[or-cvs] r8680: Backport, Security bugfixes: When the user sends a NEWNYM si (in tor/branches/tor-0_1_1-patches: . src/or)

[arma@xxxxxxxx]

Author: arma
Date: 2006-10-09 17:13:29 -0400 (Mon, 09 Oct 2006)
New Revision: 8680

Modified:
   tor/branches/tor-0_1_1-patches/ChangeLog
   tor/branches/tor-0_1_1-patches/src/or/main.c
Log:
Backport, Security bugfixes:
  When the user sends a NEWNYM signal, clear the client-side DNS
  cache too. Otherwise we continue to act on previous information.


Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_1_1-patches/ChangeLog
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_1_1-patches/ChangeLog	2006-10-09 21:11:50 UTC (rev 8679)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_1_1-patches/ChangeLog	2006-10-09 21:13:29 UTC (rev 8680)
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@
       tests when there's already one in progress -- unreachable
       servers were stacking up dozens of testing streams.
 
+  o Security bugfixes:
+    - When the user sends a NEWNYM signal, clear the client-side DNS
+      cache too. Otherwise we continue to act on previous information.
+
   o Minor bugfixes:
     - Avoid a memory corruption bug when creating a hash table for
       the first time.

Modified: tor/branches/tor-0_1_1-patches/src/or/main.c
===================================================================
--- tor/branches/tor-0_1_1-patches/src/or/main.c	2006-10-09 21:11:50 UTC (rev 8679)
+++ tor/branches/tor-0_1_1-patches/src/or/main.c	2006-10-09 21:13:29 UTC (rev 8680)
@@ -1307,6 +1307,7 @@
 #endif
     case SIGNEWNYM:
       circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs();
+      addressmap_clear_transient();
       break;
   }
 }