[or-cvs] compress sec1-3, we"re at 15pg with standard latex8.sty now

[arma@seul.org (Roger Dingledine)]

Update of /home/or/cvsroot/doc
In directory moria.mit.edu:/home2/arma/work/onion/cvs/doc

Modified Files:
	tor-design.tex 
Log Message:
compress sec1-3, we're at 15pg with standard latex8.sty now


Index: tor-design.tex
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/or/cvsroot/doc/tor-design.tex,v
retrieving revision 1.108
retrieving revision 1.109
diff -u -d -r1.108 -r1.109
--- tor-design.tex	5 Nov 2003 01:29:36 -0000	1.108
+++ tor-design.tex	5 Nov 2003 01:46:32 -0000	1.109
@@ -160,11 +160,11 @@
 
 \textbf{Directory servers:} The earlier Onion Routing design
 planned to flood link-state information through the network---an approach
-that can be unreliable and open to partitioning attacks or
-deception. Tor takes a simplified view toward distributing link-state
+that can be unreliable and open to partitioning attacks.
+Tor takes a simplified view toward distributing such
 information. Certain more trusted nodes act as \emph{directory
 servers}: they provide signed directories that describe known
-routers and their availability.  Users periodically download these
+routers and their availability. Users periodically download the
 directories via HTTP.
 
 \textbf{Variable exit policies:} Tor provides a consistent mechanism
@@ -388,8 +388,8 @@
 main goal, however, several considerations have directed
 Tor's evolution.
 
-\textbf{Deployability:} The design must be implemented,
-deployed, and used in the real world.  Thus it
+\textbf{Deployability:} The design must be deployed and used in the
+real world.  Thus it
 must not be expensive to run (for example, by requiring more bandwidth
 than volunteers are willing to provide); must not place a heavy
 liability burden on operators (for example, by allowing attackers to
@@ -491,9 +491,9 @@
 Our adversary might try to link an initiator Alice with her
 communication partners, or try to build a profile of Alice's
 behavior. He might mount passive attacks by observing the network edges
-and correlating traffic entering and leaving the network---either
-by relationships in packet timing; relationships in volume;
-or relationships in externally visible user-selected
+and correlating traffic entering and leaving the network---by
+relationships in packet timing, volume, or externally visible
+user-selected
 options. The adversary can also mount active attacks by compromising
 routers or keys; by replaying traffic; by selectively denying service
 to trustworthy routers to move users to