get right, but cheap
+\item Has some vulnerabilities
+\item Blocks at webpage level -- low over-blocking
+\end{itemize}
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Who wants online privacy?}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item<1-> Ordinary people
+\begin{itemize}
+\item To avoid personal information being sold to marketers
+\item Protect themselves when researching sensitive topics
+\end{itemize}
+\item<2-> Military and Law Enforcement
+\begin{itemize}
+\item To carry out intelligence gathering
+\item Protect undercover field agents
+\item Offer anonymous tip lines
+\end{itemize}
+\item<3-> Journalists
+\begin{itemize}
+\item To protect sources, such as whistle blowers
+\end{itemize}
+\item<4-> Human rights workers
+\begin{itemize}
+\item To publicize abuses and protect themselves from surveillance
+\item Blogging about controversial subjects
+\end{itemize}
+\item<5-> Businesses
+\begin{itemize}
+\item To observe their competition and build anonymous collaborations
+\end{itemize}
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Anonymous communication}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item People have to hide in a crowd of other people ("anonymity loves company")
+\item The goal of the system is to make all users look as similar as possible, to give a bigger crowd
+\item Hide who is communicating with whom
+\item Layered encryption and random delays hide correlation between input traffic and output traffic
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Tor is a low-latency anonymity system}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item<1-> Based on technology developed in the Onion Routing project
+\item<2-> Privacy by design, not by policy (no data collected)
+\item<3-> Commonly used for web browsing and instant messaging (works for any TCP traffic)
+\item<4-> Originally built as a pure anonymity system (hides who is talking to whom)
+\item<5-> Now designed to resist censorship too (hides whether someone is using the system at all)
+\item<6-> Centralized directory authorities publish a list of all servers; client doesn't trust the network by design
+\end{itemize}
+
+\begin{center}
+\includegraphics[height=3cm]{./images/2009-tor-logo}
+\end{center}
+
+\end{frame}
+
+ \begin{frame}
+ \frametitle{Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers}
+ \begin{center}
+ \begin{overlayarea}{9cm}{6cm}
+ \only<1>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-network}}
+ \only<2>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-safe-selection}}
+ \only<3>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-safe-path}}
+ \end{overlayarea}
+ \flushright
+
+ \tiny Diagram: Robert Watson
+ \end{center}
+ \end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Tor hidden services allow censorship resistant services}
+\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{./images/wikileaks}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{How is Tor different from other systems?}
+\\[1cm]
+\begin{center}
+\only<1>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/single_hop_relay}}
+\only<2>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/evil_single_hop_relay}}
+\only<3>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/data_snooping_single_hop_relay}}
+\end{center}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Limitations of censorship resistance}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Censorship resistance is thought controversial -- especially by the censors
+\item There is something for everyone to like, and something for everyone to dislike, going on with censorship resistance systems
+\item Bad people do use them to do bad things (for many different definitions of bad people)
+\item It is impossible to block bad uses, even if we could come up with a common definition of bad content
+\item The systems are not perfect, so it is possible some people will be caught
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Conclusions}
+ \begin{columns}[t]
+ \column{7cm}
+ \begin{itemize}
+ \item The Internet and centralisation can both improve and harm freedom of speech
+ \item Slogans regarding the borderless nature and inherent freedoms of the Internet are frequently wrong
+ \item Technical details matter: how a system is implemented can make a radical difference
+ \item Technologies can be used to resist censorship and improve privacy
+ \item However, policies must be changed too and pressure is needed on legislators
+ \end{itemize}
+ \column{5cm}
+ \vbox{}
+ \begin{overlayarea}{5cm}{10cm}
+ \resizebox{5cm}{!}{\includegraphics{./images/collage}}
+ \end{overlayarea}
+ \end{columns}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{One Version of the Future}
+\begin{quotation}
+\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad I'd like to change the design of the Internet by introducing
+regulation--Internet passports, Internet police and international
+agreement--about following Internet standards. And if some countries
+don't agree with or don't pay attention to the agreement, just cut
+them off.
+\end{quotation}
+\flushright --- Eugene Kaspersky, Co-Founder \& CEO of Kaspersky Labs
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{A better version of the future}
+\textbf{Internet Access as a Human Right}
+\medskip
+\begin{quotation}
+\noindent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad
+We think it's something you cannot live without in modern society. Like banking services or water or electricity, you need an Internet connection
+\end{quotation}
+\flushright --- Laura Vilkkonen, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Finland
+
+\bigskip
+\textbf{Tor Project's Mission}
+\medskip
+\begin{quotation}
+\noinent \includegraphics[width=1cm]{./images/opquo}\quad We remain committed to defending online privacy and anonymity as a human right.
+\end{quotation}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{How to get there}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Increased funding of research and development for privacy, circumvention, and anti-censorship technologies
+\item Policy and Legal frameworks for free access, free speech, and anonymity
+%\item Mobile devices and telco innovation
+%\item Ambient connectivity
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\begin{frame}
+\frametitle{Credits}
+\begin{itemize}
+\item Thank you to Steven J. Murdoch, \url{http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/sjm217/}, for the research and basis for this presentation. \\
+\item Photographer and Diagram credits as listed throughout the presentation.
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}
+
+\end{document}