[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
[tor-commits] [tor/master] Fix GCC 4.6's new -Wunused-but-set-variable warnings.
commit a5232e0c4c572cdff85701f698b8b90c9443d7e4
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Mon May 23 17:04:38 2011 -0400
Fix GCC 4.6's new -Wunused-but-set-variable warnings.
Most instances were dead code; for those, I removed the assignments.
Some were pieces of info we don't currently plan to use, but which
we might in the future. For those, I added an explicit cast-to-void
to indicate that we know that the thing's unused. Finally, one was
a case where we were testing the wrong variable in a unit test.
That one I fixed.
This resolves bug 3208.
---
changes/bug3208 | 2 ++
src/or/circuitbuild.c | 3 ---
src/or/command.c | 1 +
src/or/control.c | 2 --
src/or/directory.c | 2 --
src/or/dirvote.c | 3 +--
src/or/eventdns.c | 3 +++
src/test/test_crypto.c | 4 +++-
8 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/bug3208 b/changes/bug3208
index 731c96e..fd737ba 100644
--- a/changes/bug3208
+++ b/changes/bug3208
@@ -2,3 +2,5 @@
- Remove undocumented option "-F" from tor-resolve: it hasn't done
anything since 0.2.1.16-rc.
+ o Minor bugfixes:
+ - Fix warnings from GCC 4.6's "-Wunused-but-set-variable" option.
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
index 08bfb98..108007e 100644
--- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c
+++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c
@@ -3766,7 +3766,6 @@ void
entry_guards_compute_status(or_options_t *options, time_t now)
{
int changed = 0;
- int severity = LOG_DEBUG;
digestmap_t *reasons;
if (! entry_guards)
@@ -3793,8 +3792,6 @@ entry_guards_compute_status(or_options_t *options, time_t now)
if (remove_dead_entry_guards(now))
changed = 1;
- severity = changed ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_INFO;
-
if (changed) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry) {
const char *reason = digestmap_get(reasons, entry->identity);
diff --git a/src/or/command.c b/src/or/command.c
index 00d9af3..e377f4f 100644
--- a/src/or/command.c
+++ b/src/or/command.c
@@ -645,6 +645,7 @@ command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
/* XXX maybe act on my_apparent_addr, if the source is sufficiently
* trustworthy. */
+ (void)my_apparent_addr;
if (connection_or_set_state_open(conn)<0)
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c
index 0dad1b9..f75ac67 100644
--- a/src/or/control.c
+++ b/src/or/control.c
@@ -3142,7 +3142,6 @@ control_event_circuit_status(origin_circuit_t *circ, circuit_status_event_t tp,
{
const char *status;
char extended_buf[96];
- int providing_reason=0;
if (!EVENT_IS_INTERESTING(EVENT_CIRCUIT_STATUS))
return 0;
tor_assert(circ);
@@ -3166,7 +3165,6 @@ control_event_circuit_status(origin_circuit_t *circ, circuit_status_event_t tp,
const char *reason_str = circuit_end_reason_to_control_string(reason_code);
char *reason = NULL;
size_t n=strlen(extended_buf);
- providing_reason=1;
if (!reason_str) {
reason = tor_malloc(16);
tor_snprintf(reason, 16, "UNKNOWN_%d", reason_code);
diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c
index eb99e9d..ff0a5a4 100644
--- a/src/or/directory.c
+++ b/src/or/directory.c
@@ -1900,7 +1900,6 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn)
router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(conn->identity_digest);
char *rejected_hdr = http_get_header(headers,
"X-Descriptor-Not-New: ");
- int rejected = 0;
if (rejected_hdr) {
if (!strcmp(rejected_hdr, "Yes")) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL,
@@ -1913,7 +1912,6 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn)
* last descriptor, not on the published time of the last
* descriptor. If those are different, that's a bad thing to
* do. -NM */
- rejected = 1;
}
tor_free(rejected_hdr);
}
diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.c b/src/or/dirvote.c
index 96e3df5..c6ce9f6 100644
--- a/src/or/dirvote.c
+++ b/src/or/dirvote.c
@@ -1592,7 +1592,7 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
* is the same flag as votes[j]->known_flags[b]. */
int *named_flag; /* Index of the flag "Named" for votes[j] */
int *unnamed_flag; /* Index of the flag "Unnamed" for votes[j] */
- int chosen_named_idx, chosen_unnamed_idx;
+ int chosen_named_idx;
strmap_t *name_to_id_map = strmap_new();
char conflict[DIGEST_LEN];
@@ -1610,7 +1610,6 @@ networkstatus_compute_consensus(smartlist_t *votes,
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(votes); ++i)
unnamed_flag[i] = named_flag[i] = -1;
chosen_named_idx = smartlist_string_pos(flags, "Named");
- chosen_unnamed_idx = smartlist_string_pos(flags, "Unnamed");
/* Build the flag index. */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(votes, networkstatus_t *, v,
diff --git a/src/or/eventdns.c b/src/or/eventdns.c
index fc005df..b7cc292 100644
--- a/src/or/eventdns.c
+++ b/src/or/eventdns.c
@@ -1028,6 +1028,9 @@ request_parse(u8 *packet, ssize_t length, struct evdns_server_port *port, struct
GET16(answers);
GET16(authority);
GET16(additional);
+ (void)additional;
+ (void)authority;
+ (void)answers;
if (flags & 0x8000) return -1; /* Must not be an answer. */
flags &= 0x0110; /* Only RD and CD get preserved. */
diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c
index 781081a..bf2cc48 100644
--- a/src/test/test_crypto.c
+++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ test_crypto_rng(void)
uint64_t big;
char *host;
j = crypto_rand_int(100);
- if (i < 0 || i >= 100)
+ if (j < 0 || j >= 100)
allok = 0;
big = crypto_rand_uint64(U64_LITERAL(1)<<40);
if (big >= (U64_LITERAL(1)<<40))
@@ -240,11 +240,13 @@ test_crypto_sha(void)
/* Test SHA-1 with a test vector from the specification. */
i = crypto_digest(data, "abc", 3);
test_memeq_hex(data, "A9993E364706816ABA3E25717850C26C9CD0D89D");
+ tt_int_op(i, ==, 0);
/* Test SHA-256 with a test vector from the specification. */
i = crypto_digest256(data, "abc", 3, DIGEST_SHA256);
test_memeq_hex(data, "BA7816BF8F01CFEA414140DE5DAE2223B00361A3"
"96177A9CB410FF61F20015AD");
+ tt_int_op(i, ==, 0);
/* Test HMAC-SHA-1 with test cases from RFC2202. */
_______________________________________________
tor-commits mailing list
tor-commits@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-commits