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[tor-commits] [tor-browser-spec/master] Update patch links.
commit a76069c8288bcf9d680a8a39264796e057701b92
Author: Mike Perry <mikeperry-git@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Thu Nov 6 15:42:17 2014 -0800
Update patch links.
---
design-doc/design.xml | 16 ++++++++--------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/design-doc/design.xml b/design-doc/design.xml
index e57def0..7c19700 100644
--- a/design-doc/design.xml
+++ b/design-doc/design.xml
@@ -1200,7 +1200,7 @@ security of the isolation</ulink> and to <ulink
url="https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3754";>solve conflicts
with OCSP relying the cacheKey property for reuse of POST requests</ulink>, we
had to <ulink
-url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-patches/firefox/0004-Add-a-string-based-cacheKey.patch";>patch
+url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commitdiff/18dfd3064aff23a402fec248aab797036a9ba615";>patch
Firefox to provide a cacheDomain cache attribute</ulink>. We use the fully
qualified url bar domain as input to this field, to avoid the complexities
of heuristically determining the second-level DNS name.
@@ -1232,7 +1232,7 @@ FQDN that was used to source the third party element.
Additionally, because the image cache is a separate entity from the content
cache, we had to patch Firefox to also <ulink
-url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-patches/firefox/0024-Isolate-the-Image-Cache-per-url-bar-domain.patch";>isolate
+url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commitdiff/114cd22282f8b3cd6e6a5c29de8a8c396a79acc0";>isolate
this cache per url bar domain</ulink>.
</para>
@@ -1254,7 +1254,7 @@ linkability between domains</ulink>.
DOM storage for third party domains MUST be isolated to the url bar origin,
to prevent linkability between sites. This functionality is provided through a
<ulink
-url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-patches/firefox/0026-Isolate-DOM-storage-to-first-party-URI.patch";>patch
+url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commitdiff/973468a07fb9e7d9995d01b250223a8df16d6cfd";>patch
to Firefox</ulink>.
</para>
@@ -1292,7 +1292,7 @@ We currently clear SSL Session IDs upon <link linkend="new-identity">New
Identity</link>, we disable TLS Session Tickets via the Firefox Pref
<command>security.enable_tls_session_tickets</command>. We disable SSL Session
IDs via a <ulink
-url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-patches/firefox/0008-Disable-SSL-Session-ID-tracking.patch";>patch
+url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commitdiff/5524ae43780e4738310852cc2a0b7c5d25aa69ed";>patch
to Firefox</ulink>. To compensate for the increased round trip latency from disabling
these performance optimizations, we also enable
<ulink url="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bmoeller-tls-falsestart-00";>TLS
@@ -1498,7 +1498,7 @@ compromise due to the popularity of Flash, we allow users to re-enable Flash,
and flash objects are blocked behind a click-to-play barrier that is available
only after the user has specifically enabled plugins. Flash is the only plugin
available, the rest are <ulink
-url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-patches/firefox/0005-Block-all-plugins-except-flash.patch";>entirely
+url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commitdiff/1ef32dcf0cc64876f5b92a583b788dc921f22c5d";>entirely
blocked from loading by a Firefox patch</ulink>. We also set the Firefox
preference <command>plugin.expose_full_path</command> to false, to avoid
leaking plugin installation information.
@@ -1652,7 +1652,7 @@ In the meantime while we investigate shipping our own fonts, we disable
plugins, which prevents font name enumeration. Additionally, we limit both the
number of font queries from CSS, as well as the total number of fonts that can
be used in a document <ulink
-url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-patches/firefox/0011-Limit-the-number-of-fonts-per-document.patch";>with
+url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commitdiff/d515c79ffd115b132caade7f881e5b467448964d";>with
a Firefox patch</ulink>. We create two prefs,
<command>browser.display.max_font_attempts</command> and
<command>browser.display.max_font_count</command> for this purpose. Once these
@@ -1768,7 +1768,7 @@ Firefox provides several options for controlling the browser user agent string
which we leverage. We also set similar prefs for controlling the
Accept-Language and Accept-Charset headers, which we spoof to English by default. Additionally, we
<ulink
-url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-patches/firefox/0001-Block-Components.interfaces-from-content.patch";>remove
+url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commitdiff/95cd0e8071aa1fe3f4914331d4036f218007e31d";>remove
content script access</ulink> to Components.interfaces, which <ulink
url="http://pseudo-flaw.net/tor/torbutton/fingerprint-firefox.html";>can be
used</ulink> to fingerprint OS, platform, and Firefox minor version. </para>
@@ -2112,7 +2112,7 @@ network, making them also effectively no-overhead.
<blockquote>
<para>
Currently, we patch Firefox to <ulink
-url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/torbrowser.git/blob/maint-2.4:/src/current-patches/firefox/0017-Randomize-HTTP-request-order-and-pipeline-depth.patch";>randomize
+url="https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor-browser.git/commitdiff/27ef32d509ed1c9eeb28f7affee0f9ba11773f72";>randomize
pipeline order and depth</ulink>. Unfortunately, pipelining is very fragile.
Many sites do not support it, and even sites that advertise support for
pipelining may simply return error codes for successive requests, effectively
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