[tor-commits] [tor/master] Use safe_mem_is_zero in a few more places.

[dgoulet@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

commit 0034f1095680e2b05c19ec13368ddc936a53058a
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date:   Tue Apr 30 14:45:58 2019 -0400

    Use safe_mem_is_zero in a few more places.
    
    I don't believe any of these represent a real timing vulnerability
    (remote timing against memcmp() on a modern CPU is not easy), but
    these are the ones where I believe we should be more careful.
---
 src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c     | 2 +-
 src/feature/rend/rendcache.c       | 6 ++++--
 src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.c | 2 +-
 src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.c    | 3 ++-
 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
index 5db7ed726..a9190b2e1 100644
--- a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
+++ b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
         tor_free(fname);
       }
     }
-    if (tor_mem_is_zero((char*)id->seckey.seckey, sizeof(id->seckey)))
+    if (safe_mem_is_zero((char*)id->seckey.seckey, sizeof(id->seckey)))
       sign_signing_key_with_id = NULL;
     else
       sign_signing_key_with_id = id;
diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendcache.c b/src/feature/rend/rendcache.c
index abeb15068..c3f86d8c8 100644
--- a/src/feature/rend/rendcache.c
+++ b/src/feature/rend/rendcache.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 #include "feature/rend/rend_intro_point_st.h"
 #include "feature/rend/rend_service_descriptor_st.h"
 
+#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
+
 /** Map from service id (as generated by rend_get_service_id) to
  * rend_cache_entry_t. */
 STATIC strmap_t *rend_cache = NULL;
@@ -889,8 +891,8 @@ rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc,
   if (intro_content && intro_size > 0) {
     int n_intro_points;
     if (rend_data->auth_type != REND_NO_AUTH &&
-        !tor_mem_is_zero(rend_data->descriptor_cookie,
-                         sizeof(rend_data->descriptor_cookie))) {
+        !safe_mem_is_zero(rend_data->descriptor_cookie,
+                          sizeof(rend_data->descriptor_cookie))) {
       char *ipos_decrypted = NULL;
       size_t ipos_decrypted_size;
       if (rend_decrypt_introduction_points(&ipos_decrypted,
diff --git a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.c b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.c
index 400f96389..058152912 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.c
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ ed25519_keypair_generate(ed25519_keypair_t *keypair_out, int extra_strong)
 int
 ed25519_public_key_is_zero(const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey)
 {
-  return tor_mem_is_zero((char*)pubkey->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
+  return safe_mem_is_zero((char*)pubkey->pubkey, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
 }
 
 /* Return a heap-allocated array that contains <b>msg</b> prefixed by the
diff --git a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.c b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.c
index 0b1cb96c1..79c8ed1ee 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 
 #include "lib/defs/digest_sizes.h"
 #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_digest.h"
+#include "lib/ctime/di_ops.h"
 
 #ifdef ENABLE_NSS
 #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_nss_mgt.h"
@@ -314,7 +315,7 @@ crypto_strongest_rand_raw(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len)
       }
     }
 
-    if ((out_len < sanity_min_size) || !tor_mem_is_zero((char*)out, out_len))
+    if ((out_len < sanity_min_size) || !safe_mem_is_zero((char*)out, out_len))
       return 0;
   }
 



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