[or-cvs] r8938: A couple of small tweaks; add infranet reference. (in tor/trunk: . doc/design-paper)

[nickm@xxxxxxxx]

Author: nickm
Date: 2006-11-12 16:56:34 -0500 (Sun, 12 Nov 2006)
New Revision: 8938

Modified:
   tor/trunk/
   tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/blocking.tex
   tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/tor-design.bib
Log:
 r9292@totoro:  nickm | 2006-11-12 16:33:36 -0500
 A couple of small tweaks; add infranet reference.



Property changes on: tor/trunk
___________________________________________________________________
 svk:merge ticket from /tor/trunk [r9292] on 96637b51-b116-0410-a10e-9941ebb49b64

Modified: tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/blocking.tex
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/blocking.tex	2006-11-12 21:56:30 UTC (rev 8937)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/blocking.tex	2006-11-12 21:56:34 UTC (rev 8938)
@@ -82,14 +82,17 @@
 based on the signature of the Tor TLS handshake. Here we describe an
 extended design that builds upon the current Tor network to provide an
 anonymizing
-network that also resists this blocking. Specifically,
-Section~\ref{sec:adversary} discusses our threat model---that is,
+network that resists censorship as well as anonymity-breaking attacks.
+In section~\ref{sec:adversary} we discuss our threat model---that is,
 the assumptions we make about our adversary. Section~\ref{sec:current-tor}
 describes the components of the current Tor design and how they can be
 leveraged for a new blocking-resistant design. Section~\ref{sec:related}
-explains the features and drawbacks of the currently deployed solutions;
-and ...
+explains the features and drawbacks of the currently deployed solutions.
+In sections~\ref{sec:bridges} through~\ref{sec:discovery}, we explore the
+components of our designs in detail.  Section~\ref{sec:security} considers
+security implications; ..... %write the rest.
 
+
 % The other motivation is for places where we're concerned they will
 % try to enumerate a list of Tor users. So even if they're not blocking
 % the Tor network, it may be smart to not be visible as connecting to it.
@@ -152,7 +155,8 @@
   blocked information is also not a goal, given the broadness of most
   censorship regimes. This seems borne out by fact.\footnote{So far in places
   like China, the authorities mainly go after people who publish materials
-  and coordinate organized movements~\cite{mackinnon}.  If they find that a
+  and coordinate organized movements~\cite{mackinnon-personal}.
+  If they find that a
   user happens to be reading a site that should be blocked, the typical
   response is simply to block the site. Of course, even with an encrypted
   connection, the adversary may be able to distinguish readers from
@@ -230,7 +234,7 @@
 confirm that he has a genuine version and that he can connect to the
 real Tor network.
 
-\section{Components of the current Tor design}
+\section{Adapting the current Tor design to anticensorship}
 \label{sec:current-tor}
 
 Tor is popular and sees a lot of use. It's the largest anonymity

Modified: tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/tor-design.bib
===================================================================
--- tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/tor-design.bib	2006-11-12 21:56:30 UTC (rev 8937)
+++ tor/trunk/doc/design-paper/tor-design.bib	2006-11-12 21:56:34 UTC (rev 8938)
@@ -1365,6 +1365,15 @@
   note = {\url{http://prisms.cs.umass.edu/brian/pubs/bissias.liberatore.pet.2005.pdf}},
 }
 
+@InProceedings{infranet,
+   author =      {Nick Feamster and Magdalena Balazinska and Greg Harfst and Hari Balakrishnan and David Karger},
+   title =       {Infranet: Circumventing Web Censorship and Surveillance},
+   booktitle =   {Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium},
+   year =        {2002},
+   month =       {August},
+   note = {\url{http://nms.lcs.mit.edu/~feamster/papers/usenixsec2002.pdf}},
+}
+
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