[tor-commits] [torspec/master] Revert "prop224: randomise revision-counter to avoid information leaks"

[asn@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

commit 3eb33f626dae5d2c7002b0adc8dd4676a3d20779
Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Apr 12 15:14:15 2016 +0300

    Revert "prop224: randomise revision-counter to avoid information leaks"
    
    This reverts commit 01119bf1291a40aa309dfb7d76edf790133f05b9.
---
 proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt | 54 ------------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 54 deletions(-)

diff --git a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt
index 6526e05..384b941 100644
--- a/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt
+++ b/proposals/224-rend-spec-ng.txt
@@ -855,60 +855,6 @@ Status: Draft
        prevents an attacker from replacing a newer descriptor signed by
        a given key with a copy of an older version.)
 
-       The revision-counter should be updated with each upload, regardless
-       of whether the descriptor has changed. This avoids leaking whether
-       the descriptor has changed.
-
-       [ XX/teor - is the extra load on the HSDirs worth it? ]
-
-       Services should randomise the start and increment values of
-       revision-counter for each replica, to avoid leaking service
-       stability, and avoid linking descriptor replicas via
-       revision-counter values.
-
-       Say that our goal is for services to start the period at a
-       random value near zero, and end it at a random value that does
-       not exceed 2 ^ 32 (while the length of revision-counter isn't
-       specified, it's included in hashes as INT_4(revision-counter)). We'd
-       like the revision-counters of all services to increment at
-       approximately the same randomised rate, regardless of RendPostPeriod.
-
-       revision-counter could be initialised and incremented using:
-         two-periods-time = (2 * 24 * 60 * 60)
-         elapsed-ratio    = elapsed-since-last-post / two-periods-time
-         max-increment    = 2^32 * elapsed-ratio
-       where elapsed-since-last-post is the time elapsed since descriptors
-       were last uploaded for the current blinded key.
-
-       The first upload for a blinded key for the next period sets
-       elapsed-since-last-post equal to the time since the current period
-       started. Assuming the keys have just become valid, this is:
-         elapsed-since-period-start = key-validity-start - period-start
-       where key-validity-start is when the keys became valid, and
-       period-start is when the current period started.
-
-       Then, each initialisation and increment is:
-         revision-counter += random(1, max-increment)
-
-       (The random() function should be careful not to leak the raw bytes
-       returned by the PRNG to the network. See [RANDOM-REFS].)
-
-       This scheme increments revision-counter at a maximum rate of:
-         2 ^ 32 / (2 * 24 * 60 * 60) = 24855 per second
-       with an expected average value of 12428 per second. This appears
-       sufficient to blur the exact number of revisions.
-
-       This scheme could leak the approximate time at which the descriptor
-       was uploaded, and the approximate RendPostPeriod. These are easily
-       guessed from the current time, and by checking when descriptors
-       arrive at the HSDirs. Tracking unique revision-counter values would
-       also reveal how many times a descriptor has been uploaded (without
-       decrypting "encrypted").
-
-       Regardless of the method used to generate the revision counter,
-       all that HSDirs need to do is verify that new descriptors for a key
-       have a higher counter than the current descriptor.
-
      "encrypted" NL encrypted-string
 
        [Exactly once.]



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